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Abstract of the thesis by Saston Arthur Kanthonga for the degree of Doctor of 
Philosophy titled “Can culture influence economic growth?: an examination of the 
impact of cultural factors on economic growth in  developing economies” 
The thesis has investigated if cultural factors influence economic growth 
differences among countries. It was motivated by the intriguing question as to whether 
the gap between developed and developing countries is widening. Technically 
speaking, some countries which were regarded as underdeveloped three or four 
decades ago are now regarded as developed as articulated in the introduction to 
chapter 1. On the other hand, Sub-Saharan African region has failed to register 
convincing economic development (Seguino and Were, 2014, p. 1) 
 The mixed methods design used in this thesis engaged distinct frameworks of 
both quantitative and qualitative paradigms to answer the research questions within this 
thesis. Implementing mixed research design in this thesis enables the investigation of 
how each variable in the study, environments, and institutions interact with each other 
in different contexts to produce measured effects. For instance, the study examined two 
sub-samples of developed and developing countries, 6 countries in each sub-sample. 
Further, the study also examined 18 representative Sub-Saharan countries to answer 
the research question. Lastly, a multi-case study of Malawi and Botswana was 
undertaken. The first two contexts of study used secondary data analysis. The multi-
case study was used to drill down deeper than secondary data analysis allowed.  
This thesis focussed on the interaction between culture and economic growth. 
The literature review indicated that the impact of culture on growth is not particularly 
well articulated at present, and therefore this thesis seeks to make a contribution to this 
aspect of theory and practice. In addition, to the extent that culture has a significant 
impact on growth potential and its realisation, culture is not homogenous in Sub-
Saharan Africa. This will have potentially significant impact upon different countries, 
and should be taken into consideration by governments and development agencies 
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CHAPTER 1: THESIS INTRODUCTION 
1.1  THE MOTIVATION AND JUSTIFICATION OF THE THESIS 
Countries grow at different rates and, we have an incomplete understanding of 
how all of the relevant factors contribute to differential growth paths. The automatic 
catch-up process suggested by neo-classical theory does not seem to be a smooth 
process whereby on occasions, it may go into reverses such as Greece, and Portugal. 
Whereas for other nations, catch-up can advance very rapidly or, like Sub-Saharan 
Countries (SSC), it may be delayed or even struggle to occur at all. Whilst much is 
known about the various factors which influence this growth potential, there are 
indications that a wide range of factors may be at play and therefore developing nations, 
seeking to raise the future prospects for their citizens, may wish to consider the 
implications of this wide range of factors when designing their social and economic 
strategies. Weaknesses with existing growth models may stem from their theoretical 
frailties or incomplete specification and missing variable bias. This thesis, therefore, 
seeks to contribute to the existing literature by including additional factors to standard 
endogenous growth theory, and secondly, by using comparative analysis to identify 
critical differences between developed and developing economies, but additionally 
between fast and slow growth variants. The intention is to identify which variables tend 
to achieve superior outcomes given different environments and different levels of initial 
factor endowments. In particular, this thesis examines the impact that cultural variables 
may have on economic growth.  
Countries with high standards of living are classified as developed countries 
while those with lower standards of living are classified as developing countries (United 
Nations, 2013; World Bank, 2016). According to UNDP (2011), the average per capita 
Gross National Product (GNP) for developing countries in 1980 was $260 and in 2011 
was $1,671 while the average per capita GNP for developed countries in 1980 was 
$10,320 and in 2011 was $24,314. These numbers suggest that the absolute gap is 
widening, but the relative gap was closing from 2.5% in 1980 of the developed country 
average income per capita to 6.9% in 2011 (Seligson and Passe´-Smith, 2008; Watkins 
et al., 2006). That seems to suggest that the widening gap between developed and 
developing countries depends on how cross-country income comparisons are made. 
For instance, Dowrick and Akmal (2005) claimed that using comparison by exchange 
rates across countries the income gap differences appear to increase. However, they 
also observed that using purchasing power comparisons showed that the income gap 
fell across countries. The falling of income gaps between developed and developing 
countries are also reported in the literature. For example, Barro (1997) researched 100 
countries between 1960 and 1989 period, and he concluded that the income gap 
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between developed and developing countries is converging. Similarly, Bond et al. 
(2001) claimed that a convergence of income gaps between developed and developing 
countries is about 2.5% each year.  
In contrast, Berry et al. (2014:4) investigated how income per capita in power 
purchasing parity (PPP) in dollars changed from 1977 to 2010 in 52 rich countries and 
137 developing countries. They observed that the income growth difference grew 
steadily until 2008 and this gap remained large in both absolute and relative terms. 
Similarly, Baddeley (2006, pp. 395-396) argued that even though globalization 
increased capital flows, trade flows, and debt mainly in developing countries, there have 
been small changes in income inequalities between nations. For example, after 
Baddeley investigated in 107 developed and developing countries, he concluded that 
there had been limited convergence and limited equalization in the distribution of 
worldwide income between developed and developing countries. The conclusions of 
distinct studies of Berry et al. (2014) and Baddeley (2006) are also confirmed by 
Klugman (2010, p. 42), the human development report of 2010 that there has been a 
substantial divergence in income among countries. This report covering the period from 
1970 to 2010, indicated that developed countries increased income by 2.3% while 
developing countries by 1.5%.   All the points raised above seem to suggest that 
different nations within regions appear to have very different growth trajectories. For 
example, extreme poverty measured by living on $1.90 in South and East Asia has 
fallen below 20% while in Sub-Saharan countries remain at 42% (World Bank, 2016b). 
Consequently, developing countries particularly the Sub-Saharan region remain the 
least developed region in the world (Malamud and Assane, 2013). The challenging 
question is why is it that some countries are prospering while others are failing to 
prosper?  
1.2  WHY SOME COUNTRIES FAIL TO CATCH UP WHILE OTHERS HAVE 
CAUGHT UP? 
Generally, a number of factors have been offered to explain income disparities 
among countries such as the importance of saving, investment, capital accumulation 
and the repositioning of surplus labour from agriculture sector to industrial and service 
sectors as articulated by classical and neoclassical economists (Barro, 1991; Malthus 
and Appleman, 1976; Marx, 2004; Mill and Backhouse, 1997; Ricardo, 1817; Smith, 
1776; Tsoulfidis, 2011). The assumption of neo-classical theory as advocated by Solow 
1956 and Swan 1956 that countries with lower capitals grow faster than countries with 
larger capitals seems to work in developed countries than in developing countries. 
Hence, the catch-up the assumption of neo-classical theory seems not to work for all 
countries in the same way and at the same time (Nelson and Pack, 1999, p. 424; Kim 
and Nelson, 2000). One option might be that neo-classical theory is flawed and that 
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catching up is not so automatic. That is what Keynesian theory would suggest, because 
cumulative causation according to Myrdal (1957) may reinforce existing competitive 
advantages. Alternatively, else it might be due to the neo-classical models being 
insufficient possible due to missing variable bias. Therefore, there is more room for 
countries to develop their growth strategies and hence understanding the determinants 
of growth is an essential step in their development programme. 
Countries which were regarded as underdeveloped three or four decades ago 
are now regarded as developed, such as the East Asian countries South Korea, Taiwan, 
Hong Kong, and Singapore (Guta, 2011, p. 22). On the other hand, there are other 
regions in the world such as the Sub-Saharan region which has failed to register 
convincing economic development (Oyelaran-Oyeyinka, 2006b). It is despite the 
introduction of new international economic orders by international organizations such 
as International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank (WB) (Brandt, 1980; South 
Commission, 1990; Dube, 1988; Morawetz, 1977; Thirlwall, 2011). Also, European 
Union (EU) countries such as Portugal and Greece, whose catching-up to the EU 
average has stalled and gone into reverse also highlights that countries seem to have 
different determinants of economic growth. Could cultural differences among countries 
explain economic disparities? Its is the thesis purpose to find out if differences in cultural 
context among countries explain productivity differences leading to income disparities. 
These factors seem to be excluded, and as a result, the residuals seem very high. That 
being the case, this thesis is going to investigate whether cultural factors influence 
economic growth disparities among countries.  
1.3  AIMS AND OBJECTIVES OF THE THESIS INVESTIGATION 
 This thesis aims to investigate the impact of a broader range of potential 
determinants of economic growth and to identify potential causes of income disparities 
between developed and developing nations. Section 2.2 in chapter 2 explains what 
economic theories have offered to explain income disparities among countries. Also, 
the same section gives the reasons why economic theories fall short of the solutions to 
income disparities among countries. One potential reason may be that they suffer from 
missing variable bias and therefore the models used in this thesis extend the basic 
endogenous models to include political, institutional as well as cultural factors. It is in 
broadening the range of potential determinants, and by comparing the results between 
developed, developing, Sub-Saharan African, high growth and lower growth sub-sets 
that the thesis hopes to contribute to knowledge. Therefore, this research implemented 
explanatory sequential mixed methods (ESMM) so that cultural factors can also be 
included in the models for this research to investigate income disparities among 
countries thoroughly. This design has a dynamic element that considers and 
interrelates multiple components of the approaches to the investigation rather than 
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emphasizing one particular way in the investigation as suggested by (Creswell and 
Plano Clark, 2010; Maxwell and Loomis, 2003). This type of scheme is ideal to link the 
findings of testing the theory and the context representing the phenomena being 
investigated. Hence, a combination of quantitative and qualitative approaches within 
sequential explanatory scheme complement each other and permit a more robust 
analysis, taking advantage of their strengths of quantitative and qualitative approaches 
as recommended by (Greene et al., 1989; Greene and Caracelli, 1997; Miles and 
Huberman, 1994).  See more explanation in chapter 3 section 3.2.  
 Therefore, this thesis sought to identify cultural factors that enhance or hinder 
economic growth in countries. Grouping countries implement this objective in chapter 4 
in developed and developing countries. These developed and developing countries 
were further grouped into slow growth and fast-growing countries respectively. The 
grouping of countries helped to control the bias of the performance of variables due to 
development level and economic growth status of the countries. Hence, the 
identification of cultural variables whether they promoted or hindered economic growth 
in chapter 4 was further explored by using different sources of cultural variables in 
chapter 5.  The differences in the performance of cultural variables in developed and 
developing countries in chapter 4 could agree with Guss et al. (2010) who noted that 
cross-national differences were noted in all complex problem-solving strategies and 
task-specific differences. That is to suggest that individual skills in solving problems are 
cultural specific determined by ecological and socio-political context.  Similarly, Hedden 
et al. (2008) observed that cultural differences in dimensions of culture influence brain 
functions and dispositions differently. It seems to suggest that all human undertakings 
are culturally specific. Hence, the other objective of this thesis is to detect what cultural 
values promote social, economic and human productivity in the countries. This objective 
tries to answer some questions raised above like “what causes productivity differences 
among countries. That embraces cultural variables that hinder economic, social and 
human development in the mainly Sub-Saharan region. The final objective is to identify 
the type of education that could help to inculcate in citizens values that are important 
for enhancing economic, social and human capability in mainly the Sub-Saharan region. 
In order to accomplish the purpose of the investigation, the thesis is structured as 
demonstrated in Figure 1.2 below. 
1.4  CONFLICTING VIEWS  
 It is observed that classical and neoclassical theories have provided to 
policymakers wisdom to reduce economic disparities across countries, but there are no 
convincing results to explain the inequalities phenomenon among countries. For 
example, Easterly (2007) claimed that economists appear to know the answers to 
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economic development. He, however, noted that the answers have been changing from 
time to time. From 1950’s to about 1970’s economists generally emphasized more on 
capital accumulation (investment). Hence, policies encouraged developing countries 
borrowing money from international institutions to build infrastructures in the developing 
countries. However, the results were unconvincing, then came the introduction of 
Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) through ‘Washington Consensus’ (WC) 
emphasizing free markets, open to trade, and reducing deficits. This too did not deter 
underdevelopment in developing countries (Mkandawire and Soludo, 2003). Another 
reform emphasized the absence of appropriate institutions as an explanation of 
underdevelopment. The developing countries were supported in the introduction of 
democracy, neo-liberal rights, property rights, contract enforcement and reduction of 
corruption. All these brilliant ideas or policies according to Keynes even though they are 
powerful and have tremendous influences are defunct, yielding to mixed results 
(Keynes, 1936, p. 383). Further, Easterly (2006) gave an example of SSC received 
more foreign aid but have failed to catch up with developed countries. Ironically, the 
tiger nations (TN) namely: Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, and Thailand, 
received less aid but some of these nations have expertly matched or exceeded 
average GDP per capita for developed nations, whereas others may not have done so 
but have closed the gap appreciably. 
Despite previous researchers paying less attention to cultural factors as 
explainers of income disparities, a growing number of researchers have pointed out the 
relevance of cultural factors in explaining economic growth differences across 
countries. For example, Protestant work ethic1 (PWE) or McClelland when extending 
the potential influence of cultural variables beyond those of religious belief and into 
more general ethical values, cultural norms, and beliefs.  
Despite the support he receives from social sciences through annual citations, 
Schatz (1965) together with Gilleard (1989) criticised McClelland’s association of need 
of achievement2 and economic growth without using conventional economic 
techniques, and they claimed that need achievement did not cause the rate of economic 
growth. In contrast, Freeman (1976) in her conclusion supported McClelland’s claim 
that the need for achievement is essential in explaining economic differences across 
countries. Despite the criticisms leveled against the Protestant work ethic and need for 
achievement as determinants of differences in economic growth across countries, the 
                                            
 
1 People pursue wealth and material gain for its own sake rather than out of necessity (Leong, 
Huang & Mak, 2014:305) . 
2 Being creative or conforming to prevailing standards (Freeman, 1976:816) 
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claim that cultural factors are vital in explaining income per capital across countries 
persists.  
1.5  PRODUCTIVITY DIFFERENCES AMONG COUNTRIES 
Throsby (1999) lamented that economists’ differentiation of the three forms of 
capital namely: physical capital, human capital and natural capital give unconvincing 
answers to productivity differences of countries. For instance, economic variables such 
as physical capital, human capital, and investment are alleged to be important for 
explaining economic growth as observed by Levine and Renelt (1992), though their 
definitions of capitals are debatable.  For example, Jackman and Miller (1996) claimed 
that capital definitions disregard the effects of cultural values have on physical capital 
and human capital. Likewise, Costanza and Daly (1992) also raised concerns on the 
capital definitions. It is pointed out in the literature that residuals (TFP) contribute more 
to countries' productivity than economic factors (Hall and Jones, 1996, 1999; Hulten 
and Isaksson, 2007; Mankiw et al., 1992; Turner et al., 2007). Equally, social capability, 
geographical locations or cultural values influence and shape socio-economic 
conditions and economic life as advocated by (De Long and Summers, 1993; 
Abramovitz, 1956; Desdoigts, 1999). Also, Maridal (2013) summarised his research on 
culture importance to economic development in two ways: he said that culture 
contributes to economic growth through cultural traits of motivation and secondly, 
through the traits that form social capital. It appears to suggest that culture is the 
backbone for productivity which is claimed to contribute more to economic development 
than traditional economic factors. Probably, the views of both Marx, 1859; Weber, 1904 




















Figure 1.1: Marx and Weber views interaction determine productivity 
                                                                                           
                           Interaction of the two views 







                 Marx’s view        Weber’s view 
                                                                        Other forces  
Notes. Marx’s Material forces of production form social political and intellectual life. While Weber’s 
view considered that culture has effects on human beings’ capability of determining their future.  
Thus, economic disparities across countries might be due to differences in 
productivity formed from ideas, knowledge, work attitudes, beliefs, and skills provided 
by culture and production forces. In other words, the social reality of human interaction 
depends on the information provided by culture, and not only on the individual rationality 
as proclaimed in the mainstream economic theories. The Cultural setting of economies 
explains differences in productivity of countries, which implies that inefficient cultural 
factors reduce the productivity of the countries (Altman, 1993, 2001; Gifford Jr, 2005; 
Gifford, 2009; Nisbett, Peng, et al., 2001).  
1.6  CULTURAL CONTEXT VERSES PRODUCTIVITY  
 The models in chapter 3 section 3.4.1 assume that economic factors’ 
interactions occur in the context of cultural factors represented by A in equation (1) in 
the same section interpreted as Total Factor Productivity (TFP). It appears to be 
contrary to the mainline economists who emphasize in scarcity and allocation of 
insufficient resources. For example, the rational model in classical and neoclassical 
economic theories disregards any influence from the culture in an individual’s economic 
decisions and behavior. The rational model assumes that individual consumers have 
unlimited wants while the companies (enterprises) utilize technology to meet the needs 
through the law of demand and supply. However, the assumption of the rational model 























reality of economic disparities among countries. For instance, Becker (1977) claimed 
that the economic approach could explain most elements of human behavior in different 
situations and contexts. That is a rational model. However, the same author in his book 
Accounting for Tastes Becker (1996, p. 3) acknowledged that culture and symbols have 
a great influence on human behavior. Becker further claimed that preferences in the 
individual utility function should include social capital and personal relationships. This 
agrees with Weber (1922) who claimed that humans make rational decisions by (1) 
instrumental rationality, (2) value and belief-based rationality, (3) habit, and traditions, 
and (4) emotions. He further endorsed that the combinations of these lead to concrete 
action. This being the case, culture cannot be taken out of economic development 
concept or else development will be a means of advancing pre-ordained structures or 
methods to developing countries. This signifies that the economic development of a 
country springs from the capability of its people imbued with cultural values which 
enhance economic development. At the same time culture can treasure what Banfield, 
(1958) hypothesized as ‘backwardness’ which is defined as  
“a function of high levels of amoral familism according to which the norm is to 
maximize the material, short-run advantage of the nuclear family; assume that 
all others will do likewise” (Banfield, 1958, p. 85).   
 
 In this regard, culture as context provides the foundation of people’s 
development of values endogenously passed on from generation to generation. That is 
to say that culture provides the meaning of life to people within that culture. Moreover, 
a resource people get capacity from to encounter the challenges within their contexts. 
However, this resource can be restocked through experience and investment in quality 
education appropriate for the context. Nonetheless, Putnam (1993) claims that culture 
fundamentally takes a longer time to change. However, according to  Kaplow and 
Shavell (2007) moral rules and values are malleable and are necessary for a rational 
choice. While in the same vein, Tabellini (2008) argues that cooperation among people 
is traded between material incentives and individual values mainly coming from the 
norms of the society. He further claimes that endogenous values engage in both a 
forward and backward process by highlighting that parents can pass values to children 
by choosing education for their children. However, at the same time, parents can adapt 
to choices of education for their children due to future environments. Hence, it is 
possible for values to gradually change due to historical features of the external 
environment (p. 4). In the same way, Aristotle, (350 BC) claimed that the legal system 
makes citizens behave well by inculcating habits and in so doing good institutions are 
formed. That seems to suggest that using human capital that is restricted to education 




1.7  STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS 
In order to meet the primary goal of the thesis, the chapters are interconnected 
as illustrated in Figure 1.2 below. Chapter 1 has explained the motivation of the thesis 
and its justification. Moreover, has reviewed evidence about why some countries seem 
to catch up while others fail. It has also defined the aims and purposes of the thesis. 
Chapter 1 also reviewed literature regarding productivity differences among countries 
in the light of cultural values.  Chapter 2 outlines the available evidence produced by 
previous studies about the analysis of growth determinants and it does so by including 
insights drawn from the varying perspectives of different economic models such 
classical and neo-classical theories, and endogenous theory. It reviews the evidence 
about standard (macro) variables, but also political, institutional and cultural variables, 
that different studies have indicated may have a significant impact upon the growth 
potential and development path realized by different nations. Moreover, finally explains 
the concept of culture and its relevance to economic growth in countries.  
Chapter 3 presents how the thesis investigation was carried out and how the 
data of the variables were collected and sourced. The model advanced in this study 
incorporates traditional, institutional and cultural categories of variables and hypotheses 
for chapters 4 and 5 are formulated in sub-section 3.2.2 in respective categories. This 
model uses Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) technique that makes it possible to obtain 
unknown parameter (coefficient) for each independent variable due to ceteris paribus 
interpretation. The OLS technique only applied to chapters 4 and 5. The findings in 
these chapters were followed up by a multi-case study of Botswana and Malawi as 
illustrated in Figure 1.2 below. ESMM was employed to investigate the phenomenon 
adequately by using both quantitative and qualitative approaches. This is in line with 
Gable (1994) who claimed that combined methodology has recently attracted more 
attention to explaining the social phenomena causing different economic development 
performances among countries. All in all, the chapter explains the procedures followed 
in the construction of knowledge relevant to the questions designed for the 
investigation. 
Chapters 4 and 5 are both hypothetical deductive techniques chapters that 
follow the assumptions of a quantitative approach to research. Hence, both chapters’ 
analysis techniques follow the same procedures. However, they have remarkable 
differences. For example, chapter 4 focussed on 6 developed and 6 developing 
countries as the context of the study and used World Values Surveys (WVS) as sources 
of cultural variables. On the other hand, chapter 5 followed up the findings in chapter 4. 
The investigation in chapter 5 focused on 18 Sub-Saharan countries and used data for 
cultural variables from Afrobarometer Surveys (AS). In both chapters, countries were 
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further grouped into slow growth and fast-growing countries. This was done to control 
the bias of the performance of variables due to economic development level or growth 
of the countries. The OLS technique was used to see which variables in all the three 
categories significantly enhanced or hindered gross domestic product (GDP) per capita 
in the countries.  
Chapter 6 is a multi-case study of Botswana and Malawi. This chapter is 
designed to either confirm or disapprove the findings in chapters 4 and 5. Both Malawi 
and Botswana are in the Sub-Saharan region. However, these countries have different 
economic growths. For instance, Botswana is in the fast-growing group while Malawi in 
the slow growth group. This chapter is very different from chapters 4 and 5 regarding 
the approach to the techniques for analysis of data that falls within the umbrella of the 
qualitative approach. That being the case, the results and analysis of this multi-case 
study are compared to the findings in chapters 4 and 5. This means the sources of data 
of the variables or findings in the previous chapters will be different from those used for 
model estimations in chapters 4 and 5. Chapter 7 concludes the study and briefly 
discusses the empirical findings in chapters 4, 5, and 6. It does also reflect on the 
implications of the findings of traditional economic theories. Different from the 
expectations of the traditional economic theories such as neo-classical theory highlights 
the contribution of this study to knowledge. This chapter also highlights the limitations 









































                  Notes.  The thesis consists of 7 chapters  
 
Chapter 1:  Thesis introduction 
Chapter 3:                                                                    
Research Methodology 
Chapter 4:                              
Empirical investigation 
whether Cultural variables 
explain income disparities 
between developed and 
developing countries 
 
Chapter 5: Empirical 
investigation why Sub-
Saharan countries fail to 
catch up with developed 
countries as follow-up to 
chapter 4 findings 
Chapter 6: Empirical investigation whether the 
findings in hypothetical deductive techniques used in 
chapters 4 and 5 are confirmed or challenged by a 
multi-case study of Botswana and Malawi. 
Chapter 7:                          
Conclusions and implications 




CHAPTER 2: ECONOMIC GROWTH VARIANCES 
AMONG COUNTRIES 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
Economic disparities among countries as explained in chapter 1 might be 
attributed to differences in TFP3 formed from cultural values and production forces. In 
other words, the social reality of human interaction depends on the information provided 
by culture, and not only on the individual rationality as proclaimed in the mainstream 
economic theories. A series of studies have, in fact, pointed to an observed link between 
cultural factors and TFP, in that inefficient4 cultural factors lead to lower TFP (Altman, 
1993, 2001; Gifford Jr, 2005; Gifford, 2009; Nisbett et al., 2001; Nisbett, 2009).  
The significance of this thesis addresses the gaps observed in the literature. 
Moreover, an additional point of interest in this analysis is the intriguing question as to 
whether the difference between developed and developing countries is widening. 
Technically speaking, some countries which were regarded as underdeveloped three 
or four decades ago are now considered as advanced, such as the East Asian countries 
South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore (Guta, 2011). On the other hand, 
there are other regions in the world such as Sub-Saharan African countries which have 
failed to register convincing economic development Seguino and Were, (2014, p. 1) 
that GDP per capita growth rates in the region are on average constant at less than a 
third of 1% every year.  Unconvincing performance in this region seems to persist 
despite the introduction of new international economic orders by international 
organizations such as IMF and World Bank (Brandt, 1980; South Commission, 1990). 
This phenomenon reflects the explanations provided by both theoretical and empirical 
explanations as to why there is income per capita disparities among countries in the 
different regions of the world. In this regard, the reality of poverty and inequality of 
billions of people in developing countries provides a challenge to the methods, theories, 
and policies used in dealing with the escalation of the gap of economic development 
between developed and developing countries. One of the ways indicated in literature of 
coping with the situation is that after the devastating World War II, countries co-operated 
in instituting international bodies like WB, United Nations (UN), IMF and General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) primarily to reduce the gap between developed 
and underdeveloped countries (Dube, 1988; Morawetz, 1977; Thirlwall, 2011). It is 
more than a half a century ago since the end of Second World War, but the income 
                                            
 
3Total Factor Productivity 
4 Cultural values that hinder economic growth 
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disparities between developed and developing countries seem to be widening as 
explained in chapter 1. To meet the aims and objectives intended for the study, the 
organization of sections will be as follows: Section 2.1 introduces this chapter whereas 
section 2.2 deals with how economic theories explain economic development 
differences. Are these theories applied universally to achieve economic development 
by countries? This section explores more on causes of economic differences among 
countries theoretically. In section 2.3 Culture definitions are presented, and a suitable 
definition fitting to the purpose of the study is adopted. The chapter also provides the 
concepts of culture to be tested whether have any significance in explaining income 
disparities among countries or not. Section 2.4 will introduce the claim that human 
capability interacts with environment verified by historicity, geography, colonialism, and 
slave trade assertions. In this section definitions of the terms will be given to justify the 
claim that human capability determines the success of societies. Furthermore, section 
2.4 explains the differences between formal and informal institutions. This section also 
explores how these institutions impact on economic growth in the countries. The 
chapter also examines what causes capability differences in dealing with changing and 
challenging global environment. Could culture play a role in capability differences? 
Section 2.5 focuses on globalization and economic growth in the countries. Also, 
explores how people interact with an aggregate of surrounding things, conditions, and 
influences which determine countries’ economic success. Finally, section 2.6 presents 
eclectic rationale of things that determine Total Factor Productivity (TFP) differences 
among countries. This section also provides the connection of the reviewed literature 
and the thesis’s methods utilized to test the concepts explanation of economic growth 
differences among countries. In summary, all the sections highlighted above will provide 
the premises of the study to answer the thesis question.  
2.2 THEORETIC EXPLANATION OF ECONOMIC GROWTH  
Theoretical explanations of economic development in different countries 
illustrated by many theories such as aggregate demand by Keynesian growth theories 
(Dosi, Fagiolo and Roventini, 2010; Dutt, 2010; McCallum, 2009; Vaona, 2012). But, 
Keynesian also explained about the multiplying effect. However, he cautioned that 
saving and investment are not connected. For instance, in his general theory, he 
claimed that no relationship unites decisions to refrain from current consumption with 
decisions to make available future consumption (Greenwald and Stiglitz, 1988, p. 122; 
Harcourt, 2008, pp. 185-197). And of course, in more recent studies there has been the 
investigation into political aspects that are incorporating institutions in the growth 
models (Aghion, Alesina and Trebb, 2004). However, in this study, the focus is on the 





One of the key proponents of classical theory is Smith (1776) who claimed that 
differences in economic development among countries are owing to land, labor and 
capital production factors. Smith expounded that these production factors contribute to 
economic development of the nations as follows: firstly, he claimed that growth in labor 
and the accumulation of capital causes the increase in production, hence the rise of 
nation's wealth. Secondly, he claimed efficiency in production as a result of the division 
of labor and technology increased the economic growth of the country. And lastly, the 
increase in new markets due to international trade and other factors mentioned above 
determined the nation's increase in wealth. The competition among the individuals is 
what Smith called ‘invisible hand' that led to the success of the societies. He connected 
the pursuit of profits of individuals to the society's success in that the later came as a 
result of self-interests of the individuals. That suggests that the competition between 
individuals for individual gain could be compared to competition among firms or 
countries for wealth accumulation. Hence, the competition leads to better ways of 
production and discovery of new markets for the creation of wealth. Nevertheless, within 
classical economists, there are different views concerning the creation of the wealth of 
the countries. For example, Thirlwall (2011) observed that Malthus raised suspicions 
on improvement in efficiency due to the division of labor and technology as the cause 
of economic growth. Malthus claimed that due to population growth and diminishing 
returns in agriculture, countries could oscillate around the subsistence level, while 
Ricardo like Smith supported the principle of capital accumulation as the determinant 
of profits or growth. He, however, suggested that profits could be squashed as a result 
of rents to the landlords and subsistence wages (Ricardo, 1817). And he suggested 
that food prices rose as a result of diminishing returns from land and increasing marginal 
costs (Thirlwall, 1999). Despite the views expressed by Malthus and Ricardo, scientific 
discoveries and technology multiplied production outputs more than anticipated by 
Malthus and Ricardo (Nafziger, 1997). The rivalry competition between individuals, 
firms, and countries as claimed by Smith appears to persist regardless of the scientific 
discoveries and technology advancement in the world. For instance, Marx (1847) 
claimed that ‘inner contradictions' of capitalism that is ‘rival competition' among 
countries will lead to lower profits and degradation of workers. This claim is opposite to 
the reality that developed countries have continued to expand while the developing 
countries are bound to the outskirts of development. One of the reasons could be 
ascribed to what Marx (1906) proposed that 
"The battle of competition is fought by cheapening of commodities. The 
cheapness of commodities depends, ceteris paribus, on the productiveness of 
2.2.1 Classical theories 
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labor and this again on the scale of production. Therefore, the larger capitals 
beat, the smaller" (Marx, 1906, p. 626).     
Classical theories view of competition as dynamic other than static appears the 
most appealing claim, but self-interests of individuals as the source of societies' welfare 
is open to criticism. For it is through the concept of competition that the organization of 
self-interested individuals take place. Commendably, the mechanism of the competition 
process presses on towards equilibrium of profits and losses until adjustment takes 
place. On the other hand, a rational model assumes that an individual uses available 
information about different courses of action, then outcomes can be ranked according 
to their usefulness. The best usefulness outcome for the individual is also the best 
outcome for the society. However, the cause of welfare of the society is debatable such 
that some scholars advocate rational model while others observed that volition and 
actions of the people in different societies or countries determine the welfare of the 
society (Schumpeter, 1934). Nevertheless, the common ground would be as suggested 
by Gintis (1972) that economic activity has development effect on almost every aspect 
of social life although individual welfare depends on the community, work, and 
environmental structures and the individual psychic development. At some point, Mill 
and Backhouse (1997) acknowledged that an economic man partly purposed in 
maximizing wealth but at the same time there are constraints of aversion to laboring 
and subjection to leisure. The latter leads to underdevelopment which is opposite to 
creation of wealth as suggested by (Blaug, 1992; Bowley, 2013). While on the same 
issue, an individual's rationality fluctuates with time due to the stochastic environment, 
therefore, the rational model appears to limit the cognition abilities of people. And its 
assertion of utility-maximization appears to be non-falsifiable (Ellickson, 1989). Taking 
into consideration that past decisions affect future expectations, then, classical theories 
fail to provide a statistical model that would consistently give the best probabilities of 
future outcomes (Greenwald and Stiglitz, 1988). Besides, experience appears to be 
contradictory to the claim of self-interest of classical theories. For example, Elster 
(1989) argued that some helping behaviors expect no good return when they have done 
the helping, such as children helping the parents in old age. Furthermore, many altruists 
give to charities anonymously, suggesting that their motivation is not prestige. 
Consequently, Hirschman (1984) claimed that benevolence just like self-interest 
explains economic behavior. In this regard, classical economic theories appear not to 
offer a convincing explanation of the causes of disparities in economic development 
among countries. Classical economists engaged three types of capital namely: land, 
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labor, and human-made capital5. But, later on, ‘human-made capital' was adopted as 
mere ‘capital.' These different forms of capital (land, labor, and capital) determined the 
production activities in each way to satisfy the needs and also the creation of wealth. 
The production function expressed as: 
Y = ƒ (K, L, N)…………………………………………………………………………… (1) 
They claimed that capital, land, and labors were the critical production factors and 
differences in countries economic development where as a result of the use of these 
factors. The next section will engage neo-classical theories explanations to economic 
development differences among nations. 
 
In contrast to classical theories, neo-classical theories advocate static 
equilibrium in the conception of competition with no influences from history (Tsoulfidis, 
2011). In other words, neo-classical theories regard imperfections of markets such as 
excessive price cutting, uncertainty, domination, and oligopoly6 deviations from the 
perfect competition. In the ideal market, the producers and consumers do not affect the 
prices due to the numbers involved whether large or small. Therefore, product prices 
do not influence production productivity of firms, but firms increase or decrease their 
production output merely as a result of maximizing profit. It assumes that the 
concentration of competition is related to the producers' number or industry structure. 
But this appears to be contrary to the reality as expressed by Tsoulfidis (2011) that: 
"The neoclassical description of competition as a state rather than as a process 
of rivalry is far from the harsh reality of the results of competitive behavior as is 
well known from the economic history of the last quarter of the nineteenth 
century" (Tsoulfidis, 2011, p. 8). 
Tsoulfidis pointed out that the depression during the period of 1873-1896 led to the 
elimination of most of the companies that failed to compete due to excessive price cuts 
and concentration of capital. The inconsistency between perfect competition as 
proclaimed by neoclassical theories and current reality gives the impression only 
capable firms and developed countries could enjoy the monopolistic markets and not 
weaker firms or developing countries. Chamberlin (1933) argued that the real economic 
endeavoring is in nonconformity with perfect neoclassical competition, hence, the need 
for governments to correct these imperfections. Suggesting that the state of equilibrium 
is an ideal form that does not take into consideration the actuality aspect.  
                                            
 
5 Produced or manufactured capital through the ingenuity of man to enable efficient production 
of goods and services  
6 as minor 
2.2.2 Neo-classical theories 
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Another important aspect associated with neoclassical theories is the 
convergence element between developed and developing countries. Alternatively, the 
theory assumes that lower real per capita (GDP) predicts a faster growth rate than 
higher real per capita. In other words, assuming that all the conditions remain the same 
among countries except for the concentration of their capitals, then developing 
countries will grow faster in real per capita than rich countries (Solow, 1956; Swan, 
1956).  The models of growth developed by Swan and Solow highlighted that the growth 
rates of population and savings were determined exogenously; hence they claimed that 
higher growth rates of the population made the country poorer while higher growth rates 
of savings made the country richer. But in their aggregate growth model they used 
Cobb-Douglas production function which they formulated as follows: 
У (t) = K (t) α (A (t) L (t)) 1-α……………………………………………………………….. (2) 
Whereby 0 < α < 1 and in the equation (1) above Y= income; K= physical capital; A= 
technology; L= labour. The aggregate model above shows that for income growth to 
take place there has to be interaction among the variables of capital, technology, and 
labor. Firstly, the model predicts as highlighted above those countries with lower real 
income will catch up with those of higher real income due to diminishing returns of 
capital. Secondly, technology is suggested to be impacting on the economic growth 
which appears to suggest that in the absence of technology economic growth will 
vanish. The interesting part of the model is the claim that technology and population 
growth not produced by the model but are exogenous. In other words, the two variables 
that explain the real income growth rate made outside the model. The two assumptions 
claimed by the neoclassical theory are debatable. The next section will present the 
empirical findings on the convergence assumption. 
2.2.2.1    Convergence between developing and developed countries 
  The claim that developing countries catch up with rich countries has been 
empirically investigated by Baumol (1986) who claimed that countries which were 
poorer like Japan and Italy managed to catch up with countries who were regarded 
developed that is the United States of America and Canada. Nevertheless, there are 
some objections to his findings such as the period engaged by Baumol (1986) in his 
research, namely the period between 1870 and 1950, appears to be plagued with 
unreliable data and this period’s findings showed divergence instead of convergence 
according to (Abramovitz, 1986). And also the countries engaged in the research of 
Baumol (1986) only incorporated developed countries hence it is difficult to generalize 
his findings to include all countries (developed and developing countries). Furthermore, 
De Long (1988) accused Baumol’s (1986) research of being selective in mining data 
thus why he managed to come up with convergence outcome. While in the same vein, 
Dowrick and Nguyen (1989) investigated the Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
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and Development (OECD) countries from 1950 to 1985. They noted that since 1973 the 
income levels among nations were not as healthy as normal income levels. On the other 
hand, their findings showed convergence since 1950. However, this convergence could 
be as a result of biasedness in the selection of data. Also, the authors found that the 
OECD countries caught up with each other in total factor productivity, and hence 
claiming the convergence among OECD countries. 
Another side of convergence came with Abramovitz (1985) who highlighted that 
the historical experience of developed countries supports the neoclassical assumption 
that in the long run, less developed countries will catch up with the more developed 
countries. Concerning the forces behind this convergence, he referred to Gerschenkron 
(1952) who perceived that ‘relative backwardness’ was advantageous to the countries 
lagging behind in economic development. On the other hand, the countries who are 
leaders in economic development face challenges of keeping up with the pressure of 
maintaining the phenomenon of economic growth as presented by (Veblen, 1915).  
Therefore, to dismiss convergence would overlook the historical experiences of 
industrialized countries. Nevertheless, not all countries manage to achieve 
convergence assumption. For example, despite the availability of technology in 
developing countries and some other international support in the form of foreign aid 
these countries until now are failing to reduce the income per capita gap. Therefore, 
this gap in income per capita disparities between developed and developing countries 
demands further exploration. Exogenous factors such as technology, savings and 
growth population regarded as the critical determinant of real income per capita 
disparities among countries discussed in the next section.  
2.2.2.2    Impact of technology, savings, and population growth  
 In equation (1) above A stands for technology and is one of the factors that contribute 
to the income growth in the countries. The other elements are savings and population 
growth. Mankiw et al. (1992) noted that in Swan-Solow model savings and population 
growth although exogenous determine the steady-state levels of per capita income. 
Therefore, different steady-states reached by different countries could be due to 
different saving rates and population growths. Mankiw et al. (1992) confirmed the 
predictions of the Swan-Solow model that saving rates made the countries richer while 
population growth caused the countries poorer, however, they criticised the model for 
failure to indicate magnitudes. On the other hand, Mankiw and his associates claimed 
that their findings showed that saving rates and population growth correlated with 
human capital. They further explained that the saving rates or lower population growth 
implied high levels of human capital and higher levels of per capita income while lower 
saving rates and high population growths indicated more moderate levels of both 
human capital and per capita income. Then they concluded that including the human 
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capital variable in their model lowers the estimated effects of saving rates and 
population growths. It implied that the augmented model of Mankiw and associates 
gave better explanations of differences in income per capita levels than the Swan-Solow 
model. 
Furthermore, neoclassical theory proclaims that technology treated as 
exogenous enhances the effectiveness of the labor force; as a result, the output of 
products and income per capita levels increase. What neoclassical theory assumes is 
that technology is the same throughout the world; therefore, it is at disposal to be used 
by everyone. Nonetheless, Romer (1994) contested that technology cannot be the 
same in all countries for the reason that the flow of knowledge from the leader to the 
follower depends on people7. The implication is that the faster the dissemination of 
understanding the higher level of technology and the higher income per capita level in 
the country. Advancing technology, there have to be inputs that compensated so that 
the advancement continues. Of course, some discoveries are non-rival to the public 
good, but there are some which are rival to the public good to compensate for the costs 
incurred (Stiglitz, 1989). In this case, therefore, the technology could not be only 
exogenous as claimed by neoclassical theory. On the other hand, Nelson and Phelps 
(1966) argued that the progression of technology denotes the connection with 
education for the reason that more educated people are quicker in adapting to 
production techniques than less educated people. The author appears to suggest that 
schooling speeds up the process of technology diffusion8. Therefore, this being the 
case, it could be contended that differences in educational attainments in countries 
contribute to differences in the level of technology and the level of income per capita 
across countries. Rogers (1962) empirically tested if education has any effect on 
farmers in the United States of America. And he found out that the more educated the 
farmer was, the more the farmer understood and implemented programmes from the 
Department of Agriculture and the more the farmer developed new products. That 
appears to suggest that for non-rival technology to utilized in any country depends on 
the characteristics9 of people. Hence, assuming that technology will enhance labor 
force and capital efficiency equally among countries fails to consider the capacity ability 
differences among countries as indicated in Figure 2.1 below. 
 
                                            
 
. 7It implies that the quicker people are in adapting to new changes the more the diffusion of 
knowledge.  
8 Rogers defined diffusion as "the process by which an innovation is communicated through 
certain channels over time among the members of a social system."  





Figure 2.1: Capabilities in utilizing knowledge and economic disparities                                                                                     
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Notes. Sources of knowledge are highlighted as the culture, education institutions, learning by 
doing, experience, and innovations. Hence, the capacity of using this wealth of consciousness 
determines the development levels of countries. 
Figure 2.1 above shows a dynamic process that is endless, and this process is 
experienced differently across countries. It is a process that progresses in the creation 
of knowledge and the application of knowledge to meet human needs. Knowledge 
creation comes through many sources such as experience or learning by doing whereby 
skills can be improved by repetition of the same routines in the form of training (Kolb, 
1984). Of course, there are different types of knowledge, for instance, Polanyi (1974) 
claimed that there is explicit and tacit knowledge. Explicit instruction is the type of 
knowledge that can be explained through language and symbols. While the tacit 
knowledge, is the type of knowledge that is hard to be communicated and he claimed 
that this type of knowledge is context specific and experientially earned. Also, Landes 
(1998) observed that in the midst of 1st World War French lost some key companies 
that were producing arms. As a result, the French sought external help from United 
States of America (USA) by sending them their blueprints of 75-mm field guns so that 
the USA can produce for them. This did not take place until the French's workmen were 
despatched to the USA to show the American how to make them. Therefore, Landes 
too confirms that knowledge can be context specific and challenging to be 
communicated until learned through experience. It seems to suggest that the 
application of ideas, education, and skills is critical to creating economic and social 
benefits for people to use. At the same time, knowledge or technology made in one 
context could be very difficult for other settings to apply and yield positive results. 
Rogers (2010) showed out that differences in capacities lead to differences in utilizing 






















income per capita between developed and developing countries might be due to 
people's abilities, attitudes, and motivations. For example, Japan was underdeveloped 
at some point compared to industrialized countries like the USA, the United Kingdom 
(UK), Germany and France. But due to their cultural values like hardworking, work ethic, 
self-disciplined mainly after the 1868 Meiji restoration, they caught up in development 
with developed countries (Wilson, 1992). They eagerly invited skilled workers from 
developed countries who taught them how to do things they needed and sent them 
away when they did not need them anymore. They also sent their workmen to other 
developed countries to visit their factories and other areas of interest to learn and import 
skills to themselves. Aforementioned appears to suggest that unless the people in the 
developing countries have capacities to use the existing technologies, external help in 
the form of foreign aid cannot help. Inabilities of developing countries to utilize current 
technologies are further trapped in poverty on the assumption of the neoclassical theory 
of perfect markets and closed economy. It will be discussed more also in the next 
section.     
2.2.2.3    Perfect competition markets and closed economy 
Among the critical purposes of political economy is to deal with the production, 
allocation, and distribution of scarce resources. How this is achieved in the capitalist 
economy depends on the model of the perfect competition market as developed within 
the neoclassical theory. It is assumed that the market mechanism addresses the issues 
of demand, supply, resource allocation, price choice and welfare (Duff, 1997). 
Nevertheless, in the economy10 certain goods can be afforded to be produced at the 
expense of other products. And this creates the scarcity of goods, hence allocation 
problems (George and Shorey, 1978). But, neoclassical theory adopted perfect 
competition market as ideal in the distribution of scarce goods to various and different 
desires of consumers (limitless) in the real world. This model assumes that agents11 will 
act in an economical way covered by the concept of rational choice.  Generally, 
the perfect competition market model assumes the economy is made of independent 
consumers who are price takers, self-interested and sensible, no sacrifice for others 
and each decides the level of utility, independently, produce products at lowest costs 
for maximizing profits, each has perfect information. Duff (1997) noted that regulation 
of scarce resources could take many forms such as first served, a waiting list, basis on 
attractiveness and power. He claimed that Western countries adopted the neoclassical 
                                            
 
10 Defined as the orderly system of agents, rules, and regulations that monitors production, 
distribution and consumption  
11 Could be individuals, firms and countries 
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perfect competition model as the best way of allocating the resources. Nevertheless, 
the assumptions of this model do not work on the principle of need but demand and 
supply, suggesting that any deviations from the perfect competition market model will 
be dealt with by price adjustments. The capitalist economy system embraced 
neoclassical theory assumptions highlighted above, and no one can deny the fact that 
this system has prevailed in the world. Almost all the developed countries welcomed 
the policy, and the order is being enforced to be operational in the developing nations 
by institutions such as the International Monetary Fund and World Bank to mention a 
few. 
Despite the success of neoclassical theory suppositions, there are other 
elements pointed out in literature against the theory's perfect competitive market model. 
For example, taking the competition at world level, if knowledge spillover differs from 
country to country, it implies that Markets are not at the perfect match. One possible 
reason for this according to Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1988) is that markets are not at the 
ideal competition for the idea that the first entrant in the market will enjoy monopoly 
rents. The differences in the advancement of knowledge among countries will 
eventually widen differences in income per capita among countries. In other words, 
developed countries have better and advanced technologies that enable them to have 
optimal production processes denied to the developing nations. And this advanced 
technology will be deliberately limited to developing countries to gain returns from their 
investment in the advanced technology (Atkinson and Stiglitz, 1969). Therefore, 
differences in technologies will widen between developed and developing countries, 
which the perfect competition market model fails to reckon.  On the other hand, 
Brohman (1995) and Keita (2009) both linked neoclassical theory to neoliberal 
approach and critiqued the frameworks for failure on the development strategy to 
developing countries. For instance, Brohman (1995) questioned structural adjustment 
and other neoliberal policy mechanisms enforced on developing countries for boosting 
economic development. All these programmes, he argued, were implemented in the 
developing countries without taking into consideration socio-cultural and political 
relations, the intersubjective realm of meanings and value in development, environment 
and the issues of sustainability. In the same vein, both Hirschman (1981) and Feldman 
(1987) stated that the perfectly competitive market model of neoclassical theory treated 
people as atomistic individuals held together by market forces. Hirschman (1981) 
argued that such an approach dispossesses people of their history, cultural traditions, 
and social relationships that permeates people beyond market exchange mechanism. 
Furthermore, Bruton (1985) claimed that underdevelopment in developing countries is 
due to the developed countries enforcing values and institutions like markets prevailed 
in the developed countries to developing countries. In other words, the way of doing 
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things in the West has is replicated in the developing countries to grasp development 
phenomenon. The people in the developing countries fail to use their intelligence in their 
cultural values hence need of replacement by better values that have worked in the 
developed countries. Nevertheless, Bruton (1985) pointed out that such an approach 
causes tensions and uncertainty among the indigenous people, hence no foundation to 
stand upon to compete in the competitive environment among countries. It appears that 
neoclassical theory advances that economic behavior is the same among people 
regardless of time and geographical location. In so doing, then, the approach is 
universalistic whereby economic rationality rule determines the optimal choices in all 
situations (Barnes, 1988).  
In section 2.3 above it was argued that social and economic systems play an 
enormous role in the capacity development of people. Which appears to suggest that 
progress is not merely economic growth but many changes taking place in social 
relations and institutions, therefore, to dismiss mutual actions and relationships among 
people as advocated in the rational model of the neoclassical theory is to extinguish the 
capacity developing of people (Barnes and Sheppard, 1992). The development 
definition has also been explained by Todaro and Smith (2009) as covering a 
multidimensional process that incorporates the reorganization and reorientation of 
whole economic and social systems. Economic development embraces not only 
financial incomes and outputs but also changes in institutions, attitudes, customs, 
beliefs and organization structures. For example, Wicherts (2008) studied the 
plasticity12 of intelligence of the Dutch males born between 1934 and 1964. He 
observed that those born in 1934 scored 20 IQ standard lower than those born in 1964. 
And then he suggested that the Dutch population had increased in population 
intelligence. This finding is commonly known as the Flynn effect and replicated in 13 
other nations (Flynn, 1987). The central question at hand is what caused this difference 
in population intelligence between the periods? Generally, the answer could be 
accredited to genes inheritance, but people involved in the research between the 
periods belonged to the same nations respectively demands more explanations. Here 
is why the concept of development has to take a more incorporating process than only 
focussing on income outputs. Wicherts (2008) suggested environmental factors 
contributed to differences in population bits of intelligence between the years. That 
indicates that context matters regarding people's development. Thus why, despite the 
introduction of imperfect competition as the modification of neoclassical theory to 
incorporate reality into the analysis, the criticism of the approach persisted. For 
                                            
 
12 The property of something that can be worked or hammered or shaped without breaking 
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instance, Robinson (1933)  admitted that the law of supply and demand as a theory for 
price adjustment fails to rectify the problem of monopoly13 and oligopoly14 In summary, 
Marrewijk et al. (2012) point out that when a firm does not take the price level at the 
market but instead strategically interacts with other firms and the market to maximize 
its profits, then the market is under imperfect competition. But, he admitted that the 
imperfect competition is in chaos for the reason that there are many ways firms can use 
not to take the level market prices. Thus why in perfect competition model the behavior 
of individuals or firms in the imperfect competition is merely regarded as deviations. 
Even though it is difficult to model the imperfect competition compared to the perfect 
match, it represents what is happening in the real world. In other words, the imperfect 
competition appears to correlate with the classical theory assumption of dynamic 
competition See section 2.2 above for more information. Even though neoclassical 
theory model of the perfect match is easy to understand and explain the dynamics of 
economic workings, it overlooks the reality by merely taking fact as deviations.  
Since neoclassical theory theoretical explanations of economic development 
appear to give positive results in the developed countries and adverse consequences 
in the developing countries, the search for the theory to explain the income disparities 
between countries continues. The convergence assumption between nations with the 
high concentration of capital and those with the low density of money is shown to predict 
well in the developed countries but not in the developing countries. The assumption that 
technology is the same in all countries in the world appears not to be the case due to 
differences in the characteristics of people. Furthermore, empirically Holtzeakin (1993) 
claimed that neoclassical theory's assumptions are consistent with their empirical 
results in their analysis. For example, for the author to show differences in economic 
development, he tested the role of investment rate on the productivity levels of the 
countries. And he observed that the productivity levels increased yearly as a result of 
the investment rate on capital. He did the same with labor rate and technology rate and 
claimed that they too contributed to differences in productivity levels among countries. 
Senhadji (2000) also ascribed differences in economic development to differences in 
physical capital. In other words, the accumulation of physical capital caused more 
growth other than the collection of human capital. Despite the positive empirical findings 
highlighted above, the  rational and perfect competitive models valued by neoclassical 
                                            
 
13 Happens when there is possibly one firm in a specific market. Due to the profit maximization, 
the company determines what prices to sell to the market which are far above the marginal 
costs of the products 
14. This happens when there are few suppliers of the product in that one supplier's action could 
have a considerable impact on prices and its competitors. 
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theory in closed economies overlook real world realities in changing economic 
development performances. This being the case, the next approach to be explored in 
the theoretical explanations of economic development is the endogenous theory.   
   
As stressed in section 2.2.2 above, neoclassical theory assumed that economic 
growth is exogenously determined by technology, saving rates and population growth. 
But in literature, there have been divergences as pertains to the differences in economic 
growth in different countries. However, more recent economists have endorsed 
endogenous growth models than neoclassical theory. Endogenous growth models are 
advanced by (Hall and Jones, 1999; Hansen and Knowles, 1998; Pack, 1994; Romer, 
1990, 1994). The theory assumes constant or increasing returns to scale as an 
explanation of cross-country variation in income instead of decreasing returns as 
perceived by neoclassical theory. The critical element in most of the endogenous theory 
models is the human capital role as emphasized by Barro (1991) who investigated 98 
countries from 1960-1985 and observed that the growth rate of real income per capita 
is positively related to human capital15. He also claimed that countries with higher 
human capital levels had the higher investment in physical capital and lower fertility 
rates. Furthermore, economic growth is in reverse relationship to the share of 
government consumption in GDP but slightly related to the percentage of public 
investment. Then, probably, what Barro (1991) says is that human capital enables 
people to do the right things concerning economic growth and deter things that impede 
economic growth. Similarly, Romer (1990) concluded that an investment in human 
capital would propel faster economic growth. He further explained that investment in 
human capital would enhance research projects regarded as the source of 
technological change. This puts human capital levels as key to economic development 
differences among countries. It should be noted that research projects are deliberate 
efforts by firms or nations to maximize profit. In other words, the investment in human 
capital enhances the production of new products and technology implying more 
economic growth in countries. Even though neoclassical theory anticipated that 
technology played an essential role of enabling physical and labor capitals' efficiency, 
its treatment of technology as exogenous overlooked the part of human capital in 
economic development (Jorgenson et al., 1987). It takes individuals, firms or countries 
to develop or innovate technologies through experimentation, refinements, and 
scientific investigations. Judd (1985) claimed that innovation is generally internationally 
accepted as one of the sources of economic growth through the introduction of 
                                            
 
15 School enrolment rates 
2.2.3  Endogenous theory 
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patents16. In other words, due to innovation achieved through investment in scientific 
investigations and experiences, there are no diminishing returns to physical and human 
capital.  
2.2.3.1   Strengths and weaknesses of the endogenous theory 
On the other hand, Pack (1994) challenged the endogenous theory's intellectual 
and empirical appeal. In the first place, Pack acknowledged that endogenous theory 
predicted and successfully tested the forces that enhance new technology and 
productivity. Specifically, he gave credit to the claim of the endogenous argument that 
the marginal product of physical and human capitals is constant instead of diminishing 
returns as claimed in the neoclassical theory. But he questioned the productivity of 
human capital for failing to explain the impressive economic growth of the tiger nations 
up to 1990s. He clarified that tiger nations' education investment and research 
development projects did not surpass other developing countries which failed to grow 
economically. As a result of the empirical shortcomings of endogenous theory, the 
theory necessitated further explorations, hence, the development of models that 
incorporate cultural factors. In contrast, Comin (2009) claimed that economic growth is 
determined by both non-rival and rival knowledge through general innovations and 
Research and Development (R&D) innovations respectively. However, their findings 
indicated that an increase in R&D raised firm's instability while general innovations 
decreased variability of firms using free innovations. Then they concluded that the 
productivity of investment in human and physical capital to produce rival knowledge 
which drives growth is unclear. The claim of general innovations could be illustrated by 
the catching up of the EU with the USA immediately after the Second World War. It 
implies that Europeans utilized non-rival knowledge innovated by the USA to propel 
economic growth.  Despite the criticism of innovations due to costs incurred in the 
creation of new technologies as claimed by Comin above, it is a source of economic 
growth of firms and countries through patents. Despite general innovations (non-rival 
knowledge) being costless, it is only those firms and countries with capacities to 
translate it to economic and social benefits that can benefit from it, as Europeans did. 
Of course, there have been mixed findings on the importance of R&D activities 
and productivity growth. For example, Jones and Williams (1998) noted that there was 
no significant relationship between productivity growth and R&D intensity. It appears 
that Jones and Williams contradict the assumptions of the endogenous theory that 
investment in human and physical capital lead to new technologies and increasing 
productivity of the countries or firms. Instead, they are of the view that investment in 
                                            
 
16 In advanced dictionary patent is a document granting an inventor sole rights to an invention 
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R&D activities, human and physical capital have little effect on productivity and 
economic performance. On the other hand, Griliches and Mairesse (1984) together with 
Griliches (1980; 1986), investigated the relationship between TFP, richness, and R&D 
intensity. Their findings contrasted Jones and William (1998) because they observed 
that there is a healthy positive relationship between R&D investments and productivity, 
though at the firm level and they recommended that non-rival innovation was better than 
rival innovation. While Coccia (2009) claimed that his findings indicated diminishing 
returns from R&D investment and suggested that to increase the productivity and 
economic growth of countries in the long run, then policymakers have to take into 
consideration total R&D investment and socio-economic specificity of each state. 
Moreover, the endogenous theory models which recognize the positive relationship 
between productivity and investment in R&D activities are authored by (Aghion and 
Howitt, 1998; Dinopoulos and Thompson, 1998; Peretto, 1998; Segerstrom, 1998; 
Young, 1998). But, these scholars differ in their approaches. For example, Jones (1995) 
together with Aghion and Howitt (1998, 2005)  focused on semi-endogenous that 
advocates decreasing returns to knowledge to avoid side effects in the entire economy. 
In this approach, they looked at policies as the cause of permanent changes in the 
variables of the production mechanism. On the other hand, Dinopoulos and Thompson 
(1998) and Segerstrom (1998) together with Young (1998) shifted the focus from the 
entire economy to individual product line to avoid side effects at the aggregate level. 
Nevertheless, there is another trend that appears to cause disagreement among 
scholars. In endogenous theory, human capital assumes a significant role, but there is 
no precise definition of human capital. There will be a further discussion of Human 
capital in details in the next section. 
2.2.3.2   Human capital 
As explained above human capital plays a vital role in the endogenous theory. 
And it is generally, accepted that human capital is connected with education attainment 
levels, for example, Becker (1962) defined human capital as embodied skills in 
individuals that comes through education and on the job training. As a result of this 
worker-force raises their productivity hence receive higher salaries. This appears to 
confirm Atkinson (1983) who pointed out that human capital theory focuses much on 
private benefits other than social benefits. While in the same vein, the theory suggests 
that poor qualifications could lead to high unemployment by markets. Nonetheless, 
Arrow (1973) and Spence (1973) questioned the human capital assumption that 
education and job training embodies people with skills which promote economic 
development. They, however, suggested that education does not raise the productivity 
of individuals but acts as a device for screening for employees’ innate abilities. The 
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credentials enable the companies to screen applicants without spending higher 
amounts throughout the employment process. Despite the criticisms leveled against the 
human capital theory, neoclassical theory's claim that economic growth was related to 
saving rates and population growth was challenged by Mankiw et al. (1992) who 
augmented Solow's model with human capital leading to the reduction of the 
contribution of saving rates and population growth. This being the case, they claimed 
that human capital accounted for about 80% of income disparities among countries. As 
highlighted above, the definition of human capital has become a hot debate. The 
findings of Mankiw et al. (1992) raised a problem of ascribing human capital at the 
individual level to country level success or failure. Growiec (2010) pointed out that due 
to the finite lifespan of individuals, human capital might not work at the country level as 
it could be out of date due to limited lifespans of individuals. Similarly, Serneels (2008) 
claimed that human capital explains differences in the productivity and wages of 
individuals. If this is the case, then the theory of human capital could be criticised for 
promoting social classes among people. Such categories could be formed due to the 
condition that unless a person has credentials for jobs, there will be prolonged 
unemployment. In other words, people with low education attainment faces spells of 
protracted unemployment and insecure low-quality jobs (OECD, 2005). One of the ways 
of counteracting the human capital theory controversy is to consider that productivity 
does not only come through education. For example, Bucci and Segre (2011) 
developed a model containing cultural and human capital in two sectors. Scholars such 
as Throsby (1999) highlighted the connection between cultural capital as viewed by 
sociology and human capital as considered by economists. The definition of human 
capital appears to include culture, see meaning of (Costanza and Daly, 1992)17. For 
instance, Marlet and Van Woerkens (2004) argue that ‘Florida's creative class' is a 
better indicator of human capital than education. He explained that in most cases the 
creative class is essentially working other than educated while educated people may 
not be necessarily working. He also assumed that the creative class adapt easily to 
changes and might be more productive in their endeavors than those with education 
qualifications. This illustrates the point of learning by doing as illustrated by (Stokey, 
1988). Another example is related to differences in immigrants' earnings in the United 
States of America whereby Chiswick (1983) ascribed differences in the profits of 
immigrants to cultural origin differences. It suggests that human capital does not only 
come through education but through culture representing the environment one inhabits:  
                                            
 
17 who defined human capital as "the stock of education, skills, culture, and knowledge stored 
in human beings themselves" (Natural capital & sustainable development, p. 38) 
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Human capital by education system = (1 - u) H which implies that investment in culture 
would increase productive human capital. 
It suggests that well defined human capital accounts for cross-country 
differences in economic development. For example, Hall and Jones (1999) claimed that 
countries' differences in the stocks of human capital cause differences in productivity 
outputs per worker, hence differences in standards of living. However, Prescott (1998) 
pointed out that increasing the stocks for human capital takes longer than the time 
allocated to markets. In other words, the short lifespans of individuals limit the potential 
to positively contribute to macro-level economic development, implying that investment 
through education seems to be costlier than investment in culture. Therefore, countries 
that invest in culture could have the higher productivity of workers than countries that 
do not. Investment in culture could imply using the education system to instill in citizens 
better work ethic values that enhance productivity18.  
 That too, suggests that responsible government that formulates and implement 
policies enhancing productivity rather than those that hinder the richness of its citizens 
will perform better in economic development (Mokyr, 1990). In other words, social 
capabilities19 differences among countries contribute to differences in economic 
development. For example, Abramovitz (1956) claimed that Europeans caught up with 
the USA after World War Two because they had similar social capabilities. It appears 
to suggest that Europeans seized the opportunity of using Americans' advanced 
technology to their success; therefore, the values of people in countries determine their 
capability of knowledge diffusion. The diffusion of knowledge according to Wilson and 
Briscoe (2004) helped the Europeans to catch up with the USA. They observed that 
investment in human capital through education remained a key element throughout 
Europe. And this was verified by educational expenditures as a percentage of GNP that 
remained constant for all European countries for a long time. On the other hand, Landes 
(1980) observed that European technology developed because of their social capability. 
For instance, in 1980, Landes highlighted that European communities grew together as 
servants, whereby every trade like builders and mechanics communicated and worked 
with the single purpose of developing their communities. They copied and improved 
technologies by standing on what others had done who came before them. Then, it 
might be complementary to incorporate cultural and economic factors in the 
endogenous production function to increase the output concerning income per capita 
                                            
 
18 According to the model formulated by Stokey (1988) that illustrates inheritance of human 
capital from families or societies 
19 Readiness of a country in absorbing technology and have competent political, commercial, 
financial institutions to provide quality goods and services  
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(Granato et al., 1996a). Furthermore, De Long and Summers (1993) and Desdoigts 
(1999) too acknowledged that initial conditions of countries regarding resources' 
allocation and accumulation and continental geographical cultures determine the 
success or failure of their economies. All in all, endogenous theory models appear to 
advocate human capital as the leading cause of economic development in countries. 
But, the concept of human capital demands better definition to explain economic 
disparities among countries. There are many endogenous growth models in the 
literature categorized into three trends. The three patterns represent the whole 
endogenous models developed to explain economic disparities among countries. The 
next section will demonstrate how the models differ in their purposes although they all 
emphasize the importance of the contribution of human capital to the endogenous 
theory.  
 
One of the outstanding legacies of neoclassical theory is the development of 
accounting function of production factors to explain and predict economic development 
among countries. In other words, models are developed to describe the realities 
observed in the world and then devise frameworks to propel economic growth among 
nations. See section 2.2.2 above. However, neo-classical theory treatment of countries 
as similar in structures and institutions overlooks social capabilities differences in 
countries. Hence, the endogenous theory was developed to meet this need. There are 
different models developed within endogenous theory to fit the disadvantages of neo-
classical theory.   The models are presented in the next three sub-sections as follows. 
2.2.4.1    Assimilation models 
In this model as highlighted by Lucas (1988) production crucially depends on 
human capital which is both internal and external. The internal human capital is 
associated mainly with education whereby the skills obtained by the owner are specific 
and determine the salary level of the individual similar to the one used in labor context 
market (Heckman 1976). While external human capital according to Lucas (1988) is 
obtained through learning by doing, families or the societies one inhabits. Romer (1990) 
highlighted that the theoretical models developed by Lucas (1988) and King and Rebelo 
(1987) are based on the unconstrained human capital accumulation. That appears to 
suggest that both internal and external human capital included in the assimilation 
models. It is important to note the external knowledge could outlive the individual in the 
form of discoveries that are important to societies and is mainly in the non-rival form. 
This model highlighted above considers human capital as an engine of economic 
growth though is part of productive labor; hence new investment in human capital 
commands economic growth. In other words, human capital determines endogenous 
2.2.4  Endogenous theory models 
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technology growth as highlighted in Romer (1990) that human capital influences the 
domestic innovation. The motivation of the assimilation models appear to be as a result 
of the following realities in the world: firstly, failure of education attainments to propel 
the developing countries to catch up with the developed countries (Pritchett, 2001).  
Secondly, the divergence of income per capita between developed and developing 
countries; thirdly, differences in total factor productivity among countries. 
2.2.4.2    Absorption capacity models 
The models in this category emphasize the human capital element that utilizes 
the existing technology (Nelson and Phelps, 1966). In other words, the models deal with 
the relationship between levels of human capital and technology change. Neoclassical 
knowledge claims this type of technology as exogenous while the absorption capacity 
models of endogenous theory link the intangible expertise to human capital as existing 
technology. Similarly, Falvey, Foster and Greenaway 2007; Wolff 2001 connected 
human capital capacity to absorb the flow of knowledge spill-overs. It suggests that 
countries with the ability to absorb spill-overs would undoubtedly converge with the 
advanced countries in technology.   
2.2.4.3    Innovation and technology diffusion models 
Benhabib and Spiegel (1994, 2005) formulated the model that incorporated the 
two other models highlighted above. They advocated both innovation and technology 
diffusion. However, considering the answers to why developing countries are failing to 
catch up, they probably referred to the inability of utilizing the knowledge spill over. On 
the other hand, they noted that education attainments might have been under-utilized 
or the education attainment as a proxy for human capital fails to capture necessary 
skills for productivity (Dowrick and Rogers, 2002). Above all, what is common in the 
models employed is the variables engaged in explaining economic outcomes in their 
production functions. Hence, the next section will briefly explain efficiency differences 
among countries. The models in sections 2.2.4.1, 2.2.4.2, and 2.2.4.3 above express 
the efficiency of countries differently. This efficiency is in most studies regarded as TFP 
which is the focus in section 2.6 below. 
 
 
Section 2.2 above highlights the general wisdom in mainly three pivotal theories 
namely: classical, neo-classical and endogenous theories. For instance, the generally 
classical theory according to Smith (1776), the differences in economic growth among 
countries is owing to land, labor, and capital production factors captured in equation (1).  
On the other hand, the theory advocates competition among the individuals called by 
Smith (1776) ‘invisible hand’ that determines economic growth differences among 
countries. However, there are inconsistencies highlighted in the literature on the role 
2.2.5  Traditional or economic category 
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classical theory explanation of economic growth differences among countries (Thirlwall, 
1999, 2011; Nafziger, 1997; Marx, 1847; Gintis, 1972; Mill and Backhouse 1997). 
Furthermore, taking into consideration that an economic man partly purposed in 
maximizing wealth, but at the same time, there are constraints of aversion to laboring 
and subjection to leisure (Blaug, 1992; Bowley, 2013). Individual's rationality fluctuates 
with time due to the stochastic environment; that past decisions affect future 
expectations, then, the classical theory fails to provide a statistical model that would 
consistently give the best probabilities of future outcomes (Greenwald and Stiglitz, 
1988). Therefore, the traditional economic theory appears not to offer a convincing 
explanation of the causes of disparities in economic development among countries.  
On the other hand, the neo-classical theory assumes static equilibrium in 
competition conception with no external influence from outside the model. And in this 
perfect market, the producers and consumers do not affect the prices due to the 
numbers involved whether large or small. Besides, the product prices do not influence 
production productivity of firms, but firms increase or decrease their production output 
merely as a result of maximizing profit. However, historically, there has been 
inconsistency in the assumption of the perfect competition of neo-classical theory. For 
example, Tsoulfidis (2011) points out that the depression during the period of 1873-
1896 led to an elimination of most of the companies that failed to compete due to 
excessive price cuts and concentration of capital.  Another important aspect associated 
with the neo-classical theory is the convergence element between developed and 
developing countries. In other words, assuming that all the conditions remain the same 
among countries except for the concentration of their capitals, then developing 
countries will grow faster in real per capita than rich countries (Solow, 1956; Swan, 
1956). Generally, it is observed that income between developed and developing 
countries is widening (Dowrick and Akmal, 2005; Baddeley, 2006; Berry, Guillén and 
Hendi, 2014). In contrast, some studies have reported the convergent of the income 
gap between developed and developing (Bond, Hoeffler and Temple, 2001, pp. 22-24; 
Barro, 1997). Whatever the case, developing countries, particularly the Sub-Saharan 
region, remain the least developed region in the world (Malamud and Assane, 2013). 
Hence, the catch-up assumption of neo-classical theory seems not to work for all 
countries in the same way and at the same time (Nelson and Pack, 1999, p. 424; Kim 
and Nelson, 2000).  
Marx (1906) claimed that the capacities of individuals develop according to the 
tasks assigned to in the economic production system. Hence, suggested that individual 
welfare depends on the path of development of the individual's capacities as they 
engage in the tasks assigned. These tasks are mostly captured in this category of 
variables such as saving, investment, capital accumulation (capital stock), and human 
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capital (division of labour) portrayed as the key determinants of economic growth of 
countries in classical and neoclassical theories (Smith, 1937; Malthus and Appleman, 
1976; Ricardo, 1817; Marx, 2004; Barro, 1991; Lucas, 1988). Despite the efforts of 
engaging this traditional category variable in theoretical frameworks to provide a link 
between its theoretical explanations and the empirical world, it seems not to work as 
noted by (Blumer, 1969). Consequently, economic disparities still exist mainly between 
developed and developing countries. See the introduction of chapter 1 for more 
explanations. Could this accord with the claim of Merton (1968) that the variables 
involved in the theoretical frameworks are interrelated and are defined according to their 
fitness to the empirical instances as perceived by the researchers? For example, 
researchers embracing neo-classical assumptions define variables in theoretical 
frameworks without consideration of non-economic factors (Mill and Backhouse, 1997; 
Nurkse, 1966). This study will also extend the number of variables in this category with 
the rationale of finding out if other variables other than those mainly embraced in 
classical and neo-classical models explain income disparities between developed and 
developing countries. The variables in the traditional category are demonstrated in 
Table 2.1 below. However, their definitions are in Table 3.2 in chapter 3.  
Table 2.1: Abbreviated and full names of the traditional variables 
  
 Notes. Human capital is represented by TED in chapter 4 while HCT in chapter 5. Also, FDI is 
 applied in chapter 4, and AID in chapter 5.  
 
Hence, hypotheses of the variables in this category are as follows: 
H1a:  EMP HDI IGS RKN TED HCT EGS FDI GCI GRS ETR AID significantly 
          contribute to economic growth 
 
H1b:  EMP HDI IGS RKN TED HCT EGS FDI GCI GRS ETR do not significantly  
          Contribute to economic growth 
 
H1c:  EMP HDI IGS RKN TED HCT EGS FDI GCI GRS ETR has an effect on  
           economic growth 
 
H1d:  EMP HDI IGS RKN TED HCT EGS FDI GCI GRS ETR has no effect on    
          economic growth 
Condensed variable Complete variable name 
GDPPC GDP per capita based on purchasing power parity (PPP).  
EMP Employment to population ratio (%)  
HDI The Human Development Index  
IGS Imports of goods and services (current US$)  
RKN Real capital stock an (in thousands 2005US$)  
TED Population with tertiary education (%)  
HCT Index of human capital per person on years of schooling  
EGS Exports of goods and services (%)  
FDI Foreign direct investment (current US$)  
AID Foreign aid to developing countries  
GRS Gross Domestic Saving (%)  
GCI The Global Competitiveness Index  
ETR  New business density (new registrations per 1,000 people  
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2.3 CULTURE DEFINITIONS 
The definitions of culture given in sociological, economics, psychology, and 
anthropology literature express culture differently due to their ideological assumptions 
associated with the stance of respective disciplines. Consequently, the culture concept 
has been branded as a vague concept that includes many strata, hence trying to be 
useful in explaining the economic differences between countries around the world.  But, 
looking closely at culture definitions by different authors,  it could be argued that the 
culture construct has a long history and can be used in many different ways (Bond, 
1998; Bond et al., 2010; Fischer, 2009; Tung and Verbeke, 2010; Keesing, 1974; 
Kroeber and Kluckhohn, 1952; Matsumoto and Yoo, 2006; Parsons and Shils, 1951; 
Schudson, 1989; Sternberg, 2004; Swidler, 1986; Hofstede et al., 2010). For example, 
Geertz (1973) and Cochrane (2006) define culture as historically transmitted traditions, 
rules, beliefs and norms of a group, while  Berry et al. (1992) explain the concept of 
culture as psychologically how the group creatively interacts with the environment, and 
how the group is culturally structured. Therefore, in this thesis culture is intently defined 
as adjusting system of ideas, structures, and symbols transferred through socialization 
of behavioural patterns of the societies connected to environmental surroundings like 
technologies, modes of economic running, settlement patterns, political organization, 
religious beliefs and practices similar to the view of (Keesing, 1974). Even though 
Keesing extensively focused on the definitions of different layers of culture, his views 
lack empirical evidence; hence this thesis intends to fill this gap (1974). However, for 
this to be done this thesis limits the definition of culture to accumulated knowledge due 
to both individual and society experiences and discoveries concerning ecological 
conditions culminating in values, rules, beliefs and social norms as claimed by 
(Fernandez, 2009; Nunn, 2012; Sternberg, 2004). In summary, culture is limited to 
functional and constituent senses playing a part as universal aspects of people's 
behavior, in most cases authenticated in their activities and belief systems. Hence, the 
concept of culture seems to have concomitant values that are embedded in traditional 
economic factors claimed to be the engine of economic growth in countries as explained 
in section 2.2 above. Moreover, these concurrent values too are assumed to contribute 
to differences in human experiences such as wealth creation of the nations.  It seems 
parallel to a rational model whereby individual uses available information about different 
courses of action; then outcomes can be ranked according to their usefulness and 
become the outcome for the society. This thesis observes that concomitant values can 
also be classified and seem to differ between individuals and communities leading to 
different courses of action of individuals and communities.  For example, Throsby 
(1999, p. 6) together with Rizzo and Throsby (2006, pp. 986-987) assume that cultural 
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value could be measured regarding a unit of account playing a role comparable to 
commercial scale in regulating economic value. Also, cultural valuation can take the 
form of assets such as buildings, structures, sites and locations placed in the category 
of cultural heritage. Furthermore, cultural significance can be in the way of artwork and 
artefacts such as paintings and sculptures. The stock levels of these tangible assets 
contribute to the rise and flow of goods and services in the societies. On the other hand, 
the concomitant cultural values may form the stock of intangible assets such as a set 
of ideas, practices, beliefs, traditions, and values. This group also enhance the flow of 
goods and services in the societies which this thesis empirically intends to explore. 
Hence, the thesis focuses on intangible cultural capital (ICC) articulated in different 
layers as the proxy for the concept of culture.  Narrowing the definition of culture as 
various forms of ICC provides the foundation of the study and supports the purpose of 
this study throughout the argument. The next sub-sections will explain more about the 
forms of ICC embraced in the cultural category in this thesis. 
 
2.3.1.1  ICC as civic capital (CPR) 
CPR in this study is defined as the ability of citizens in respective countries of 
coming together in unison for the construction of solutions to the current challenges for 
better social outcomes such as economic development. Of course, the study notes that 
an institution could shape behavior both exogenously and endogenously or be fulfilling 
specific actions or purposes similar to the clarification of North (1990) that: 
"Institutions are the rules of the game in a society, or ..., institutions are the 
constraints that shape human interaction". (North, 1990, p. 3). 
Also, Wu (2013) defined the institution as "established rules and organizations 
accumulated from settled choices that are capable of affecting future decisions" (p. 4). 
He further highlighted that the institution includes both physical entities such as family, 
firm, and jail and non-physical but physical entities like events and laws. Similarly, 
Gnegne (2009) claimed that culture is an element of institutions though, also noted that 
institutions could undermine culture. Likewise, Harrison (1992) argued that culture, not 
politics is the force behind the success of societies though he further commented that 
politics could change the culture and save it from itself. As it appears, the culture and 
institution definitions suggest that cultural evolution and institution formation happen as 
a result of human interaction with the environment. Hayek (1973, 2013) explains better 
when he suggested that "rules of conduct have thus not developed as the recognized 
conditions for the achievement of a known purpose but have evolved because the 
groups who practiced them were more successful and displaced others" (Hayek, 1973, 
p. 18). That seems to suggest that civic capital embodies individuals, but the aggregate 
of individuals' political capital levels determine possession of a durable network of more 
2.3.1 Cultural category 
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or less institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance and recognition as 
observed by (Bourdieu, 1985). However, the representation of institutional political 
agents seems to play a part in the construction of the view of the social world whereby 
in some instances representing agents impose their views of the social world contrary 
to social structures. It seems to determine the differences in political capital levels in 
different societies. For instance, in societies where the agents of political representation 
objectively construct the social world, they also consider the current structures or 
institutions. It seems to suggest that prescribed institutions contrary to societies' culture 
could lead to the inappropriate evolving civic capital building due to lack of interaction 
process of perception and reason. For example, Putnam (1993) observed that the free 
city-state that happened in Italy about five centuries earlier could be the foundation of 
civic capital differences between North and South Italy leading to different economic 
outcomes. Even though Putnam empirically connected public capital and economic 
growth differences in North and South in Italy, his research lacks generality to other 
countries such as developing countries. Hence, this study engaged political capital 
generated from WVS from 1994 to 2015 for six developed and six developing countries 
in chapter 4. Besides, the political capital concept from WVS, political capital was also 
captured from Afrobarometer Surveys in chapter 5 for sub-Saharan 18 nations from 
2000 to 2015 period. The questions used to obtain the political capital concept in both 
chapters are illustrated in Table 3.5 in chapter 3. Similarly, Aghion et al. (2010, p. 2) 
noted that levels of civic capital in individual or society depend on how citizens trust or 
distrust the government institutions. They claimed that when citizens distrust institutions 
more regulations are demanded to deter corruption and ineffectiveness of their 
government institutions. Their study also contended that higher control is a sign of no 
investment in civic activities such as entrepreneurship or political participating in voting 
mechanism. Also, Glaeser and Shleifer (2003) who investigated substantial historical 
literature regarding the rise of the regulatory state in the US at the commencement of 
the 20th century and observed that the call for regulation originates from the perceived 
unfairness of the existing social order. While in the same vein, Di Tella and McCulloch 
(2009) claimed that injustice due to capitalism causes voters in developing countries 
not to participate in the political mechanism. Hence, the dissatisfaction among citizens 
in developing countries could be due to inequality of wealth and political power 
consequently lower civic virtues. That is what the thesis investigates whether public 
capital could explain differences in economic growth in developed and developing 
countries. Despite connection of civic capital and economic growth in literature, most of 
the studies used public capital data sources readily available in developed countries 
other than developing, hence, this thesis uses Afrobarometer Surveys in chapter 5 to 
address this gap. The bottom line is that political capital captured through surveys 
56 
 
seems to play a more significant role in economic development than currently portrayed 
in literature in mainly developing countries.  
2.3.1.2  ICC as social capital (SOC) 
Acemoglu et al. (2001) claimed that evil colonial institutions that happened many 
years ago could have long-lasting effects on the colonized countries. In other words, 
the way societies organise themselves are path dependent reflecting their history, 
economic, legal, political, social and moral institutions that cultural beliefs, values, 
norms, and rules account for intersociety differences in institutions as reasonably 
expressed by (Bagella et al., 2002; Brohman, 1995; Greif, 1994; Richerson et al., 2010). 
The claim that culture is a backbone for the institutional building was empirically tested 
by (Licht et al., 2007). They investigated the relationship between national cultures and 
social institutions. The culture operationalized with data of cultural dimensions from 
cross-cultural psychology literature (Schwartz, 1994, 1999; Hofstede, 1980, 2001). On 
the other hand, social institutions operationalized as social norms of governance: the 
rule of law, corruption, and democratic accountability (Kaufmann et al., 2003, 2006). 
Then they concluded that social norms of governance systematically and strongly 
associated with national cultural dimensions’ scores and differ across cultural regions 
of the world. All the literature in this sub-section above connect to ICC in the form of 
social capital in three ways. These three ways are in line with the summary by (Holt, 
2008, p. 227). Firstly, social capital associated with the embodiment of individuals 
relying on broader socio-economic processes. Secondly, the embodying of individuals 
takes place through political-economy interplay with power facilitation. Thirdly, social 
capital embodiment registers through the endurance of inequalities and the possibilities 
of social transformation. These ways of how social capital formed in individuals and 
created through the strategies such as semi-structured interviews and questionnaires 
(Butler and Robson, 2001; Smith and Phillips, 2001; Ley, 2003; Bridge, 2001; Bridge, 
2006; Waters, 2006). Despite surveys widely used in literature, there is dissatisfaction 
with how the concept of social capital is correlated with the measure of trust by attitude 
surveys. For example, Glaeser et al. (2000, p. 813) question standard attitudinal 
question in surveys that generally do not predict individual choices of behavior. 
However, the authors noted that attitude surveys seem to predict trustworthiness. 
Hence, to address the concerns, this study generated social capital as an index from 
survey questions measuring past trusting attitude representing confidence in people in 
different leadership roles in the countries. See Table 3.5 in chapter 3 for more 
information. It is generally accepted that aggregate confidence of people in societies 
successfully measures the concept of social capital (Glaeser et al., 2002, p. F444). 
Besides, this study use of social capital captured from two different surveys over a 
period measure mutual expectations of individuals arising from the social justice 
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systems, professional standard and codes of practice in line with an observation from 
(Paldam and Svendsen, 2000, p. 342). Having looked at ICC as social capital above, 
there is another aspect of ICC that is not thoroughly empirically researched in 
developing countries, yet seems to provide the utilizing capacity differences of ICC in 
the states. FER forms part of ICC investigated in the next sub-section. 
2.3.1.3  ICC as responsibility (FER) 
The definition of responsibility in this study is limited to personal motivation to 
engage in public affairs conscientiously guided by moral ethics to maximize outcomes 
for the best interests of the common good of the society. Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995) 
pointed out that knowledge and skills application or management is the foundation of 
economic growth in the context of competitive environments. Many studies have 
researched on the creativity, management, and form of intellectual capital versus new 
product development and economic growth; however, the impact of responsibility of 
individuals concerning the application of ICC remains incomplete. For instance, Hsu 
and Yang (2009, pp. 664-665) researched intellectual capital20 and new product 
development performance in firms in Taiwan. They claimed that the interaction of 
intellectual capital and organizational21 learning capabilities are the precursor to the 
performance of new product development that enhances economic growth. Their 
research focussed on organizational learning capabilities to explain performance 
differences of firms, in contrast, this study examines the maximization of outcomes by 
responsibly engaging in public affairs for the common good of the society. Similarly,  
Makkonen et al. (2014, p. 2715) investigated the dynamic22 capabilities and 
performance of firms during the financial crisis of 2008. They observed that different 
dynamic capabilities have different effects on the performance of firms in the 
competitive environment. Their study focused on internal and external organizational 
matters that affect the performance of firms while this research centers on the 
responsibility of individuals for the advancement of their society regarding economic 
growth. This is why responsibility as one of the critical aspect of ICC is very needful in 
the competitive global environment. The competition between countries in the world 
economy compared with engaging the five forces of Porter (Porter, 2008). Porter argued 
that for firms to survive, they have to understand the competition they are involved in 
and device strategies or plans to continue to make the profit. In the same way in the 
                                            
 
20 Defined as human capital, structural capital and relational capital 
21 Means an active actor that can, at least to some extent, adapt to the environment, mainly 
within the limits of its resources and capabilities (Makkonen et al., 2014, p. 2707). 
22 Dynamism refers to the rate of technological change or environmental volatility in general 
(Ambrosini et al., 2009; Helfat et al., 2009). 
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global economy countries have to understand the competition and devise strategies for 
their local economies to survive and grow. Marx (1847) described the competitive 
environment as a battle, countries fighting for survival. In other words, the fierceness of 
competition is not only fought between nations but also between social classes and 
individual members of the societies. Also, Johnson and Whittington (2009) together with 
Peng (2009) highlighted that for countries to be competitive, they have to have tangible 
and intangible resources which are part of the ICC concept. Resources and capabilities 
are almost defined in the same way because both are core competencies of countries 
that enable countries to devise appropriate strategies and implement them to achieve 
their targets as claimed by (Barney, 1991). In other words, using and managing 
resources responsibly promotes the well-being of all citizens in the society. While on 
further exploration of ICC, the next sub-section will the relevance of ICC in the form of 
hard work in developed and developing countries.  
2.3.1.4  ICC as hard work (HWK) 
According to Weber (1930) cultural values such as hard work, thrift and honesty 
were instruments of accumulation of capital and capitalism. While on the same, 68 
years later, Landes (1998) claimed that Japan's cultural values of hard work that 
permeated their societies enabled the transformation of their country from lack of real 
economic growth to sustained economic growth. It was everyone's responsibility and 
commitment to materialize the government's initiatives of economic growth. Similarly, 
Yang and Lester (2000, p. 282) explained that attributes of "Confucian ethic" such as 
hard work, respect for family and social order in countries like Taiwan, Hong Kong, and 
Singapore enabled these countries to industrialize and develop. Also, Becker (2013) 
empirically observed that culturally motivated behaviors vary with contexts and 
situations. Becker in his empirical work implied that virtues such as hard work in 
countries are critical for sustainable economic growth that generally raises the standard 
living of the citizens. It seems to agree with Banfield (1958) who earlier on argued that 
success or failure concerning economic growth in countries is subject to personal 
efforts. In other words, progress according to Banfield (1958) is owing to individuals 
persistently endeavoring to earn more wages. Hence, their productivity increases their 
welfare individually but also propels economic growth in their respective society. For 
instance, Grier (1997, p. 49) observed that Protestantism virtues of hardworking and 
individualism enhanced economic development in the USA and Canada consequently 
propelled sustainable economic growth. Despite empirical work in mainly developed 
countries confirming the importance of hard work virtue, it necessitates testing if hard 
work virtues are equally important in developing countries. Furthermore, almost all the 
empirical work extensively researched in developed nations relied on data that captures 
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virtues in advanced economies context. Hence, this study employs data sources that 
capture both advanced and non-advanced countries.  
 
2.3.1.5  ICC as Religion (REG) 
Marshall (1920, p. 1) as one of the 20th-century modern economics founder 
recognized that religion is one of the two great world history formative agents. Of 
course, belief can mean many things, but this study borrows the definition from Stark 
and Bainbridge, (1985, p. 5) who defined religion as any “shared set of beliefs, activities, 
and institutions premised upon faith in supernatural forces"; however, this study 
captures spirituality narrowing to believe in God, heaven, hell as crucial elements in the 
importance of religion in people's lives. Regarding empirical work on religion, essential 
studies have extensively worked on its impact on economic growth. For instance, Grier 
(1997, p. 47) observed that Latin America mainly Spanish speaking countries inherited 
Catholicism cultural traits that are not commercial friendly. This view seems to agree 
with Weber (1930) who claimed that Protestantism is positively related to economic 
growth. Nonetheless, the above studies focussed on differences in belief values 
between Catholics and Protestants while this thesis denotes religion concerning the 
importance of God in people's lives that captures levels of religious people regardless 
the types of faith in countries. While on the same, some social scientists have negatively 
connected Catholicism to economic growth (Harrison, 1985; Morse, 1964). On the other 
hand, Fanfani (1939) claims that religion is a catalyst for economic growth only when it 
is separate from politics and economic life. On this, Fanfani was of the view that 
Protestantism positive correlation with economic growth was due to their ability to 
separate state and religion, unlike the Catholicism. It seems to agree with Weber (1905, 
2002) claims that Protestantism linked religious salvation and good works as the 
fulfillment of duties in worldly affairs which was contrary to Catholicism. Hence, this 
thesis intends to bridge the inconsistency in the literature regarding the importance of 
religion to explain economic growth differences among countries. The concept of 
religion captured for this study in this subsection is part of the ICC form of cultural capital 
highlighted in section 2.3 above. Furthermore, ICC is denoted as security which is the 
focus in the next sub-section. 
2.3.1.6  ICC as security (SEC) 
 Table 3.2 defines security as freedom from fear of violence that includes theft, 
war, bodily harm, terrorism and being robbed of materials or properties hardly acquired. 
It is generally pointed out in the literature that low levels of security in countries hinder 
motivations and opportunities to invest, limits foreign technology and innovation (Mauro, 
1995, p. 81). It is well thought that protection to people, property rights, and contract 
enforcement cannot be dependable unless there are adequate measures in place to 
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check on executive discretion (Buchanan, 1962; Hayek, 1973; Cass, 2001; Dicey, 
1982). Also, Licht et al. (2001, p. 7) observed that values such as freedom, security, 
wealth, hedonism, and justice implicitly or explicitly guide executive actors' actions to 
do what is right, right and desirable in the societies.  That seems to suggest that people 
in leadership determine policies that enhance or not economic growth depending on 
what values are directing their decisions. For example, Jones and Olken (2004, p. 861) 
suggested that the change of national leaders in developing countries corresponded 
with the patterns of economic growth in the countries. They concluded that constraining 
the power of leaders in developing countries to promote economic growth. The next 
paragraph will highlight the empirical research conducted and why it is different in this 
study. 
 Haggard and Tiede (2011) observed that the literature rule of law is associated 
with economic growth. To attest the signature of the rule of law in explaining economic 
growth among countries, they denoted the rule of law in four dimensions namely: the 
provision of security of person and property; enforcement of contract; checks on 
government; and checks on corruption. One of the main reason why they used these 
dimensions is that the concept of the rule of law in literature has been captured 
differently. They noted that some indicators were subjectively measured through the 
evaluations of experts, investors, and citizens. Others were objectively measured 
through political institutions capturing institutional and legal environment. According to 
Glaeser et al. (2004), the proxy of legal institutions such as the rule of law is subject to 
objective measurements for the reason that subjective measures are prone to the risk 
of bias. This view is supported by the empirical work of Kurtz and Schrank (2007) who 
found that the importance of subjective measurement of governance indicators 
evaporates in cross-country growth analysis after controlling economic performance. 
On the other hand, objective measures of the rule of law are also subject to 
measurement error or proxies not reflecting the conventional structures of the 
institutional and legal environment (Haggard and Tiede, 2011, p. 676). Furthermore, 
Oman and Arndt (2006, p. 30) pointed out that the distinction between subjective and 
objective indicators is that objectively obtained indexes are replicated in contrast to 
individual symbols. They, however, argued that it would be a mistake to consider that 
real accomplished signs are more impartial because the choice of facts used and their 
interpretation incorporates to some extent subjective judgments in their generation. For 
instance, La Porta et al. (2004) observed that even though Peru in their research had a 
perfect score on judicial independence, this finding contrasted the persistence of 
authoritarian executive and rampant corruption in Peru. This difference between 
objective indicator measurements and reality in Peru is analogous to the distinction 
between de jure and de facto institutions as observed by (Woodruff, 2006).  Hence, 
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Haggard and Tiede (2011) used data to measure the security of persons from the 
International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) as one dimension to measure the rule of law.  
They claimed that the data produced by ICRG capture both subjective and objective 
measures of the rule of law. They concluded that violence in developing countries 
significantly hinders economic growth than other proxies of the rule of law other than 
corruption. However, the indices of security of persons they used from ICRG may fall 
in the same trap they highlighted that discrete components of the rule of law widely 
used in literature have fundamental methodological problems in their construction 
(Oman and Arndt, 2006). The study assumes that the methodology problem highlighted 
above might be due to the shortfall of capturing the differences between de jure and de 
facto or failure to consider informal institutions. For this reason, security of people and 
property will be obtained from the Afrobarometer Surveys as illustrated in Table 3.5 in 
chapter 3.  
Having looked at how ICC in sub-sections 2.3.1.1 to 2.3.1.5 above, the next 
section will further examine formal and informal institutions. The institutional change 
theory according to North (1990) explains that formal institutions configure informal 
institutions, and he acknowledged that formal and informal institutions concurrently 
evolve through the operation of social organizations such as villages, firms, 
governments, and households. On the other hand,  Pande and Udry (2005) contested 
North’s definition of institutions23. They argued that moral and ethical behavioral norms 
are in most cases embodied in informal institutions such as religion and caste 
determining the quality of institutions. In other words, in 2005, Pande and Udry’s view 
is more oriented to de factor institutions than de jure institutions. In this vein, the next 
section will explain more about formal and informal institutions. Hence, this thesis 
postulates that variables in the social category in sub-sections 2.3.1 to 2.3.5 significantly 
contribute to sustainable economic growth in countries. See condensed and complete 








                                            
 
23“Institutions are a set of rules, compliance procedures and moral and ethical behavioural 
norms designed to constrain the behaviour of individuals in the interests of maximizing the 
wealth or utility of the principals."  
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Table 2.2: Condensed and complete cultural variables  
 
Shortened names  Full names  
HWK Hard work 
CPR Civic capital  
SOC Social capital  
FER Feeling Responsibility 
REG Religion  
SEC Security  
ICC Intangible cultural category 
 
       Notes. FER variable was applied only in chapter 4 while SEC only in chapter 5.  
 
H2a: HWK CPR SOC FER REG SEC significantly contribute to economic growth 
 
H2b: HWK CPR SOC FER REG SEC do not significantly contribute to economic  
         Growth 
 
H2c:  HWK CPR SOC FER REG SEC have an effect on economic growth 
 
H2d:  HWK CPR SOC FER REG SEC have no effect on economic growth 
 
2.4 FORMAL AND INFORMAL INSTITUTIONS 
North (1991, p. 77) defined institutions as restrictions that construct political, 
economic and social interactions, but he acknowledged that both formal and informal 
institutions administer people’s actions through incentives. However, Pande and Udry 
(2005) were sceptical about North's agency implication in the definition of formal and 
informal institutions. Instead, they argued that institutions are often not designed, and 
even when they are, their operation may be different to what was initially intended. 
Boettke and Coyne (2009) described formal institutions as classified written rules and 
informal institutions as inclusive of cultures, norms, and conventions enforced by social 
custom. There is one more element in this study that needs to be explained by 
answering the question, "How do both formal and informal institutions satisfactorily 
explain their impact on economic growth?" Williamson and Mathers (2011) empirically 
tested formal and informal institutions by operationalizing formal institutions as 
economic freedom institutions by taking measurements from the Fraser Institute, while 
informal institutions were operationalized by taking measurements from WVS. They 
concluded independently that both culture and financial institutions contribute to 
economic prosperity. Despite the work of North (2005) and Weber (1904, 1905,  2002) 
agree with the findings of Williamson and Mathers (2011) economic freedom institution 
is not clearly labeled. Firstly, the data is prone to measurement problems. Secondly, 
the data used to measure economic freedom is not available in many countries, and 
the period the data covers are limited. Therefore, it is doubtful that the correlation 
between economic freedom and economic growth is robust enough to be trusted (De 
Haan and Sturm, 2000, p. 216).   While on the same, the relationship between formal 
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and informal institutions versus economic growth is further explained by (Casson et al., 
2010). They claimed that even though more credit given to formal institutions, the form 
of socio-economic outcomes does not solely depend on a development-orientated 
institutional perspective but also informal institutions. For instance, they explained that 
informal institutions influence the formation of the formal ones such as laws. It seems 
to suggest that informal institutions are deeply embedded in changing the actions and 
interactions of people in different types of social organizations such as household, 
villages, firms, groups, and governments in line with the study by (Pateman, 1988; Mies, 
2014).  In short, informal institutions seems to influence the quality of formal institutions. 
For example, Casson et al. (2010) argued that in the developing countries informal 
institutions play a significant role in the formation of legal institutions, especially if the 
interaction between markets and formal rules or institutions crumbles. Additionally, 
Platteau (1994; 2009) observed that informal institutions formed from culture and 
history re-installs trust among people when official rules fail to operate. To explicitly 
further explain the link between formal and informal institutions, the next sub-section 
also highlights the relationship. This relationship is vital in explaining economic 
differences among countries. However, in the next sub-section, there is the 
acknowledgment that economic growth among countries involves a wide range of 
factors such as geography, history, globalization, different capabilities, and many 
others. 
 
Generally, it is accepted in the literature that multinational enterprises theory 
highlights four motives for MNEs24 to invest in a country other than their own namely: i) 
natural resource seeking, ii) market seeking, iii) efficiency seeking, and iv) strategic 
asset seeking (Daft, 2012). Since their motive is to maximize returns, they chose 
countries to invest in due to country-specific advantages which include natural 
resources and location. It suggests that inflows of foreign direct investment (FDI) 
contribute significantly to the economies of the countries. Therefore, lack of FDI due to 
geography contributes to the underdevelopment of the nations. On the other hand, 
backwardness has also connected to histories of the countries. For example, Putnam 
(1993) claimed that North and South Italy enjoy the same institutions but their GDP per 
capita differs due to different historical origins, hence, differences in social capital levels. 
Further explanations why geography contributes to the quantity of FDI received in the 
specific countries that in turn enhances economic growth will be explained in the next 
sub-section. 
                                            
 
24 Multinational Enterprises 
2.4.1 Geography and Historical events  
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2.4.1.1   Geography 
Bloom et al. (1998) claimed that a lack of development in Africa is ascribed to 
geography that has dimensions of climate, soils, topography, and diseases. They 
observed that most of the countries under tropical zone have low production output 
compared to temperate zone countries. For instance, they noted that in 1995, tropical 
economies averaged $3326 in GDP per capita, while the non-tropical nations averaged 
$9027 in GDP per capita. Only two of the top 30 countries in a world ranking of GDP 
per capita lie in the tropics: Hong Kong and Singapore. This assumption according to 
Glawe and Wagner (2017, p. 2) of a relationship between tropical location and 
underdevelopment is not a new topic in economic development but comes from as far 
back as 16th and 18th centuries by (Machiavelli, 1519; Montesquieu, 1748 both cited in 
Easterly and Levine, 2003, pp. 5-6). If this is the case, it seems to suggest that country-
specific advantages determine the levels of FDI inflows in countries. For example, FDI 
inflows according to United Nations Conference on Trade (UNCTAD) report in the year 
2008 in developed nations had $962.3 billion while developing countries in the same 
year had $620.7 billion.  Also, in the year 2009 due to the financial crisis, the FDI inflows 
in developed nations dropped to $565.6 billion while developing countries fell to $405.5 
billion. Of course, climate and location as claimed by Landes (1999), Machiavelli (1519) 
together with Sachs and Warner (1997), possibly explains why most developing 
countries such as SSC had the least FDI in UNCTAD report. Nevertheless, 
geographical explanations of economic disparities yield ambiguous results for the 
reason that there are some countries like Nigeria, rich in natural resources and access 
to external markets but the country is struggling economically. On the other hand, Japan 
which was underdeveloped at some point in time compared with developed countries 
managed to catch up with the developed countries, yet it has few natural resources 
comparing to Nigeria (Meisenberg and Lynn, 2011). At the same time, in Sub-Saharan 
region countries like Botswana and Mauritius to mention a few appear to do better 
economically than other developing countries like Malawi, Tanzania, Zambia and many 
others in the same region. Hence, the question remains what then causes economic 
disparities? The next sub-section attempts to answer the question. 
2.4.1.2   Critical Historical Juncture in the African continent 
North (1981) was one of the first scholars to connect countries right path to 
differences in economic development. His claim reinforced by the work of Acemoglu et 
al. (2001) and  Hall and Jones (1999) who associate underdevelopment to colonial 
origins mainly by the Europeans. Their findings focused on policies and political 
maneuvers that were beneficial to colonizers' economic interests rather than to the 
colonized. On the other hand, scholars like La Porta et al. (1999) explained economic 
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development differences regarding the origin of legal institutions. They claimed that 
legal background contributes to the performance of the governments while taking note 
of the views presented by above scholars in this paragraph. This study is interested 
more in the connections between historical paths of countries and the formation of 
cultural values, beliefs, norms, and rules that the study explores as determinants of 
economic disparities among nations. For instance, Banfield (1958) and Putnam (1993) 
connected social capital, civic and economic behavior differences between Northern 
and Southern Italy to variations of their respective traditional histories. It appears to 
suggest that formation of preferences of doing things is attached to the past values, 
norms and rules of the societies and these values are the ones that explain economic 
performance differences (Glaeser et al., 2002; Tabellini, 2010).  
In contrast, Lipset (1997) and Inglehart and Baker (2000) claimed that the level 
of economic development induces the creation and consolidation of democracy or 
institutions. For this reason, the institutions embraced in the developed countries were 
enforced in less developed countries with the anticipation that democratic governance 
will be created leading to economic development. Nonetheless, Glaeser et al. (2004) 
raised a concern that institutions embraced in the modernization theory yield different 
financial performances in different countries due to different informal institutions. 
Therefore, the claim that historical paths of nations appear to stand for the reason that 
history contributes to the formation of culture. For instance, Nunn (2009) presented that 
history can have long-time impacts on the creation of culture. Also, Landes (1999) 
connected the present state of economic differences between North and South America 
to differences in cultural values among the colonizers. Furthermore, in 1999, Landes 
explained that in South America Portuguese and Spaniards as colonizers were more 
interested in extracting natural resources to mother countries rather than developing 
institutions that would empower indigenous people. In contrast, British colonizers in 
North America introduced their hard-working values and economic freedom that 
eventually lead North Americans to grow more rapidly than the counterparts (Bertocchi 
and Canova, 2002; Price, 2003). Comparing the three colonizers, Britain was more 
industrially developed and had better economic freedom institutions than Portugal and 
Spain (Lange, 2004).  
Besides, Darity (1982) claimed that the slave trade was the most lucrative 
activity in the 18th century. Due to this nature of the unproductive activity, slave raiders, 
slave traders, and intermediaries caused African continent militarised, the formation of 
kingdoms, and warlords (Law, 1991; Manning, 1990). The extent of violence and 
suffering for those who remained in Africa and those taken is immeasurable. 
Furthermore, immediately after the abolition of the slave trade, colonialism came into 
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force in the African continent (Nunn, 2007). Therefore, if critical historical junctures 
could explain the formation of culture (informal institutions), then underdevelopment in 
Africa could also be associated with colonialism and slavery. Platteau (2009) declared 
that African development lagged behind due to international obstacles. He further 
explained that governance problems remain correlated to institutional legacies that 
existed during pre-colonial and colonial times in African countries. Hence, the 
prescribed institutions imposed on Africans impacted on their values and capabilities. 
See more explanations in the next paragraph. 
Acemoglu (2003) claimed that Europeans introduced different institutions in 
different colonies depending on the motive of their colonization. If the motivation was to 
extract natural resources from the colonized countries, they entered institutions that 
protected them to do that instead of protecting the indigenous people. Institutions 
introduced helped the elites consolidate the power over the indigenous people. For 
example, Prah (2002) argued that the current realities in Africa are as a result of the 
encounter of the Africans with the Europeans through colonization. He further explained 
that education systems established under the colonial rule were contrary to the cultures 
of the colonized. Similarly, it was agreed that history matters by giving the form of 
colonization as a formula of integration that shaped the development of institutions in 
the colonized countries  (Engerman and Sokoloff, 1997, 2002; La Porta et al., 1997, 
1999; La Porta, 2008). Likewise, Nunn (2007) and Amin (1972) associated 
unproductive activities of African societies to the legacy of the slave trade and 
colonialism by the Europeans. Furthermore, Adejumobi (2000); Bohannan and Curtin 
(1988) claimed that African nations had developed political systems and advanced legal 
institutions that could be compared to today's courts. Nonetheless, colonialism 
explanations of underdevelopment are debatable for the reason that historically, 
Christian missionaries from European countries established in kind many things that 
were good to the lives of people such as hospitals and schools which are still in 
operation today in Africa continent. However, the question remains if education systems 
provided were in the interest of indigenous people or the colonizers. Furthermore, there 
are rail lines built by colonizers over 50 years ago which are still operational today. 
Ironically, after independence, many African countries failed to develop better rail lines, 
roads, and education systems. Instead, they maintained or was unable to keep good 
things started by the colonizers. This view is not without criticism. For instance, South 
Africa and Zimbabwe developed better facilities within the same period than other 
countries. Why?  The possible answer is that it is not African leaders who developed 
better facilities but Europeans. Of course, colonialism impacted on the cultural values 
of indigenous people both negatively and positively but the better development of 
infrastructures in Zimbabwe and South Africa raises questions on the role of native 
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national bits of intelligence in most of the African countries which until now most people 
experience extreme poverty. The next sub-section will further explore national culture 
and knowledge.   
 
In section 2.3 above culture definitions given are relevant to this study. However, 
the main focus in this section is to explain the relationship between culture and ability. 
Sternberg (2004) argues that trying to define the ability of people to solve contextual 
challenges out of their cultural context is not doing justice for it could lead to the 
imposition of skills that are not relevant to the challenges faced by people in the cultural 
setting. It is, therefore, a responsibility of each cultural system to define the skills and 
ability important for the economic development of its people. Hence, differences in 
perception and cognitive are also cultural specific as claimed by (Nisbett et al., 2001; 
Varnum et al., 2010). They claimed that differences in cognitive styles correlated to 
differences in social orientations. For instance, Varnum and his associates observed 
that holistic cognitive style is associated with interdependence orientation while analytic 
cognitive style associated with independence orientation. Figure 2.2 below it indicates 
that social and economic systems have the impact on the development of the capacities 
of individuals better explained in section 2.4.3.2 below. For instance, Berry (1966) 
conducted a research to test the hypothesis that psychological tendencies develop as 
adaptations to geography, economy, social and culture. He concluded that 
environmental demands and cultural practices are significantly related to the 
development of ability and skills. Likewise, other scholars argue that neural processes 
vary across cultural groups and that environmental forces are acting on people of 
different locations continually shaping their capacity and skills (Davidson and McEwen, 
2012; Chiao and Ambady, 2007; Han and Northoff, 2008; Kitayama and Uskul, 2011). 
Also, Nisbett et al. (2012) claimed that genes and environment contribute to making 
what human capability is. In other words, the ability to do things skilfully could be 
transferred genetically, but also created through social learning. In this case, therefore, 
the capacity to do things should make people identify and solve problems by analyzing, 
creating possible solutions and practically engaging in solving the challenges better 
described in the concept called phronesis25 (Clegg and Ross-Smith, 2003; Flyvbjerg, 
2008). The skills and knowledge gained are essential for the progression of skills and 
ability in each context. Therefore, it seems to suggest that Creativity of doing things 
involves both performance and knowledge acquisition components to novel challenges 
in changing environments. Hence, practical intelligence comes when both performance 
                                            
 
25 It means wisdom in determining ends and the means of attaining them  
2.4.2      Ability to novel challenges in different contexts  
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and acquisition components summoned to experiences with the aim of adapting and 
shaping to fitness in the fluctuating environments. Herrmann et al. (2007) claimed that 
cognitive abilities have evolved due to specific diverse environments. It helps 
individuals to have a capability of solving novel problems of their social lives meaning 
that they have what can be called social capability.  
In the same way, Hsu and Fang (2009) observed that in today's business 
environment the firms make long-term profits and performance due to intangible capital. 
They further explained that intangible ability capital of the firm is significant in the 
development of new products. It appears humans developed cognitive abilities or skills 
much better than other species due to the reproduction process through social learning. 
In other words, culture has effects on cognitive abilities or skills (van Schaik and Burkart, 
2011; Moll and Tomasello, 2007; Herrmann et al., 2007).  This cultural intelligence is 
very vital for it involves both the development and evolution parts of its existence. 
Therefore, condemning some cultures as inferior to economic development does not 
help for the reason that people will be limited to develop their cognitive abilities outside 
their culture. This paragraph expounds more on the definition of culture in section 2.3 
above captured as ICC in four proxies of culture. Furthermore, some empirical studies 
are discussed in the next sub-section to illuminate why different societies make different 
economic decisions. 
2.4.2.1    Societies Make Different Decisions 
Guss et al. (2010) conducted a study that involved 511 students from 5 different 
countries26 , and they concluded that Cross-national differences were noted in all 
complex problem-solving strategies and task-specific differences. It seems to suggest 
that individual skills in solving problems are culturally specific determined by ecological 
and socio-political context. Similarly, Hedden et al. (2008) researched participants from 
East Asian27 cultures and those from Western contexts in North America and Western 
Europe. They observed that cultural differences in dimensions influence capacity and 
skills and dispositions differently. For instance, they noted that Western cultural 
contexts do well on tasks emphasizing independent aspects while those from East 
Asian settings emphasize interdependence dimensions of culture. That seems to 
suggest that all human undertakings are culturally specific. In other words, their ideas, 
values, feelings, skills, knowledge, beliefs attitudes, strategies, and goals embedded in 
cultural experiences (Heine, 2008; Richerson et al., 2010; Gifford, 2009). Hence, the 
claim that socio-cultural environment shapes and influences strategy formulation and 
                                            
 
26 Brazil, Germany, India, the Philippines, and the United States 
27 China, Japan, and Korea 
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their implementation in dealing with problems. The contexts become a foundation 
where people become experts in developing their strategies and using that knowledge 
in their application (Gauvain and Perez, 2007). It is essential because the experience 
they acquire and learn includes norms, values, skills, and standards and are equally 
regulated by them with any changes and desirability (Guss and Wiley, 2007). That leads 
to differences in socio-cultural and political systems developed according to their mode 
of preferences and capabilities which is the focus in the next sub-section.  
2.4.2.2    Socio-cultural and Political systems  
All classical and neoclassical theories discussed in section 2.2 above take up a 
rational, self-interested approach which is claimed not to be influenced by the social 
world. The assumption of theories based on the claim that self-interests of individuals 
pursuing their own goals as far as does not violet laws will be beneficial not only to the 
individual but the whole society (Smith, 1776). The self-interested individual outcomes 
associated with the welfare of the society metaphorically called an "invisible hand" by 
Smith. By contrast, Gintis (2007) raised some concerns on a rational actor model such 
that not all individual choices even if they are self-interested can always be welfare 
enhancing or consciously maximize anything. On the other hand, Marx (1906) claimed 
that the capacities of individuals develop according to the tasks assigned to in the 
economic production system. Hence, suggesting that individual welfare depends on the 
path of development of the individual's capacities as they engage in the tasks assigned. 
Hence, claim that "preference structures" are endogenous in the economic system and 
financial doings have the power of influence in almost all elements of social life. That 
appears to suggest that choices or preferences made by individuals for welfare do not 
only rely on qualities of goods and services but the environmental structures such as 
social organization institutions and economic institutions. Economic and organization 
institutions seem to contribute to the development of individual capacities (Gintis, 1972).  
Figure 2.2 below explains better what stated in the previous sentence. Savani et al. 
(2010) researched Americans and Indians participants on what construe actions as 
choices. Then they found that opportunities are contextual, socio-cultural systems of 
meanings and practices are shaping that.  
Figure 2.2 below illustrates the point that the environment determines the 
development of the capacities of individuals. Also, the chart shows that cultural systems 
contribute to the formation of both economic and social networks which impact on the 
development of individuals. Therefore, the development of an individual's capacities 
depends on the interaction in the whole environment in which the individual located. 
Arguably, this is a dynamic relationship in that individual's thinking is not limited by 
culture, but their preferences or behaviors fluctuate according to different situations 
(Zou et al., 2009). It suggests that there is no one way of dealing with problems as 
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indicated by neoclassical theories, but, instead of skills, knowledge, ideas are updated 
according to purposes achieved in the pertinent situation and environment. Therefore, 
it is not legitimate to impose policies that have worked in developed countries to 
developing countries in enhancing economic development. The treatment of countries 
in one28 overlooks the socio-cultural and political relations, intersubjective meanings 
and value in progress, and stochastic environments. The fact that neoclassical theories 
do not take into consideration the contribution of non-economic factors to economic 
development, the assumptions are part of the reason for the inequality of economic 
growth across countries, concerns are raised about the position of development theory 
about reducing people to isolated atoms open to market (Mill and Backhouse, 1997; 
Nurkse, 1966). Also, Myrdal (1957, 1968). He suggested that development theory has 
to include institutional and socio-cultural factors in economic development 
phenomenon. While on the same issue, Hirschman (1981) points out that the discipline 
of economics fails to deal with the reality of development by failing to take broader views 
of politics and social insights. In this case, therefore, political and economic powers in 
the world have to take into consideration the fact that economic factors and none 
economic factors contribute differently in enhancing or hindering economic progress in 























                                            
 
28Same box manner 
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Notes. Capacity development of people could be due to economic and social systems in 
place in any society. 
 
This category has also received attention in recent years in literature for 
explaining economic performance differences among countries. As a result, the 
developing countries were supported by developed countries to introduce democracy, 
neo-liberal rights, property rights, contract enforcement and reduction of corruption. All 
these brilliant ideas according to Keynes even though they are powerful and have 
tremendous influences, are defunct, yielding mixed results (Keynes, 1936:383). Of 
course, institutions are essential when formed with the right intentions. For instance, 
Williamson and Mathers (2011) empirically tested formal and informal institutions by 
operationalizing formal institutions as economic institutions by measuring (Gwartney et 
al., 2008), while informal institutions were operationalized by taking measurements from 
World Values Surveys. They concluded independently that culture and financial 
institutions contribute to economic prosperity. However, Acemoglu et al. (2001) noted 
that evil colonial institutions that existed many years ago could have long-lasting effects 
on the colonized countries. In other words, the way societies organize themselves are 
path dependent reflecting their history, economic, legal, political, social and moral 
institutions as expressed by (Bagella et al., 2002; Brohman, 1995; Greif, 1994; 
2.4.3      Institutional category 












Richerson et al., 2010). The inconsistency in literature for this category meticulously 
discussed in sub-sections 2.4.1 to 2.4.2 above. However, the variables embraced in 
this category are briefly discussed below. 
2.4.3.1    Control of corruption (COC) 
COC captures perceptions of the extent to which public power exercised for 
private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as "capture" of 
the state by elites and private interests. See more information in Table 3.2 in chapter 3. 
Aidt et al. (2008, p. 209) observed that quality of institutions determines the extent of 
the contribution of corruption towards economic growth. They claimed that in regimes 
with the high quality of institutions corruption reduces economic growth in all 
specifications significantly. On the other hand, administrations of the low quality of 
institutions the effect of crime on economic growth are insignificant. Likewise, some 
authors argue that illegal operations of government institutions significantly reduce 
incentives and opportunities to invest and innovate (North, 1990; Schleifer, 1993). 
Hence, hurting economic growth. Furthermore, Tanzi (1998) empirically researched on 
the effects of corruption and observed that bribery adversely lowers the levels of 
investment, the productivity of public expenditure, revenue collection, investment in 
education, and health services. Consequently, the public resources are misallocated to 
agents of bureaucracy furnishing own non-productive projects (Del Monte and Papagni, 
2001, p. 2). Despite, numerous studies are empirically verifying that corruption erodes 
investments in human resource development mainly in developing countries 
(Bukovansky, 2006, p. 191). The anti-corruption campaign seems not to yield tangible 
results in the states (Uberti, 2016). Therefore, causes of corruptions demand better 
scrutiny. The inconsistency in literature in the use of de jure and de factor capturing 
variables by depicting institutions could explain the discrepancies in developing 
countries. Hence, this thesis fills this gap by catching concepts with connotations of de 
jure and de facto institutions.  
2.4.3.2    Government Effectiveness (GEF) 
 GEF identifies perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the 
civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of 
policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government’s 
commitment to such policies. The data come from World Governance Indicators) (WGI), 
and the scores range from -2.5 to 2.5, with higher scores corresponding to a higher 
level of government effectiveness.  Anyanwu (2014, p. 475) conducted empirical 
research about the importance of GEF in explaining differences in economic growth. 
He observed that one unit increase of GEF in Africa enhanced economic development 
significantly by 0.166 percent. Likewise, Sa (2011, pp. 105-107) tested GEF and found 
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it significantly and positively contributes to economic growth in both developed and 
developing countries. The findings in both studies highlighted above seem to show that 
proper civic engagement, cooperation and coordination of inhabitants in developing 
countries mutually benefit and enhance the effectiveness of governments. It is in line 
with the observations of Putnam (1993, p. 2) that communities where SOC dictates fair 
play among people, adherence to the law breeds leaders who are honest and 
committed to equality in their communities. It also appears to suggest that failure of 
GEF in developing countries reflects what can be called uncivil societies whereby public 
affairs is someone else's business. Similarly, Rodrik (2000, pp. 2-3) suggested that 
social arrangements of social cooperation and trust, the rule of law, social and political 
institutions are crucial to solving economic and justice challenges in developing 
countries. It seems to suggest that the variables that proxies institutions by 
organizations such WDI do reflect not only formal institutions but also informal 
institutions. There is a further consideration in the first paragraph of section 2.4 above.  
2.4.3.3    Rule of law (ROL) 
 The capture of the ROL intends to gauge whether the law as a significant effect 
in both developed and developing countries. Acemoglu (2003) suggested that the rule 
in some countries is applied selectively. In countries where the law is selectively applied 
justice is in a dilemma. For instance, in contexts where unlimited political and economic 
power belongs to the elites, the authority entrusted to them is abused for the benefits 
of the few (Acemoglu, 2003, pp. 468-469). Consequently, weak civil cooperation is 
created leading to non-functional of the ROL (Stoelhorst and Richerson, 2013). 
Furthermore, non-functional of ROL derails the participation and effective 
implementation of human rights. Hence, less empowerment of citizens disrupts positive 
changes which could lead to the safe environment where participation and 
accountability in politics becomes a priority   (UNDP, 2011, pp. 85-86). Therefore, ROL 
is crucially essential to promote capability and freedom of citizens and providing to them 
quality education, improved standard of living and healthy life (Lanzi, 2007, p. 424).  
All in all, section 2.3 above has explained the culture definitions relevant to the 
purpose of this study. For instance, culture in this study proxies ICC in different forms 
namely: political capital, social capital, responsibility, hard work, and security. Also, 
gaps in the literature identified. Furthermore, section 2.4 clarifies and illustrates how 
ICC in part 2.3 relates to formal and informal institutions whereby socio-cultural and 
political systems formed by the interactions of social organization institutions and 
economic institutions. Importantly, section 2.2 above discusses the current theoretical 
assumptions and their relevance to existing economic realities relative to developed 
and developing contexts. The upshot, the interactions involving all variable categories 
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addressed in sections 2.2 to 2.4 above take place in the global environment. Hence, 
the next section explores more on how the global context impact on the importance of 
the variables explained above. Also, Table 2.3 below illustrates shortened and full 
institutional variables names and the assumptions portrayed in this institutional 
category is that: 
H3a: ROL FER COC significantly contribute to economic growth 
 
H3b: ROL FER COC do not significantly contribute to economic growth 
 
H3c:  ROL FER COC have an effect on economic growth 
 
H3d:  ROL FER COC have no effect on economic growth 
 
Table 2.3: Shortened and complete names of institutional variables 
 
 
 Notes. GEF and ROL were applied in chapter 4 while chapter engaged all the three 
 variables.  
2.5 GLOBALISATION29 MOREOVER, ECONOMIC GROWTH  
 
The concept of environment could mean global, regional, national, and tribal 
cultures. Global culture appears to influence every level of culture through a process 
called top-down according to (Erez and Gati, 2004). The milieu accompanied by global 
culture are technologies, media, market, and ways of economic and political 
organization. Hence, how people interact with an aggregate of surrounding things, 
conditions, and influences determines their economic success. It seems to suggest that 
human capability is crucially important in the global competitive environment. The focus 
here is on the globalization of the world economy whereby countries rely on each other 
concerning goods, services, and capital flows. For example, Intriligator (2004) 
highlighted some of the benefits of globalization such as reduction of goods, and 
services' costs, and prices. He, however, noted that the gains obtained through 
globalization raise concerns about increasing economic disparities between developing 
and developed countries. In 2004, Intriligator's concerns about economic disparities 
between developed and developing countries were also vindicated a decade later in 
                                            
 
29 means the processes through which national countries are crisscrossed and undermined by 
transnational actors with varying prospects of power, orientations, identities, and network 
(Beck, 2018)  
Shortened variables Complete names of variables 
GEF Government Effectiveness (Governance).  
ROL The rule of law  
COC Control of corruption 
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the study of (Dabla-Norris et al., 2015). In their work, they observed that income 
inequality is not a challenge only in developing countries but also in developed 
countries. For example, their finding indicated that income inequality between the poor 
and the rich in developed countries is presented in the highest levels, while in emerging 
and developing countries there are uncertain outcomes (p.4). They further observed 
that even though income inequality seems to decline in emerging and developing 
countries, there remains the spread of injustices accessing key components of human 
development such as education, and financial services.  The upshot of the work of 
Dabla-Norris et al. (2015) is that income inequality between developed and developing 
countries is increasing which provides a major challenge to the globalized economy. 
Even though globalization has successfully reduced trade barriers among countries, 
the gap between countries' standard of living seems to be increasing. For instance, in 
the survey conducted by Pew Research Centre (PRC, 2014) about 60% of the 
participants globally acknowledged that the inequality between the rich and the poor is 
a defining challenge of our time.  In this global culture the autonomy of countries' 
governments and political control over their societies seems to be reduced (Bryant, 
1994; Imai, 2006).  The loss of control and autonomy could be due to a sudden and 
enormous increase of information, and capital flows. That has led to the unstoppable 
power of influence of multinational enterprises, International institutions like the World 
Bank, and International Monetary Fund. In this regard, in a globalized world, a problem 
is noted whereby countries will act differently to the same global changes. For example, 
Rey (2015) observed that prevailing economic conditions in important financial centers 
such as US, EU, and China determine international financial cycle through their ability 
to control cross-country credit flows. This seems to suggest that it is only those 
countries with the capabilities to compete in the global environment that enjoys the 
opportunities provided by globalization. In contrast, those countries which are less 
competitive are vulnerable to external competition (Slaughter, 1997; Thomas, 1997). Of 
course, globalization faces challenges in some countries due to differences in culture 
and political power (Brown and Jones, 1995; Dupont, 1996; Huntington, 1991). 
Ironically, this suggests that some countries retain their culture, autonomy, and power. 
Consequently, countries are affected differently by globalization. Hence, the national 
culture which represents the level of cultures at tribal and individual levels is of interest. 
This type of demonstration has been advocated in cross-cultural studies by authors 
such as (Boyadgiller et al., 1996; Hofstede, 1980; House et al., 1999; Schwartz, 1992). 
The question is “what happens at national culture in the presence of globalization?” 
Schein (1992) claimed that national culture is at the same level as organizational 
culture. Therefore, a national culture defined as people sharing beliefs, values, and 
norms and these play a crucial role in influencing their behaviors. Remarkably, at 
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organizational culture level implied as national level, there are interior dimensions such 
as innovation, attention to details, outcome orientation, risk-taking, and team focus as 
highlighted by (Miron et al., 2003; O'Reilly et al., 1991). So, the processes involved in 
global and national cultures are top-down and bottom-up respectively. The two 
processes represent the tension between the global and national cultures and are 
dynamic and very competitive. Western countries dominate this dynamic environment 
according to Thurow (2003, 2009) for the reason that they are economically empowered 
as they control about 57% of world GDP. Hence, the global culture mainly reflects the 
core values of western societies such as freedom of choice, individual rights and market 
liberalism (Gupta and Govindarajan, 2004). This type of environment according to 
Thurow (2003) is very competitive at the national level, which suggests that the 
countries that can innovate and adapt to the changing global and local environments 
could be able to survive in this global economy. It seems to suggest that the capabilities 
of countries determine success or failure of economic growth. However, the question is 
what determines capabilities? The next section explores more on the abilities of 
countries to compete in the global economy. 
 
 
Cantwell (2009) and Dunning (2009) contend that decisions on which countries 
establish Multinational Enterprises do not only depend on low transaction cost theories 
but the location of the country. The position of a nation has country-specific advantages 
which include the availability of natural resources, capabilities, and the type of 
institutions in operation. Skills and institutions work hand in hand with individuals 
through reflection that helps the formation of social organization and culture, but also 
how social organization and culture constrain and inform the individual (Elder Jr, 1994; 
Thomas and Znaniecki, 1920). Also, appears to suggest that the abilities and moral 
qualities rely on the formal and informal institutions of the specific country. Probably, 
this can be perceived as a human capability of interacting with the environment. 
Alternatively, it implies that the construction of the way of life by making decisions, what 
strategies and choices to pursue concerning local and global environments determines 
social outcomes such as the extent of economic growth in the countries. For instance, 
Kitayama and Uskul (2011) noted that cultural orientations contributed to their cultural 
differences in self, cognition, attention, and motivation. Also, Markus and Kitayama 
(2010) found that the capacity of people in a particular culture create a culture and 
shaped by the culture produced. Furthermore, Stoelhorst and Richerson (2013) claimed 
that human species have greater capabilities of organization than any other animal 
species as a result of this human capacity. Such being the case, humans have 
developed a culture that distinguishes them from other animals. This culture capacity 
2.5.1     What determines capabilities? 
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suggests that humans accumulate knowledge, ideas, skills, norms, and values that 
come as a result of humans interacting with the environment (Gowdy et al., 2013). It 
seems to agree with the aim of the thesis of exploring whether cultural factors enhance 
or hinder economic growth in the countries. Sections 2.3 and 2.4 above capture the 
accumulation of knowledge and differences between countries in formal and informal 
institutions. Does it mean humans interact with the environment differently? Probably 
yes, for instance, Wilson and Gowdy (2013) suggest that differences in economic 
growth and social outcomes are not the result of genetic differences among humans, 
but it is the result of organizational capabilities that maximize better strategies and 
choices on the scarce resources within their reach in the face of competition from 
others. Besides, differences in organizational capabilities are connected to the process 
called "niche construction" by (Brown and Richerson, 2013; Kendal et al., 2011; Odling-
Smee et al., 2003) This process highlights the importance of feedback loops between 
humans and their environments leading to cultural and genetic variation as illustrated 
in Figure 2.1 above. The evolution mechanism in culture and genes provide 
explanations of how societies differ in dealing with challenges in their environments. 
These differences captured in sections 2.3 and 2.4 above. If this is the case in 
explaining economic growth differences between developed and developing countries, 
then globalization seems to be in opposition to the novelty of indigenous citizens dealing 
with the challenges in their context further explained as capability limitation in the next 
sub-section. 
 
Since cultural and genetic evolution lead to accumulated improvement of skills, 
knowledge, values, and norms they provide further novel answers to challenges in 
respective environments. Then global culture limits the ability of the local people to meet 
the challenges in their countries. In other words, the wisdom in determining ends and 
the means of attaining them depends on the people in the contexts such as those in 
developing countries.  According to Clegg and Ross-Smith (2003) and  Flyvbjerg, 
(2008) intelligence (local wisdom) should make people face and solve their challenges 
by analyzing, creating possible solutions and practically engaging in addressing them. 
This claim is supported by Al Mamun (2008) who argued that the disregarding of 
accumulated local knowledge, skills, values damage the agenda of economic growth in 
developing countries. Also, Chambers (1985) observed that the centralized urban 
professional power, culture and values often override the local people's intelligence. 
The author hinted that the approach limits how indigenous people interact with their 
environment, hence the people having no congruent knowledge, skills in tackling their 
challenges. In so doing local people become lost in their environment due to an 
2.5.2     Limitation to capabilities 
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overwhelming amount of knowledge and skills not relevant to their social organization 
and languages. The claim that human beings are unique in their range of environments 
helps to explain cultural variations regarding knowledge, skills, values, and norms and 
these are different in different contexts (Bucci and Segre, 2011; Henrich and McElreath, 
2003; Sacco and Segre, 2009).  
In literature, some examples seem to indicate that confidence in utilizing local 
wisdom has more significant economic growth impact than the application of global 
knowledge. For instance, Easterly (2006) gave an example of Sub-Saharan countries 
which received more foreign aid than the tiger nations such as Japan, South Korea, 
Taiwan, Singapore, and Thailand but managed to catch up with the developed 
countries. Easterly explained that the tiger nations had a more excellent self-reliance 
attitude than the Sub-Saharan countries. This begs the question: Why did all those 
brilliant ideas which worked in developed countries not yield the same results in 
developing countries? It appears to suggest that the wisdom offered was not congruent 
to African challenges. Nonetheless, this failure of brilliant ideas shoveled into 
developing nations (Rodrik, 2006). Paradoxically, the same author a decade later 
suggested that globalization has spurred economic growth in African countries (Rodrik, 
2016, p.17). He observed that structural change and industrialization he criticized 
earlier on propelled economic growth in Africa. He further claimed that the globalization 
of the economy provided macroeconomic stability and improved governance in African 
countries (p.17). Similarly, Intriligator (2017) pointed out that generally, globalization 
enhances competition and expansion of markets that in turn lead to specialization and 
division of labour which improves production worldwide. As a result, there are 
reductions in prices and costs that fosters economic growth globally.  On the contrary, 
Usman and Bashir (2018) noted that the Washington Consensus and the Neoliberal 
Approach s tenets of globalization had failed miserably in the African context.   
Perhaps, Easterly (2006) was right that the contextual approach to solving their 
challenges in the tiger nations was right in the sense that they used their wisdom and 
intelligence to devise their policies that were suitable to their countries rather than 
implementing all the strategies suggested by the world institutions such as World Bank 
and International Monetary Fund. Alternatively, is it what Smith (1979) wrote that the 
structure of the global system causes the lack of sustainable economic growth in the 
developing countries? Easterly (2006) together with Smith (1979) seem to highlight 
developing countries’ dependency on the wisdom of the tenets of the Global network; 
Whereby, the proponents of dependency theory, do not blame the internal 
characteristics of the developing nations on the failure of sustained economic growth in 
the countries.  Instead, the blame is on the power of the developed countries who 
decide what is needed and not needed in the global system. Therefore, this perspective 
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implies that developing countries are subordinates in the order and that these countries 
cannot survive without accepting the position allocated to them. However, the theory 
fails to stand up with the empirical evidence of the countries which were in the same 
place as developing countries six decades ago such as Japan, China, Singapore, South 
Korea, and others and have managed to strikingly raise the living standard of people in 
their countries. Even though dependency theory does not take into consideration the 
internal characteristics of the developing countries, it is arguable that attitudes such as 
self-reliance, achievement motive, the determination which rely on the cultures present 
in these countries contribute to economic growth of the nations. In other words, the 
wisdom and intelligence abilities determine the level of economic growth of the nations. 
This position seems to agree with Herrnstein and Murray (1994, 2010) who claimed that 
intelligence ability of individuals predicated their productivity. Also, Rindermann and 
Thompson (2011) referred cognitive ability to intelligence which he said determines 
technology and other scientific achievements hence creating the wealth of the 
countries. These authors raised another point that the people with knowledge will form 
good economic and political institutions which in turn enhance economic growth in the 
countries. Cognitive abilities are connected with the receiving of the information, 
decoding and understanding it and storing as knowledge which can be applied well in 
the solving problems. In conclusion, this section and other sections above present 
eclectic of things explaining economic differences among countries. These 
explanations are generally crucial in determining the productivity and economic growth 
differences among nations further discussed in the next section.  
2.6. TFP30 AND, ECONOMIC GROWTH  
Caselli (2005) in explaining cross-country differences in income per capita, 
argued that the existing literature attributes about 50% to efficiency differences among 
countries. He expounded the development function as: 
Outcome = F (input factors such as physical & human capital, efficiency)….….........(3) 
Efficiency interpreted as residual31 in Solow's production function and is endorsed as 
the cause for poverty and underdevelopment. Therefore, the s expected that to 
counteract this ignorance it is important to improve the quality and measurement of the 
input factors. Caselli (2005) claimed that despite empirical researches conducted in this 
vein, the input factors in equation (3) above failed to account for differences in income 
per capita among countries. For example, Islam (1995) and Knight et al. 1992  used 
                                            
 
30 Total Factor Productivity 
31 Measure of our ignorance  
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panel data analysis to estimate output from economic growth function in equation (3) 
above. Their findings indicated that physical capital and human capital (input factors) 
regarding accumulation did not explain the differences in economic growth among 
countries. However, they noted that country-specific effects determine differences in 
economic growth outcomes, these country-specific effects interpreted as TFP. 
Similarly, King and Levine (1994) together with Prescott (1998) used calibration 
approach and found that input factors in production function equation (3) above had 
limited power of explanation without large differences in TFP. Likewise, Bos et al. (2010) 
in explaining the growing differences in per capita income among countries, claimed 
that inefficiencies and different production technologies account for income per capita 
differences across countries. They pointed out that the assumptions of neoclassical 
theory that all countries are efficient and use the production inputs at best practice 
frontier technology are not consistent with their findings. They observed that countries 
use frontier technology with varying degrees of competence. The probable cause of 
differences to efficiencies could be attributed to the cultural values that embrace the 
production practices in the countries. This view would be consistent with Petrakis and 
Kostis (2013) who found that cultural background explains the unexplained efficiency 
in the production functions. They explained that cultural values affect the organization 
and function of institutions which determines the allocation and distribution of 
resources. So it appears to agree with the findings of De Jong (2009) who observed 
that culture defined as attitudes and values that permeate the society determines the 
level of development of the society or country. Nonetheless, Breton (2013) objected to 
the claim that TFP was larger than the contribution of physical and human capital. He 
explained that a good amount of TFP might be due to the error measurement of human 
capital. Hence, he interpreted Solow's residual as new technology and more efficient 
practices of management. That appears to agree with Restuccia and Rogerson (2013) 
who claimed that differences in income per capita across countries are not credited to 
TFP but allocation and misallocation of the input factors in the production function. 
Generally, despite these objections, there is a consistent agreement in the literature 
that differences in income per capita are due to TFP. For instance, Cazzavillan et al. 
(2013) researched the trade-off between education and total factor productivity in 
explaining per worker incomes differences between unlucky32 and lucky33 countries. 
Then they observed that educational attainment levels and physical capital to some 
extent explained differences in income per worker between unlucky and lucky countries. 
                                            
 
32 Sub-Saharan countries 
33 G7 countries 
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They also noted that technology variations between unlucky and lucky countries caused 
differences in per worker incomes; hence, unlucky countries appear to be trapped in 
poverty. They finally concluded that education matters for economic growth but fails to 
explain the larger part of differences in income per worker between unlucky and lucky 
countries. Instead, they suggested that TFP explains better the differences in income 
per worker between unlucky and lucky countries. However, Cazzavillan et al. (2013) 
interpreted TFP as technology progress in their research. Hence, the production 
function of the form was used: 
Y = ΑKα (Lh) 1-α……………………………………………………………………..……… (4) 
Where K is capital stock, Lh is quality workers adjusted so that L is some workers while 
h is human capital, A is TFP (technology progress). In their conclusion, they 
commented that differences across countries in capital accumulation and productivity 
lead to differences in income per worker which they ascribed to differences in social 
infrastructures34. Their conclusion appears to agree with Bartolini and Bonatti (2008) 
who argued that social capital in the form of a measure of trust, work ethic and honesty 
in the society accounts for an increase of TFP. There is an association between social 
infrastructures and social capital, for instance, in a situation where there is honesty, 
trust in business contracts there is a reduction in costs of the firms. However, in the 
absence of these social capital traits firms are exposed to risk hence high costs incurred 
in dealing with the situation.  Similarly, Grafton et al. (2004) investigated the role of 
social capital35 also, social divergence36 on TFP in a society. Then, they found that high 
levels of social divergence reduce both TFP and income per capita. TFP for each 
country was regarded as levels of output per worker which remained unexplained after 
taking away the contribution of physical and human capital. The levels of output per 
worker (TFP) was calculated in the formulae below: 
У í = (K í ⁄ У í) α ⁄ (1-α) h í ΤFP í ………………………………………………………….….. (5) 
Where У is output per worker, Y is output, K is capital stock, h is human capital per 
worker. Then the authors anticipated that by knowing the value of α it could be possible 
to solve TFP. They obtained the values from (Hall and Jones, 1999). Furthermore, La 
Porta et al. (1997) argued that social capital raises TFP which implies that the 
                                            
 
34 As institutions and government policies that determine economic development within which 
individuals accumulate skills, and firms accumulate capital and produce output (Hall and 
Jones, 1999). 
35 Defined as the propensity of people in a society to cooperate to produce socially efficient 
outcomes and to avoid inefficient non-cooperative traps such as that in the prisoner's dilemma 
(Porta et al., (1997) 
36 Defined as the social barriers to communication and exchange between individuals and 
groups within a society (Grafton et al., 2004)   
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cooperation raised the productivity of social institutions. All in all, it appears that TFP is 
interpreted differently in literature, however, the explanation that social capital, cultural 
values, and attitudes are a source of productivity differences appeals and needs further 
exploration. In most cases, the production function of an endogenous growth model is 
displayed in the form: 
Y = ΑK………………………………………………………………………..…………......(6) 
 This production function is advocated by (Lucas, 1988; Romer, 1986). The 
distinguishing difference with neoclassical theory model is that A stands for factors 
influencing technology, K stands for both physical and human capital. This model 
predicts no diminishing returns to K for the reason that investment in K has external 
effects that offset diminishing returns. The assumption is that investment in K that 
stands for both physical and human capital raises productivity that exceeds private 
benefits to social benefits. As illustrated above in section 2.2.4, endogenous theory’s 
human capital takes a central role in explaining the productivity of the labor force. In 
other words, higher levels of human capital prompted higher productivity and economic 
growth. According to Becker (1962), human capital is made from education attainment 
levels. Furthermore, Lucas (1988) claimed that in the endogenous models there are 
two types of human capital such as internal and external human capitals. See more 
information 2.2.3.2 above. All in all, this section generally points out that productivity of 
countries depends on some input factors in the production function (4) embraced in this 
study. Therefore, many variables representing sections 2.2, 2.3, and 2.4 in categories 
of traditional, cultural and institutional variables will be investigated in this study while 
section 2.5 highlights the context the variables interact to achieve economic growth in 
countries.   
2.7 CONCLUSION  
In summary, the review of the literature provides the foundation to the claim that 
culture is worthwhile in determining economic growth differences among countries. For 
example, in section 2.3 above it is argued that culture construct has a long history and 
could imply many different forms (Geertz, 1973; Cochrane, 2006). On the other hand, 
Berry et al. (1992) explained the concept of culture as psychologically how the group 
creatively interacts with the environment, and how the group is culturally structured. It 
suggests that cultural evolution and institution formation happen as a result of human 
interaction with the situation. Also, section 2.5.1 above consolidates the previous 
argument by suggesting that the ability and moral qualities rely on the formal and 
informal institutions of the specific country. That implies that the construction of the way 
of life by making decisions about what strategies and choices to pursue concerning 
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local and global environments determines social outcomes such as economic growth 
or lack of sustainable economic growth.  
Furthermore, section 2.4.1 above highlights the importance of geography, 
critical history juncture, and colonialism in the development of cultural values that 
determine the worldviews or preferences differences among the societies. It appears to 
suggest that cultural and genetic evolution leads to accumulated improvement of skills, 
knowledge, values, and norms which further provide new answers to challenges in 
respective environments. Therefore, the superiority of global culture over national or 
local cultures by disregarding accumulated local knowledge, skills, values 
misappropriate the agenda of economic growth as noted by (Al Mamun, 2008). 
Regarding economic growth, economic factors such as capital, labor, and human 
capital are not the only factors that enhance economic growth but also cultural factors 
such as efficient and social orientations (Petrakis and Kostis, 2013). Therefore, the 
claim that human beings are unique in their range of environments helps to explain that 
cultural variations concerning knowledge, skills, values and norms and these are 
different in different contexts (Bucci and Segre, 2011; Henrich and McElreath, 2003; 
Sacco and Segre, 2009). 
Furthermore, section 2.5 above briefly explained that preferences and 
motivations of individuals are subject to attitudes, beliefs, and norms of the individual's 
environment and acquired through social learning (Boyd and Richerson, 1990). Hence, 
international differences in the cultural system both at individual and society levels 
suggest different approaches essential in dealing with the challenges or problems. 
Cultural systems differ in orientations, attitudes or values, for instance, Hofstede (1980, 
1984) categorized values in the following dimensions: individualism versus collectivism, 
power distance, uncertainty avoidance and masculinity versus femininity. It appears to 
suggest that different cultural systems lead to various economic and social policies that 
impact on the capability development of people see Figure 2.2 above. Sternberg (2004) 
argued that trying to define intelligence out of its cultural context is not doing justice for 
it could lead to the imposition of dominating culture's definitions of knowledge about 
other cultures. Since cultural systems are different from one context to another, then 
behaviors can be interpreted differently. Therefore, condemning some cultures as 
inferior to economic development does not help for the reason that people will be limited 
to develop their cognitive abilities outside their culture.  
Of course, many kinds of research have been done to explain economic 
disparities across countries, but they have given inconclusive results due to different 
definitions of cultural, institutional and economic variables. Many theories, techniques, 
and methods have been employed to explain and reduce economic disparities across 
84 
 
countries, but in reality, the gap is widening between the developed and developing 
countries. That may suggest that not all ideas or policies implemented in the developing 
nations were appropriate in dealing with developing countries underdevelopment. For 
example, Easterly (2007) claimed that economist appears to know the answers to 
economic development. He, however, noted that the solutions have been changing 
from time to time. From 1950's to about 1970's economists generally emphasized more 
on capital accumulation (investment); hence, policies encouraged developing countries 
borrowing money from international institutions to build infrastructures in the developing 
nations. However, the results were unconvincing, then the introduction of structural 
adjustment through WC emphasizing on free markets, opening to trade, and reducing 
deficits. That too did not deter underdevelopment in developing countries. Another 
reform emphasized in right institutions as explanations to backwardness. The 
developing countries were supported to introduce democracy, neo-liberal rights, 
property rights, contract enforcement and reduction of corruption. All these brilliant 
ideas or policies as highlighted by Keynes above had tremendous influences but with 
mixed results. For instance, Easterly (2006) gave an example of SSC received more 
foreign aid than the tiger nations (Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, and 
Thailand), but the tiger nations caught up with developed countries. Easterly explained 
that the tiger nations had a more excellent self-reliance attitude than the SSC. It begs 
the question for all those brilliant ideas which worked in developed countries but did not 
yield the same results in developing countries. Perhaps, Easterly was right that the 
mental aptitude for the tiger nations was right in the sense that they used their 
intelligence to devise their policies that were suitable to their countries rather than 
implementing all the strategies suggested by the world institutions. 
Lastly, section 2.2 above presents the theoretical explanations for economic 
development differences. This section notes that classical and neoclassical theories 
have provided to policy-makers wisdom to reduce economic disparities across 
countries, but there are no convincing results to explain the phenomena. In this regard, 
the approach used in this study is the endogenous theory but the factors of production 
such as capital, human capital, and education defined regarding cultural influences. 
The variables incorporated in the production function (model) as expressed in an 
equation four above are in chapter 3 section 3.3. All in all, the study's purpose is to 
investigate if cultural variables explain economic disparities between developed and 
developing countries. The findings in chapters 4 and 5 explored further in chapter 6.  
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CHAPTER 3: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY    
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
This chapter describes how the investigation of the thesis has been designed 
and implemented to meet the purpose of this thesis. The research organization adopted 
for the study is a mixed methods design. This design is further discussed in section 3.2 
below. Following this section is the research questions, and objectives and hypotheses 
of the thesis explained in section 3.2. The research design is explained in section 3.3. 
On the other hand, secondary data analysis is discussed in section 3.4. The discussion 
in section 3.5 includes model design, variables, and their specifications. Furthermore, 
section 3.6 presents the approach of multi-case study while section 3.7 presents data 
sources, collection, and data management. Then the conclusion is in section 3.8. 
3.2 RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
  
Taking into consideration that the identification and formulation of questions are 
critical in determining research design, the model in Figure 3.1 was adopted because it 
fitted well with the purpose of the thesis compared to other models suggested in the 
literature. See the purpose of the thesis in the next section. The figure shows each 
stage of the formulation of the specific research questions in a manner more 
comfortable to follow. 
Figure 3.1 Identifying research questions 
 
Moving to next stage 
1. State purpose of                                                                                                    
                                                          Research 
 
    No      Yes                                                         2. Formulate specific research                                                                          
5. Have questions been  
questioned answered already? 
 
 
4. Survey relevant              3. Are they interesting                                                                                       
Literature                                                                      No      or important?                                                                                              
         Yes 
 Notes. Identifying research questions as indicated by (Collis and Hussey, 
 2014). The figure has five stages with arrows indicating the directions of the 







The purpose of this study is to find out whether, and to what extent, cultural 
factors contribute to differences in economic development across countries. To do this, 
Table 3.2 below presents all variables engaged in the thesis with their definitions and 
sources. These variables compared concerning their importance in enhancing 
economic development across countries. Economic development generally measured 
as GDP per capita reflecting the standard of living in each country selected for the study. 
As suggested by Locke et al. (2013), the intentions of the study are set out in the 
following objectives. 
3.2.1.1     Aims and Objectives 
 This thesis focuses on cultural factors to examine whether differences in cultural 
factors contribute to differences in economic disparities among countries. For this 
reason, the thesis focuses primarily upon Sub-Saharan countries, because the region 
is failing to reduce the gap of the standards of living between the region and developed 
countries (Malamud and Assane, 2013); Ndulu et al., 2007). What causes the 
underperformance in this region? Is it the continent’s cultural values? It is what 
motivates the study. Hence, the thesis aims: 
 
➢ To identify the causes of economic disparities between developed and 
developing countries and suggest possible ways of addressing the 
challenge of slow and erratic economic growth in developing countries 
➢ To identify cultural values that hinder economic development in 
developing countries 
➢ To identify and explore the values that are vital in promoting economic, 
social and human capacity development                               
The purpose of the thesis is rooted in the reasons for undertaking the study 
among which is to explore, identify, detect, describe and explain the phenomenon to 
bring about change as highlighted by (Robson, 2002). Consequently, this leads to the 
formulation of research questions that direct the study to attempt to investigate and 
answer the intentions of the study. Figure 3.1 above demonstrates how the research 
questions were formulated to fit in with the primary research question. 
The Main question: Can culture influence economic growth?: An examination of 
the impact of cultural factors on economic growth in  developing economies 
The research questions in Figure 3.2 below reflect the purpose of study in 
generating the answers to the phenomenon. While at the same time the questions are 
also directed to unknown elements of the phenomenon as perceived by (Maxwell and 
Loomis, 2003). This study gets inspiration from the challenge of the widening gap in 
3.2.1 Purpose of study 
87 
 
income per capita between developed and developing countries regardless of all the 
efforts exhausted in dealing with the situation. For this to happen the study investigated 
the existing literature in chapter 2 and inconsistencies are identified, which this thesis 
intends to investigate. In this regard, this study attempts to answer the central question 
posed above. Hence, finding out the extent of influence of each variable on economic 
development will be piloted by research questions in each chapter as demonstrated in 
Figure 3.2 below. The variables tested for their association or causality about empirical 
evidence reflecting deductive and quantitative methods of analysis. The models 
underpin the theoretical framework which provides the foundation for the research 
questions that emerge from the central research question clarified above. Table 3.1 
below illustrates the shortened names and complete names of the variables in all the 
categories.  
Table 3.1: Condensed and full names of the variables in respective categories 
 
Notes. Each variable is shown in its respective category 
 
 Hence, hypotheses empirically examined in chapters 4 and 5 respectively in 
categories as discussed in chapter 2 are as follows: 
3.2.2.1   Traditional category hypotheses 
H1a:  EMP HDI IGS RKN TED HCT EGS FDI GCI GRS ETR AID significantly 
          contribute to economic growth 
 
H1b:  EMP HDI IGS RKN TED HCT EGS FDI GCI GRS ETR do not significantly  
          Contribute to economic growth 
 
H1c:  EMP HDI IGS RKN TED HCT EGS FDI GCI GRS ETR has an effect on  
           economic growth 
Condensed variable Complete variable name 
Traditional category  
GDPPC GDP per capita based on purchasing power parity (PPP)  
EMP Employment to population ratio (%)  
HDI The Human Development Index  
IGS Imports of goods and services (current US$)  
RKN Real capital stock an (in thousands 2005US$)  
TED Population with tertiary education (%)  
HCT Index of human capital per person on years of schooling  
EGS Exports of goods and services (%)  
FDI Foreign direct investment (current US$)  
AID Foreign aid to developing countries  
GRS Gross Domestic Saving (%)  
GCI The Global Competitiveness Index  
ETR  New business density (new registrations per 1,000 people  
Institutional category  
GEF Government Effectiveness (Governance)  
ROL The rule of law (Governance) 
COC Control of corruption (Governance) 
Cultural category  
HWK Hard work 
CPR Civic capital  
SOC Social capital  
FER Feeling Responsibility 
REG Religion  
SEC Security  




H1d:  EMP HDI IGS RKN TED HCT EGS FDI GCI GRS ETR has no effect on    
          economic growth 
 
3.2.2.2   Cultural category hypotheses 
 
H2a: HWK CPR SOC FER REG SEC significantly contribute to economic growth 
 
H2b: HWK CPR SOC FER REG SEC do not significantly contribute to economic  
         Growth 
 
H2c:  HWK CPR SOC FER REG SEC have an effect on economic growth 
 
H2d:  HWK CPR SOC FER REG SEC have no effect on economic growth 
 
3.2.2.3   Institutional category hypotheses 
 
H3a: ROL FER COC significantly contribute to economic growth 
 
H3b: ROL FER COC do not significantly contribute to economic growth 
 
H3c:  ROL FER COC have an effect on economic growth 
 












































   Notes. The figure indicates the scheme of the thesis investigation  
3.3 MIXED RESEARCH DESIGN 
The mixed methods design is not without criticism. For instance, the positivist 
and interpretivist approaches have distinct ways of investigating. That leads to 
differences in the way knowledge created. Hence it is challenging for the scholars in 
one school to accept the knowledge made by the other school. It suggests that variation 
in the procedures for the construction of knowledge in the approaches could lead to 
different conclusions. Besides, positivism assumes that social reality is objective and 
external to the researcher. In contrast, interpretivism assumes that social reality is 
subjective and socially constructed. Despite the criticism leveled against mixing the 
positivist and interpretivist approaches, the increasing gap in economic development 
Thesis central question: Can culture influence economic growth?: An 


































































































































































































































































































































































Why a multi-case study of Botswana and Malawi? It seeks to 
understand how the variables, circumstances, institutions, and 
environments interact with each other by using qualitative 
techniques in the analysis other than secondary analysis used in 
the previous chapters. 
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between developed and developing countries needs the insight of both approaches. 
Hence, this study engaged in procedures that enabled the investigation to use the 
mixed methods approach. The three designs of the procedures used to engage both 
quantitative and qualitative approaches are triangulation, development, and 
complementary designs which further explained in the next sub-sections. 
 
Triangulation strategy in this study mainly applied to mix quantitative and 
qualitative methodologies whereby the distinct methods complement each other as 
claimed by (Webb et al., 1966; Smith, 1975; Denzin, 1978). Triangulation approach to 
research has recently attracted support from many scholars because according to 
Bouchard Jr (1976, p. 268) the agreement of the results between two methods 
increases external validity. Furthermore, Denzin (1978, p. 301) observes that 
triangulation can also be applied in within-method, for example, he claims that 
application of varieties of techniques within a method through data collection and 
interpretation is a form of triangulation.  Nonetheless, Jick (1979, p. 603) argues that 
using a collection of data as a form of triangulation is the simplest form. Hence, more 
complex designs are desired for better validation of the results. However, according to 
Glaser and Strauss (1965, p. 7) regularly observation of qualitative data particularly 
participants of multiple groups increases internal validity of the findings. Hence, this 
thesis utilized mixing methods and constant data collection from multiple groups forms 
of triangulation to reinforce the external and internal validity of thesis findings.  
The variables in chapters 4 and 5 were merged from different data sources. For 
instance, data collected through World Values Surveys (WVS) and Afrobarometer 
Surveys (AS) were used to generated variables in a cultural category using EFA and 
CFA techniques. However, some cultural variables did not go through EFA and CFA 
techniques, but instead, the variables gathered through surveys were transformed into 
means by using Stata software so that statistical analysis techniques such as the 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) can be used. Furthermore, the data gathered from other 
sources that did not need any transformations were merged with cultural variables in 
chapters 4 and 5 respectively. Therefore, triangulation happened at methods and data 
levels. Of course, in the process of doing triangulation design, other designs played a 
part such as development design, clarified more in the next sub-section. 
  
 This strategy fits in well with this study because the three analytical chapters 
designed in the way that there are three stages involved. The first stage is for chapter 
4, the second stage is chapter 5, and the third stage in chapter 6. As illustrated in the 
previous section the first two stages use a quantitative approach (see Figure 3.2 above). 
In this approach, it perceived that the phenomenon is objective and external to the 
3.3.1  Triangulation strategy   
3.3.2  Development strategy   
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researcher. Hence, the findings considered valid knowledge depicting the phenomenon 
as illustrated by (Collis and Hussey, 2014). Moreover, these two chapters sequentially 
executed. The findings of chapter 4 enhanced the selection of the sample, and 
development of analysis of chapter 5. The development design is ideal for this study 
because chapters 4 and 5 embrace the same type of approach as the claim of (Greene 
et al., 1989). Also, both chapters used OLS estimation technique. It is done so that 
cause and effect between the dependent variable and independent variables can be 
estimated. Hence, the approach adheres to quantitative approaches of determinism, 
reductionism, and detailed observations and measurement of variables as perceived 
by (Denzin and Lincoln, 2005). Consequently, chapters 4 and 5 provide the basis for 
testing theory and provide careful observations by measurement of objective reality 
existing out there in the world. The third stage mentioned earlier on in this section further 
explained in the next design. The arrangement of the empirical chapters 4, 5, and 6 
disclose the development aspect of the mixed design. For example, the findings in 
chapter 4 lead to the investigation of chapter 5. This element of instituting the 
investigation of another chapter is what regarded as developmental design. It is different 
from triangulation design because triangulation in this study took place when more than 
one data source used, and more than one technique was used to transform data and 
merge variables to one dataset for the investigation, mainly in chapters 4 and 5. That 
was not all for the mixed methods design. Hence, the findings in chapter 4 and 5 lead 
to chapter 6 which is the next focus. 
 
This design connects the results from quantitative chapters 4 and 5 to chapter 
6 which is a multi-case study. Therefore, the results of the multi-case study using a 
qualitative approach confirms or verifies the results of quantitative chapters as noted by 
(Greene et al., 1989). In this phase, qualitative data not transformed into quantitative 
data. Instead, the findings based on qualitative methods of analysis in line with the 
qualitative paradigm as expressed by (Corbin and Strauss, 2008). In other words, 
according to Kane and Trochim (2007), the data collected through surveys (primary or 
secondary) are represented quantitatively by methods. However, this quantitative 
information rests upon qualitative judgment (Corbin and Strauss, 2008; Trochim and 
Donnelly, 2001). It suggests that quantitative and qualitative information is intertwined, 
hence, making it possible for them to mix in the research design. Subsequently, the 
primary aim of this complementary design is to follow-up the findings in chapter 5 
focussing mainly on how the cultural category performed by using statistical analysis 
techniques. This follow-up uses different qualitative analysis techniques that capture all 
the participants in the surveys other than reducing to means as applied in chapters 4 
and 5. Therefore, quantitative and qualitative approaches in this study build on each 
3.3.3  Complementary strategy 
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other such as using estimation techniques in chapters 4 and 5 and interpreting output 
results and generalizing the findings to context by qualitative knowledge (Coll and 
Chapman, 2000; Reichardt and Cook, 1979).  
         
            The previous sections have discussed triangulation, development, and 
complementary strategies under the mixed method design. These strategies within the 
mixed methods design regarded as the sequential explanatory scheme (ESS). The ESS 
provides an opportunity to link the findings in chapters 4 and 5 to multi-case study in 
chapter 6 as illustrated in Figure 3.2 above. Hence, the combination of quantitative and 
qualitative approaches within ESS complement each other and permit a more robust 
analysis, taking advantage of the strengths of quantitative and qualitative approaches 
as recommended by (Greene et al., 1989; Greene and Caracelli, 1997; Miles and 
Huberman, 1994). Nonetheless, mixed methods design adopted is not without 
disadvantages. For instance, quantitative approach embraces the premise that social 
entities exist which is external to social actors. Hence, this approach advocates value 
independent observations, and observed facts confirm the relevance of theories 
through hypothetical-deductive technique (Bryman and Bell, 2011). In this realm, 
knowledge exists independently of social actors. In contrast, the qualitative approach 
supports the view that social phenomenon created from the perceptions and 
subsequent actions of social actors (Saunders et al., 2012). It also claimed that the 
process of social interaction impacts the social phenomenon which continually 
subjected to changes. So subjective knowledge is in most cases conditioned in an 
individual's mind and regarded as the justified true belief by (Plato and McDowell, 
1973). 
              Despite the opposing views of quantitative and qualitative approaches, the 
combination in ESS did not conflict the opposing views since the findings in chapters 4 
and 5 are verified by chapter 6 as recommended in the literature (Morgan, 2007). Also, 
the mixing of the opposing views happened during data collection such as using surveys 
as a method for data collection as noted by (Shulman, 1998; Morse and Niehaus, 2009). 
Thus, the mixed methods design used in this thesis engaged distinct frameworks of 
both quantitative and qualitative paradigms to answer the research questions within this 
thesis as indicated by (DePoy and Gitlin, 1994). Therefore, implementing a mixed 
research design in this thesis enables the investigation of how each variable in the 
study, environments, and institutions interact with each other in different contexts to 
produce measured effects. Hence, ESS is chosen to attempt to answer why there is 
different economic growth among countries. As a result, the emphasis on the mixed 
methods design is on research purpose, research questions, and the context of study 
or research problem. That is why the use of ESS is of significance in the thesis rather 
3.2.4   Justification for mixed method design
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than other designs such as embedded, transformative, exploratory, and multiphase 
designs. These designs have one common feature of violating the opposing views of 
the quantitative and qualitative approaches. Hence, they were not suitable for the 
purpose and objectives of this thesis. Therefore, ESS adds validity and quality to the 
findings of the thesis.   
3.4 SECONDARY DATA ANALYSIS (SDA)              
             SDA in this thesis involved longitudinal survey whereby data collection of a 
chosen sample of countries were followed up over time. This type of study provides 
multiple observations which can be used to compare the differences in economic growth 
among countries. Hence, the data collection would help identify trends, differences, and 
relationships and assist comparison between countries. Therefore, using the best 
aspects of macro and micro secondary data analysis, in a mixed method approach, in 
2 empirical chapters. The second part of a multi-case study is used to drill deeper into 
questions of how impacts arise in different countries and how different cultural and 
institutional variables may impact upon economic development in practice. 
  
Chapter 2 reveals that many economic theories have been utilized to explain 
economic disparities across countries, but, up to the present time, the level of income 
disparities between developed and developing countries have been increasing. 
Classical, and neo-classical theories have guided policy and wisdom in reducing the 
disparities between developed and developing countries but seem not to produce the 
desired outcomes. In this regard, the model advanced in this study incorporates 
traditional, institutional and cultural categories of variables. This model uses OLS 
technique that makes it possible to obtain the unknown parameter for each independent 
variable due to ceteris paribus interpretation. This condition offers the ability to control 
other variables while monitoring one independent variable's effect on the dependent 
variable (Wooldridge, 2013). The model assumes that the standard production 
functions appropriate to explaining economic disparities among countries given as 
follows: 
 Y = AKα (LH) 1-α…………………………………………………………………………….(1) 
Y = income output, K = physical capital, L = unskilled labour, H = human capital, A 
denoted TFP interpreted as social infrastructure, see section 2.5.5 in chapter 2 for more 
details. Therefore, the model assumes that traditional variable interactions occur in the 
context of cultural values represented by A that is TFP. The cultural category variables 
included in the model depicts TFP differences across countries, and the model in 
equation (1) above is empirically tested in chapters 4 and 5 as indicated in the models 
below respectively. Hence, this thesis investigates how each variable in the study, 
3.4.1   Model design  
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environments, and institutions interact with each other in different contexts to produce 
measured effects. 
The empirical investigation executed in chapters 4 and 5. Chapter 4 has two 
sub-samples of six developed and six developing countries each of which further 
divided into slow and fast economies. The number of countries in each sub-sample was 
limited to 6 dues to the inconsistency of WVS in mainly developing countries. Hence, a 
subsample of 6 developed countries was deliberately designed to give the same 
conditions regarding the number of observations so that the estimation of parameters 
is not biased (Wald, 1948, p. 220). Similarly, chapter 5 has a sub-sample of 18 Sub-
Saharan countries selected through a technique called purposive sampling as 
suggested by (Guarte, 2006, p. 277). Besides, the findings in chapter 4 such as 
reduction of GDP per capita by capital stock in developing countries while increasing 
GDP per capita in developed countries seem to contradict the catching-up effect of neo-
classical theory. Hence, increasing the number of developing countries to investigate 
further the finding in chapter 4 was of interest to meet the purpose of the thesis. 
Furthermore, the findings in chapter 5 indicated that SSC seems not to have 
homogenous cultural settings and countries experience different economic growth.  
For this reason, further investigation is effected in chapter 6 as a multi-case 
study for Botswana and Malawi by using a convenient sampling of the units of study 
(Etikan, 2016, p. 1). The multi-case study chapter, therefore, seeks to drill down below 
the macro data to try to put some of the findings from the other two empirical chapters 
into context and to explain apparent anomalies. It therefore strengthens and 
compliments the secondary data analysis done in chapters 4 and 5. This thesis, 
therefore, investigates which variables determine economic growth in countries. The 
definitions of variables from all the categories presented in Table 3.2 below. These 
variables systematically tested as presented in Figure 3.2 whereby research questions 
asked at each stage of the investigation. Also, Figure 3.2 above shows the sequence 
of questions in each chapter leading to the thesis answers addressed in the empirical 
chapters. As previously stated all the three categories of variables are incorporated in 
the models for chapters 4 and 5 as presented in equations 2 and 3 respectively below. 
GDPPC (Y) = a0 + a1EMP + a2HDI + a3IGS + a4RKN + a5TED + a6EGS + a7FDI + 
a8GCI + a9GRS + a10ETR + a11ROL + a12GEF + a13HWK + a14CPR + a15SOC + 
a16 FER + a17REG + …...…………………………………………..…………..(2) 
GDPPC (Y) = a0 + a1EMP + a2HDI + a3IGS + a4RKN + a5HCT + a6EGS + a7AID + 
a8GCI + a9GRS + a10ETR + a11ROL + a12GEF + a13COC + a14CPR + a15SOC + 





The variables engaged in this thesis follow the production function 
demonstrated under section 3.3.1 above. Hence, variables are structured in three core 
areas, namely: traditional, institutional and cultural variables. The variables took 
different units and demonstrated in Table 3.2 below. The definitions of variables and 
their sources also presented in Table 3.2 below. Countries engaged in chapter 4 are 
presented in Tables 4.2 and 4.3, while countries for chapter 5 displayed in Table 5.3. 
 
3.4.2   Description of Variables 
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Table 3.2: Variable sources and definitions 
  
 
(1) (2) (3) 
Variables Definition Sources of Variables 
GDPPC GDP per capita based on purchasing power parity (PPP). PPP is gross domestic product converted to international dollars using purchasing 
power parity rates. An international dollar has the same purchasing power over GDP as the U.S. dollar has in the United States. GDP at 
purchaser's prices is the sum of gross value added by all resident producers in the economy plus any product taxes and minus any 
subsidies not included in the value of the products. It calculated without making deductions for depreciation of fabricated assets or depletion 
and degradation of nature.  
 
World Bank: World Governance Indicators 
EMP Employment to population ratio (%) is the proportion of a country's population that is employed. Ages 15 and older are generally considered 
the working-age population. This ratio includes those not working due to illness, childcare problems or vacation. 
 
International Labour Organization 
HDI The Human Development Index is a summary measure of average achievement in critical dimensions of human development: a long and 
healthy life, being knowledgeable and have a decent standard of living. The HDI is the geometric mean of normalized indices for each of the 
three dimensions. HDI value range from 0 to 1, 0 indicates no development while 1 very high development.  
 
United Nations development programme 
IGS Imports of goods and services (current US$) comprise all transactions between residents of a country and the rest of the world involving a 
change of ownership from nonresidents to residents of general merchandise, nonmonetary gold, and services.  
 
World Bank: World Governance Indicators 
 RKN Real capital stock an (in thousands 2005US$) This capital also represents material goods*/ structure*/ tools, machines, buildings, 
infrastructure- which contribute to the production process, traditionally represented as physical capital in production functions.   
 
Penn World Tables 9.0. 
TED Population with tertiary education (%) defined as those having completed the highest level of education, by age group. It includes both 
theoretical programmes leading to advanced research or high skill professions such as medicine and more vocational programmes leading 
to the labor market. The measure is a percentage of the same age population.  
                                                              
UNESCO: World Bank 
HCT Index of human capital per person, based on years of schooling       Penn World Tables 9 (Barro & Lee, 2012; 
Psacharopoulos, 1994)  
 EGS Exports of goods and services (%) represent the value of all goods and other market services provided to the rest of the world. They include 
the value of merchandise, freight, insurance, transport, travel, royalties, license fees, and other services, such as communication, 
construction, financial, information, business, personal, and government services. They exclude compensation of employees and 
investment income (formerly called factor services) and transfer payments.  
 
World Bank: World Governance Indicators 
 
 
FDI Foreign direct investment (current US$) refers to direct investment equity flows in the reporting economy. It is the sum of equity capital, 
reinvestment of earnings, and other capital. Direct investment is a category of cross-border investment associated with a resident in one 
economy having control or a significant degree of influence on the management of an enterprise that is resident in another economy. 
Ownership of 10 percent or more of the ordinary shares of voting stock is the criterion for determining the existence of a direct investment 
relationship. 
 
World Bank: World Governance Indicators 
 
 
AID Development assistance to developing countries mainly from developed countries World Bank: World Governance Indicators 
GRS Gross Domestic Saving (%) is GDP minus final consumption expenditure.   World Bank: World Governance Indicators 
GCI The Global Competitiveness Index attempts to quantify the impact of some key factors which contribute to creating the conditions for 
competitiveness, with a particular focus on the macroeconomic environment, the quality of the country's institutions, and the state of the 
country's technology and supporting infrastructure. GCI evaluates the productivity and efficiency of countries ranging from 1 to 7, 1 being 
the lowest and 7 the highest  
United Nations development programme 
ETR  New business density (new registrations per 1,000 people ages 15-64): In other words: New businesses registered are the number of newly 
limited liability corporations registered in the calendar year.  
World Bank's Entrepreneurship Survey and 
database 
GDPPCG Annual percentage growth rate of GDP per capita at market prices based on constant local currency. Aggregates based on constant 2010 
U.S. dollars. An economy's growth measured by the change in the volume of its output or the real incomes of its residents. 
World Development Indicators 
GEF Government Effectiveness (Governance) captures perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and the degree 
of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government's 
commitment to such policies. It also captures governance defined by UNESCO as structures and processes that are designed to ensure 
 
Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) 
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accountability, transparency, responsiveness, the rule of law, stability, equity and inclusiveness, empowerment, and broad-based 
participation. Governance also represents the norms, values, and rules of the game through which public affairs managed in a manner that 
is transparent, participatory, inclusive and responsive. This rank score 0 means the lowest while 100 the highest.  
 
ROL The rule of law captures perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the 
quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence. This rank score 0 
means the lowest while 100 the highest. 
 
Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) 
COC Control of Corruption captures perceptions of the extent to which public power exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand 
forms of corruption, as well as "capture" of the state by elites and private interests.  This rank score 0 means the lowest while 100 the 
highest.  
 
Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) 
Cultural Variables   
HWK Hard work in this study defined as personal accountability and self-determination that economic success is as a result of their effort. People 
with this trait of quality they work harder to increase their productivity for greater payoff in return increase their welfare 
 
World Values Survey from 1994 to 2014 
CPR Civic capital in this study described as the ability of citizens in respective countries of coming together in unison for the construction of 
solutions to the current challenges for better social outcomes such as economic development. This concept captures how cultural capital 
enhances or hinders strategies of actions directed towards positive social outcomes in the societies.  This concept comes as a latent 
variable from factorized variables. See Table 3.5 for more details 
 
World Values Surveys from 1994 to 2014;  
Afrobarometer Surveys from 2001 to 2015. 
  
SOC Social capital represented as the network or interpersonal trust of citizens. It assumed in this study that elected officials in government 
performance or governance determine trust capital or social capital levels that reciprocally determines economic performance of countries. 
See Table 3.5 how the latent variable of civic capital was generated respectively in chapters 4 and 5.  
 
World Values Surveys from 1994 to 2014;  
Afrobarometer Surveys from 2001 to 2015. 
 FER Defined as the sense of responsibility and personal motivation to engage in public affairs responsibly guided by moral ethics to maximize 
outcomes. That is an outstanding quality to encourage children to learn at home see more details of this variable in Appendix 3 that gives 
the possibility of comparing the feeling of people in developed and developing countries.  
 
World Values Surveys from 1994 to 2014;  
 
 REG This variable can have an impact on economic growth directly or indirectly whereby religious beliefs may shape institutions or order the 
individual behaviors which could promote or hinder economic growth. This variable captured from the question: How important is religion in 
life? The tenets of the importance of religion implied in belief in God, heaven, and hell. See more details in Table 3.5.  
World Values Surveys from 1994 to 2014;  
Afrobarometer Surveys from 2001 to 2015. 
 
SEC Defined as freedom from fear of violence that includes theft, war, bodily harm, terrorism and being robbed of materials or properties hardly 
acquired. This concept comes as a latent variable from factorized variables Q9B to Q10B of Afrobarometer surveys from 2001 to 2015.  
Afrobarometer Surveys from 2001 to 2015. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               
Notes. Column (1) shows a dependent variable and independent variables. Column (2) gives the definitions of the variables and lastly, column (3) gives 




This section focuses on preliminary analysis. It is the first stage of familiarising 
with data so that outliers, trends over time, proportions, distributions, and extreme 
values can be identified. The narrative techniques are used to show variations of the 
units of study in graphs, histogram, averages, median, mode, and frequencies. The 
stage is regarded as the exploration in diagrams to understand data as noted by (Tukey, 
1977). After that, the second stage of examining relationships, differences, and trends 
done by using OLS method (Dillon and Goldstein, 1984). However, before any form of 
OLS estimation in the second stage, data must be verified if it meets the assumptions 
of OLS regression. Figures 3.3, 3.4, and 3.5 for OLS1(combined), OLS2 (developed), 
and OLS3 (developing) respectively for models in Table 4.5 in chapter 4 indicate the 
models meet OLS regression assumptions. 
Similarly, Figure 3.6 for OLS1SSC in Table 5.4 in chapter 5 meets the OLS 
regression assumptions. Also, normality was also tested by checking severity outliers 
in the models demonstrated in Table 3.7 below. The models for chapters 4 and 5 
passed the test, confirming the observation made in Figures 3.3, 3.4, 3.5, and 3.6 as 
explained above. Hence, all the models engaged in the thesis meets the OLS estimation 
requirements and results could not be misleading. Also, the influence of the 
observations in the datasets for both chapters 4 and 5 are measured by using Cook's 
D technique. According to Cook and Weisberg (1982) if D is greater than 1, then the 
observation has considerable influence. The highest influence of observation in the 
dataset for chapter 4 is 0.39 while in chapter 5 dataset is 0.064. That shows that in both 
datasets the influence of observations is less than 1. Hence, there is no reason for 
concern of outlier observations of the countries in both representative samples. 
Furthermore, Tables 3.3, 3.4, 3.5, 3.6, 3.7, and 3.8 describe descriptive statistics, 
correlation matrix, numerical test for testing normality, the goodness of fit for latent 
variables and variance inflation factor (VIF) values respectively.  
Table 3.3 below shows the descriptive statistics of mean, Standard Deviation 
(SD), minimum, and maximum.  Chapter 4 indicates that there are differences in 
variables between developed and developing countries. That being the case, the study 
undertakes empirically testing to see if such differences in variables explain economic 
development differences between developed and developing countries.  
 
 
3.4.3   Identification outliers and testing the robustness of the models 
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Notes.  Column (1) shows three categories of variables; traditional, institutional, and cultural. Columns (2), (3) and (4) indicate summary statistics N 
(observations), mean, SD (standard deviation), minimum and maximum for developed, developing, and Sub-Saharan countries respectively. 
                                            
 
37 For countries engaged, see Tables 4.4 and 5.3 respectively. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Variables Developed Countries Developing Countries Sub-Saharan countries 
N Mean SD Min Max N Mean SD Min Max N Mean SD Min Max 
Traditional                
GDPPC 13
2 




270 135.50 78.09 1.00 270.00 
EMP 13
2 
44.02 17.01 0.10 64.70 132 19.39 23.23 0.10 81.5 270 82.93 40.41 1.00 162.00 
HDI 13
2 
0.30 0.24 -0.22 1.04 132 0.94 1.36 -2.62 3.35 270 662.64 443.64 22.00 1480.0
0 IGS 13
2 
52.91 35.63 0.10 117.60 132 48.18 32.07 0.10 114.70 270 -0.27 0.15 -0.85 -0.05
RKN 13
2 
8.11 1.04 6.82 9.78 132 5.50 1.65 2.27 7.68 270 217.13 393.13 5.51 2224.8
6 TED 13
2 
22.88 16.19 0.10 50.80 132 11.03 20.90 -52.92 96.23      
HCT           270 1.88 0.41 1.14 2.81 
EGS 13
2 
22.86 14.97 0.01 50.30 132 20.82 12.17 0.01 48.62 270 137.38 80.95 1.00 285.00 
FDI 13
2 
27.98 15.28 0.92 51.18 132 25.96 15.85 1.85 51.41      
AID           270 113.13 59.90 1.00 227.00 
GCI 13
2 
91.94 16.30 39.66 141.32 132 29.62 33.11 0.10 122.36 270 192.12 129.97 1.00 756.00 
GRS 13
2 
60.71 25.67 1.20 99.30 132 30.34 31.50 0.70 108.60 270 142.66 83.95 1.00 285.00 
ETR 13
2 
95.00 58.27 -17.37 263.73 132 83.46 113.46 -274.84 291.32 270 2.04 1.79 0.05 12.30 
Institutional                
ROL 13
2 
71.57 16.79 -19.94 89.52 132 27.81 19.76 -48.93 74.20 270 312.29 129.49 7.00 651.00 
GEF 13
2 
0.65 0.18 0.03 1.05 132 0.50 0.10 0.23 0.70 270 11.70 2.70 2.00 16.00 
COC           270 0.23 0.12 0.04 0.49 
Cultural                
HWK 13
2 
4.42 0.31 3.66 5.94  4.08 0.46 2.46 5.83      
CPR 13
2 
-0.24 0.08 -0.74 0.15  -0.09 0.13 -0.24 0.35 270 0.78 2.17 -1.40 10.10 
SOC 13
2 
-0.02 0.08 -0.27 0.35  -0.12 0.09 -0.45 0.02 270 0.10 0.90 -2.52 2.83 
FER 13
2 
1.17 0.08 1.02 1.34  1.52 0.14 0.88 1.74      
REG 13
2 
-0.08 0.70 -2.04 1.22  -0.23 0.52 -1.47 0.75 270 3.88 0.57 2.93 12.07 
SEC           270 -0.13 0.77 -0.86 3.12 
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 The correlation matrix in Table 3.4 below indicates correlations of variables. The 
correlations highlighted in green indicate readings from 0.46 and above. Some of the 
correlations in green are very high. That necessitates further testing to ensure the model 




Table 3.4: Correlation Matrix of Variables in chapters 4 and 5 
 Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 
 Traditional OLS1(combined) Model in chapter 4 
1 GDPPC 1                  
2 EMP 0.08 1                 
3 HDI -0.12 -0.17 1                
4 IGS -0.25 0.31 0.15 1               
5 RKN 0.11 0.33 -0.67 -0.12 1              
6 TED 0.09 0.01 -0.05 -0.02 0.09 1             
7 EGS 0.05 0.27 0.00 0.60 -0.15 -0.02 1            
8 FDI 0.12 0.12 -0.05 0.05 0.16 -0.06 0.09 1           
9 GCI 0.28 0.38 -0.33 -0.04 0.71 0.25 -0.02 0.14 1          
10 GRS 0.28 0.48 -0.15 0.16 0.27 0.12 0.38 0.14 0.40 1         
11 ETR 0.20 -0.12 -0.37 -0.36 0.40 0.05 -0.29 0.06 0.27 0.00 1        
 Institutional                   
12 ROL 0.15 0.43 -0.23 -0.00 0.66 0.22 -0.01 0.05 0.74 0.39 0.16 1       
13 GEF 0.17 0.36 -0.11 -0.02 0.32 -0.02 0.11 0.05 0.26 0.39 0.12 0.41 1      
 Cultural WVS                   
14 HWK -0.07 0.20 0.32 0.19 0.00 0.07 0.14 0.02 0.28 0.19 -0.22 0.29 0.17 1     
15 CPR 0.12 -0.32 -0.32 -0.17 -0.16 -0.13 -0.05 0.01 -0.43 -0.23 0.12 -0.51 -0.38 -0.54 1    
16 SOC -0.04 0.22 0.22 0.12 0.18 0.15 0.06 -0.06 0.33 0.17 -0.10 0.38 0.26 0.66 -0.60 1   
17 FER -0.04 -0.42 0.18 -0.13 -0.65 -0.30 -0.02 -0.08 -0.76 -0.39 -0.07 -0.71 -0.35 -0.38 0.54 -0.46 1  
18 REG -0.12 0.03 0.36 0.10 -0.35 0.09 0.14 -0.08 0.03 -0.03 -0.12 0.09 0.15 0.28 -0.51 0.29 -0.03 1 
  OLS2 ( developed) in chapter 4    
 Traditional 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
 
16 17 18 
1 GDPPC 1                  
2 EMP 0.29 1                 
3 HDI -0.02 -0.32 1                
4 IGS -0.07 0.30 0.07 1               
5 RKN -0.05 -0.06 -0.04 -0.20 1              
6 TED -0.14 -0.21 0.05 0.08 -0.46 1             
7 EGS 0.07 0.29 0.00 0.72 -0.39 0.06 1            
8 FDI 0.04 0.17 0.09 0.08 0.12 -0.17 0.04 1           
9 GCI 0.36 0.51 -0.25 0.22 -0.16 -0.04 0.25 0.02 1          
10 GRS 0.25 0.73 -0.25 0.49 -0.02 -0.27 0.47 0.21 0.44 1         
11 ETR 0.06 -0.24 0.08 -0.45 0.22 -0.26 -0.49 0.04 -0.41 -0.31 1        
 Institutional                   
12 ROL 0.19 0.18 -0.39 -0.08 0.24 -0.09 -0.03 -0.05 0.19 0.11 -0.08 1       
13 GEF 0.09 0.33 -0.25 -0.04 0.21 -0.37 0.00 0.01 -0.31 0.22 0.08 0.17 1      
 Cultural                    
14 HWK 0.10 0.01 0.08 0.11 -0.10 0.02 0.17 0.00 0.12 0.05 -0.13 -0.03 -0.06 1     
15 CPR 0.11 -0.13 0.40 0.15 -0.20 0.19 0.09 0.06 -0.03 -0.08 -0.11 -0.26 -0.24 0.12 1    
16 SOC -0.07 -0.07 0.04 -0.04 0.13 -0.11 -0.04 -0.13 -0.16 -0.09 0.13 -0.01 0.12 0.45 -0.12 1   
17 FER 0.03 -0.03 0.19 -0.37 -0.40 0.20 -0.26 0.06 -0.18 -0.27 0.22 -0.12 0.09 -0.04 0.03 0.09 1  
18 REG -0.01 -0.01 -0.28 -0.07 -0.66 0.14 0.19 -0.12 -0.20 -0.03 0.10 -0.03 0.09 -0.11 -0.23 -0.02 0.39 1 
  OLS3 ( developing) model in chapter 4 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 
1 GDPPC 1                  
2 EMP -0.06 1                 
3 HDI -0.11 0.02 1                
4 IGS -0.39 0.35 0.27 1               
5 RKN 0.11 -0.02 -0.79 -0.26  1              
6 TED 0.15 -0.15 0.05 -0.14 -0.03 1             
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Notes. Highlighted correlations are not of concern for chapters 4 and 5 because tests for VIF in Table 3.6 below show each variable less than 10. 
Also, the mean VIF for chapter 4 is 3.68 while chapter 5 is 2.73 far below the threshold of 10.   
7 EGS 0.04 0.27 0.05 0.42 -0.22 -0.15 1            
8 FDI 0.16 0.05 -0.05 0.01 0.17 -0.03 0.14 1           
9 GCI 0.33 -0.24 -0.13 -0.37 0.56 0.05 -0.35 0.20 1          
10 GRS 0.29 0.07 0.03 -0.16 -0.11 0.11 0.32 0.05 -0.07 1         
11 ETR 0.23 -0.16 -0.42 -0.37 0.58 0.15 -0.22 0.07 0.54 0.09 1        
 Institutional                   
12 ROL 0.11 -0.03 0.07 -0.10 0.31 0.03 -0.19 0.05 0.45 0.02 0.29 1       
13 GEF 0.24 0.00 0.15 -0.08 -0.18 0.03 0.27 0.03 -0.07 0.29 0.15 0.07 1      
 Cultural                    
14 HWK -0.20 -0.02 0.62 0.23 -0.54 -0.10 0.08 -0.02 -0.10 -0.03 -0.31 -0.03 0.03 1     
15 CPR 0.24 0.01 -0.79 -0.38 0.59 -0.00 -0.07 0.07 0.02 0.11 0.30 -0.10 -0.17 -0.63 1    
16 SOC -0.11 -0.05 0.59 0.24 -0.47 0.07 0.09  -0.08 -0.09 -0.09 -0.27 -0.01 -0.03 0.67  -0.61       1   
17 FER 0.09 0.06 -0.21 0.00 -0.11 -0.22 0.34 -0.11 -0.38 0.16 -0.10 -0.23 0.04 -0.12 0.16 -0.15 1  
18 REG -0.24 -0.08 0.80 0.35 -0.64 -0.03 0.04 -0.05 -0.06 -0.18 -0.32 0.04 0.15 0.64 -0.88 0.62 -0.03 1 
   OLS1SSC Model in chapter 5 
 Traditional 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 
1 GDPPC 1                  
2 EMP 0.04 1                 
3 HDI -0.18 0.01 1                
4 IGS -0.11 0.16 0.01 1               
5 RKN 0.03 -0.27 0.08 0.25 1              
6 HCT 0.27 -0.26 -0.28 -0.16 0.26 1             
7 EGS 0.25 -0.34 -0.10 -0.47 0.10 0.46 1            
8 AID -0.14 -0.02 0.08 0.12 0.13 -0.01 -0.01 1           
9 GCI 0.16 -0.30 0.03 -0.03 0.50 0.46 0.16 0.6 1          
10 GRS 0.04 -0.02 -0.06 0.20 0.07 0.02 -0.02 -0.05 0.10 1         
11 ETR 0.04 -0.15 0.07 -0.11 0.31 0.41 0.15 -0.06 0.59 0.04 1        
 Institutional                   
12 ROL 0.01 -0.39 0.11 -0.21 -0.05 0.17 0.15 -0.06 0.23 0.07 0.27 1       
13 GEF -0.12 -0.38 -0.03 -0.04 0.18 0.14 -0.08 -0.03 0.41 0.19 0.30 0.46 1      
14 COC -0.27 0.06 0.10 0.18 -0.32 -0.23 -0.18 -0.00 -0.28 0.03 -0.20 0.27 0.04 1     
 Cultural                   
15 CPR 0.07 0.07 -0.14 0.04 0.12 0.17 -0.06 -0.04 0.13 0.05 0.16 -0.13 -0.10 -0.38 1    
16 SOC -0.05 0.08 0.12 -0.0 -0.18 -0.08 -0.11 -0.06 0.05 0.03 0.06 0.21 0.13 0.09 0.53 1   
17 REG 0.18 0.18 -0.10 -0.22 0.01 0.10 0.16 -0.03 -0.04 -0.14 0.00 -0.30 -0.22 -0.35 0.20 -0.05 1  
18 SEC 0.19 0.05 -0.12 -0.02 0.24 0.17 -0.02 -0.02 0.21 0.05 0.20 -0.18 -0.09 -0.53 0.87 0.32 0.24 1 
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Furthermore, Table 3.5 reports the better fit for factorized variables in the 
cultural category. See more details in section 3.4.4 below. All the variables in Table 
3.5 below indicate outstanding fitness because RMSEA is below the threshold of 0.05. 
Moreover, all these generated latent variables have CFI ranging from 0.500 to 1.000 
which is a perfect representation of variables involved to create latent cultural 
Variables. 
Table 3.5: Goodness of fit for cultural variables generated  
 Significant levels of RMSEA *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Notes. Generated latent variables from 1 to 2 apply to WVS in chapter 4 while from 3 to 7 apply 
to Afrobarometer Surveys in chapter 5.                                                                                                                          
Lastly, the data collected from WVS and AS are prone to missing values since 
data is collected every three or four years in selected countries. It leaves years in 
between as missing values. Therefore, interpolation and extrapolation techniques were 
used to fill the missing years. These techniques were applied to all cultural variables to 
fill up missing years. Of course, some economic variables missing data marginally filled 
by an interpolation technique. These techniques have been are one or the other, 
extensively used in literature (Dufur et al., 2013; Gennaioli et al., 2013; Kuznets, 1955; 
Malik, 2013). Further exploration of models for chapters 4 and 5 done by checking 
outliers as illustrated in Table 3.6 that shows no severe outliers that can influence the 
regression coefficients as previously explained below. 
 Generated 
cultural  Latent 
Variable 





 Generated from WVS   
1 FER N/A N/A N/A 
2 CPR E023: How interested would say are in politics? 
A004: How important in life is politics?  
E026:  Political action: joining in boycotts. 
0.006*** 0.961 
3 SOC E069_06 Confidence: The Police 
E069_07 Confidence: Parliament   
E069_08 Confidence: The Civil Services 
E069_11 Confidence: The national   government 
E069_12 Confidence: The Political Parties  
E069_17 Confidence: Justice System 
0.000*** 0.514 
4 REG F50: Belief in God   
F53: Belief in  hell 
F54: Belief in heaven 
F59: Belief in the devil  
0.000*** 0.700 
 Generated from AS  
1 SEC Q9B:   How often feared crime at home;  
Q10A: Had something stolen from the house;  






2 CPR Q30A: Contact a local government councilor; 
Q30B: Contact MP;  
Q30C: Contact official of a Government Agency;  
Q30D. Contact political party official 
0.046** 0.993 
3 SOC Q59A: Trust president;  
Q59B: Trust parliament / national  Assembly;  
Q59C: Trust national Electoral  Commission 
Q59E: Trust elected local government council 
0.000*** 1.000 
4 REG NA NA N/A 
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Table 3.6: Checking severe outliers38 in the models  
 










                                            
 
38 A model with observations from 10 to 300 in real data with severe outliers of 5% should be 
rejected of normality. 
Chapter 4   
OLS1 (combined) model 
Mean    =   1.3e-06 Standard deviation  1.0e+04                                    (N= 264) 
Median =   1115 Pseudo standard deviation =   8461                        (IQR=   1.1e+04) 
10 trim  =   227.2  
  Low                               High 
 Inner fences -2.3e+04                    2.3e+04 
 # mild outliers 7                    6 
 % mild outliers 2.65%                    2.27% 
   
 Outer fences -4.0e+04                    4.0e+04 
 # severe outliers 0                                    0 
 % severe outliers    0.00%                   0.00% 
 OLS2 (developed) model 
Mean    =  1.6e+04 Standard deviation =  2.4e+04                                         (N= 132) 
Median =  5381 Pseudo standard deviation =    2.8e+04                          (IQR=  3.7e+04) 
10 trim  =  1.4e+04  
  Low                                 High 
 Inner fences -5.7e+04                      9.2e+04 
 # mild outliers  0                                     0 
   % mild outliers  0.00%                      0.00% 
   
 Outer fences -1.1e+05                      1.5e+05 
 # severe outliers  0                                     0 
 % severe outliers    0.00%                              0.00% 
OLS3 (developing) model 
Mean    =   408.5 Standard deviation   1.2e+04                                        (N= 132) 
Median =  -149.8 Pseudo standard deviation =   1.1e+04                        (IQR=   1.5e+04) 
10 trim  =  -169.1  
  Low                                  High 
 Inner fences -3.0e+04                       2.9e+04 
 # mild outliers 1                                      6 
 % mild outliers 0.38%                      2.27% 
   
 Outer fences -5.1e+04                      5.0e+04 
 # severe outliers 0                        0 
 % severe outliers    0.00%       0.00% 
Chapter 5 
OLS1SSC model 
Mean    =  -3.3e-08 Standard deviation 66.26                                         (N= 270) 
Median =  0.1082 Pseudo standard deviation =  67.87                         (IQR= 91.55) 
10 trim  =  0.7042  
  Low                                 High 
 Inner fences -182.7                      183.5 
 # mild outliers 0                                      0 
 % mild outliers 0.00%                       0.00% 
   
 Outer fences -320                      320.9 
 # severe outliers 0                                      0 





EFA and CFA techniques were used to reduce the number of cultural variables 
which are highly correlated (Abdi and Williams, 2010; Tipping and Bishop, 1999). Factor 
analysis is a systematic tool used to reduce the number of mostly correlated variables 
in the dataset with fewer uncorrelated variables (Kim and Mueller, 1978). Hence, EFA 
and CFA procedures were used to reduce interrelated variables captured from WVS 
and AS. This has helped to create indexed cultural variables (latent constructs) from 
variables that capture similar things by topic or sub-topics covered by the 
questionnaires used to gather data in each survey. For instance, Table 3.5 above shows 
variables generated and names of variables used to generate a latent variable in each 
case.  
  
  This test is used to find out if there is the presence of a multicollinearity problem 
among the variables used in the models. The presence of perfect relationships between 
independent variables in the regression model unstabilizes the coefficients and wildly 
inflates standard errors. The mean VIF for OLS1 (combined) OLS2 (developed) and 
OLS3 (developing) in chapter 4 are 2.87, 2.83, and 3.36 respectively in Table 3.7 below. 
Hence, there is no strict linearity among variables in the models because VIF in each 
variable is below 10. Also, Table 3.7 shows that there is no multicollinearity problem in 
SSC model for chapter 5 because mean VIF is 2.34 which is well below the threshold 
of 10 and each variable has VIF below 10. As a result, all variables in all the models 
are retained.   
 
 
3.4.4   Techniques used to reduce cultural variables 
3.4.5    Variance inflation factor (VIF) 
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Table 3.7: VIF values for Variables in 4 different Models 
 
Chapter 4 Chapter 5 
OLS1(Combined) model OLS2 (Developed) model OLS3 (Developing) model OLS1SSC model 
Variable VIF 1/VIF   Variable VIF 1/VIF   Variable VIF 1/VIF   Variable VIF 1/VIF   
RKN 9.40 0.106339 RKN 6.69 0.149459 RKN 9.15 0.109341 CPR 7.31 0.136855 
FER 4.19 0.238865 REG 5.60 0.178486 HDI 8.80 0.113595 SEC 5.99 0.166839 
GCI 4.12 0.242917 GCI 4.24 0.235856 REG 7.68 0.130201 SOC 2.35 0.424786 
HDI 3.87 0.258319 EMP 3.42 0.292091 CPR 5.99 0.166973 GCI 2.32 0.430738 
CPR 3.56 0.280672 GRS 3.19 0.313586 GCI 3.58 0.278981 EGS 1.99 0.501428 
ROL 3.33 0.300169 EGS 3.14 0.318929 IGS 2.41 0.414674 COC 1.97 0.506430 
REG 2.43 0.411792 IGS 2.85 0.350516 HWK 2.38 0.420060 RKN 1.97 0.508242 
SOC 2.35 0.424825 GEF 2.58 0.387683 SOC 2.34 0.427093 HCT 1.94 0.515043 
HWK 2.21 0.452741 FER 2.50 0.400364 EGS 2.16 0.463707 IGS 1.93 0.517251 
EGS 2.16 0.463936 HDI 2.34 0.428055 ETR 2.08 0.479915 ROL 1.87 0.533978 
IGS 2.00 0.500463 TED 2.25 0.443826 FER 1.99 0.502362 GEF 1.87 0.534859 
GRS 1.85 0.540578 ETR 1.81 0.553522 ROL 1.69 0.591308 ETR 1.78 0.560610 
EMP 1.74 0.574078 CPR 1.64 0.610035 GRS 1.57 0.638926 EMP 1.66 0.602167 
GEF 1.65 0.604685 SOC 1.59 0.627032 GEF 1.52 0.656161 REG 1.36 0.733920 
ETR 1.60 0.626531 HWK 1.56 0.640729 EMP 1.32 0.758795 HDI 1.30 0.768333 
TED 1.25 0.799734 ROL 1.40 0.715676 TED 1.23 0.810986 GRS 1.15 0.871740 
FDI 1.13 0.887060 FDI 1.25 0.799407 FDI 1.19 0.843695 AID 1.06 0.947489 
Mean VIF 2.87  Mean VIF 2.83  Mean VIF 3.36  Mean VIF 2.34  
               




3.5 MODEL ESTIMATION AND TESTS 
The study adopted the mixed research design because it accommodates both 
OLS estimation technique and a multi-case study. The methods were chosen because 
they were appropriate to address the primary and specific research questions 
highlighted in section 3.3 above. Therefore, the data analysis techniques were well-
thought-out to fit in with the research approach and collection of data as suggested by 
(Sharp et al., 2002). The OLS estimation technique makes it possible to identify 
variables in the model that positively or negatively impact economic development 
significantly in chapters 4 and 5. On the other hand, a multi-case study (further 
discussed in section 3.6 below) verifies the findings in chapters 4 and 5. It was done by 
presenting the evidence after analysis in a matrix of categories, displaying data in 
graphs and charts by using means across tabulations as suggested by (Huberman and 
Miles, 1984; Runkel, 2007). This type of study provides the quantitative or numeric 
explanations of trends, attitudes, and opinions by carefully studying and making an 
analysis of the sample of the population. For the analysis to done appropriately and 
efficiently the right pieces of training were undertaken and the suitable software (Stata) 
used in the analysis.  
 
This study's investigation employed panel data on the sample of countries 
covering a period from 1994 to 2015.  Model estimations used OLS other than Fixed 
Effects and Random Effects. After the Hausman test for fixed effects and random 
effects, in chapter 4 model the results showed that Fixed Effects was better than 
Random Effects, hence, elimination of Random Effects Model. In the same model, 
further test between OLS and Random effect determined by Breusch and Pagan 
Lagrangian multiplier (LM) test which also rejected random effects. Now the choice was 
between OLS and Fixed effects models. Fixed models assume that there is constant 
variance among countries in the sample of study (Kohler and Kreuter, 2005). However, 
the Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroscedasticity reveals that there are 
differences of variances across countries in the sample of developed and developing 
countries, hence, the OLS model chosen as ideal for this study.  
3.5.1.1     Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test; Cameron & Trivedi's IM-test 
 This test was employed to check heteroscedasticity because its presence 
conflicts the assumption of OLS model that constant variance among entities is 
important for its credible prediction. OLS1 (combined), OLS2 (developed), and OLS3 
(developing) models were tested for heteroscedasticity by using Stata commands such 
as estat hettest and estat imtest. The hypothesis for both tests is that residuals are 
homogeneous. The p-value threshold for the outcomes in both tests is 0.05. The p-
3.5.1   Models in chapter 4  
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value scores for estat hettest and estat imtest are as follows: OLS1 = 0.3971 and 
0.0001; OLS2 = 0.9088 and 0.4591; OLS3 = 0.1613 and 0.4591 respectively. Hence, 
the hypothesis that the residuals are homogeneous is accepted in OLS2 (developed) 
and OLS3 (developing) models while OLS1 (combined) has heteroscedasticity. Even 
though heteroscedasticity to some extent was reported to be present in the models in 
this section above, the extent of the effect on OLS models is relatively small as indicated 
by estat hettest and estat imtest tests. The OLS models in Table 3.7 above shows 
models passed the VIF test. The models were further subjected to tests that check 
normality of the residuals by using kdensity command. Figures 3.3, 3.4, and 3.5 below 
show that all the three models have passed the normality tests. These figures for each 
model are created by first running each OLS regression and then using predict 
command to generate residuals.  After that, kdensity command with an option of normal 
was used to create normal density overlaid on the plot. Then, pnorm command for 
residuals was used to check non-normality in the middle range of data. Furthermore, 
qnorm command was used to check non-normality near tail ends. All these three 
commands are illustrated in the figures below.  
Despite, the pleasing outcomes from the figures below, there are slight 
violations of normality in the middle range of data for OLS2 (developed) and near the 
tail ends in OLS2 (developed) and OLS3 (developing) models. To sort out these small 
failures of heteroscedasticity, normality, and outliers IVOLS regression technique was 
used in OLS2 (developed) and OLS3 (developing) models as shown in Table 4.3 in 
chapter 4. This table shows that coefficients of OLS2(developed); OLS3 (developing), 
and IVOLS2; IVOLS3 models respectively are almost the same though slight 
differences noted in standard errors which do not have any effect on the p-values and 
t statistics. Therefore, the OLS technique used for estimation in this study produces 

















Figure 3.3: OLS1 (combined) model normality distribution   
 
 
Notes. Graph 1 checks the normality of OLS1 (combined) model data while graph 2 and 3 
checks normality in the middle range and end tails respectively. 
 
Figure 3.4: OLS2 (developed) model normality distribution  
 
 
Notes. Graph 1 checks the normality of OLS2 (developed) model data while graph 2 and 3 







































kernel = epanechnikov, bandwidth =  2.5e+03
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kernel = epanechnikov, bandwidth =  7.1e+03
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Notes. Graph 1 checks the normality of OLS3 (developing) model data while graph 2 and 3 
checks normality in the middle range and end tails respectively. 
3.5.1.2   Specification of models OLS2 (developed) and OLS3 (developing)  
Linktest command in Stata is used to detect any misspecification of the model. 
It is achieved by checking if _hatsq is less than < 0.05 in which case the model is 
misspecified. On the other hand, if _hatsq is > 0.05, then the model is specified. The 
misspecification of the model happens when one or more relevant variable(s) is/are 
omitted in the model. Alternatively, when one or more irrelevant variable(s) is/are 
included in the model. Linktest command creates two variables namely _hat and the 
_hatsq after running the model regression. The _hat variable is regarded as a variable 
of prediction while _hatsq a variable of squared prediction. The main aim of this test is 
to verify if the model is properly specified and doesn’t need any more additional 
independent variables by chance. Hence, it is expected that _hat should be significant 
while _hatsq insignificant. The outcome of this test for OLS2 (developed): _hat = 0.087 
and _hatsq = 0.863 and the outcome for OLS3 (developing): _hat = 0.013 and _hatsq 
= 0.761. Both models are correctly specified since scores for p-values of _hatsq are 





































kernel = epanechnikov, bandwidth =  3.2e+03
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Graph 3: Checking normality at end tails




Table 3.8. Checking specification error by using the linktest technique 
                                                                                                                                               
 
Notes.  P-Value in yellow in both models in the row for _hatsq is above 0.05 significance level as 
an indication there are no omitted variables in the models. 
 
 
This study's investigation employed panel data on the sample of countries 
covering a period from 2001 to 2015.  Model estimations used pooled OLS other than 
Fixed Effects and Random Effects. After the Hausman test for fixed effects and random 
effects, the results showed that random effects were better than fixed effects. The 
Hausman test p-value was more significant than the 0.05 threshold. Hausman result 
was also confirmed by the testparm test that indicated that there were no fixed effects 
on the panel data. Hence, the fixed effects model eliminated. Now, the random-effects 
model was also tested by using the xttest0 technique. This test result was insignificant, 
hence failed to reject the assumption of random effects model that variances across 
countries are zero. That being the case, the random effects model is of interest and will 
be used in the study to check the OLS model. However, OLS model can be prone to 
the serial correlation of the regressors and their errors. Hence, a Lagram-multiplier 
test was used, and it was noted that there is the presence of correlation of the first-order 
autocorrelation. Therefore, to check the seriousness of correlation, this study adopted 
other models such as IVREG2 and GLS models as demonstrated in Table 5.3 in chapter 
5.  The results show that first order autocorrelations are not severe enough to raise 
concern since the results of Random, IVREG2, and GLS models are like the OLS 








(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
GDP per Capita Coefficient Std. Err. t-test P-value [95% Confidence Interval] 
 OLS2 (developed) Model  
_hat 1.109727 .6441492 1.72 0.087 -.1647378 2.384192 
_hatsq -0.00000220 .0000127 -0.17 0.863 -.0000274 .000023 
_cons -1288.823 8029.287 -0.16 0.873 -17174.96 14597.32 
 OLS3 (developing) Model  
_hat .8948358 .3559388 2.51 0.013 .1906022 1.599069 
_hatsq 0.00000215 00000704 0.30 0.761 -.0000118 .0000161 
_cons 1014.927 4089.916 0.25 0.804 -7077.072 9106.927 
3.5.2    Model OLS1SSC for chapter 5 
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Figure 3.6:  Checking Normality of Residuals for OLS1SSC model   
  
Notes. Graph 1 checks the normality of OLS1SSC model data while graph 2 and 3 checks 
normality in the middle range and end tails respectively. 
 
3.5.2.1    Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test 
Heteroscedasticity was checked by using Stata commands such as estat 
hettest and estat imtest in Stata software. The p-values of the tests are 0.7101, and 
0.0063 respectively. The p-value for hettest is more significant than 0.05 at 95% 
significance level. Hence, the null hypothesis that residuals are homogeneous is 
accepted. However, the test for imtest shows the presence of heteroscedasticity 
because its p-value is less than 0.05. Therefore, to check this problem OLS method in 
the estimation was checked by random, IVREG2 and GLS models as demonstrated in 
Table 5.3 chapter 5. Also, the assumption of normality tested as shown in Figure 3.6 
above. The outcome seems to indicate normality of the OLS model.  
3.5.2.2    Specification of the model  
 Linktest command was used to check if more variables were needed in the 
model. The result as in Table 3.9 below supports the null hypothesis that there is no 
specification error. It is shown by the p-value of _hatsq which is 0.260. It is above 0.05 
at 95% significance level. Hence, the null hypothesis that there are no omitted variables 
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Table 3.9: Checking specification error in the OLS model 
 
 
Notes. No omission of variables in OLS model                     
3.6 MULTI-CASE STUDY: BOTSWANA AND MALAWI 
Figure 3.8 below demonstrates the summary of the processes and procedures 
previously discussed above. These processes and procedures have implemented 
through graphic sequential mixed methods design. As previously explained in section 
3.3.3 above complementary strategy connects the results from quantitative chapters 4 
and 5 to chapter 6 which is a multi-case study.  Even though this multi-case study 
engages only two countries of Botswana and Malawi, they were sampled purposively 
as recommended by (Guarte, 2006). This qualitative approach engages a more 
extensive range of variables than quantitative approaches demonstrated in chapters 4 
and 5. The approach provides a rich in-depth and cross-cases comparison investigation 
that is needed to explore the findings in chapters 4 and 5 (Walsham, 1995). The in-
depth investigation relies on multiple sources of evidence as suggested by (Yin, 1994, 
p. 13).  Hence, this multi-case study compliments secondary data analysis by seeking 
to understand how individual variables, circumstances, institutions, and environment 
interact with each other in specific national settings to produce measured effects (Darke 
et al., 1998, p. 277; Popper, 2014). Therefore, the mixed methods design in this thesis 
combines opposite positivist and interpretive orientations to enhance the quality and 
validity of the findings as noted by (Gable, 1994, p. 112). That being the case the 
philosophical position that seems ideal is Positivism/Neo-empiricism as demonstrated 
in Figure 3.7 below. All in all, the case study chapter seeks to drill down below the macro 
data to try to put some of the findings from the other two analytical chapters into context 
and to explain apparent anomalies. It therefore strengthens and compliments the 







(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
GDP per Capita Coefficient Std. Err. t-test P-value [95% Confidence Interval] 
_hat .9303584 .427186 2.18 0.030 .0892768 1.77144 
_hatsq .0021014 .0018628 1.13 0.260 -.0015663 .0057692 
_cons 34.88656 33.89272 1.03 0.304 -31.84443 101.6175 
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Figure 3.7: Epistemological and ontological assumptions 




                                                                                                                                                
  E.g., Positivism/       e.g., Critical Theory;      e.g., Postmodernism                                               
Neo-empiricism                     Critical Realism; Pragmatism                                                                                               
Source: Gill, Johnson, and Clark (2010) 
Therefore, the results of the multi-case study using a qualitative approach 
confirms or verifies the results of quantitative chapters as noted by (Greene et al., 
1989). The sources of data for the cultural category in this third phase are AS, Malawi 
National Surveys, Botswana National Surveys, and other sources of variables in 
traditional and institutional categories are demonstrated in Table 3.2 above. In this 
phase, qualitative data not transformed into quantitative data. Instead, the findings 
based are on qualitative methods of analysis in line with the qualitative paradigm as 
expressed by (Corbin and Strauss, 2008). In other words, according to Kane and 
Trochim (2007), the data collected through surveys (primary or secondary) are 
represented quantitatively by methods. However, this quantitative information rests 
upon qualitative judgment (Corbin and Strauss, 2008; Trochim and Donnelly, 2001). It 
suggests that quantitative and qualitative information is intertwined, hence, making it 
possible for them to be mixed in the research design. Subsequently, the main aim for 
this complementary design is to follow-up the findings in chapter 5 focussing mainly on 
how the cultural category performed by using statistical analysis techniques. This 
follow-up uses different qualitative analysis techniques that capture all the participants 
in the surveys other than reducing to means as applied in chapters 4 and 5. Therefore, 
quantitative and qualitative approaches in this study build on each other such as using 
estimation techniques in chapters 4 and 5 and interpreting output results and 
generalizing the findings to context by qualitative knowledge (Coll and Chapman, 2000; 













































Notes. Processes and procedures are systematically implemented to meet the purpose 
of the thesis. 
 
3.7 SECONDARY DATA SOURCES 
 
  It is generally accepted that secondary data sources are widely used in empirical 
economic research (Cowton, 1998; Atkinson and Brandolini, 2001). However, some 
secondary data sources might have exaggerated data or might have inconsistency in 
data information on some aspects of interest for empirical research. Nonetheless, the 
shortfalls highlighted above were dealt with by looking at the credentials of the 
researchers, the reputation of the organizations, the methodologies employed in the 
Representative sample: six 
developed and six developing 
countries: Purpose of study 
Secondary data collection 
and data management: 
Variables 
                                           
Estimation of variables: OLS 
method 




                                          
Secondary data collection 
and data management 
                                        
Estimation of variables: 
OLS method 
                                                  
Results / Findings 
                                          
Results / Findings 
        Multi-case study: Botswana and Malawi 
Synthetic interpretation of secondary data 
analysis and multi-case study outcomes 
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collection of data and how the ethics were deliberated in their collection of data. For 
instance, the data of the variables employed in the thesis were taken from reputable 
international, national accounts such as (Summers and Heston, 1991). The above data 
source has been extensively used in the literature. Also, other data of variables came 
from reputable international agencies like the World Bank, and United Nations who 
collect data consistently over time. These international agencies engage larger samples 
and collect data that contain substantial breadth (Johnston, 2017). Capitalizing on the 
availability of trustworthy data sources this study collected data on crucial topics from 
different sources and merged them by using Stata software.  
 The study engages cross-sectional and longitudinal data of countries. The 
cross-sectional and longitudinal investigation was used to explore variables in different 
countries over the same period and over a long time. Hence, data collected for variables 
were taken from more than one country at a particular time so that comparison can be 
made to uncover patterns of association or differences as observed by (Bryman and 
Bell, 2011; Sekaran and Bougie, 2013). For example, in this study 12 countries were 
selected in chapter 4; 18 countries in chapter 5, and two countries in chapter 6. The 
variables included in the models illustrated in the equations (2) and (3) in section 3.4 
above are measurements of the desired elements taken at a particular time over an 
extended period such as GDP per capita for each country. On the other hand, data 
collected through surveys were also used. Survey data is equally important because 
primary or secondary data was collected from a sample of the population (countries) so 
that results can be generalized as suggested by (Fowler, 2009). This type of data 
provides multiple observations which can be used to compare and contrast the 
differences in economic development across countries (Baum, 2006; Tonkiss, 1998). 
As a result, it helps to identify trends, differences, relationships, and these are 
compared among countries. The data sources in all the three categories are 
demonstrated in Table 3.2 above. It is generally acknowledged in the literature that data 
sources collected objectively such as the sources of traditional and institutional 
categories variables are trustworthy and valid other than those collected subjectively 
(Glaeser et al., 2004).  Hence, the next paragraph will further discuss the validity of data 
sources for mainly cultural category variables collected from WVS and Afrobarometer 
Surveys.  
The thesis defines culture as accumulated knowledge due to both individual and 
society experiences and discoveries concerning ecological conditions culminating in 
values, rules, beliefs and social norms as claimed by (Fernandez, 2009; Nunn, 2012; 
Sternberg, 2004). In summary, culture is limited to functional and constituent senses 
playing a part as universal aspects of people's behavior, in most cases authenticated 
3.7.1 World Values Surveys (WVS) and Afrobarometer Surveys (AS) 
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in their activities and belief systems. For this reason, the concept of culture seems to 
have concomitant values embedded in traditional economic and institutional variables 
claimed to be the engine of economic growth in countries as explained in chapter 2 
sections 2.2 and 2.4 respectively. Therefore, this study assumes that the methodology 
bias in capturing traditional and institutional variables fails to observe the differences 
between de jure and de facto experiences. For this reason, cultural variables will be 
obtained from WVS and Afrobarometer Surveys capturing subjective understandings of 
the participants. These surveys are similar to national census whereby a representative 
sample of the population is formed from participants of different ages, different 
employment status, different levels of education, and income levels while living in 
different parts of the country (Cohen et al., 2011). 
3.7.1.1   World Values Survey as data sources 
The data from WVS are periodically collected with almost identical 
questionnaires at each particular time which Hakim, (1982) referred to as surveys 
collected at regular intervals. WVS is an international network with competent 
international researchers dedicated to studying changes in cultural values and their 
impact on political and social life. The network has been extensively used academically 
across social sciences disciplines39. Furthermore, WVS conducts surveys through face 
to face interviews or phone interviews, and the sampling is representative of all people 
from age 18 to 85 years living within private households in each country, regardless of 
their nationality, citizenship or language. The minimum sample size in most of the 
countries is 1200, and they use full probability or a combination of probability and 
stratified. They engage the principal investigator40 in each country who is responsible 
for conducting the surveys in respective countries following the fixed rules and 
procedure adhering to ethics requirements. The WVS network has accomplished six 
waves of surveys from 1981 to 2012. They are however presently conducting the 
seventh wave. Their use of a standardized questionnaire to measure changing values 
concerning religion, gender roles, work motivations, democracy, good governance, 
social capital, political participation, tolerance of other groups, environmental protection, 
and subjective well-being seems ideal for this study as highlighted above. Also, the 
network ensures internal consistency checks which are made between the sampling 
design and the outcome and rigorous data cleaning procedures are followed before any 
data from any country is archived on their official database. Despite the network's 
                                            
 
39 www.worldvaluessurvey.org/WVSContents.jsp  
 
40 social scientists working in academic institutions 
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capturing surveys from participants from rich and developing countries, the 
inconsistency of data collection in mainly Sub-Saharan countries seems to be the 
primary challenge in monitoring the value changes and subjective thinking in the 
countries. Hence, to fill this gap, the study engaged Afrobarometer Surveys that are 
conducted consistently in Sub-Saharan countries.  
3.7.1.2   Afrobarometer Surveys as data sources 
 Afrobarometer is a pan-African research network that conducts public attitude 
surveys on democracy, governance, economic conditions, and related issues in more 
than 35 countries in Africa. The network started in 1999 with a few countries, but more 
countries joined the network as time progressed. Moreover, the network’s core role is 
to capture the ebb and flow of African thinking on critical issues such as constitutional 
changes, political participation, governance, and official corruption. Hence, data 
collected and analyzed denotes the thinking of ordinary citizens regarding pertaining 
social-economic and political issues. Presently, Afrobarometer surveys are the world’s 
leading research venture on issues that affect Africans. 
 Furthermore, the network employs a robust sample41. Designs that ensure that 
every person from the age of 18 and over has the probability of being selected for an 
interview. The sample sizes for each country vary with the population size; the countries 
with lower population numbers have at least 1200 participants while those with higher 
populations have 2400 participants. Also, the network follows strict ethical procedures 
that ensure data collected is reliable and accurate and portrays the thinking of the 
Africans. 
  
This type of data provides multiple observations which can be used to compare 
and contrast the differences in growth say for example economic development among 
countries. Moreover, it helps identify trends, differences, and relationships among 
countries and making comparisons possible. This nature of the study is costly, but the 
cost was eliminated for the reason that secondary data is free to the public. Hence, the 
collection of data from data sources in Table 3.2 above reduced time for data collection. 
The time saved was used to do other tasks for the study. Secondary data also give 
liberty to choose the up to date quality data from data sources with the distinguished 
history, as a result producing credible results (Saunders et al., 2012).  
  
The data sources indicated in Table 3.2 above show the periods covered mainly 
for the cultural category fall in the range of 10 to 21 years. However, economic 
                                            
 
41 http://afrobarometer.org/surveys-and-methods/sampling-principles  
3.7.2   Advantages of Secondary data sources 
3.7.3   Limitations of data sources 
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development of the countries takes a longer time of about 100 years to be thoroughly 
monitored. Therefore, this type of data is limited in its ability to explain economic 
development differences among countries over an extended period. Despite this 
limitation, the patterns of differences and similarities of economic growth are identified 
and compared between developed and developing countries as demonstrated in 
chapters 4 and 5. This is vital to provide explanations as to whether cultural values 
hinder or promote economic growth or productivity. It also helps to detect and describe 
barriers to human capability in dealing with contextual challenges.  
However, secondary data sources are prone to databases not being completed, 
inaccurate or not updated which is pointed out in the literature (Gray, 2009). Despite 
this limitation, the study handled the collection of data by looking at different databases 
providing the same type of data. The other limitation encountered during the 
investigation is the absence of data. That happened mostly to survey data where data 
is collected periodically such as every three years. It leaves gaps in the years' data was 
not collected, hence reducing the number of years to be engaged in the study. However, 
missing data in this study were dealt with by using the recommended method of 
imputation as recommended by (Saunders et al., 2006).  Imputation is the procedure 
used for assigning missing data in variables and this study employed hot decking 
procedure in filling missing values. The filling of missing values by this method engaged 
highly correlated variable to fill missing data of the other correlated variable in a 
balanced dataset which is widely used in literature (Streiner, 2002; 2013).  
  
 The secondary data sources provided both raw data and unprocessed data in 
large datasets, making it not ideal for the study. Hence, identification of data sources 
and collection of data was not the end in itself, but the beginning of data mining. For 
instance, all the data of variables collected were in the form of large datasets. Hence, 
these datasets need to be processed so that they could be used in this study. However, 
for the processes of data to be appropriately and expertly handled, training had been 
undertaken to gain the skills and techniques needed for the study. Some of the pieces 
of training done are Statistics software Training; Quantitative methods course; Statistics 
for Researchers; Attended some seminars taken place at the University of Central 
Lancashire; support from supervision team; Stata software advanced training; self-
training through academic YouTube sources; and using University of Central 
Lancashire library sources. The acquired skills enabled the successful use of the 
procedures to process the data. The procedures used to process data are as follows: 
data cleaning, data integration, data reduction, and data transformation. 
3.7.4   Procedures used for data processing 
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3.7.4.1  Data cleaning 
This process involved screening the datasets for inconsistencies, missing 
values, and extraneous variables. The process helped improve the quality of data by 
removing inconsistencies and extraneous variables. Concerning missing values in 
datasets, the correction was either dropping variables or observations with many 
missing values. Alternatively, using Stata software to impute missing values on the 
variables within each dataset. Also, missing data in some variables were filled by using 
the recommended method of imputation such as hot decking as recommended by 
(Saunders et al., 2006). Stata software provides excellent procedures of data 
imputation, and hot decking is among the procedures executed by Stata software. This 
procedure uses a highly correlated variable to fill missing data of the other correlated 
variable in a balanced dataset (Streiner, 2002; 2013). Data cleaning also involved 
checking double data entry, duplicates and summary statistics of variables as 
suggested by (Mitchell, 2010). Data cleaning helped to form reliable datasets by 
merging variables from different sources together through the process called data 
integration explained more in the next section. 
3.7.4.2  Data integration 
 
This process helped to merge variables from different sources to fulfill a single 
purpose. For example, there were some great datasets but with missing values on the 
key variables. Hence, missing values were sourced from other data sources covering 
the same period and countries. Data integration also covered the triangulation of 
variables from different data sources. For example, variables from more than one 
source were merged (Denzin, 1978:291). This process happened in three phases. 
Firstly, all the variables in Table 3.2 above from different sources except variables from 
AS were merged to form chapter 4 dataset. Secondly, all the variables in the same table 
from different sources except WVS were merged to form chapter 5 dataset. In Stata 
software processes called appending or merging were used to combine variables from 
different data sources as highlighted above. These processes were executed as 
explained by (Mitchell, 2010; StataCorp). After the merging of variables to datasets in 
chapters 4 and 5, further scrutiny of variables was conducted through a process called 
data reduction which is explained more in the next section. 
3.7.4.3  Data reduction 
This process was mainly undertaken to survey sources of data. For instance, 
variables collected through questionnaires have a scale of options. The scale options 
differ with the intended meaning given to participants to choose from the options 
offered. Hence, in both chapters 4 and 5, these survey variables were reduced to the 
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means by using Stata software. The command used in Stata to reduce these options to 
means is collapse command. The variables were reduced to means representing the 
people in that country who opted for that choice. Hence, the means of each variable in 
each year represented each country for each year the survey was done. Hence, data 
reduction for survey variables was essential to execute statistical analysis in chapters 
4 and 5. Furthermore, EFA and CFA techniques were used mainly to reduce cultural 
variables from the surveys as suggested by (Maylor and Blackmon, 2005). These 
procedures were used to create one variable concept from more than two variables 
captured by two or more questions under the same topic. Therefore, data reduction is 
an essential process because the variables selected are organized in datasets so that 
Stata software can be used to execute the analysis and manipulation of other forms of 
variables which are recommended in the literature for credible results during analysis 
of data (Blaikie, 2000). This process associated with data transformation which is 
explained more in the next section.  
3.7.4.4  Data transformation 
There have been changes to some variables' scales, mainly datasets from AS 
and WVS. Some scales used were not preferred concerning efficiency issues and 
credible results. This data transformation was done to use statistical analysis of 
qualitative data collected through WVS and AS which is endorsed by (Maylor and 
Blackmon, 2005). This technique reduces observation of participants' views or opinions 
to numbers. Moreover, these numbers represent views and can be statistically analyzed 
(P. 352). These processes applied to variables from surveys in chapters 4 and 5. 
However, chapter 6 did not need such data transformation because the variables from 
the survey did not need to be analyzed statistically. Hence, all participants in the 
surveys were used as the source of ideas that can represent real-world phenomenon 
as claimed by (Bryman and Bell, 2003; 2015). This process changed the form of data 
from qualitative to quantitative for statistical analysis purposes demonstrated in chapter 
4 and 5 chapters.  
3.8 Conclusion  
The quantitative and qualitative nature of approaches fit well with the knowledge 
developed in attempting to answer the research questions in this study. The nature of 
reality embraced in the study has been shaped by literature review in chapter 2. This 
standpoint influenced the formulation of questions which helped to identify the variables 
incorporated in the conceptual model in section 3.4.1 above. The variables in the model 
are tested for their relationships, association and how they fit in to answer the research 
questions. It is accomplished by using statistical analysis techniques such as OLS 
technique that fits well with the quantitative approach mainly pinpointing chapters 4 and 
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5 in the thesis. The qualitative approach is utilized in chapter 6 and substantiates the 
findings of the quantitative approach in chapters 4 and 5 as demonstrated in section 
3.6 above. As can be seen from the presentation of this chapter, both quantitative and 
qualitative approaches incorporate philosophies, theories, and research designs that 
work well to accomplish the purpose of the thesis as recommended (Freeman et al., 
2007). Therefore, the mixed methods design this study engaged is well fitted to explain 
income disparities among countries. So, the findings are valid and trustworthy because 
the study has followed rigorous methods and techniques for finding knowledge during 
the entire investigation. The empirical results in chapters 4 and 5 were complementary 
to each other while those of chapter 6 confirmed the findings in chapters 4 and 5 by 
using a different approach from chapters 4 and 5.   
CHAPTER 4. INCOME DISPARITIES BETWEEN 




The widening gap between income levels between developed and developing 
countries as discussed in chapter 1 exposes the inconsistency in economic theory in 
explaining economic growth disparities among countries. For instance, the catching-up 
effect, and multiplier effect fail to explain the income disparities among countries. 
Hence, the rationale for the thesis is to examine the impact of cultural factors on 
economic growth in both developed and developing countries.  The assumption of the 
neo-classical theory that countries with lower capitals grow faster than countries with 
more copious amounts of accumulated capital seems not to work as advocated by 
(Solow, 1956; Swan, 1956).  It appears developed countries have a proportionately 
more significant positive impact upon growth in than developing nations. It appears 
against the idea that everyone is expected to catch up, even in countries with much 
lower capitals. Hence, the catching-up assumption of neo-classical theory seems not to 
work for all countries in the same way and at the same time. Why? Part of the reason 
might be that the theory is failing to include variables such as institutional and cultural 
variables. These variables seem to be excluded, and as a result, the residuals seem 
very high. That being the case, two sub-samples of developing and developed countries 
have been chosen six for each, and further divided each of these into fast and slow 






4.2 CLASSIFICATION OF DEVELOPED AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
 
This chapter allows the study to estimate panel regressions effectively and 
analyze many multivariate time-series models namely: OLS1 for combined developed 
and developing countries, OLS2 for developed and OLS3 for developing countries. In 
the first place, the question is “how did the classification of countries come about?” 
Table 4.1 below summaries classification systems used by selected international 
organizations. These organizations used different development thresholds to classify 
countries into different categories. For example, the World Bank (WB) use gross 
national product (GNP) per capita levels to classify countries as follows: Low income: 
$1,025 or less; Lower middle-income: $1,026 to $4,035; Upper-middle-income: $4,036 
to $12,475; High income: $12,476 or more. Consequently, the WB classify low income 
and lower-middle-income countries as developing countries. While upper middle 
income and high income as developed countries (World Bank, 2018). 
Similarly, the United Nations Development Programme’s (UNDP) classifies 
countries according to their performance in human development index (HDI) measuring 
achievement of countries in longevity, education and income indices. The UNDP 
classifies developed countries as those with scores from 76 to 100 (top quartile) of the 
HDI distribution; developing countries as those with HDI percentiles 51-75, 26-50, and 
the bottom quartile HDI distribution (Malik, 2013). The rationale of the classifications of 
countries by these international organizations might reflect the view of Pearson (1969) 
to redirect resources from more prosperous nations to poorer nations to enhance their 
development status. The classification system that seems ideal for this study is by 
World Economic Situation and Prospects (WESP) and United Nations Development 
Programme’s (UNDP) because both organizations use similar categories of countries.  
Furthermore, WESP (2014, pp. 145-146) provides a list of countries according to their 
group classification as illustrated in Table 4.2 below.  The classification of countries 
according to their level of development is a contentious issue. Nonetheless, it is widely 
used in literature labeling countries as developed and developing (Aderonke, 2018; 














Table 4.1: Classification Systems in Selected International Organizations 
 
 
Notes. The most commonly used classification in this table is developed and developing label. 
 
Table 4.2. Names of countries in each classification system 
 




Austria Belgium Denmark Finland France Germany Greece 
Ireland Italy Luxembourg Netherlands Portugal Spain Sweden 
the United Kingdom Bulgaria Croatia the Cyprus Czech Republic 
Estonia Hungary Latvia Lithuania Malta Poland Romania 
Slovakia Slovenia Iceland Norway Switzerland Australia Canada 
Japan New Zealand the United States Canada Japan France 
Germany Italy the United Kingdom the United States  
 
Transition countries 
Albania Bosnia and Herzegovina Montenegro Serbia  
The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia Armenia Azerbaijan 
Belarus Georgia Kazakhstan Kyrgyzstan Republic of Moldova 




Developing countries (Africa) 
Angola Botswana Lesotho Malawi Mauritius Mozambique 
Namibia South Africa Zambia Zimbabwe Algeria Egypt 
Libya Mauritania Morocco Sudan Tunisia Cameroon Central 
African Republic Chad Congo Equatorial Guinea 
Gabon Sao Tome and Prinicipe Burundi Comoros Democratic 
Republic of Congo Djibouti Eritrea Ethiopia Kenya Madagascar 
Rwanda Somalia Uganda Tanzania Benin Burkina Faso Cabo 
Verde Côte d’Ivoire Gambia Ghana Guinea Guinea-Bissau 
Liberia Mali Niger Nigeria Senegal Sierra Leone Togo 
 
  
 Notes. Countries in the developing category are limited to the African continent 
 
The classification of countries in Table 4.2 above largely depends on the 
economic achievement or output of the country’s economy. This type of reasoning could 
help to explain the causes of different economic performances among countries (Dion, 
1998). Hence, the study adopts the technique of different cases sampling which relies 
on the maximum variance between two categories explained by different conditions in 
each category (Seawright and Gerring, 2008, p. 300). The technique is like the method 
introduced by Mill (1872) on the agreement and differences. Equally, the technique is 
also called heterogeneity sampling (Patton 2002, p. 234). This study believes that this 
approach to estimate models based on the developed and developing classification of 
countries has several advantages concerning providing policy implications compared 
to grouping all countries into one case. The differences in income outputs may reflect 
internal and external group capacities in their formulation of development policies. The 





























1) Developed countries 
2) Developing countries 
1) Advanced Countries 
 




internal differences of developed and developing countries may broadly refer to 
respective group's political system, economic system, income level, and economic 
growth rate, while appropriate external structures include main trading partners, 
geopolitical relationships, and degree of influence in international economic institutions. 
All in all, the differences between the groups are captured in the variables illustrated in 
Table 3.2 in chapter 3.  
Having explained in the above paragraph about the choice of developed and 
developing countries categories by diverse case sampling, the countries in each 
category were randomly chosen as indicated in Table 4.3 below. The random sampling 
of these countries to some extent relied on the availability of data of World Values 
Surveys (WVS) in developing countries. Hence, only six countries in each category 
were chosen to give an equal number of observations so that the estimation of 
parameters is not biased (Wald, 1948, p. 220).  
Table 4.3: Classification of countries in OLS2 and OLS3 models 
 
 
 Notes. There are six countries in each group as indicated in the table above 
 
In this sub-section, countries in OLS2 (developed) and OLS3 (developing) 
models are further grouped into fast and slow developed and developing by using a 
dependent variable GDP per capita growth (GDPPCG) rates as a proxy for average 
economic growth rates over the period from 1994 to 2015. Why? According to Dion 
(1998, p. 127), a range of a dependent variable can be explained by the conditions of 
the phenomenon taking place in the context. Hence, using the method of agreement, 
the selection of cases (fast or slow) can be based on the value of a dependent variable 
(Mill, 1868 cited in Dion, 1998).  For this reason, the mean of GDPPCG became a 
cutting point whether a country belongs to slow or fast growth in both models (OLS2 
developed) and OLS3 (developing) respectively. That seems to imply that any value of 
GDPPCG from 0 to mean of GDPPCG in OLS2 (developed) was categorized 
SlowOLS2 (developed) while any value above was classified FastOLS2 (developed). 
Similarly, any value from 0 to mean of GDPPCG in OLS3 (developing) model 
was labeled SlowOLS3 (developing) while those above mean were categorized 
FastOLS3 (developing). Graph 1 in Figure 4.1 below shows that there are more 
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negative residual observations in the SlowOLS3 (developing) model than positive 
residuals after running a regression with GDPPCG as output. Also, in graph 2 in the 
same figure shows more positive residuals than negative hence, FastOLS3 
(developing) model.  
Figure 4.1: Frequencies of residuals in Slow and Fast (developing) models 
 
Notes. Residuals below 0 are more in the SlowOLS3 model while residuals above 0 are more in 
 the FastOLS3 model (developing). 
 
 Figure 4.1 above seems to suggest that the cutting point for a dependent 
variable GDPCG is justified. Furthermore, graphs 1 and 2 in Figure 4.2 below indicates 
residual frequencies for SlowOLS2 and FastOLS2 (developed) models. Graph 1 has 
slightly more negative values than positive; the same pattern seems to occur in graph 
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Notes. Graphs 1 and 2 show slim margins between negative and positive residuals. 
  
Figure 4.2 above shows slim differences between SlowOLS2 and FastOLS2 
developed models. For example, graph 1 shows about four more negative residuals 
than positive while graph 2 positive residuals are more just by two residuals.   
Nonetheless, the rationally for grouping the OLS2 (developed) and OLS3 (developing) 
models into SlowOLS2, FastOLS2 (developed), SlowOLS3 and FastOLS3 (developing) 
sub-groups is to find out if the performance of the variables in respective categories 
varies with the status of economic growth in the countries. It would help to identify which 
category of variables seem to provide robust support for economic growth over time in 
each sub-group. This is in line with the research done by Grier and Tullock (1989, p. 
259) who noted that coefficient values of variables vary widely across groups of 
countries in explaining economic growth. Hence, it would be possible to identify which 
category of the variables robustly support economic growth in the sub-group of 
countries similar to Asiaei and Jusoh (2015, p. 685) who identified organizational culture 
as a critical factor for sustainable average economic growth in Iran in the time the 
country was plagued with international sanctions from 2000 to 2007 period. Hence, a 
further grouping of countries in OLS2 (developed) and OLS3 (developing) models in 
this section attempts to identify the engines of growth which appears to be very elusive 
in economics empirical work as claimed by (Eberhardt and Teal, 2011, p. 143). All in 

























































Graph 2: Developed fast countries
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into the sources of economic growths. Table 4.4 below shows the names of countries 
in each category.  
Table 4.4: Countries in each sub-group of OLS2 and OLS3 models 
 




Australia Poland South Africa Egypt 
Germany 
South Korea 
Sweden Zimbabwe Ghana  
Japan 
Malaysia 
  Nigeria 
Switzerland   Rwanda 
                                                                                                                                         
Notes. There are four countries in each of the SlowOLS2 and FastOLS3 models while only two 
countries in each model of FastOLS2 and SlowOLS3. 
 
Having looked at Figures 4.1 and 4.2 above, Figure 4.3 below seems to confirm 
the discussions above whereby the figure shows differences in GDPPCG rates of 
growth over the period from 1994 to 2015.  
 
Figure 4.3: Average economic growths by category from 1994 to 2015 
 
Notes. Slow and Fast OLS2 (developed) models and Slow and Fast (developing models)   
As discussed earlier in the methodology chapter, the analysis contained within 
this chapter incorporates three categories of variables. Therefore, this investigation 
explores and possibly identify the reasons why there are income disparities among 
countries. In order to Justify the assertion, this chapter is organized as follows: Section 













































































































Source: World Development Indicators from 1994 to 2015
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section 4.3 presents the results, section 4.4 discusses the findings, and section 4.5 
concludes the chapter. The variables incorporated in the model of the study as shown 
in section 3.4.1 are described and defined in Table 3.2. The results are presented in 
the next section. 
4.3 RESULTS  
 
  The empirical results presented in this section examines whether variables in 
three categories could explain the income disparity phenomenon between developed 
and developing countries. To achieve this, estimation models used the production 
function of the form: 
Y = ΑKα (Lh) 1-α …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………..…(1) 
Y = income output, K = physical capital, L = unskilled labor, H = human capital, A 
denoted TFP interpreted as social infrastructure, social capability, social capital, 
technology progress, ignorance, see more details in chapter 2 section 2.6 and sub-
section 3.4.1 in chapter 3. The findings are reported in categories starting with the most 
influential category in the next section. 
 
Table 4.5 below has a combined model for developed and developing countries 
model (OLS1), developed countries model (OLS2) and developing countries model 
OLS3. The table also has instrumental variables in IVOLS2 and IVOLS3 models to 
check the estimation of OLS2 (developed) and OLS3 (developing) models respectively. 
Hence, the reporting of the results will be primarily limited to specifications of OLS2 
(developed) and OLS3 (developing) respectively. Furthermore, Tables 4.5 and 4.6 
below indicate the performances of the variables in all three categories. Also, the 
reporting will include the results in Tables 4.7 and 4.8 for the SlowOLS2, FastOLS2 
(developed models), SlowOLS3 and FastOLS3 (developing models) respectively. That 
being the case, the presentation of results in the next section is reported starting with 
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Table 4.5: Performance of variables in all OLS models 
 
              Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Notes. The Standard errors are in parentheses. Column (1) shows independent variables in 3 
categories. Columns (5) and (6) shows Instrumental Variables' models (IV) to check the 
performance of OLS2 and OLS3 respectively.  
 
 
Table 4.5 above shows the significance of the models in terms of p-value and 
R-Squared Adjusted as follows: OLS1(combined) = 0.0000, 0.32; OLS2 (developed)= 
0.0000, 0.31; OLS3 (developing) = 0.000, 0.43 respectively. The results in the three 
models appear to suggest that the importance of variables varies with the development 
level of the countries. The approach of estimating the contribution of variables to 
GDPPC according to the development level of the countries meets the purpose of this 
study. The purpose is to examine if cultural variables explain economic differences 
among countries. Also, Table 4.6 below demonstrates the relative importance of 
variables ranked in each model from 1 to 17. 1 being the most important while 17 the 
least important regarding contribution to GDPPC in each model. Tables 4.5 and 4.6 
have been color-coded as follows: green color shows variables that contribute to 
GDPPC significantly and positively while the yellow color indicates the least important 
Dependent Variable: GDPPC 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES OLS1(combined) OLS2(developed) OLS3(developing) IVOLS2 IVOLS3 
TRADITIONAL      
EMP 21.6674 -31.5332 55.2907 -31.5332 55.2907 
 (36.5567) (71.2258) (51.9671) (85.9404) (39.0155) 
HDI 1,170.0248 12,754.2678*** -52.4242 12,754.2678*** -52.4242 
 (1,257.9599) (4,120.7651) (2,286.1243) (4,862.1309) (2,855.7733) 
IGS -103.6191*** -60.0711* -24.6343 -60.0711** -24.6343 
 (27.4444) (31.0437) (50.9231) (28.2063) (50.7867) 
RKN -2,861.2804*** 2,825.5653* -6,708.6458*** 2,825.5653 -6,708.6458** 
 (1,064.2002) (1,634.0502) (1,924.6530) (2,287.1213) (2,622.2274) 
TED 30.8184 115.0273* 94.1277* 115.0273 94.1277 
 (37.6024) (60.7020) (55.8773) (84.8634) (80.0576) 
EGS 141.3374** 67.7849 15.5560 67.7849 15.5560 
 (70.7833) (77.4382) (126.8774) (51.0727) (172.6833) 
FDI 55.5997 -0.4164 118.4918 -0.4164 118.4918 
 (44.8970) (47.9283) (72.2347) (51.1947) (82.0366) 
GCI 213.8793*** 435.6208*** 388.3148*** 435.6208*** 388.3148*** 
 (32.8598) (82.7270) (60.1349) (75.4156) (80.4098) 
GRS 50.6011* 54.6718 5.0161 54.6718 5.0161 
 (27.5891) (45.5558) (41.7750) (70.2907) (36.7151) 
ETR 8.7606 51.7521*** -10.2082 51.7521** -10.2082 
 (9.2225) (15.1054) (13.3803) (20.0712) (13.6424) 
INSTITUTIONAL      
ROL 47.4993 70.0452 55.3817 70.0452** 55.3817 
 (42.0894) (46.1130) (69.2054) (32.6090) (45.4583) 
GEF 16,931.7849*** 20,850.8544*** 43,099.0682*** 20,850.8544** 43,099.0682** 
 (5,284.0133) (5,974.6306) (12,784.4075) (8,773.0522) (16,866.2484) 
CULTURAL      
HWK -3,669.9039 3,423.1078 -4,948.2980 3,423.1078* -4,948.2980 
 (2,299.7430) (2,621.2594) (3,556.8242) (2,015.4908) (4,147.3466) 
CPR 27,325.9826*** 34,925.9275*** 25,778.8945 34,925.9275*** 25,778.8945** 
 (9,421.8856) (10,756.9504) (19,421.1291) (7,227.7330) (12,393.3707) 
SOC 15,139.4281 -7,198.5094 42,357.9035** -7,198.5094 42,357.9035* 
 (10,588.8777) (10,986.7059) (17,967.9883) (6,856.3476) (23,189.9060) 
FER 14,937.2468** -9,845.8697 36,017.1198*** -9,845.8697 36,017.1198*** 
 (6,478.4769) (12,966.0879) (10,855.4400) (14,679.8692) (12,505.7419) 
REG -3,940.6927** 5,633.0886** -16,202.9915*** 5,633.0886** -16,202.9915** 
 (1,650.4169) (2,202.0574) (5,615.3124) (2,447.0554) (6,404.3376) 
Constant 16,324.7076 -61,167.0803** -7,534.7589 -61,167.0803* -7,534.7589 
 (18,408.3651) (29,946.3837) (29,734.5326) (36,226.5604) (33,595.2391) 
OBS 264 132 132 132 132 
R2 0.3679 0.4018 0.5044 0.4018 0.5044 
R2_A 0.324 0.313 0.431 0.313 0.431 
DF_R 246 114 114 114 114 
DF_M 17 17 17 17 17 
F 8.422 4.504 6.826 7.953 15.26 
p 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
4.3.2  Significance of OLS1 OLS2 and OLS3 models 
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variables and significantly reduces GDPPC. Furthermore, Tables 4.7 and 4.8 below 
also show that variables perform differently in slow and fast developed and developing 
countries. The significance of the models in terms of p-value and R-Squared Adjusted 
are as follows: SlowOLS2 (developed) = 0.000, 0.74; FastOLS2 (developed) = 0.000, 
0.48; SlowOLS3 (developing) = 0.000, 0.77; and FastOLS4 (developing) = 0.000, 0.40 
respectively. The results in Tables 4.7 and 4.8 also appear to suggest that the 
differences in economic growths in both developed and developing countries affect the 
performance of variables. Therefore, the reporting of the results in Tables 4.5, 4.6, 4.7, 
and 4.8 in the next section will follow the performance of variables in their categories. 
Also, the confidence interval ranges of all variables are reported at 95% confidence 




Table 4.6: Relative importance of variables in OLS1, OLS2, and OLS3 models   
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      
 
Notes. The Table shows the impact of variables in OLS1, OLS2, and OLS3 models. Independent variables ranked in columns (1) according to standardized 
coefficients in columns (3, 6, & 9). Significance levels are shown as follows: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  Effect size (Eta^ %) indicated in columns (4, 7, & 
10) respectively.  
  
Dependent Variable: GDPPC 
 OLS1 (combined) OLS2 (developed) OLS3 (developing) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Rank Independent Variables standardized 
Coefficients 
Eta^ (%) Independent Variables standardized 
Coefficients 
Eta^ (%) Independent Variables Standardized 
Coefficients 
Eta^ (%) 
1 GCI *** 0.67 10.89 GCI *** 0.79 14.55 GCI*** 0.81 18.13 
2 CPR*** 0.28 2.16 REG** 0.44 3.43 FER *** 0.31 4.79 
3 FER** 0.24 1.37 GEF*** 0.41 6.39 GEF*** 0.27 4.94 
4 GEF** 0.21   2.64 HDI*** 0.34   5.03 SOC** 0.24 2.42 
5 EGS** 0.15 1.02 ETR *** 0.33 6.16 CPR 0.21 0.77 
6 GRS* 0.13 0.86 RKN* 0.32 1.57 TED* 0.12 1.23 
7 SOC 0.11 0.53 CPR*** 0.30 5.53 FDI 0.12 1.17 
8 ROL 0.10 0.33 TED* 0.21 1.88 EMP 0.08 0.49 
9 HDI 0.09   0.22 GRS 0.16 0.76 ROL 0.07 0.28 
10 FDI  0.07 0.39 ROL 0.13 1.21 EGS 0.01 0.01 
11 ETR 0.06 0.23 HWK 0.12 0.89 GRS 0.01 0.01 
12 TED 0.05 0.17 EGS 0.11 0.40 HDI -0.00 0.00 
13 EMP 0.04 0.09 FDI -0.00 0.00 IGS -0.05 0.10 
14 HWK -0.12 0.65 EMP -0.06 0.10 ETR -0.07 0.25 
15 REG**   -0.19 1.46 SOC -0.06 0.23 HWK -0.14 0.84 
16 IGS*** -0.27 3.66 FER -0.09 0.30 REG*** -0.53 3.62 





This category has ten variables incorporated in each model as demonstrated in 
Tables 4.5 and 4.6 above. The variables have performed differently in each model as 
indicated in Table 4.5. For instance, RKN in OLS2 (developed) model significantly 
impacts GDPPC and is ranked 6th in Table 4.6 above. The confidence interval ranges 
from -411.48 to 6062.60 while its p-value is 0.086 less than 90% significance level 
threshold. In contrast, in OLS3 (developing) model, RKN significantly reduces GDPPC. 
So its p-value is 0.001 which is less than 90% significant level threshold while its 
confidence interval ranges from -10521.37 to -2895.92. Furthermore, the results in 
Tables 4.7 and 4.8 below indicate that RKN insignificantly reduces GDP per capita 
growth rate (GDPPCG) in the FastOLS2 (developed) model. On the other hand, in 
SlowOLS2 (developed) model insignificantly promotes GDPPCG. Therefore, RKN 
appears to impact GDPPCG differently in both slow and fast economic growth in 
developed countries. In contrast, RKN in FastOLS3 (developing) model insignificantly 
increases GDPPCG while in SlowOLS3 (developing) model RKN significantly reduces 
GDPPCG. Likewise, RKN seems to impact GDPPCG differently in slow and fast-
growing developing countries. It gives the impression that RKN impact on GDPPCG 
does not only depend on economic growth status of the countries but also different 
factors affecting the economies of the countries.  
The HDI in Table 4.5 in the OLS2 (developed) model has a p-value of 0.002 less 
than 90% significant level threshold. Its confidence interval ranges from 4591.06 to 
20917.47 and its contribution to GDPPC is positive and significant. On the other hand, 
HDI in OLS3 (developing) model insignificantly reduces GDPPC. Its confidence interval 
ranges from -4581.22 to 4476.37 and its p-value is 0.982 more than 90% significance 
level threshold. Furthermore, Table 4.7 shows that HDI in FasOLS2 (developed) model 
insignificantly enhances GDPPCG while it significantly increases GDPPCG in 
SlowOLS2 (developed) model. In contrast, HDI insignificantly reduces GDPPCG in 
FastOLS3 (developing) while in SlowOLS3 (developing) insignificantly enhances 
GDPPCG. The next variable to be reported is GCI as illustrated in Table 4.5 above. Its 
confidence interval in OLS2 (developed) model ranges from 271.74 to 599.50. Also, its 
p-value is 0.000 which is less than 90% significance level threshold. Likewise, GCI in 
OLS3 (developing) model has a p-value of 0.000 less than 90% significant level 
threshold. Its confidence interval ranges from 269.19 to 507.44. The performance of 
GCI in both developed and developing countries is outstanding as also demonstrated 
in Table 4.6 above. GCI also contributes to GDPPCG significantly in SlowOLS2 
(developed), SlowOLS3 (developing), and FastOLS3 (developing) while in FastOLS2 
(developed insignificantly reduces GDPPCG as demonstrated in Table 4.7 below. 
4.3.3  Traditional category 
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Besides, the effect size of GCI in SlowOLS2 (developed) and SlowOLS3 (developing) 
is more substantial than in FastOLS2 (developed) and FastOLS3 (developing) as 
indicated in Table 4.7 below.  
The next variable to be reported in the traditional category is ETR as 
demonstrated in Table 4.5 above. In OLS2 (developed) model, p-value for ETR is 0.001 
which is less than 90% significance level threshold, and its confidence interval ranges 
from 21.83 to 81.68. On the other hand, ETR in OLS3 (developing) model has 
confidence interval ranges from -36.71 to 16.30 and its p-value is 0.447 which is more 
than 90% of significance level threshold. However, ETR in Table 4.7 in SlowOLS2 
(developed) significantly increases GDPPCG while in FastOLS2 (developed) model 
insignificantly enhances GDPPCG. In contrast, ETR insignificantly reduces to GDPPCG 
in SlowOLS3 (developing) model while in FastOLS3 (developing) model insignificantly 
enhances GDPPCG. Furthermore, IGS variable significantly reduces GDPPC in OLS2 
(developed) model, and its p-value is 0.055 which is less than 90% of significance level 
threshold. IGS confidence interval in OLS2 (developed) ranges from -121.57 to 1.43. 
Contrary, IGS in OLS3 (developing) model insignificantly reduces GDPPC. Its 
confidence interval ranges from -125.51 to 76.24 and its p-value is 0.629 which is more 
than 90% significance level threshold. On the other hand, IGS in FastOLS3 (developing) 
model significantly reduces GDPPCG while in SlowOLS3 (developing) model 
insignificantly reduces GDPPCG. In contrast, in both SlowOLS2 and FastOLS2 
(developed) models IGS significantly reduces GDPPCG though the negative impact is 
higher in SlowOLS2 than in FastOLS2 (developed) models as shown in Table 4.7 
below. The next variable to be reported is TED which in this chapter strictly represents 
tertiary education. The results in Table 4.5 above shows that TED's p-value in OLS2 
(developed) model is 0.061 which is less than 90% significance level threshold, and its 
confidence interval ranges from -5.22 to 235.28. Similarly, TED in OLS3 (developing) 
model has a p-value of 0.095 which is less than 90% significance level threshold. Its 
confidence interval ranges from -16.56 to 204.82. Furthermore, TED in Table 4.7 in 
SlowOLS2 (developed) model significantly promotes GDPPCG while in FastOLS2 
(developed) model insignificantly reduces GDPPCG. TED also insignificantly enhances 
GDPPCG in both SlowOLS3 and FastOLS3 (developing) models.  
Of course, there are other variables in this category in Tables 4.5 and 4.6 above 
that contribute insignificantly to GDPPC in either OLS2 (developed) or OLS3 
(developing) are not reported in this section. In the same vein, there are variables not 
reported in this section which insignificantly reduce GDPPC in both OLS2 (developed) 
and OLS3 (developing) models respectively. All in all, the findings in the traditional 
category indicate that variables' importance varies with the development level or the 
state of countries' economic growth of countries. That seems contrary to the neo-
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classical theory that expects that the variables should perform in the same way in the 
countries. Therefore, the results in this section are in line with the rationale of the study 
of finding out which variables explain economic disparities between developed and 
developing countries. The next section will explore the performance of variables in the 
cultural category. 
 
Tables 4.5 and 4.6 above work together regarding identifying variables that 
seem essential in this category in OLS2 (developed) and OLS3 (developing) models. 
Further explorations of variables are conducted in Tables 4.7 and 4.8 by grouping into 
slow and fast-growing countries. The first variable to be reported in this category is 
SOC. The confidence interval of SOC in OLS2 (developed) model ranges from -
28963.09 to 14566.07 and its p-value 0.514 which is more than 90% significance level 
threshold. In contrast, SOC in OLS3 (developing) has a confidence interval range of 
6763.46 to 77952.35 and its p-value is 0.020 which is less than 90% significance level 
threshold. The differences of the direction of the impact of SOC on GDPPC in OLS2 
(developed) and OLS3 (developing) models could be due to differences in 
performances of formal and informal institutions, see section 4.4 for more details. Figure 
4.4 below illustrates this by showing mean scores of the rule of law in 6 developed and 
six developing countries. The rule of law scores measures confidence in the police, 
judicial system and property security whereby developed countries have much higher 
scores than in developing countries.  
Figure 4.4: The rule of law operation in developed and developing countries 
                                                                 
 
Notes. The index score for the rule of law for developing countries is from zero to almost -0.2 (the 
indication rule of law failure in operation).  
 
4.3.4  Cultural category  
6 Developed Countries




















Source: World Development Indicators
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Furthermore, Tables 4.7 and 4.8 below show that SOC insignificantly increases 
GDPPCG in SlowOLS2, FastOLS2, SlowOLS3, and FastOLS3 in developed and 
developing countries respectively. The outcome of this variable in Tables 4.7 and 4.8 
below seems to indicate that the impact of SOC on GDPPCG in developed and 
developing countries do not vary with the status of economic growth in the countries. 
The second variable to be reported in this category is FER as indicated in Tables 4.5 
above. In OLS2 (developed) model FER has a p-value of 0.449 which is more than 90% 
significance level threshold. Moreover, its confidence interval ranges from -35531.59 to 
15839.85. Contrary, FER in OLS3 (developing) model has a p-value of 0.001 which is 
less than 90% significance level threshold. Its confidence interval ranges from 14512.58 
to 57521.66. The impact of FER on GDPPC is about 16 times more in developing 
countries than in developed countries as demonstrated in Tables 4.6 above. Further 
estimation presented in Tables 4.7 and 4.8 below which show that FER in SlowOLS2 
(developed) model significantly reduces GDPPCG. In contrast, in FastOLS2 
(developed) model FER insignificantly enhances GDPPCG. On the other hand, FER 
insignificantly reduces GDPPCG in SlowOLS3 (developing) model while in FastOLS3 
(developing) model significantly promotes GDPPCG. The literature indicates that FER 
is one of the excellent characteristics citizens are encouraged to have and these 
characteristics are embraced in a culture that is said to drive economic development 
(Tabellini, 2010; Carroll, 1979). The effect size of FER on GDPPC in OLS3 (developing) 
model in column (10) in Table 4.6 above is 4 times larger than human capital in the 
same model, while in OLS2 (developed) model in column (7) in same table human 
capital effect size on GDPPC is 6 times more effective than FER in the same model. 
Furthermore, the effect size of FER on GDPPCG is three times more in FastOLS3 
(developing) than in SlowOLS3 (developing) models as illustrated in columns (10) and 
(13) in Table 4.8 below respectively. Hence, the exclusion of cultural variables such as 
FER in neo-classical theory does not reflect differences in explaining income disparities 
among countries. See more explanations in sub-section 4.4.4.1. Tables 4.5 and 4.6 
disclose that CPR in OLS2 (developed) model has confidence interval range from 
13616.49 to 56235.36 and its p-value is 0.002 less than 90% significant level threshold. 
Contrary, in OLS3 (developing) model CPR has a p-value of 0.187 more than 90% 
significance level threshold. Its confidence interval ranges from -12694.21 to 64252.0. 
CPR in OLS2 (developed) model has seven times more impact on GDPPC than in 
OLS3 (developing) model. Besides, Tables 4.7 and 4.8 show that CPR positively and 
insignificantly impacts GDPPCG in all the models.  
  Also, Table 4.5 above indicates that religion in OLS3 (developing) model 
significantly reduces GDPPC. The confidence interval ranges from -27326.88 to -
5079.10 and its p-value is 0.005 less than the 90% threshold of significant level. On the 
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other hand, religion in OLS2 (developed) model significantly enhances GDPPC. Its 
confidence interval ranges from 1270.83 to 9995.35, and its p-value is 0.012 less than 
the 90% threshold of significance level. The performance of religion in OLS2 
(developed) and OLS3 (developing) models seems to agree with graph 1 in Figure 4.5 
below whereby religion is considered more important in developing countries than in 
developed countries. Also, religion in Table 4.7 below shows that religion is positively 
and significantly related to GDPPCG in SlowOLS2 (developed) model while in 
FastOLS2 (developed) model insignificantly enhances GDPPCG. That reflects the 
views of participants in graph 2 whereby more people regard religion as necessary in 
developing countries other than in developed countries.  
Figure 4.5: Importance of religion in Developed and Developing Countries 
 
 Notes. The Views of participants about the region in developed and developing countries.  
            The findings in this category seem to indicate that more cultural variables 
significantly contribute to GDPPC in developing countries than in developed countries. 
Hence, exclusion of this category of variables in neo-classical theory underestimates 
their influence in the developing countries. Therefore, a universal approach to explain 
income disparities among countries does not reflect the real phenomena in countries. 
The developed and developing countries have been further grouped into fast and slow 
growing economies so that the performance of variables can be compared between 
the groups and help to explain the phenomena under study.  
 
This category has only two variables incorporated in each model as 
demonstrated in Tables 4.5 and 4.6 above. ROL in this category insignificantly 
enhances GDPPC in both OLS2 (developed) and OLS3 (developing) models. The 












































Source: World Values Surveys from 1994 to 2015
























































Graph 2: Religion in Slow growth versus Fast  growth countries
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confidence interval of ROL in OLS2 (developed) ranges from -21.30 to 161.39 and its 
p-value is 0.132 which is more than 90% significance level threshold. On the other hand, 
the confidence interval in OLS3 (developing) model ranges from -81.71 to 192.48 and 
its p-value is 0.425 more than 90% significance level threshold. Furthermore, ROL in 
Table 4.7 below in SlowOLS2 and FastOLS2 developed models insignificantly 
increases GDPPCG. Also, ROL in SlowOLS3 and FastOLS3 developing models in 
Table 4.7 below insignificantly enhances GDPPCG in SlowOLS3 (developing) model 
while in FastOLS3 (developing) model reduces GDPPCG insignificantly. Another 
variable in this category is GEF which significantly promotes GDPPC in both developed 
OLS2 (developed) and developing OLS3 (developing) models. The confidence interval 
of GEF in OLS2 (developed) model ranges from 9015.16 to 32686.55, and its p-value 
is 0.001 less than 90% significance threshold level.  
Similarly, GEF significantly enhances GDPPC in developing the OLS3 model. It 
is a p-value of 0.001 which is less than 90% significance threshold level. So its 
confidence interval ranges from 17773.26 to 68424.88. Further exploration of GEF in 
Tables 4.7 and 4.8 below shows that GEF insignificantly reduces GDPPCG in both 
SlowOLS2 and FastOLS2 developed models. In contrast, GEF in SlowOLS3  
(developing) model insignificantly reduces GDPPCG while in the FastOLS3 
(developing) model it significantly enhances GDPPCG. It seems to agree with graph 1 
in Figure 4.6 below which shows that developed countries have better scores of GEF 
than developing countries. However, GEF seems to have a more significant effect on 
GDPPC in developing countries than in developed countries. Graph 2 in Figure 4.6 
below shows that better scores of GEF have a more significant impact on GDPPCG in 
fast developing countries than slow developing countries. That seems to suggest that 




















Figure 4.6: Comparison of GEF in developed and developing countries 
  
 Notes. Graph 1 compares GEF in developed and developing countries while graph 2 
 compares GEF in slow and fast growth developed and developing countries.     
                                                                                                                                                                    
Tables 4.7 and 4.8 below shows specifications of each growing category 











































Graph 1: GE in Developed and Developing countries
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Graph 2: GE in Slow and Fast growth countries
Source: World Governance Indicators
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Table 4.7: Variables’ impact on GDPPCG in slow and fast models 
 
            Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1           
 
Notes. Column (1) indicates independent variables in traditional, institutional and cultural 
categories. Column (2) to (5) shows models: SlowOLS2, FastOLS2 (developed); SlowOLS3, and 
FastOLS3 (developing). 
 
   
Dependent Variable: GDPPCG 








g) TRADITIONAL     
EMP -83.1958* -1.6297 44.2404 17.3475 
 (44.5216) (274.1993) (74.2098) (64.7516) 
HDI 4,856.7865* 20,141.6736 928.8086 -200.0575 
 (2,708.7003) (17,604.8021) (4,046.2894) (3,022.5750) 
IGS -38.0057** -918.6457* -20.3349 -132.4087** 
 (15.2324) (513.9697) (136.6820) (63.6500) 
RKN 424.9992 -20,207.2999 -14,371.8404*** 1,465.9805 
 (1,282.9056) (18,639.4593) (4,035.6434) (2,844.8997) 
TED 153.3164*** -198.6576 78.7634 2.1775 
 (47.5547) (213.0979) (139.2800) (82.2012) 
EGS 145.1785*** 1,948.1043 47.1178 269.8188* 
 (34.5244) (1,265.2556) (459.8042) (159.7170) 
FDI 27.1937 9.2307 156.3447 229.7074*** 
 (25.7061) (129.2085) (108.9188) (84.1399) 
GCI 386.5430*** -953.0549 809.4581*** 529.0283*** 
 (62.6433) (698.3904) (100.6134) (103.4651) 
GRS -42.0372* 293.8109 -133.1721 -19.7306 
 (24.5772) (176.3397) (236.3337) (43.7526) 
ETR 17.3022* 68.5373 -24.4395 0.1193 
 (8.9957) (83.3639) (21.2803) (21.4487) 
Institutional      
ROL 52.7316** 1,070.0784 117.7781 -53.6727 
 (21.5499) (740.0850) (139.5295) (81.2873) 
GEF -10,631.0161 -9,909.0425 -34,223.4581 83,365.9339*** 
 (6,407.6993) (37,945.1366) (28,638.5211) (19,053.6389) 
Cultural     
HWK 2,263.6184 -1,293.9915 -5,381.9163 -2,882.9284 
 (1,450.6662) (7,302.8137) (7,823.7680) (3,732.3455) 
CPR 4,899.2744 20,044.2847 10,678.2652 22,305.1125 
 (9,366.0488) (27,712.4403) (18,513.3506) (40,298.9713) 
SOC 618.6294 8,134.1116 39,300.8523 31,901.8140 
 (6,514.2249) (31,975.7167) (29,226.9506) (21,026.0176) 
FER -25,198.2311*** 43,462.7052 -37,586.1247 30,756.9813** 
 (6,337.0480) (66,113.5923) (28,530.6626) (14,535.0117) 
REG 5,502.3419*** 26,060.8979 14,151.6808 7,975.5354 
 (1,164.6123) (29,723.1576) (14,255.2347) (10,309.4792) 
Constant 14,048.1909 129,676.7861 159,323.3200** -64,117.2035* 
 (23,262.9302) (178,209.5468) (70,903.4971) (35,168.6401) 
Observations 88 44 44 88 
R-squared 0.7885 0.6851 0.8611 0.5181 
r2_a 0.737 0.479 0.770 0.401 
df_r 70 26 26 70 
df_m 17 17 17 17 
F 15.36 3.327 9.480 4.427 
p 0.0000 0.0029 0.0000 0.0000 
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Table 4.8: Importance of variables on economic growth in SlowOLS2, FastOLS2, SlowOLS3, and FastOLS3 models 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       
Significant levels *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       
Notes. The dependent variable in all models is GDPPCG. Columns 1 to 13 represents rank, independent variables, standardized coefficients, and eta^ 
in each model respectively. Independent variables are ranked according to effect size on GDPPCG as standardized coefficients in columns (3, 6, and 
9). 
Dependent Variable: GDPPCG 
SlowOLS2 (developed) FastOLS2 (developed) SlowOLS3 (developing) FastOLS3 developing) 

























1 GCI***    0.87 11.50 EGS 1.48 2.87 GCI*** 2.10 34.5
8 
GCI*** 0.75 18.00 
2 REG*** 0.76 6.74 ROL 1.13 2.53 REG 0.23 0.53 GEF*** 0.61 13.18 
3 EGS*** 0.40 5.34 GRS 0.62 3.36 SOC 0.18 0.97 REG   0.30 0.41 
4 TED*** 0.29 3.14 HDI 0.54 1.59 FDI 0.14 1.10 FER 0.28 3.08 
5 ETR* 0.17 1.12 REG 0.35 0.93 ROL 0.14 0.38 FDI*** 0.25   5.13 
6 ROL** 0.16 1.81 ETR 0.29 0.82 TED 0.08 0.17 EGS* 0.25 1.96 
7 HDI* 0.14 0.97 FER 0.19 0.52 EMP 0.06 0.19 CPR 0.21 0.21 
8 HWK 0.10 0.74 CPR 0.16 0.63 TED 0.00 0.18 SOC 0.20 1.58 
9 RKN 0.07 0.03 SOC 0.06 0.09 HDI 0.03 0.03 RKN 0.17 0.18 
10 FDI   0.07 0.34 FDI 0.01 0.01 EGS 0.02 0.01 EMP 0.03 0.05 
11 CPR 0.05 0.08 EMP -0.00 0.00 IGS -0.04 0.01 TED 0.00 0.00 
12 SOC 0.01 0.00 HWK -0.04 0.04 GRS -0.09 0.17 ETR 0.00 0.00 
13 GRS -0.17 0.88 GEF -0.13 0.08 HWK -0.10 0.25 HDI -0.02 0.00 
14 GEF -0.19 0.83 TED -0.22 1.05 GEF -0.17 0.76 GRS -0.05 0.14 
15 EMP* -0.20 1.05 RKN -0.31 1.42 ETR -0.23 0.70 ROL -0.07 0.30 
16 IGS** -0.25 1.88 GCI -1.53 2.26 FER -0.30 0.93 HWK -0.10 0.41 







The data analysis in this chapter is focussed on 12 countries grouped into six 
developed and six developing countries. See more information in chapter 3 section 
3.4.1 and introduction to this chapter in sections 4.1 to 4.2. Besides, developed and 
developing countries are further grouped into slow and fast-growing countries, see 
section 4.3 above for more information. Hereafter, the design embraced in this chapter 
is as articulated in chapter 3 section 3.4.1. It is mainly about the thesis purpose of finding 
out why catch-up assumption of neo-classical theory seems to work in developed 
countries and not in developing countries. Also, why is the accumulation of causality 
not useful in developing countries? Is it because neo-classical theory omits cultural and 
institutional variables? That is what is driving this study also discussed below.  
 
The study’s investigation in this chapter employed panel data. Model 
estimations used Ordinary least squares (OLS). See more information on fixed and 
random effects in chapter 3 sub-section 3.5.1. Furthermore, the severity of any 
presence of heteroscedasticity among countries was checked as explained in chapter 
3 sub-section 3.5.1.1.  
 
Table 4.5 above presents the results of OLS1(combined), OLS2 (developed), 
and OLS3 (developing) models while Table 4.6 ranks relatively the importance of 
variables regarding contribution to GDPPC by using standardized coefficients. It is in 
this vein that hypotheses and questions in this chapter are addressed. The findings are 
reported in section 4.3 above. 
  
These results reported above are principally explained in the following key 
findings of the investigation: 1) capital stock levels are not the critical determinant of 
economic development but utilization capacity. 2) The competitive environment is good 
for economic growth in Africa. 3) Socio-cultural and political systems derail economic 
development in Africa. 4) Self-reliance attribute determines FDI attraction in developing 
countries. 5) Religion derails economic development in African countries. The findings 
are based on the outcomes in Tables 4.5, 4.6, 4.7, and 4.8 above for 12 developed and 
developing countries. These key findings in this chapter are discussed in the next sub-
section.  
4.4.1  Context and design for the chapter 
4.4.2  Estimation method and tests 
4.4.3  Summary of findings 




4.4.4.1   RKN not the critical determinant of economic development  
The catch-up effect of developing countries is not confirmed because RKN 
appears to be negatively related to GDPPC in developing countries while increases 
significantly GDPPC in developed countries. The differences of the impact of RKN in 
developed and developing countries contradicts the expectation of neo-classical theory. 
For instance, some scholars assume that developing countries would grow faster in 
GDPPC than developed countries (Solow, 1956; Swan, 1956). That is contrary to the 
expectation of the theories because developed countries grow faster while developing 
countries regress in GDPPC. The question is why negative growth in developing 
countries? There are some possible explanations. One of them is high population 
growth in developing countries as indicated by Swan (1956) and Solow (1956) that 
higher populations cause countries to be more miserable. Moreover, Figure 4.7 below 
shows that there are higher dependency ratios and population growth in developing 
countries than in developed countries. The lower dependency ratios and population 
growth in developed countries seem to enhance GDPPC contrary to developing 
countries significantly.  
However, there are differences regarding the impact of RKN in slow and fast 
growth developed and developing countries as illustrated in Tables 4.5 and 4.6 above. 
It is reported in section 4.3.2.1 above whereby RKN in fast developed model 
insignificantly decreases GDPPC while in slowly developed model RKN insignificantly 
enhances GDPPC. In contrast, RKN in fast developing model insignificantly increases 
GDPPC while in slow developing model RKN significantly reduces GDPPC. Therefore, 
both the development level of countries and the state of economic growth in countries 
affect RKN performance. It, thus, meets the aim of this chapter of investigating what 
























Notes. The dependency ratio and population growth are very high in developing countries than in 
developed countries.  
 Another possible explanation for why RKN significantly reduces GDPPC in 
developing countries while significantly enhances GDPPC in developed countries is 
differences in HDI. The developed OLS2 model in Table 4.5 above shows that HDI 
contributes significantly to GDPPC. In contrast, in developing the OLS3 model, HDI 
insignificantly reduces GDPPC. Concerning effect size, HDI in developed countries is 
more than 16 times more effective than in developing countries. The differences in HDI 
significance between developed and developing countries are illustrated in some of the 
dimensions demonstrated in Figure 4.9 below. The figure shows that developed 
countries have scored well in all the four elements demonstrated in graphs 1 to 4 below. 
The differences in the dimensions of HDI between developed and developing countries 
reflects the HDI performance in the developed OLS2 model and developing the OLS3 
model. HDI is also regarded in literature as social capability mainly through the two 
elements demonstrated in graphs 3 and 4 in Figure 4.9 below (Neumayer, 2001). The 
social capability is higher in developed countries than in developing countries because 
they have higher human capital that sustains their economic growth as illustrated in 
graph 3 in Figure 4.9 below.  
In contrast, developing countries have lower human capital and fail to sustain 
economic growth in them as noted in graph 3 same figure. Therefore, the findings in 



























































































































in Figure 4.9 below. It is expected in the literature that RKN levels determine the 
capacity to increase the flow of goods and services (Ekins et al., 2003). It seems to 
suggest that the decline in RKN levels in developing countries impedes the flow of 
goods and services while the increase in RKN levels in developed countries propels the 
flow of goods and services (Aghion and Howitt, 1998). For this reason, the utilization 
capacity as claimed by Commendatore et al. (2014), is key to keeping RKN levels and 
maintaining or increasing the flow of goods and services in both developed and 
developing countries. That seems to agree with Neuayer (2001) who observed that 
depreciation of both manufactured and natural capital that is greater than investment 
leads to the unsustainability of economic development.  
The results reported in section 4.2 above show that HDI in developed FastOLS2 
model insignificantly contributes to GDPPCG. In contrast, in the developed SlowOLS2 
model, HDI significantly impact GDPPCG. Also, HDI in developing FastOLS3 model 
insignificantly reduces GDPPCG while in developing SlowOLS3 model insignificantly 
enhances GDPPCG. These observations seem to suggest that utility capability in slow-
growing countries in both developed and developing seems to be better than in fast-
growing countries in both developed and developing countries. These observations 
confirm the utility capacity ranking of the respective groups of countries demonstrated 
in Figure 4.8 below. What does this mean for the negative impact of RKN in developing 
countries? Considering the explanations above, most of the developing countries fail to 
reach the threshold of utilizing capacity that maintains stock levels to propel economic 
growths in the countries. Figure 4.9 below demonstrates some elements of HDI that 
reveal high gender inequality, high underweight children, low human capital index levels 
in developing countries compared to the developed countries. These findings meet the 
objectives of the thesis in that some causes of income disparities among countries are 
explained above.  
Hence, this section notes that RKN significantly enhances economic growth in 
developed countries while in developing countries negatively related to economic 
growth. That is contrary to the neo-classical expectation of catch up and accumulation 
effect. However, the accumulation effect seems to work in developed countries, for 
example, the six founders of EU countries between 1950 to 1973 grew at higher rates 
than the UK and eventually caught up as observed by (Whyman and Petrescu, 2017).  
Therefore, policies or variables that are good for developed countries might not be 
suitable for developing countries. It is also noted that population growth and high 
dependency ratios negatively impact economic growth in developing countries. In this 
vein, RKN levels seem not the critical determinant for economic growth in developing 
countries but utilizing the capacity to maintain or increase the RKN levels. This utility 




reasoning ability of individuals predicated their productivity. Also, utility capacity 
according to Rindermann and Thompson (2011) could be referred to as intelligence 
which he said determines technology and other scientific achievements, hence creating 
the wealth of the countries. That is in line with the investigation of the thesis of finding 
out if cultural factors explain income disparities among countries. The next topic to be 
discussed is how competition among countries affect economic growth in countries. 
Figure 4.8: Ranking of countries by scores of HDI (utility capacity) 
                                                                                                                                                        
 







































































Figure 4.9: Key elements of HDI in developed & developing countries 
  
 












































































































4.4.4.2   Competitive environment good for economic growth in Africa 
The results for GCI in developed and developing countries are reported in sub-
section 4.3.2.1 above.  The components of GCI demonstrated in Figure 4.10 below. 
Developed countries have higher scores in each component of GCI than developing 
countries. For example, graphs 1 and 3 in Figure 4.10 below show that absorption 
capacity and technological exports are much higher in developed countries than in 
developing countries. Also, graph 2 indicates that institutional variables for developed 
countries have higher scores than in developing countries. Furthermore, the 
management of resources in developed countries is far higher than in developing 
countries. Therefore, even though this competitiveness among countries seems to 
benefit developing countries as well, the benefits could rise more if the countries have 
much higher scores in each component of GCI.                                                                                                          
The globalization of world economy centers on countries depending on each 
other concerning goods, services, and capital flow as explained more in chapter 2 
section 2.5. In other words, the competition among countries for the production of 
goods, services, and capital flows creates wealth and success of the nations (Smith, 
1776, p. 687). The results of GCI in Table 4.5 above seem to confirm the importance of 
globalization of economy and competition among countries. However, erratic economic 
growths in developing countries as claimed by Korotayev and Zinkina (2014); Ndulu et 
al. (2007) raises the concern of globalization of economy and competition among 
countries. Why? According to Marx (1906, p. 626) the competition battle is fought by 
lowering the prices of the goods and services that rely on the productivity of each 
countries' citizens and the scale of production in place in each country. Moreover, Marx 
concluded that countries with larger capitals get the larger share in the creation of 






Figure 4.10 Components of GCI in countries 

































Graph 1: Productivity of countries by group























Graph 2: Institutions quality by group of countries
Governance Political stability


















Graph 3: Capability to survive by country group






















Graph 4: Economy management by country group
Monetary policy Fiscal policy




Therefore, the differences in capital stocks according to Marx seem to 
determine the performance of countries. However, the assumption of the neoclassical 
theory that competition takes place in the perfect market environment seems not to 
hold in the current wealth distribution among countries. Furthermore, a country's 
position in the global market does not only rely on the macroeconomic environment 
but also microeconomic characteristics (Önsel et al., 2008). Figure 4.11 below 
indicates that developed countries have a massive advantage over developing 
countries regarding RKN that determines creativity of the countries in sustaining 
economic growth. 
Figure 4.11: RKN in developed and developing countries 
 
Notes. This figure shows mean differences of RKN in developed and developing countries.   
Even though globalization and liberation of markets seem to increase, 
developing countries seem to fall short of the competitiveness that would benefit and 
sustain economic growth in those countries. This failure exposes developing 
countries' resources to more able competitors leading to erratic economic growths 
that do not liberate citizens from severe poverty in the countries. These costs of 
globalization are highlighted in the literature (Gnegne, 2009; Intriligator, 2004). It 
reflects the citizens' views concerning what they perceive about themselves regarding 
competition as highlighted in sub-section 4.4.4.2 above. There seem to be national 






























































in solving problems are culturally specific, determined by ecological and socio-political 
context, see chapter 2 sub-section 2.4.2.1 for more information. Therefore, 
globalization seems not adequate to solve the problems of underdevelopment in 
developing countries as noted by (World Economic Forum, 2000). The differences in 
standards of living in developed and developing countries are still very high as 
highlighted in Figure 4.12 below shows the poverty headcount ratio of people living 
on $1.90 PPP of the total population.  
Figure 4.12: Poverty differences in developed and developing countries 
 
Notes. Poverty headcount in developed countries is about 10% of the total population while in 
developing countries is slightly over 50% of the total population. 
 What type of competition reflect in the affirmative and significant contribution in 
developed and developing models? Smith (1776) claimed that all the production 
factors in the models depend on: 
"Every man, as long as he does not violate the laws of justice, is left entirely free to 
pursue his interests in his way” (Smith, p. 687) 
The competition among the individuals is what Smith called ‘invisible hand’ 
that leads to the success of the societies. He connected the pursuit of profits of 
individuals to the society's success in that the latter came as a result of self-interests 
of the individuals which was not the purpose of laboring. That suggests that the 
competition between individuals for individual gain could be likened to competition 
among firms or countries for wealth accumulation. Hence, the competition leads to 
better ways of production and discovery of new markets for the creation of wealth as 











































levels of RKN relies on culture attributes of saving, and thrift, self-determination, 
feeling the responsibility, independence and many other attributes that support 
economic growth in individuals and at country levels (Weber, 2001; Weber and 
Swedberg, 2009). Also, Gintis (1972) suggested that economic activity has a 
development effect on almost every aspect of social life through individual welfare 
depends on the community, work, and environmental structures and individual 
psychic development. At some point Mill acknowledged that an economic man is 
partly purposed in maximizing wealth but at the same time there are constraints of 
aversion laboring and subjection to leisure, the latter leading to underdevelopment 
opposite to creation of wealth (Blaug, 1992; Bowley, 2013). These characteristics are 
further explored in the case study between Malawi and Botswana (chapter 6) to see 
if differences in the characteristics of people explain economic level differences 
between the countries in line with the findings in this chapter.  
All in all, competition seems essential for enhancing economic growth in both 
developed and developing countries. However, the differences in the scores of the 
components of GCI between developed and developing countries explain differences 
in income disparities between developed and developing countries. Also, 
globalization through promoting competition among countries also enforces cultures 
that are contrary to the developing countries (Thurow, 2009, 2003; Al Mamun, 2008). 
It seems to hinder the development of capability in developing countries due to the 
tension between the global and national cultures, see sub-section 2.5.2 for more 
details. That is in line with the purpose of the study of finding out if cultural variables 
hinder or enhance economic growth among countries. This section appears to 
suggest that socio-cultural and political systems contribute to the competitiveness of 
the countries further discussed in the next section.  
4.4.4.3   Socio-cultural and political systems derail economic growth in Africa 
Section 4.4.2.2 above reports the performance of cultural variables related to 
the finding in this section. The differences of the performance of variables in the 
cultural category in developed and developing countries may reflect what Önsel et al. 
(2008) observed, that the prosperity of the country not only relies on economic and 
institutional factors but also relies on their conditions and preferences that determine 
their success in the global market. It seems to suggest that subjective choices of 
citizens in each country reflect in what people think about politics and responsibilities. 
For instance, graph 1 in Figure 4.15 below shows that individuals own welfare 
responsibilities in developed countries while in developing countries government 
owns welfare responsibilities. In countries where the citizens' view its government as 




according to Smith (1776) without competition among the individuals' society cannot 
succeed. The responsibility of individuals inclines citizens to pursue profits of 
individuals leading to the society's success. It is in line with traditional theory 
assumption that self-interests of individuals are a source of societies’ welfare wealth 
creation. Of course, an individual is somewhat purposed in maximizing wealth but at 
the same time is exposed to constraints of aversion to laboring, and instead can be 
subjected to leisure that leads to underdevelopment (Blaug, 1992; Bowley, 2013).  
Figure 2.2 in chapter 2 illustrates the point that the environment determines the 
development of the capacities of individuals. This figure shows that cultural systems 
contribute to the formation of both economic and social systems which impact on the 
development of individuals. Furthermore, the figure indicates that the development of 
an individual's capacities depends on the interaction in the whole environment in 
which the individual located. Arguably, this is a dynamic relationship in that individual's 
thinking is not limited by culture but their preferences or behaviors fluctuate according 
to different situations (Zou et al., 2009).  
Another explanation as reported in sub-section 4.3.2.2 above is that socio-
cultural and political systems derail economic development in Africa. That is in line 
with the performance of CPR in Table 4.5 above. The subjective choices of each 
country's citizens are reflected in what people think about politics. CPR is captured as 
already explained in sub-section 4.3.2 above. The outcomes of the views of 
participants are illustrated in Figure 4.13 below. More participants in developed 
countries consider politics significant than in developing countries. The difference 
between the views of participants concerning the importance of politics is reflected in 
the CPR performance in Table 4.5 above. It seems to suggest that a unit increase of 
CPR in developing countries increases economic development.  Hence the current 
situation in which many people in developing countries do not consider politics 
important, CPR insignificantly enhances economic development. 
In contrast, in developed countries, more people consider politics very 
important rather than not essential which reflects public capital performance in Table 
4.5 above. It is what Phelps (2013) calls grassroots innovation whereby people are 
free and able to assume an appropriate alternative correctly with greater responsibility 
to compete with other countries globally. That too is echoed by Carrillo (2014) who 
acknowledged that knowledge-based competition of countries rests on an economic, 
political and cultural order sustained by intangible values. These intangible values 
sustain the modern standard of living through achieving the balance between access, 
use, and marshaling energy for optimal outcomes (Smith and Max-Neef, 2011). The 




performance of activities affecting outcomes (Smith and Allee, 2009). In other words, 
variations of CPR understanding among countries could be due to cultural 
differences, socio-cultural and political environments (Jackman and Miller, 1996b).  
Furthermore, the lack of accountability in developing countries may 
discourage people from engaging in politics. For instance, possibly most of the 
leaders in developing countries are plagued by what Banfield (1958) called amoral 
familism whereby, leaders do all they can to enrich their families at the expense of all 
citizens. The families here could also apply to the political parties to which they 
belong. Consequently, the rule of law may fail to function and this could lead to fewer 
people participating in CPR in developing countries. Also, Acemoglu (2003) 
suggested that in the countries where the rule of law is applied selectively there is 
unlimited political and economic power to the elite who use this power for the benefits 
of the few. As a result, there is weak civil cooperation making the rule of law unable 
to functional (Stoelhorst and Richerson, 2013). Hence, less CPR is associated with 
citizens not participating or engaging in politics responsibly as illustrated in Figure 
4.13 below.  




Notes. More citizens in developing countries do not engage in politics, while in developed 
countries more citizens engage in politics. 
Having looked at CPR as one of the factors that seem to hinder economic 

















































embraced in culture is said to drive economic development (Tabellini, 2010). Figure 
4.12 below shows that this factor less embraced in developing than in developed 
countries. This variable too is part of socio-cultural and political environments that 
seem to derail economic development in developing countries. FER in developed 
countries in Tables 4.5 above insignificantly reduces GDPPC.  
In contrast, in developing countries, FER significantly contributes to GDPPC. 
Despite the observation in Figure 4.14 below that the majority of people in developing 
countries are not responsible citizens, hence not being actively involved in improving 
the communities in which they live (Carroll, 1979). FER significantly impacts economic 
growth in developing countries, why? Part of the explanation could be that FER in 
developed countries does not perform well due to responsible and quality institutions 
in place contrary to developing countries as illustrated in graph 2 in Figure 4.8 above. 
Hence, the responsibilities of the citizens significantly contribute to economic growth 
when institutions fail to function as they are supposed to do. It seems to suggest that 
in countries where there are weak institutions cultural attributes seem to perform well. 
Hence, differences in the functions of institutions seem to suggest differences in the 
importance of culture on economic growth. That also seems to suggest that ideas, 
values, feelings, skills, knowledge, beliefs attitudes, strategies, and goals are 
embedded in cultural experiences that are different in different contexts (Heine, 2008; 
Richerson and Boyd, 2005; Richerson et al., 2010; Gifford, 2009). That being the 
case, the socio-cultural environment seems to influence strategy formulation and its 
utilization in dealing with problems. What does this suggest? The results suggest that 
FER enables people to be productive, hence, leading to economic growth. Therefore, 
learning FER attribute in most of the developing countries would enhance even more 
productivity of the countries (Rogers, 2010). Hence, the assumption of the 
endogenous theory of putting much emphasis on education fails to release the full 
potential of people. Instead, education systems in developing countries should be 













Figure 4.14: FER in developed and developing countries 
  
                                                                                                                                                      
Notes. This figure shows participants' views in each group of countries concerning the 
importance of FER. 
Hence, the differences in views of people concerning responsibility in 
countries have implications for the effectiveness of their governments dealing with 
issues. Moreover, once people have more responsibilities they put leaders in 
positions with responsibility such as is the case in developed countries. Furthermore, 
in societies where individuals have more responsibilities they believe in the 
competition that in return improves the wealth of the society (Cardinal et al., 2006; 
Guiso et al., 2003). In contrast, in developing countries, people seem not to care about 
government use of resources, and hence are not bothered when leaders misuse the 
resources. Figure 4.15 below demonstrates the evidence that government 
effectiveness correlates with individuals' responsibility. For instance, graph 1 shows 
that people in developed countries are more responsible than in developing countries. 
Also, graph 2 shows the government effectiveness that helps for example to reduce 
income gaps among its citizens. In so doing, the resources of the country could be 
directed appropriately and responsibly to meet the needs of the citizens. There seems 
to be an association between government effectiveness and government 
responsibility which appears to agree with the findings of GEF reported in section 
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seem to have an economic payoff as noted by (Sapienza et al., 2006). For instance, 
Table 4.7 above shows remarkable differences in the performance of GEF and FER 
in SlowOLS3 and FastOLS3 models for developing countries.  In the fast model, both 
GEF and FER significantly contribute to GDPPCG while in the slow model they 
insignificantly impact GDPPCG.  
All in all, cultural factors such as FER and CPR as discussed above are 
crucially needed in developing countries because they are useful for enhancing 
economic growth. It has been observed that virtue such as CPR enhances economic 
growth in developed countries while in developing countries insignificantly impact 
economic growth. It meets the purpose of this investigation of identifying factors that 
enhance or hinder economic growth in the countries. Generally, this section has 
highlighted that socio-cultural and political systems determine the economic level of 
countries. See more discussion on this topic in section 2.3 in chapter 2. However, 
there are other factors such as self-reliance that appear equally crucial for enhancing 
economic growth. This factor is discussed further in the next section. 
Figure 4.15: Government effectiveness versus responsibility in countries 
 Notes. Graph 1 shows the mean scores below 5 as individuals own responsibility while mean 
 scores above 5 indicate responsibilities for governments. Graph 2 indicates the scores of 
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4.4.4.4   Self-reliance attribute determines the FDI attraction of countries   
 Sub-section 4.4.4.2 above discusses competition among countries in the 
global economy and its positive contribution to economic growth in the countries. The 
disparities in economic growth between developed and developing countries depend 
on how these countries react to the same global changes. It is only those countries 
with the capabilities to compete globally that will enjoy the opportunities provided by 
globalization while those countries which are less competitive are vulnerable to 
external competition (Slaughter, 1997; Thomas, 1997). Developed countries 
dominate the competitive and dynamic environment according to Thurow (2009; 
2003) since they are economically empowered as they control about 57% of world 
GDP. As a result, the global culture mainly reflects the core values of western 
societies such as freedom of choice, individual rights and market liberalism (Gupta 
and Govindarajan, 2004). This is why self-reliance perception and understanding 
enables countries to gain from this competitive environment. For example, importation 
of goods from technological leaders aligns with technological advancements of the 
countries importing, hence promoting productivity that seems to be the engine of 
economic development (Lawrence and Weinstein, 1999; Rivera-Batiz and Xie, 1993). 
It is observed in the performance of IGS in Table 4.5 in OLS2 and OLS3 models for 
developed and developing countries respectively. For instance, IGS in developed 
OLS2 significantly reduces GDPPC while in developing OLS3 model insignificantly 
reduces GDPPC.  
 On the other hand, too many expenses on imports characterize strict limitation 
of economic development. Therefore, developing countries need to understand that 
to survive the competition they are engaged in, and they need to devise strategies or 
plans to continue to make the profit (Porter, 2008). It demonstrated in slow and fast 
growth models in developing countries whereby FDI in FastOLS3 model significantly 
enhances GDPPC while in SlowOLS3 model insignificantly promotes GDPPCG. 
However, self-reliance and dependence syndrome are two sides of the same coin. 
Chapter 2 section 2.3.1.3 discusses the causes of dependency or self-reliance 
attitudes in the countries. This will be further examined in chapter 5. Hence, the next 
section to be discussed is religion.  
4.4.4.5   Religion derails economic development in African countries 
Weber (1958) claimed that the spirit of capitalism caused the wealth 
accumulation of the nations. Capitalism embodied the cultural factors associated with 
Puritans in Europe and USA. Moreover, the PWE explicitly focused on one’s calling 
as interpreted by John Calvin who encouraged his followers to be involved in the 




the prevailing views of medieval Catholic Church whereby work was a curse and 
nothing else (Adriano, 1977; Hardy, 2001). In other words, the Catholics viewed world 
achievement as a barrier to God's blessing while the Protestant churches regarded 
worldly achievement as a sign of election to eternal life after death. In this way, the 
cultural aspect that drives capitalism is the habits of acquisition and enjoyment of 
luxuries. Weber's thesis culminates in this quotation:  
“…it is at the same time determined by the ability and disposition of men to 
adopt certain types of practical, rational conduct” and that “The magical and 
religious forces…been among the most important formative influences on 
conduct.” (Weber, 1958, p. 26). 
 Weber’s work ‘the Protestant work ethic’ remains controversial, even though, 
it has attracted support from many scholars like (Van Hoorn and Maseland, 2013; 
Tawney, 1926; Harrison and Huntington, 2000; Rupasingha and Chilton, 2009; 
Bettendorf and Dijkgraaf, 2010; Linz and Chu, 2013; Cavalcanti et al., 2007; Hill, 
1996). For instance, Marx (1867, 2010) attributed to the change of the values in 
people's lives to economic production technologies. Also, Becker and Woessmann 
(2009) were of the view that the cause of the spirit of capitalism was not a result of 
Protestant work ethic values as explained by Weber. However, instead, they claimed 
that human capital formed through education in Protestant church schools is what 
caused the beginning of capitalism. However, the previous claim seems irrelevant 
because according to Thompson (1984) and Blum (2001) vernacular languages were 
taught in Protestant schools to enhance understanding of Protestant faith among the 
followers and not for educational attainment as perceived today.  
Furthermore, McClelland (1961) also ascribed economic development to 
cultural values of the society. He claimed that non-economic forces might help to 
explain the economic development problems faced by many nations. It assumed that 
books reflected the cultural values, norms, and beliefs that influenced the countries' 
decision making regarding economic development (Iannaccone, 1998). Despite the 
support he receives from social sciences through annual citations, Schatz (1965) 
together with Gilleard (1989) criticised McClelland’s association of need of 
achievement42Moreover, economic growth without using conventional economic 
techniques and they claimed that need achievement did not cause the rate of 
economic growth. In contrast, Freeman (1976) in her conclusion supported 
McClelland's claim that the need for achievement is essential in explaining economic 
differences across countries.  
                                            
 




OLS2 (developed) and OLS3 (developing) models in Table 4.5 above indicate 
that religion tends to have a significant positive impact on economic growth in 
developed nations, whereas it significantly reduces economic development in 
developing nations. It may be due to a PWE versus catholic or even Islamic influence 
as explained above. Could a positive impact in some developed nations be due to 
PWE?  The evidence in graph 2 in Figure 4.16 below shows that developed nations 
tend to place greater emphasis upon more individualistic values of determination to 
succeed and thrift than do developing nations, whose emphasis is more traditional in 
orientation, emphasizing obedience and religious faith (Harrison, 1985; Morsc, 1964; 
Branco, 2007). It may interact with other evidence from the world values studies, 
which indicate that citizens of developed nations place greater emphasis upon 
personal responsibility and independence than do citizens of developing nations as 
indicated in graph 1 same figure. Consequently, it might be the case that it is more 
traditional values, which place greater emphasis upon universal social norms, which 
may include religious faith and obedience, rather than more individualistic values 
which may foster a different approach to work and business activity, and hence 

































Notes. Graph 1 indicates the cultural values of saving, independence and feeling 
responsibility. Graph 2 shows the characteristic of thrift, determination, obedience, and 
religious faith. 
All the above reasons might be valid, but it seems there is more to why in 
developing countries religion reduces GDPPC. In sub-section 4.4.4.3 above it is 
pointed out that most of the leaders in Africa lack accountability in their leadership. It 
does not exclude leaders in the church, mosques, and other faiths' places of worship. 
The developing model shows that 3.6% of GDPPC reduced due to religion, similar to 
the findings of (Grier, 1997, p. 47). In contrast, Weber (2009) attributed the spirit of 
capitalism to religion. The spirit of capitalism revolves around: independence, 
determination, saving and thrift or profit orientation, which are the virtues prevailing in 
developed societies as indicated in Figure 4.14 above (Mathers and Williamson, 
2011; Marini, 2004). Of course, there are functional attributes that people have that 
are positively friendly to economic development in developing countries. However, 
hard work spirit encouraged by religions such as Judaism, Christianity, Islam, and 
many others seem not to influence GDPPC in developing countries significantly. 
Why? The possible reason could be that the traits of culture such as hard work 
claimed to be sources of economic growth seem not to work in developing countries 
due to the impact of religion as shown in Figure 4.14 above. This finding in this section 
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Graph 2: Virtues' importance in each group of countries




categories so that those critical for enhancing economic growth among countries 
identified plus the countries are encouraged to embrace them. 
All in all, the discussions above show that utility capability or social capability, 
competitive spirit on individuals, feeling the responsibility, self-reliance, and political 
capital are important factors needed in developing countries to enhance economic 
growth. It is in line with the purpose of this thesis of examining whether cultural factors 
explain economic disparities among countries. It is perceived that the accumulation 
of capital and foreign aid seems not to explain economic disparities among countries. 
Furthermore, the estimations in Tables 4.5 and 4.7 acknowledged bias due to 
combining developed and developing countries in the model, hence, developed and 
developing countries had separate models. That has exposed variables that 
contribute differently in developed and developing countries. Therefore, excluding 
some categories of variables in the model does not explain economic realities in the 
societies with different lifestyles or preferences. The approach in this study seems to 
be in a better position to explain the income disparities between developed and 
developing countries. However, some findings in developing countries need further 
exploration which will be the primary purpose for chapter 5. 
4.4.4.6   How the findings of this thesis fit with the existing literature  
Generally, the findings discussed in section 4.3 reveal that economic growth 
is not uniform among countries. That seems to suggest that the policies that have 
worked in developing countries may not work in the same way in developing countries 
as noted by (Hausmann and Velasco, 2008, p. 1). The findings also show that Socio-
cultural and political systems derail economic development in the African context. The 
variables that revealed this are CPR, religion, and feeling responsibility. Also, self-
reliance orientation seems to be the critical element in enhancing economic 
development in developing countries other than depending on foreign aid. In the light 
of the above findings, Appendix 1 below briefly compares the findings to other studies.  
4.4.4.7    Strengths and weaknesses of literature versus this study 
Firstly, Appendix 1 below incorporates studies with similar or different 
methodological approaches to this study. Although most of the studies in Appendix 1 
have similar approaches to research for this study, they used different techniques for 
estimating the variables in the models. Moreover, yet some have similar results to this 
study. Besides, most of these studies used WVS as the source of cultural variables. 
Secondly, Appendix 1 also illustrates some studies with different methodological 
approaches to this study. For example, studies in rows 8 and 10 in Appendix 1 below 
had the investigation in China and the United States of America respectively. These 




approach with this study, the results indicated that cultural values are essential for 
economic development. Hence, the next paragraph will briefly discuss why this study 
is different and highlight weaknesses and strengths for other studies which are briefly 
discussed below. 
Dinda (2008) narrowed culture to social capital and argued that it increases 
human capital that he claimed propels economic growth in the countries. Even though 
the author found that social capital significantly impacted on economic growth, the 
author engaged very few variables from WVS covering the period 1990 to 2000.  
Moreover, Dinda's study is different from this thesis regarding the estimation approach 
by combining developed and developing countries in his estimation, contrary to this 
study. Also, Dinda's study only covered the period from 1990 to 2000 while this thesis 
covers the period from 1994 to 2015 on variables with up to date data. Similarly, Guiso 
et al. (2004) researched on how differences in social capital levels in Italy affected the 
behavior of people differently concerning cheque usage, investment in cash or stock 
and accessibility to institutional credit. They sourced data from WVS from 1990 to 
1999 and observed that social capital plays an essential role in the degree of financial 
development across different parts of Italy. They researched in different parts of Italy 
while this study focuses on six developed and six developing countries. They defined 
culture by equating it to trust which is too narrow. Hence, this study addressed this by 
generating eight cultural variables. Likewise, Maridal (2013) researched 92 
developing countries with many cultural variables in the model. However, many 
developing countries do not have consistent WVS data, hence, liable to bias. It was 
addressed by reducing developing countries to only 6 with consistent WVS data. 
Other studies in Appendix 1 are prone to the same criticisms highlighted above. For 
example, Mathers and Williamson (2011); Gennaioli et al. (2013); Petrakis and Kostis 
(2013); Granato et al. (1996a) combined developed and developing countries 
together in their estimations. Moreover, most of these studies used WVS as the 
source of study which does not consistently cover developing countries mainly in 
Africa.  
On the other hand, Gaddis (2013) investigated the influence of habitus in the 
relationship between cultural capital and academic achievement. He used data from 
Big Brothers/ Big Sisters of America program during the 1990s. He engaged data 
collected from national surveys in the USA, hence, may not be generalized to most of 
the developing countries. Hence, this study is different regarding the context of the 
study and cultural data used for the study. Besides, the next section will briefly discuss 




It seems to suggest that the agency of human beings in creating wealth in 
every society does not only rely on human capital or capital stock but also the context 
and environment they live. For instance, human capital and capital stock in Table 4.9 
below lose their significant impact on GDPPC when cultural variables are excluded in 
developed OLS2. On the contrary, human capital and capital stock in developing 
OLS3 model maintain significance impact though loses effect size when cultural 
variables are not included in the model. Therefore, definitions of human capital and 
the capital stock that exclude cultural aspect do not capture the real productivity of 
these variables. Hence, endogenous theory that puts human capital and capital stock 
at the center for propelling economic growth needs to extend definitions of these 
variables to include cultural values that impact productivity positively (Islam, 1995; 
Knight et al., 1992; King and Levine, 1994; Prescott, 1998; Bos et al., 2010).  
In conclusion, the findings in this chapter raise issues on neo-classical 
assumptions of catching-up, multiplier effect, and accumulation causality. Also, 
definitions offered by the endogenous theory of human capital and capital stock. 
Hence, the omission by the neo-classic theory of other categories of variables  
partly fails to explain the income disparities among countries. This study investigated 
all the three categories of variables and confirmed that some cultural factors are 
significant to enhance economic growth while other factors hinder economic growth. 
Therefore, economic growths among countries are explained by different factors. In 
























Table 4.9: Impact of human capital & capital stock without cultural variables 
                                                                                             
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
Notes. Cultural variables affect the performance of human capital and capital stock as noted in 
models OLS1, OLS2, and OLS3 models.  
4.5 CONCLUSION 
 
The research question addressed in this chapter is "do cultural variables 
influence economic development among countries? The findings in this chapter show 
that the performances of all the three categories of variables depend on the 
development level of the country. Hence, combining both developed and developing 
countries in research could lead to the bias of the results. It suggests that emphasis 
on the universal approach to enhance economic development among countries 
overlooks the effect of development levels of countries. Furthermore, this study notes 
that RKN levels in developing countries impede the flow of goods and services while 
RKN levels in developed countries propel the flow of goods and services (Aghion and 
Howitt, 1998). It seems to suggest that the wisdom of capital accumulation is not the 
critical determinant of economic development in developing countries. Also, the catch-
up assumption seems to work in developed countries other than in developing 
countries. 
Dependent variable: GDPPC 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES OLS1 (combined) OLS2 (developed) OLS3 (developing) 
TRADITIONAL    
EMP 5.7411 -39.8755 85.3465 
 (38.9993) (71.9275) (55.9383) 
HDI -1,293.1156 9,952.0882*** -5,470.1366** 
 (1,091.2749) (3,342.1892) (2,101.2304) 
IGS -133.0162*** -67.4508** -145.2810*** 
 (28.6427) (30.2189) (49.4450) 
RKN -2,321.1381*** -435.5638 -5,360.1286*** 
 (846.8314) (877.7990) (2,023.4045) 
TED 6.9237 62.5913 97.5433* 
 (38.3047) (57.9354) (58.1160) 
EGS 156.2245** 105.3276 189.9279 
 (75.0188) (76.7300) (129.9049) 
FDI 70.6076 3.4397 92.5479 
 (47.2404) (47.2667) (77.9917) 
GCI 120.1731*** 324.1967*** 258.3398*** 
 (30.7179) (69.5369) (60.3266) 
GRS 68.7899** 70.5825 60.2866 
 (28.6806) (46.3199) (43.0679) 
ETR 15.3589 49.4570*** -10.7302 
 (9.4585) (15.5275) (14.6379) 
INSTITUTIONAL    
ROL -23.4592 80.5453* 65.2231 
 (43.2205) (46.8924) (75.6411) 
GEF 6,230.3897 15,727.5770*** 23,724.7791* 
 (5,327.6198) (5,839.7060) (13,216.7636) 
Constant 29,398.8517*** -25,713.3371* 35,004.7489*** 
 (5,445.4978) (12,989.5287) (12,759.3207) 
OBS 264 132 132 
R2 0.2604 0.3264 0.3756 
R2_A 0.225 0.259 0.313 
DF_R 251 119 119 
DF_M 12 12 12 
F 7.364 4.806 5.965 




For this reason, the utilization capacity as claimed by Commendatore et al. 
(2014), is vital to keep RKN levels and maintain or increase the flow of goods and 
services in both developed and developing countries. For example, Neuayer (2001) 
suggested that depreciation of both manufactured and natural capital in developing 
countries is higher than investment, hence unsustainability of economic development 
in developing countries. The findings as discussed in section 4.4.4.3 above suggest 
that developing countries experience underdevelopment due to lack of the 
responsibility of individuals. In other words, individuals' responsibility, rather than 
perceiving that it is the government's responsibility for the welfare of individuals and 
their societies, enhances economic growth. In so doing people become self-reliant 
and pursue things that will make their societies poverty free.  
Also, the discussion in section 4.4.4.5 above points out that religion derails 
development in developing countries. Religion seems to provide the context where 
habits, customs, and education direct the behaviors of people (Guiso et al., 2009; 
Smith, 1776). Additionally, religion is highly correlated with obedience. Graph 3 in 
Figure 4.16 above illustrates this mainly in developing countries. So according to 
Mathers and Williamson (2011) obedience or religion captured in the concept of 
culture limits freedom which is a necessary component for enhancing economic 
development. Likewise, some social scientists have negatively connected Catholicism 
to economic development (Harrison, 1985; Morsc, 1964). It seems to agree with 
Branco (2007) who pointed out that profound influence of secularism in countries 
where religious life is a status quo fail to boost economic development. Different 
societies embrace social norms that influence people's behaviors and choices, hence, 
influencing outcomes of the whole society.  
The upshot of the findings reported above about the hypotheses discussed in 
sub-section 3.2.2 in chapter 3, can be condensed in the statement that most of the 
variables in the traditional category are more significant in developed countries than 
in developing countries. On the other hand, cultural category variables have a more 
significant effect size in developing countries than in developed countries. The effect 
sizes of variables differ regarding size and whether negative or positive. Lastly, the 
variables in the institutional category were more critical in developed than in 
developing countries. For more details see the results and discussion sections (4.3 
and 4.4) above.    
Therefore, the findings articulated above are crucially essential to enhance 
economic growth in developing countries. Hence, the investigation of all the three 
categories of variables exposes the shortfalls of traditional economic theories towards 




variables more critical in developing countries representative to all developing 
countries? Hence, taking into considering the limited sample of countries engaged in 
this chapter, this finding necessitates further investigation by engaging more countries 
in the developing group particularly from the SSC region. Hence, further examination 
will be made in chapter 5 designed to follow-up the findings in this chapter. There are 
remarkable differences between the two chapters. For example, cultural variables in 
this chapter were sourced from WVS that is not consistent in many developing 
countries.  
In contrast, chapter 5 uses AS data as the source of cultural variables while 
traditional and institutional variables' sources remain the same in both chapters. For 
this reason, the focus of chapter 5 will be developing countries to find out whether the 
findings above could be repeated. Therefore, increasing the number of countries with 
the different cultural data source that is specially designed for African context is more 
appealing. The insights from the next chapter and this chapter could explain why this 
region is lagging behind compared to other regions of the world concerning economic 
growth. 
CHAPTER 5: ECONOMIC GROWTH IN 18 SUB-
SAHARAN COUNTRIES  
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
The widening gap between income levels between developed and developing 
countries as discussed in chapter 1 exposes the inconsistency in economic theory in 
explaining economic growth disparities among countries. Table 5.2 below shows that 
developed and developing countries seem to have different variables relevant to 
economic growth. The results indicate differences in the importance of variables 
between developed and developing countries and also slow and fast-growing 
countries. Table 5.2 discloses that most of the variables in the traditional category are 
very relevant for economic growth in developed countries. In contrast, most of the 
variables in the cultural category are very relevant for economic growth in developing 
countries. However, the question is “are the results representative to developing 
countries in Africa?” Despite, following necessary procedures in sampling six 
developing countries in chapter 4 section 4.2, its difficult to explain the problem of the 
countries being outliers to other developing countries in the continent. Therefore, this 
chapter engages a larger sample to repeat the investigation executed in chapter 4. In 
addressing the possible problem of 6 developing countries being outliers, this chapter 




collected from Afrobarometer Surveys (AS). These countries were chosen randomly 
with the criteria that at least 3 waves of AS were consistently collected.  
Table 5.1 below provides a list of countries in the Sub-Saharan region. 
However, the countries which were randomly chosen and met the criteria of cultural 
category data source were reduced to 18. 




Angola Benin Botswana Burkina Faso Burundi Cameroon Cape Verde 
Central African Republic Chad Comoros Congo (Brazzaville) Congo 
(Democratic Republic) Côte d'Ivoire Djibouti Equatorial Guinea Eritrea 
Ethiopia Gabon The Gambia Ghana Guinea Guinea-Bissau Kenya Lesotho 
Liberia Madagascar Malawi Mali Mauritania Mauritius Mozambique Namibia 
Niger Nigeria Réunion Rwanda Sao Tome and Principe Senegal Seychelles 
Sierra Leone Somalia South Africa Sudan Swaziland Tanzania Togo Uganda 
Western Sahara Zambia Zimbabwe 
18 SSC sampled Benin, Kenya, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Namibia, Senegal, South 
Africa, Tanzania, and Zimbabwe. Botswana, Cape Verde, Ghana, Mali, 
Mozambique, Nigeria, Uganda, and Zambia 
 
 Notes. Countries highlighted in green were part of developing countries sample in chapter 4 
The goal to find whether cultural variables in this chapter will significantly 
impact on GDP per capita (GDPPC) the study utilizes the most similar method 
(Anckar, 2008; Meckstroth, 1975). The method assumes that the characteristics of 
the countries regarding geography and history are similar and also similar on all the 
independent variables involved in the analysis except the category of independent 
variables of interest (Seawright and Gerring, 2008, p. 304). Moreover, all the countries 
involved are in the same SSC region that remains the least developed region in the 
world (Malamud and Assane, 2013). Figure 5.1 below shows the three groups of 




















Figure 5.1 Residual frequencies in Slow and fast developing and 18 SSC 
  
 Notes. The figure shows how far the observed values of GDPPC are far away from the 
 observed values.  
 
 Graph 1 in Figure 5.1 (Slow developing countries) above shows 26 
observations below the regression line while only 18 above the expected line. Graph 
2 same figure (Fast-developing countries) has 43 observations below and 45 
observations above. Graph 3 has 136 observations under regression line and 134 
above regression line. The figure seems to suggest similarities regarding economic 
performance among the countries in this region under the model conditions specified 
in this study. 
 Henceforth, the purpose of this chapter is to follow up on the findings in the 
chapter, four particularly for the developing countries. The catching-up effect and 
accumulation of capital through foreign aid seem not to work in this region as noted 
by (Islam, 1995; Knight et al., 1992). For this reason, the investigation involves three 
categories of variables as indicated in Table 3.2 in chapter 3. All analyses were 
empirically carried out using panel data and the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) 
method on 18 SSC for the period 2001 to 2015. Lastly, the organization of the chapter 
is as follows: 5.1 is an introduction to the chapter; 5.2 results reporting, 5.3 
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Notes. Variables shaded in green colour indicates relevance for economic growth in each model. On the contrary, variables in yellow color show not relevant for economic 
growth in each model. 
Dependent Variable: GDPPC 
OLS2 (developed) OLS3 (developing) SlowOLS3 (developing) FastOLS3 developing) 





























GCI*** 0.75 18.00 
2 REG** 0.44 3.43 FER *** 0.31 4.79 REG 0.23 0.53 GEF*** 0.61 13.18 
3 GEF*** 0.41 6.39 GEF*** 0.27 4.94 SOC 0.18 0.97 REG   0.30 0.41 
4 HDI*** 0.34   5.03 SOC** 0.24 2.42 FDI 0.14 1.10 FER 0.28 3.08 
5 ETR *** 0.33 6.16 CPR 0.21 0.77 ROL 0.14 0.38 FDI*** 0.25   5.13 
6 RKN* 0.32 1.57 TED* 0.12 1.23 TED 0.08 0.17 EGS* 0.25 1.96 
7 CPR*** 0.30 5.53 FDI 0.12 1.17 EMP 0.06 0.19 CPR 0.21 0.21 
8 TED* 0.21 1.88 EMP 0.08 0.49 TED 0.00 0.18 SOC 0.20 1.58 
9 GRS 0.16 0.76 ROL 0.07 0.28 HDI 0.03 0.03 RKN 0.17 0.18 
10 ROL 0.13 1.21 EGS 0.01 0.01 EGS 0.02 0.01 EMP 0.03 0.05 
11 HWK 0.12 0.89 GRS 0.01 0.01 IGS -0.04 0.01 TED 0.00 0.00 
12 EGS 0.11 0.40 HDI -0.00 0.00 GRS -0.09 0.17 ETR 0.00 0.00 
13 FDI -0.00 0.00 IGS -0.05 0.10 HWK -0.10 0.25 HDI -0.02 0.00 
14 EMP -0.06 0.10 ETR -0.07 0.25 GEF -0.17 0.76 GRS -0.05 0.14 
15 SOC -0.06 0.23 HWK -0.14 0.84 ETR -0.23 0.70 ROL -0.07 0.30 
16 FER -0.09 0.30 REG*** -0.53 3.62 FER -0.30 0.93 HWK -0.10 0.41 






This section clarifies grouping of 18 Sub-Saharan countries (SSC) in 
OLS1SSC model into FastOLS1SSC and SlowOLS1SSC growth economies by using 
average Real GDP per capita annual growth (RGDPPCG) rates as a proxy for 
average economic growth rates over the period from 2000 to 2015 as demonstrated 
in Table 5.4 below. Dion (1998, p. 127) argues that a range of a dependent variable 
can be explained by the conditions of the phenomenon taking place in the context. 
After that, using the method of most similar as discussed above, the selection of cases 
(FastOLS1SSC) / SlowOLS1SSC) can be based on the value of a dependent variable 
(Mill, 1868 cited in Dion, 1998).  For this reason, the mean of GDPPCG became a 
cutting point whether a country belongs to slow or fast growth in both models 
(FastOLS1SSC and SlowOLS1SSC) models. That seems to imply that any value of 
GDPPCG from 0 to mean of GDPPCG in OLS1SSC model was categorized 
SlowOLS1SSC model while any value above was a classified FastOLS1SSC model. 
The rationally for grouping countries into slow and fast sub-groups is to find out if the 
performance of the variables in respective categories varies with the status of 
economic growth in the countries. It would help to  
identify which category of variables seem to provide robust support for economic 
growth over time in each sub-group of the countries. The countries RGDPPCG rates 
below 1.2% are grouped as SlowOLS1SSC model while those above are a 
FastOLS1SSC model. See Table 5.3 and Figure 5.2 below. 
Table 5.3: Countries in each model of real GDPPC annual growth 
                                                                                                                                                                     
Notes. There are ten countries in SlowOLS1SSC model while the FastOL1SSC model has 










5.1.1  Fast and slow growth countries   
Growth group Countries  
SlowOLS1SSC model Benin, Kenya, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Namibia, Senegal, South 
Africa, Tanzania, and Zimbabwe.  





Figure 5.2: Levels of GDPPCG in SlowOLS1SSC and FastOLS1SSC models 
 
 
Notes. The figure shows the mean of GDP annual growth for ten slow and eight fast-growing 




This section presents the empirical results of the investigation of how 
economic, institution and cultural variables influence economic development 
differently in SSC. Nevertheless, the main aim is to find out if cultural variables hinder 
or enhance economic development in Sub-Saharan countries. To achieve this, 
estimation model used the production function of the form:  
Y = ΑKα (Lh) 1-α……………………………………………………………………..……..(1) 
Y = income output, K = physical capital, L = unskilled labor, H = human capital, A 
denoted TFP interpreted as social infrastructure, social capability, social capital, 
technology progress, ignorance.  See more details in chapter 2 section 2.6 and 
chapter 3 section 3.4.1. The next section will report the results in categories of 
variables indicated in Table 5.4 below. 
  
Table 5.4 below shows four models namely: OLS1SSC, Random, IVREG2, 
and GLS. Models such as Random, IVREG2, and GLS are used to check the validity 
of the OLS1SSC model. These models' results are not very different from the 






















































OLS1SSC model; hence, the problem of correlations among independent variables is 
checked. Therefore, the discussion of the results will be largely limited to the 
OLS1SSC model. The p-value for the OLS1SSC model in Table 5.4 below is 0.000, 
and its R-squared is 28%. The variables in Table 5.4 below are compared to each 
other regarding contribution to GDPPC. However, comparison of the significance of 
variables can be tricky due to differences in measurement units of the variables. For 
this purpose, standardized coefficients are used to compare the variables' contribution 
to GDPPC as illustrated in Table 5.4 below. For more information on checking the 
OLS1SSC model for this chapter sees chapter 3 sub-section 3.5.2. Furthermore, 
variables ranked in Table 5.5 according to the standardized coefficients magnitude in 
contribution to GDPPC. All confidential interval ranges below are reported at a 95% 




























Table 5.4:  Independent Variables and their impact on GDP per capita 
                                                   
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1    
Notes. Column 2 shows the OLS1SSC model while Columns 3 to 5 shows Random, IVREG2, 






Dependent Variable: GDPPC 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES OLS1SSC Random IVREG2 GLS 
Traditional     
EMP -0.0164 -0.0164 -0.0164 0.0888 
 (0.1331) (0.1331) (0.1629) (0.1253) 
HDI -0.0216** -0.0216** -0.0216* 0.0041 
 (0.0107) (0.0107) (0.0119) (0.0087) 
IGS 76.8200** 76.8200** 76.8200 -4.5534 
 (38.1403) (38.1403) (46.8181) (22.3190) 
RKN -0.0293** -0.0293** -0.0293 0.0424* 
 (0.0149) (0.0149) (0.0260) (0.0232) 
HCT 33.9346** 33.9346** 33.9346** 38.6322*** 
 (14.3161) (14.3161) (16.7716) (14.0870) 
EGS 0.1319* 0.1319* 0.1319 0.0512 
 (0.0728) (0.0728) (0.0970) (0.0491) 
AID -0.1862*** -0.1862*** -0.1862*** -0.0755*** 
 (0.0716) (0.0716) (0.0679) (0.0280) 
GCI 0.1076** 0.1076** 0.1076* 0.0404 
 (0.0489) (0.0489) (0.0581) (0.0328) 
GRS 0.0403 0.0403 0.0403 0.0231 
 (0.0533) (0.0533) (0.0608) (0.0252) 
ETR -5.5920* -5.5920* -5.5920 -1.7402 
 (3.1097) (3.1097) (5.3014) (3.1368) 
Institutional     
ROL 0.0836* 0.0836* 0.0836 0.0015 
 (0.0441) (0.0441) (0.0540) (0.0369) 
GEF -6.3771*** -6.3771*** -6.3771*** -0.8667 
 (2.1119) (2.1119) (2.4035) (1.0155) 
COC -130.4326*** -130.4326*** -130.4326** -117.5427*** 
 (49.1160) (49.1160) (52.6589) (29.9373) 
Cultural     
CPR -22.1926*** -22.1926*** -22.1926*** -12.2566*** 
 (5.2051) (5.2051) (6.5977) (3.7783) 
SOC 11.9876* 11.9876* 11.9876 7.4713* 
 (7.1377) (7.1377) (8.0374) (4.5108) 
REG 11.8196 11.8196 11.8196*** 3.2874 
 (8.5169) (8.5169) (4.2202) (3.2472) 
SEC 55.1315*** 55.1315*** 55.1315*** 37.3099*** 
 (13.2460) (13.2460) (16.5565) (9.1180) 
Constant 158.2456*** 158.2456*** 158.2456*** 77.4722** 
 (54.8223) (54.8223) (57.2489) (39.1000) 
OBS 270 270 270 270 
R2 0.2799  0.2799  
R2_A 0.231 . 0.231 . 
DF_R 252 . 252 . 
DF_M 17 17 17 . 
F 5.763 . 6.975 . 
p 0 0 0 . 
     





Table 5.5: Variables’ effect size43 on GDPPC in OLS1SSC model   
                                                 
Notes. Significant levels *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Columns 1 to 6 shows variables’ 
ranking, independent variables, Standardized coefficients, Eta%, t-tests, and p-values 
respectively.  
  
 Table 5.4 above shows HCT ranked 3rd out of 17 variables in Table 5.5 above 
and it is measured in years (Barro and Lee, 2013). The confidence interval ranges 
from 5.74 to 62.13, and its p-value is 0.019 which is less than 90% significance level 
threshold. Further exploration in Table 5.6 below indicates that HCT significantly 
enhances GDPPC in SlowOLS1SSC model while in FastOLS1SSC model 
insignificantly impacts GDPPC. The standardized coefficients of HCT in Table 5.6 for 
SlowOLS1SSC and FastOLS1SSC models are 0.38 and 0.14 respectively. It seems 
to suggest that the impact of HCT is higher in slow growth than in fast-growth 
countries.  
 Furthermore, column 4 in the same table in SlowOLS1SSC and 
FastOLS1SSC models shows that the contribution of employment in slow growth 
countries is 0.17% compared to only 0.02% in fast-growth countries. Figure 5.3 below 
shows that HCT levels are slightly higher in fast-growth countries than in slow growth 
countries. Nonetheless, the impact of HCT is higher in slow growth countries than in 
fast-growth countries. That appears to agree with the employment findings explained 
above whereby employment is more effective in slow growth countries than in fast-
                                            
 
An effect size is a standardized measure of the magnitude of an observed effect. It is the 
measure of the net effect of a particular variable in this model (context). 
44 Effect size of less than 1 % is considered small; between (1 to 10 %) is considered 
medium; more than 10 % is considered large. 
 Dependent variable: GDPPC  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Rank Independent variables    Standardized coefficients ETA44 %   t-test P - value 
1 SEC *** 0.54 4.95 4.16 0.000 
2 GCI ** 0.18 1.38 2.20 0.029 
3 HCT ** 0.18 1.61 2.37 0.019 
4 IGS** 0.15 1.16 2.01 0.045 
5 EGS * 0.14 0.94 1.81 0.071 
6 ROL* 0.14 1.03 1.90 0.059 
7 SOC* 0.14 0.81 1.68 0.094 
8 REG 0.09 0.55 1.39 0.166 
9 GRS 0.04 0.16 0.76 0.450 
10 EMP -0.01 0.00 -0.12 0.902 
11 HDI** -0.12 1.16 -2.01 0.045 
12 ETR* -0.13 0.92 -1.80 0.073 
13 AID*** -0.14 1.93 -2.60 0.010 
14 RKN** -0.15 1.11 -1.97 0.050 
15 COC*** -0.20 2.02 -2.66 0.008 
16 GEF*** -0.22 2.61 -3.02 0.003 
17 CPR *** -0.62 5.19 -4.26 0.000 




growth countries. The reasons why will be discussed in section 5.3 below. The next 
variable to be reported under the traditional category is EGS. 
Figure 5.3. Levels of HCT in slow and fast growth countries 
Notes. Human capital measured concerning years in education, the higher the number of years 
the more educated are the people.  
 EGS in Table 5.4 above significantly contributes to GDPPC. Its confidence 
interval ranges from -0.01 to 0.28 and its p-value is 0.071 which is less than 90% 
significance threshold level. Further analysis in Table 5.6 below shows that EGS 
impacts on GDPPCG significantly in SlowOLS1SSC model while in FastOLS1SSC 
model insignificantly contributes to GDPPCG. In contrast, graph 1 in Figure 5.4 below 
shows that EGS as a percentage to GDP is higher in the FastOLS1SSC model than 
the SlowOLS1SSC model. It seems to suggest that EGS has a higher impact in slow 
growth countries than fast-growth countries. Captivatingly, IGS significantly 
contributes to GDPPC in Table 5.4 above contrary to literature expectations whereby 
imports are expected to decrease economic growth other than increase. 
Nevertheless, graph 2 in Figure 5.4 below indicates very low imports in the SSC 
region, which seems to suggest that low imports have a positive impact on economic 
growth. Having looked at exports and imports, the next variable to be reported is GCI 
in the next paragraph. 
 
 




















Figure 5.4: Levels of exports and imports in Sub-Saharan countries 
 
Notes. Graph 1 indicates exports while graph 2 imports. 
GCI contributes significantly to GDPPC as shown in Table 5.4 above. The 
confidence interval ranges from 0.01 to 0.20 and has a p-value of 0.029 less than 
90% significance level threshold. GCI in Table 5.5 above is ranked 2nd regarding its 
relative impact on GDPPC over 15 years period. GCI concept attempts to quantify the 
impact of some critical factors which contribute to creating the conditions for 
competitiveness, with a particular focus on the macroeconomic environment, the 
quality of the country's institutions, and the state of the country's technology and 
supporting infrastructure. GCI in Table 5.6 below insignificantly contributed to 
GDPPCG in both SlowOLS1SSC and FastOLS1SSC models. However, GCI impact 
on GDPPCG in a 15-year period is higher in fast-growth countries than slow growth 
countries as indicated in columns (4) of Table 5.6 below respectively. It seems to 
contradict Figure 5.5 below whereby GCI levels are higher in SlowOLS1SSC model 
than the FastOLS1SSC model. For further discussion of GCI see section 5.3 below. 
Intriguingly, some factors in GCI formation such as technology and infrastructure can 
proxy as RKN. Hence, the next paragraph will report the performance of RKN in Table 





















Source: AFDB from 2001 to 2015
















































Source: Penn World Tables 9.0 from 2001 to 2015




Figure 5.5: GCI levels in slow and fast growth countries 
 
Notes. GCI evaluates the productivity and efficiency of countries ranging from 1 to 7, 1 being 
the lowest and 7 the highest.  
 
RKN levels in literature are expected to determine the capacity to increase the 
flow of goods and services (Ekins et al., 2003). However, Tables 5.4 above indicate 
that RKN significantly reduces GDPPC in Sub-Saharan countries. The confidence 
interval of RKN ranges from -0.06 to -0.00 and its p-value is 0.050 less than a 90% 
threshold of significance level. Further examination in Table 5.6 below indicates that 
RKN significantly reduces GDPPCG in SlowOLS1SSC model. In contrast, in the 
FastOLS1SSC model, RKN insignificantly reduces GDPPCG. The reduction impact 
on GDPPCG in SlowOLS1SSC model is 383 times more than in the FastOLS1SSC 
model. Graph 1 in Figure 5.6 below seems to confirm RKN these findings whereby 
fast growth countries have higher levels of RKN than slow growth countries. The other 
variables in this category that reduce GDPPC significantly are HDI, AID, and ETR as 
indicated in Table 5.4 above. HDI in Table 5.4 above significantly reduces GDPPC. 
Its confidence interval ranges from -0.04 to -0.00 and its p-value is 0.045 less than 
90% significance level threshold. The impact of HDI on GDPPC differs with economic 
growth status in SSC. For instance, HDI insignificantly enhances GDPPCG in 
SlowOLS1SSC model while in FastOLS1SSC model significantly reduces GDPPCG 



















































SlowOLS1SSC model is about four times less than the impact of RKN in 
SlowOLS1SSC model as indicated in columns (4) in Table 5.6 below. Graph 2 in 
Figure 5.6 below shows that slow growth countries in SSC have higher levels of HDI 
than fast-growth countries. Therefore, grouping countries together as illustrated in 
Tables 5.4 and 5.5 above may miss out explaining the differences in economic growth 
among countries in the same region. That seems to agree with the findings discussed 
in section 4.4 in chapter 4 whereby the performance of variables dramatically differs 
in developed and developing countries.    
Figure 5.6: RKN and HDI levels in Slow and Fast growth models 
 
 
Notes. Graph 1 shows RKN levels while graph 2 indicates HDI levels in slow and fast-growing 
countries. 
 
 Another variable in this category that significantly reduces GDPPC in Sub-
Saharan countries is ETR. Its p-value is 0.073 which is less than 90% significance 
threshold level. The confidence interval range of ETR is from -11.72 to 0.53. Further 
exploration in Table 5.6 below indicates that ETR significantly reduces GDPPCG in 
the FastOLS1SSC model while insignificantly promotes GDPPC in SlowOLS1SSC 
model. However, Figure 5.6 below shows that levels of ETR are higher in fast-growth 




















































































































Graph 2: HDI levels  in Slow & Fast models




Figure 5.7: Levels of ETR in Sub-Saharan countries 
 
 
Notes. New business registrations per 1,000 people are higher in Fast growth countries than 
slow growth countries. 
 
Also, AID in this category significantly and negatively impacts on GDPPC as 
demonstrated in Table 5.4 above. The confidence interval range is from -0.33 to -0.05 
and its p-value is 0.010 less than 90% significance threshold level. Further exploration 
in Table 5.6 below shows that AID significantly reduces GDPPCG in SlowOLS1SSC 
model while in FastOLS1SSC model insignificantly reduces growth. Column (4) in 
Table 5.7 below demonstrates that the effect size of AID for GDPPCG is two times 
more in slow growth countries than in fast-growth countries. Nonetheless, Figure 5.7 

































































Figure 5.8: Comparison of AID levels in slow and fast growth countries 
 Notes. AID levels are slightly higher in slow growth countries than in fast-growth countries. 
 
All in all, in this category according to Table 5.5 above, variables ordered from 
2 to 5 significantly contributes to GDPPC while the variables placed from 11 to 14 
significantly reduces GDPPC. On the other hand, further examination in Table 5.6 
below shows that many variables in both SlowOLS1SSC and FastOLS1SSC models 
insignificantly impact on GDPPCG. Having reported the different impact of variables 
in Tables 5.4, 5.5, 5.6, and 5.7 in the traditional category, the next category to be 
reported is a cultural category. 
 
The confidence interval that has the real value of SEC contribution to GDPPC 
ranges from 29.04 to 81.22 US dollars over the period from 2001 to 2015. Its p-value 
is 0.000 which is less than 90% significance level threshold. Even though the findings 
show that the SEC is positively and significantly related to GDPPC in the SSC region, 
the opposite is true. Further investigation of data shows that the coding of variables 
ranged from 0 to 4, where 0 denoted no SEC fear or want while anything above 0 
denoted presence of fear or want. Figure 5.9 below shows the SEC index where any 
number above zero indicates the presence of insecurity of the participants. In all 
the countries represented in Figure 5.9 below. The degree of insecurity among 
participants differs from country to country as demonstrated in Figure 5.9 below.  





































































Figure 5.9: Fear of crime in Sub-Saharan countries 
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However, the effect of SEC on GDPPCG may differ among countries in the 
same region depending on economic growth status. It is demonstrated in Tables 5.6 
and 5.7 below. For instance, in Table 5.6 SEC significantly impacts to GDPPCG in 
SlowOLS1SSC model, while in FastOLS1SSC model SEC insignificantly impacted 
GDPPCG. However, due to reverse coding as explained above SEC significantly 
reduces GDPPCG in slow growth countries while in fast-growth countries security 
insignificantly reduces GDPPCG. It seems to suggest that SEC reduces GDPPCG 53 
times more in slow growth countries than in fast-growing countries as illustrated in 
columns (4) in Table 5.7 below. Hence, the severity of SEC on GDPPCG is worse in 
slow growth countries than in fast-growth countries. 
While in the cultural category, Table 5.4 above also shows that SOC 
significantly contributes to GDPPC in the 18 SSC. The confidence interval for SOC 
ranges from -2.07 to 26.04 and its p-value is 0.094 less than the significance level of 
90% threshold. Also, SOC performs differently in slow and fast-growing countries in 
Tables 5.6 and 5.7 below. For instance, SOC positively and significantly influences 
GDPPCG in SlowOLS1SSC model while in FastOLS1SSC model insignificantly 
contributes to GDPPC. That seems contradictory to further investigation in Figure 
5.10 below which shows that SOC level in slow growth countries is less than in the 
fast-growing countries. SOC significantly contributes to GDPPCG in slow than fast-



















Figure 5.10: Levels of SOC in slow and fast growth countries 
    
 
Notes. The mean of SOC index is higher in the FastOLS1SSC model than in SlowOLS1SSC 
model. 
 Even though SOC positively influences GDPPC, its significance concerning 
contribution seems to depend on other factors in the countries. That is demonstrated 
by the fact that fast growth countries have higher levels of SOC than slow growth 
countries, yet SOC significantly impacts in slow growth countries.  Furthermore, Table 
5.7 below shows relative contributions of each variable to GDPPC. For instance, SOC 
contributes to GDPPCG in SlowOLS1SSC model 3 times more than in the 
FastOLS1SSC model. The differences in SOC contribution to GDPPC is explained in 
different ways in the literature (Dinda, 2008; North, 1990; Schleifer and Vishny, 1993). 
However, in this section further examination is done on how SOC relates to CPR, 
SEC, and democracy. 
5.2.3.1  Relationship of SOC, CPR, SEC, and democracy    
Figure 5.11 below seems to show CPR playing a significant role in shaping 
SEC and SOC in the countries in this region. For example, most of the countries in 
the region from 2000 to 2010 indicate low CPR and SOC. However, during this period 
there were no SEC concerns. On the other hand, there is an indication that CPR 
increased in some countries from about 2011 to 2015. Also, in these countries, there 

















































have also been concerns of SEC in the countries. Besides, democracy seems to be 
maintaining support in the region from the year 2000 to the present time.  
Even though CPR seems to play a significant role, Table 5.4 above shows that 
CPR in SSC negatively and significantly impacts GDPPC. The confidence interval 
range for CPR is from -32.45 to -11.94 and its p-value is 0.000 less than 90% 
threshold confidence level. That seems to agree with the findings in chapter 4 sub-
section 4.4.4.3 whereby Figure 4.13 shows that CPR appears to be lower in 
developing countries than in developed countries. So it is also observed that the 
impact of CPR in developing countries on GDPPC is more substantial than in 
developed countries. For example, the impact of CPR on GDPPC in developing 
countries is 5.5% while in developed countries is just 0.77% as demonstrated in 
columns (7) and (10) in Table 4.6 in chapter 4.  
Furthermore, Table 5.6 below indicates that CPR reduces GDPPCG in 
SlowOLS1SSC model by 16.4% compared to just 0.99% in the FastOLS1SSC model. 
Hence, encouraging people to participate in politics yields greater economic success 
in SSC. While in the same category, Table 5.4 above indicates that REG 
insignificantly contributes to GDPPC in SSC. However, Table 5.6 below shows that 
REG significantly promotes GDPPCG in the FastOLS1SSC model while in 
SlowOLS1SSC model insignificantly enhances GDPPCG.  
Finally, variables in this category seem to perform differently with the 
economic status of the countries. These findings disclose that variables' importance 
differs within each economic growth level of countries. Therefore, grouping countries 
together as for the 18 SSC may fail to capture which variables are necessary for each 




Figure 5.11: Plots of graphs showing relationships of variables 
 
Notes. Even though the Y scale seems the same for CPR, SOC, SEC and democracy, zero (0) in the scale has different meanings for each variable. For 
instance, SEC and democracy (0) mean no crime in the society and it means support for democracy. On the other hand, SOC and CPR (0) or anything less 
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COC in Table 5.4 above significantly reduces GDPPC in 18 Sub-Saharan 
countries. The p-value for COC is 0.078 which is less than 90% significance level 
threshold. Its confidence interval range is -227.16 to -33.7. However, it is noted in 
Table 5.6 below that COC in SlowOLS1SSC model significantly reduces GDPPCG 
while in FastOLS1SSC model insignificantly contributes to GDPPC. On the contrary, 
Figure 5.12 below indicates that COC is better executed in slow growth countries than 
in fast-growth countries. That seems to suggest that institutions may not be the critical 
determinant of fast economic growth in SSC. However, the finding seems to agree 
with Knack and Keefer (1997) that higher levels of trust enhance better quality of 
institutions.  
Figure 5.12: COC in slow and fast growth countries 
   
Notes. Slow growth countries score well than fast-growing countries in the Sub-Saharan region 
concerning corruption control.  
Another variable in this category that significantly reduces GDPPC in Sub-
Saharan countries is GEF as illustrated in Table 5.4 above. Its confidential interval 
ranges from -10.54 to -2.22 and its p-value is 0.003 which is less than 90% 
significance threshold level. Further exploration in Table 5.5 below indicates that GEF   
significantly reduces GDPPCG in the FastOLS1SSC model while in SlowOLS1SSC 


























































model insignificantly enhances GDPPCG. Figure 5.13 below shows that slow growth 
countries have slightly better scores of GEF than fast-growth countries.  
Figure 5.13: Scores of GEF in slow and fast growth countries 
 
 Notes. Scores of GEF in both slow and fast growth countries 
 
 The last variable in the institutional category to be reported in this section is 
ROL. Table 5.4 above indicates that ROL significantly promotes GDPPC in Sub-
Saharan countries. Its confidence interval ranges from -0.00 to 0.17 and its p-value is 
0.059 which is less than 90% significance threshold level. However, the impact of 
ROL on GDPPCG is different in SlowOLS1SSC model and FastOLS1SSC model. For 
instance, ROL significantly enhances GDPPCG in the FastOLS1SSC model while in 
SlowOLS1SSC model insignificantly reduces GDPPCG. The impact size of ROL on 
GDPPCG indicated in columns (4) in Table 5.7 below shows that ROL contributes to 
GDPPCG in FastOLS1SSC model 47 times more than in slow growth countries. The 
observations made in Tables 5.4, 5.5, 5.6 and 5.7 seem to indicate that variables in 
all the categories perform differently in SSC as observed in slow and fast-growing 























































Table 5.6: Impact of Variables on GDPPCG in slow and fast countries 
 
 
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1   
                                                               
Notes. Column (2) shows SlowOLS1SSC model while column (3) indicates FastOLS1SSC 
model with traditional, institutional and cultural variables.  
Dependent variable: GDPPCG 
(1) (2) (3) 
Independent variables  SlowOLS1SSC FastOLS1SSC 
Traditional    
EMP 0.0917 0.0748 
 (0.1420) (0.3828) 
HDI 0.0073 -0.0352* 
 (0.0133) (0.0205) 
IGS 76.9003 38.7577 
 (47.3966) (78.6792) 
RKN -0.0955*** 0.0052 
 (0.0218) (0.0330) 
HCT 73.6827*** 25.7169 
 (24.5514) (27.5934) 
EGS 0.2077* 0.0268 
 (0.1058) (0.1278) 
AID -0.1990** -0.1643 
 (0.0814) (0.1236) 
GCI 0.0852 0.1349 
 (0.0562) (0.0972) 
GRS 0.0836 -0.0172 
 (0.0630) (0.1134) 
ETR 1.2159 -9.1213* 
 (4.5121) (5.4229) 
Institutional    
ROL -0.0275 0.1826** 
 (0.0671) (0.0842) 
GEF 0.1591 -9.0551** 
 (2.6659) (3.7231) 
COC -155.5713*** 26.4787 
 (57.4022) (103.6554) 
Cultural   
CPR -42.4049*** -10.5587 
 (6.6153) (8.9040) 
SOC 24.5307** 11.1005 
 (10.9590) (12.2023) 
REG 6.6097 126.3467*** 
 (7.6231) (47.6756) 
SEC 101.2105*** 14.3800 
 (16.3263) (22.2524) 
Constant 34.9705 -303.1952 
 (72.1205) (222.2977) 
OBS 150 120 
R2 0.4732 0.2840 
R2_A 0.405 0.165 
DF-R 132 102 
DF-M 17 17 
F 6.976 2.380 
P-value 0.0000 0.003 




Table 5.7: Effect size of independent variables on GDP per capita growth in slow & fast-growing economies  
                                                                                                     
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           
Notes. Significant levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. SlowOLS1SSC for slow growth economies while FastOLS1SSC for fast growth economies. 
Dependent Variable: GDPPCG 
SlowOLS1SSC Model FastOLS1SSC Model  
(1) (2) (3) 
 
(4) (5) (6) (1) (2) (3) 
 














value 1 SEC*** 0.97 15.34 6.20 0.000 1 REG*** 0.42 4.93 2.65 0.009 
2 HCT*** 0.38 3.59 3.00 0.003 2 ROL** 0.31 3.30 2.17 0.032 
3 SOC** 0.24 2.00 2.24 0.027 3 GCI 0.19 1.35 1.39 0.168 
4 EGS* 0.23 1.54 1.96 0.052 4 SOC 0.15 0.58 0.91 0.365 
5 GCI 0.16 0.92 1.52 0.132 5 SEC 0.15 0.29 0.65 0.520 
6 IGS 0.16 1.05 1.62 0.107 6 HCT 0.14 0.61 0.93 0.354 
7 GRS 0.10 0.70 1.33 0.186 7 IGS 0.07 0.17 0.49 0.623 
8 EMP 0.06 0.17 0.65 0.520 8 COC 0.04 0.05 0.26 0.799 
9 REG  0.06 0.30 0.87 0.387 9 EMP 0.03 0.02 0.20 0.845 
10 HDI 0.04 0.12 0.55 0.582 10 EGS 0.03 0.03 0.21 0.834 
11 ETR 0.03 0.03 0.27 0.788 11 RKN 0.02 0.02 0.16 0.874 
12 GEF 0.01 0.00 0.06 0.953 12 GRS -0.02 0.02 -0.15 0.880 
13 ROL -0.05 0.07 -0.41 0.682 13 AID -0.12 1.24 -1.33 0.186 
14 AID** -0.16 2.38 -2.44 0.016 14 HDI* -0.18 2.07 -1.72 0.089 
15 COC*** -0.25 2.93 -2.71 0.008 15 ETR* -0.23 1.99 -1.68 0.096 
16 RKN *** -0.53 7.66 -4.38 0.000 16 GEF** -0.28 4.15 -2.43 0.017 
17 CPR *** -1.15 16.40 -6.41 0.000 17 CPR -0.31 0.99 -1.19 0.238 





Generally, Tables 5.4 and 5.5 above indicate that traditional category has 
many more variables significantly impacting GDPPC than cultural and institutional 
variables. However, regarding the size of the impact on GDPPC, cultural variables 
seem to be the most influential category in the SSC. However, further examination in 
Tables 5.6 and 5.7 above shows that the impact of variables on GDPPCG differs with 
the economic growth level of countries. Also, some variables that significantly or 
insignificantly impacted GDPPC in Tables 5.4 and 5.5 above did not do the same in 
Tables 5.6 and 5.7 above. That seems to suggest that the impact of variables on 
GDPPC differs from context to context. This finding is related to the findings in chapter 
4 whereby the variables in all categories perform differently in developed and 
developing countries as reported in chapter 4 section 4.3. Therefore, the assumption 
of neoclassical theory that economic variables work in the same way in all countries 
misses out the reality of the performances of variables in each level of economic 
development. Also, the exclusion of cultural variables in neo-classical theory misses 
out important factors that enhance the productivity of human capital in countries. 
Hence, the goal of this study is to explain economic disparities among countries by 
incorporating all the three categories of variables in the model. So countries should 
be grouped according to their development level or economic growth level so that 
performance of variables can be identified to explain economic differences among 
countries. Hence, the next section will discuss in detail the overall findings in the 
empirical analysis above.  
5.3 DISCUSSION 
  
 The findings in this chapter based on the performance of variables in Tables 
5.4, 5.5, 5.6, and 5.7 above. The context of the study is 18 SSC which is one of the 
least developed regions in the world. The investigation has been carried out as a 
follow-up to the findings in chapter 4. See the introduction for more information. The 
techniques used in the analysis briefly highlighted in the next section.  
 
Section 3.5.2 in chapter 3 explains in detail the tests used to affirm the OLS 
estimation technique. On the other hand, Models such as Random, IVREG2, and GLS 
respectively in Table 5.4 above were included to check the concern of correlations 
noted among independent variables in OLS1SSC model. The results are almost like 
5.2.5   Conclusion of the reporting of the results section 
5.3.1   Context for the chapter 




the OLS1SSC model. Hence, OLS results are valid and justified and are selected for 
the study.  
 
The results for the OLS model are presented in Tables 5.4 and 5.5 above. 
Table 5.5 shows variables ranged from 1 to 7 which significantly contribute to GDPPC 
in the 18 SSC. Other variables that positively but insignificantly contribute to GDPPC 
are ordered from 8 to 10. However, some variables significantly reduce GDPPC in the 
SSC region; these variables are ranked from 11 to 17 in Table 5.5 above. 
Furthermore, the performance of variables in Table 5.4 is further investigated by 
grouping the 18 SSC into slow and fast-growing countries as explained in sub-section 
5.1.1 above. The results are presented in Tables 5.6 and 5.7 above. Generally, 
variables impact GDPPCG differently in SlowOLS1SSC and FastOLS1SSC models 
in SSC. The performance of variables in Tables 5.4, 5.5, 5.6 and 5.7 are reported in 
section 5.2 above. Hence, the next section will briefly summarize the main findings in 
this chapter.  
  
The main findings in this chapter are as follows: 1) Insecurity in Sub-Saharan 
region hinders economic growth. 2) human capital is vital for economic growth in 
Africa. 3) CPR needful in Africa. 4) self-reliance key to economic development in 
Africa. 5) the Competition among people (individuals) good for economic growth. 6) 
Foreign aid increases dependency spirit that derails economic growth. These findings 
are further discussed in the next paragraphs. 
5.3.4.1   Insecurity in SSC region hinders economic growth 
The results in Tables 5.4 and 5.5 above show that security significantly 
enhances GDPPC in SSC. However, further investigation of data shows that security 
was inversely coded 0 to 4, whereby 0 denoted no security fear or want while anything 
above 0 denoted presence of fear or want. Figure 5.9 shows that the mean of security 
in SSC is above zero. It indicates the presence of insecurity in SSC. Also, Table 3.3 
in column (4) for Sub-Saharan countries shows that a standard deviation (SD) 
decrease of insecurity by 0.77 increases GDPPC by an SD of 78.09. The percentage 
effect size of security on GDPPC is about 5% as shown in Column (4) in Table 5.5 
above over the period of 15 years. Therefore, security is one of the essential factors 
in explaining why SSC experience unsustainable economic growth over a period. The 
question is “what is the possible cause of insecurity in SSC?” Some possible 
suggestions are the ineffective rule of law, little confidence in police or justice systems, 
political instability, poor service delivery, and inadequate regulatory control. The 
elements are shown in Figure 5.14 below capturing security and service quality 
5.3.3   Summary of findings 




differences between developed and developing countries. Developed countries 
scores are higher than developing countries in all security and service elements in 
Figure 5.14 below.  
Lower scores in developing countries in all the elements of security illustrate 
that security concerns in these countries derail economic growth. For instance, 
security concerns in SlowOLS1SSC model reduce GDPPCG 53 times more than in 
the FastOLS1SSC model as shown in columns (4) in Table 5.7 above. Therefore, 
failure to address insecurity concerns in most of the slow growth countries is a human 
factor. Moreover, in most cases demonstrated in self-seeking individuals and 
government officials corruptly indulging in abuse of countries’ resources as observed 
by (Ostrom, 2010, p. 642; Krueger, 1974, p. 291; Ehrlich and Lui, 1999, p. 272). This 
being the case, lack of security in most of SSC relates to the purpose of this study 
whereby variables hindering economic growth in the countries are identified. This 
identification of variables explains why these countries economically are lagging 
behind developed countries. How? Lack of security chases investors away due to 
high-security costs for businesses (Ndulu et al., 2007, p. xv; Enamorado et al., 2014, 
p. 2; Hall and Jones, 1999, p. 94; Beraho, 2007, p. 265; Duch and Taylor, 1993, p. 
752). Lack of investment could lead to high unemployment discussed in the next 




       
Figure 5.14: Security and service quality indicators in developed and SSC  




















Source: WDI from 1994 to 2015
Graph 1: Security differences between the groups






































Source: WGI from 1994 to 2015
Graph 2: Service quality differences between groups
Quality of Budgetary & Finance Property Rights






























5.3.4.2   Human capital necessary for economic growth in Africa 
 
 HCT in this chapter is based on years of schooling and returning to education 
(Barro and Lee, 2013). The results in Tables 5.4 and 5.5 above show that HCT 
significantly enhances GDPPC in SSC. However, Tables 5.6 and 5.7 above show that 
HCT significantly promotes GDPPCG in SlowOLS1SSC model. On the other hand, in 
the FastOLS1SSC, HCT insignificantly enhances GDPPCG. Why is economic growth 
in slow growth countries characterized by slow and erratic growth if human capital 
significantly contributes to economic growth? Generally, it is claimed in the literature 
that HCT positively and significantly impacts economic development in countries 
through innovation, absorption capacity, technology diffusion (Romer, 1990; Nelson 
and Phelps, 1966; Falvey et al., 2007; Wolff, 2001). 
 Nevertheless, Benhabib and Spiegel (1994) in their research concluded that 
HCT when included in their production function directly contributed insignificantly to 
economic differences among countries. In contrast to their claim, the impact of HCT 
in Table 5.4 in OLS1SSC model above significantly enhances GDPPC. Besides, in 
Table 5.6 above in SlowOLS1SSC model HCT significance level of contribution to 
GDPPCG is increased from 0.019 in Table 5.4 to 0.003 in Table 5.6. The impact of 
HTC in SlowOLS1SSC model in Table 5.7 is two times more than the OLS1SSC 
model in Table 5.4 above. Also, Table 5.6 shows HCT insignificantly contributes to 
GDPPCG in FastOLS1SSC model yet Figure 5.3 above indicates that HCT level is 
slightly higher in the FastOLS1SSC model than in SlowOLS1SSC model. The 
outcomes of HCT in Tables 5.6 and 5.7 are different from the results in Tables 5.4 
and 5.5 above. What does this mean? It seems to suggest that HCT though crucial in 
the 18 SSC does not explain differences in economic growth between slow-growing 
and fast-growing countries. 
 Remarkably, Tables 4.5 and 4.6 in chapter 4 indicate that tertiary education 
(TED) significantly enhances GDPPC in both developed countries and developing 
countries. Table 4.6 shows that human capital in the developed SlowOLS2 model has 
more effect on GDPPC than in the developed FastOLS2 model. Similarly, TED in 
developing SlowOLS3 model has more impact than developing the FastOLS3 model. 
This finding does also suggest that TED does not explain economic development 
differences between slow and fast growth developed and developing countries. The 
different performances of TED in chapter 4 and this chapter demand further 
explanation. Human capital performances may reflect different expressions of the 
concept among scholars. For instance, human capital in chapter 4 is generated as a 




In contrast, the concept of human capital in this chapter is based on years 
spent on education from primary to tertiary education. The findings in chapter 4 
suggested that TED education significantly promotes GDPPC in both developed and 
developing countries. However, TED education in literature is highly associated with 
high costs mainly by the leading countries through innovating technologies and 
experimentation, refinements, and scientific investigations (Judd, 1985). However, it 
is reported in the literature that differences in the advancement of knowledge among 
countries eventually widens differences in GDPPC mainly between developed and 
developing countries (Atkinson and Stiglitz, 1969). Furthermore, Nelson and Phelps 
(1966) claimed that the advance of technology is associated with education for the 
reason that more educated people are quicker in adapting to production techniques 
than less educated people. The author appears to suggest that education speeds up 
the process of technology diffusion. On the other hand, human capital seems to 
facilitate absorption capacities more in slow developed and slow developing countries 
than in fast-growth countries in chapter 4. Similarly, in this chapter HCT in slow growth 
countries perform better than in fast-growth countries.  
Therefore, the inconsistency of the productivity of HCT in both chapter 4 and 
this chapter demands more exploration. Partly, the ranking of variables in Tables 5.5 
and 5.7 illustrate that cultural variables are equally as important as traditional and 
institutional variables. The agency of human beings in creating and developing better 
standards of living in every society does not rely only on HCT (TED) obtained through 
education and training but also the context and environment in which they live. Hence, 
HCT/TED is extended to include cultural values that determine productivity 
differences between people with the same level of HCT/TED concerning education 
and training. See chapter 2 sub-section 2.2.3.2 for more arguments on HCT/TED and 
cultural variables. Therefore, endogenous theory model’s exclusion of cultural 
category and context for the definition of HCT/TED do not engross the real cause of 
productivity differences demonstrated in chapter 4 and this chapter. Therefore, 
HCT/TED contradictory results in chapters 4 and 5 are further examined in chapter 6 
a multi-case study for Malawi and Botswana. These two countries each represent the 
group of slow and fast-growing countries respectively. It also appears to suggest that 
the productivity of individuals refers as well to the choices or preferences made by 
individuals for welfare. Therefore, productivity does not only rely on HCT/TED but the 
environmental structures such as social organization institutions and economic 




5.3.4.3   SOC and CPR needful in Africa 
 
The findings in Tables 5.4 and 5.5 above show that CPR significantly reduces 
GDPPC in SSC as also noted by (Guiso et al., 2010). Significance reduction in 
GDPPC indicates that CPR is generally missing in the SSC.  Furthermore, Tables 5.6 
and 5.7 above indicate that CPR significantly reduces GDPPCG in SlowOLS1SSC 
model. On the other hand, in the FastOLS1SSC model, it insignificantly reduces 
GDPPCG. It is confirmed in Figure 5.15 below whereby fast growth countries have 
higher levels of CPR than slow growth countries.  That seems to agree with the 
findings in chapter 4 sub-section 4.4.4.3 whereby Figure 4.13 showed the lack of CPR 
in developing countries compared to developed countries. For instance, CPR 
promotes GDPPC in developed countries by 5.5% while in developing countries only 
0.77% as demonstrated in Table 4.4 in chapter 4. Also, Table 5.6 above indicates that 
CPR reduces GDPPC in SlowOLS1SSC model by 16.4% compared to just 0.99% in 
the FastOLS1SSC model. Chapter 2 sub-section 2.4.2.1 explains the reasons why 
societies' approach to economic development is different. These differences reflect in 
the socio-cultural perceptions in the societies. These perceptions can be hostile or 
friendly to economic development.  
Furthermore, Figure 5.11 above appears to show CPR playing a significant 
role in shaping security and SOC in the SSC. For instance, most of the countries in 
this region from 2000 to 2010 indicate low CPR and SOC. However, in this period 
there has been no security concerns. On the other hand, CPR increased in some 
countries from about 2011 to 2015. So there has been an increase in SOC among the 
citizens in these countries. That seems to agree with the findings in chapter 4 section 
4.4.4.3 whereby Figure 4.13 shows that CPR appears to be lacking in developing 
countries compared to developed countries. 
5.3.4.3.1 Association of CPR, SOC, and economic growth 
The association of CPR and SOC is mainly connected to people's trust in the 
leaders leading to participation in politics. Tables 5.4 and 5.5 above show the impact 
of SOC on GDPPC is positive and significant. However, the impact of SOC on 
GDPPCG seems to differ in slow growth and fast-growing countries.  For example, 
Table 5.6 above shows that SOC in SlowOLS1SSC model significantly influences 
GDPPCG. However, in FastOLS1SSC, SOC insignificantly enhances GDPPCG even 
though levels in fast-growth are higher than in slow-growth countries as illustrated in 
Figure 5.15 below. The effect size of SOC in SlowOLS1SSC is about four times 
greater than in FastOLS1SSC, yet, the countries have slow economic growth. SOC 




efficiencies or inefficiencies in facilitating and coordinating their actions with wealth 
creation. The findings in this chapter are in line with Dinda (2008) who noted that trust 
has a positive and significant influence on economic development.  
Figure 5.15: CPR differences in Slow-SSC and Fast-SSC growth countries 
 
Notes. Civic capital is generated from four variables representing officials contacted (see Table 
3.5 in chapter 3).  
 Despite the strong performance of SOC in Tables 5.4 and 5.5, SOC in these 
countries is generally low. For instance, graph 1 in Figure 5.16 below shows most 
SSC's score of SOC cluster around ‘0' while very few countries have the score of SOC 
above 1. It shows distrust of citizens towards their leaders hampers economic growth 
in the SSC (Guiso et al., 2010). Also, graph 2 in Figure 5.16 below shows that citizens 
in Malawi do not trust their leaders. In contrast, graph 3 in the same figure shows 
citizens in Botswana trust their leaders. Concerning economic growth, Botswana 
performs much better than Malawi. Hence, an increase of SOC is very vital to 
stimulating economic growth in the SSC. Knack and Keefer (1997) further researched 
the effects of SOC on judicial efficiency, and they concluded that one increase of 
standard deviation of SOC improves judicial efficiency. The judicial efficiency can be 
captured by institutional variables as suggested by (North, 1990; Schleifer and 
Vishny, 1993). For example, Table 5.4 above shows that COC negatively and 
significantly impacts GDPPC in SSC. It is also noted that COC in SlowOLS1SSC 
model negatively and significantly impacts GDPPCG while in FastOLS1SSC model 







































that COC is better executed in slow-growth countries than in fast-growth countries. 
That seems to suggest that institutions may not be the critical determinant of fast 





Figure 5.16: SOC, FDI and GDP per capita in SSC 
 
 
Notes. Graph 1 shows the relationship of GDPPC and SOC in the region. Graph 2 shows that SOC in Malawi is decreasing with time. Moreover, Graph 3 
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Furthermore, Banfield (1958) together with Putnam (1993) connected SOC, 
CPR and economic behavior to differences of traditional histories. It appears to 
suggest that formation of orientations or preferences of doing things is attached to the 
past values, norms and rules of the societies and these values are the ones that 
explain economic performances differences (Glaeser et al., 2002; Tabellini, 2010). 
Hence, lack of SOC in the SSC could be attributed to what Darity (1982) claimed, that 
slave trade was the most lucrative activity in the 18th century. Also, it is claimed that 
immediately after the abolition of the slave trade, colonialism came into force in the 
African continent (Nunn, 2007). If critical historical junctures could explain the 
formation of culture, then underdevelopment in Africa could also be associated with 
colonialism and slavery (Platteau, 2009). See details in chapter 2 sub-section 2.4.1.2. 
The governance problems can be in the form of corruption, civil war, political instability 
and many other unproductive activities (Collier et al., 2008a). In this case, issues 
supposed to be at the center for the economic development progress of their countries 
were at the periphery to pave the way for unproductive acts that satisfied the leaders' 
appetite for power and profit maximization.  
Similarly, Novak (1982) talked about the ills of global capitalism as 
empowering the developed countries to act as centers of planning and authority that 
attempt to make developing countries dependent upon the capitalist centers. In this 
case, therefore, the relationship hinders the creativity of the periphery countries, 
hence their inability to compete at the global level, leading to underdevelopment 
(Mahutga and Smith, 2011, p. 257). Hence, self-realization and self-reliance are 
crucially important for people in SSC to change the future of the next generations as 
discussed in the next section.  
5.3.4.4   Utilizing capacity and self-reliance key to economic development  
The results in Tables 5.4 and 5.5 above indicate that RKN significantly reduces 
GDPPC in 18 SSC. This finding agrees with the finding in chapter 4 section 4.4.4.4 
whereby RKN significantly enhances GDPPC in developed countries while in 
developing countries significantly reduces GDPPC. Figure 5.17 below illustrates the 
differences regarding RKN levels between developed and developing countries. The 
question is what causes low RKN in SSC?  To answer the question, the reference is 
made to a dataset of chapter 4 for developed and developing countries. For instance, 
graph 1 in Figure 5.17 below shows differences in gross capital formation and high 
technology exports between developed and developing countries.  
On the other hand, graphs 2 and 3 illustrate differences in GRS and ETR for 
developed and developing countries. In all the four elements in Figure 5.17 below 




developed countries have larger RKN than developing countries. The capacity to build 
RKN captures both its quality and quantity and is indicated in elements such as those 
in Figure 5.17 below as explained in chapter 2 sub-section 2.2.2.3. However, the 
capacity to produce according to Caselli (2005) depends on the input factors of RKN 
and HCT/TED. Caselli attributed poverty and underdevelopment to inadequate levels 
of RKN and HCT/TED in Solow's production function. The finding in Tables 5.4 and 
5.5 above shows RKN negatively and significantly impacts GDPPC in SSC which 
appears to agree with Caselli's view that low capital levels cause underdevelopment. 
However, his view that low levels of HCT/TED in developing countries cause 
underdevelopment contradicts the finding in Tables 5.4 and 5.5 above since 
HCT/TED significantly contributes to GDPPC in SSC.  
The other possible explanation of low capitals in developing countries is by 
Islam (1995) and Knight et al. (1992) who indicated that input factors concerning 
accumulation did not explain the differences in outcomes among countries. This view 
is in line with the findings in Tables 5.4 and 5.5 above. Nonetheless, they attributed 
the differences in development levels to country-specific effects interpreted as TFP. 
See chapter 2 section 2.6 for more information. Therefore, the capacity to produce 
RKN levels does not only rely on traditional economic factors in production functions 
but other factors as well, such as cultural factors.  
Likewise, Steger (2002) also interpreted capital regarding physical and human 
capitals by claiming that the absence of diminishing returns in endogenous theory is 
as a result of HCT/TED formed through education and productive consumption45. 
What does this mean to determinants of RKN levels as illustrated in Figure 5.17 
below? That suggests that the determinants of RKN levels in Figure 5.17 below are 
not only quantity and quality of RKN but also a social capability that influence and 
shape socio-economic conditions and economic life in the countries. Hence, capital 
formation, high technology exports, domestic savings, and new business registrations 
are formed from both economic and cultural factors. For instance, in countries where 
there are high population growths, savings and investment in HCT/TED are reduced 
(Mankiw et al., 1992; Pack, 1994; Thirlwall, 2011). The increase in population has an 
aspect of cultural orientation and reduces the productivity of the country. The view 
seems to be in line with literature (Benhabib and Spiegel, 1994; Romer, 1990). It 
appears to suggest that increasing HCT/TED in SSC increases economic 
                                            
 





development in the region. However, comparing the effect size of HCT/TED and SEC, 
it is noted that SEC generated from the cultural data source is three times more 
effective than HCT/TED.  
Furthermore, weaknesses in investment in HCT/TED are pointed out in the 
literature (Benhabib and Spiegel, 1994). They observed that HCT was insignificant in 
its contribution to economic development if not entered the regression model with the 
productivity of the countries. This productivity of the countries is referred to as 
capability of people or characteristics of people (cultural capital) in countries to utilize 
their resources (Mankiw et al., 1995). Characteristics or capability of people could 
also be referred to as socio-economic specificity of countries as suggested by 
(Coccia, 2009).  
Therefore, HCT/TED definition that only captures years of study or enrolment 
rates does not capture all that make people productive. Hence, varying levels of 
productivity of HCT/TED with people of the same education levels from country to 
country explains the role of specific characteristics of people (Bangwayo-Skeete et 
al., 2011; Pritchett, 2001). All in all, productivity relies on choices made by people in 
their context shaped by socio-cultural systems of meanings and practices through 
social organization and economic institutions. Can there be differences in the effects 
of slavery and colonialism among SSC? The possible answers are explored in chapter 
6 in the case study between Malawi and Botswana. Upshot catch up effects and 
accumulation of capital seem not to work in SSC; hence, better representation of 
categories of variables as illustrated in this study better explains economic disparities 
among countries. Differences in the capabilities of the people in different contexts also 
raise the issue of survival in the global competition which is discussed in the next 



















Figure 5.17: Determinants of RKN levels in countries 
  
 Notes. Graphs 1 to 3 illustrates four essential elements contributing to differences in RKN 
 between developed and developing countries. 
 
5.3.4.5   Competition among people good for economic growth 
The findings in Tables 5.4 and 5.5 above show that GCI significantly enhances 
GDPPC in the SSC. However, GCI in Tables 5.6 and 5.7 above insignificantly 
enhance economic growth in both SlowOLS1SSC and FastOLS1SSC models. 
However, the effect size of GCI in Table 5.7 is 1.5 times more effective in the 
FastOLS1SSC model than in SlowOLS1SSC model in SSC. On the contrary, in 
chapter 4 in Table 4.8 GCI is five times more effective in slow-growth than in fast-
growth developed countries. Similarly, in the same chapter 4 GCI is two times more 
effective in slow-growth than fast-growth developing countries as demonstrated in 
Table 4.8. Figure 5.18 below shows the GCI levels in slow and fast developed and 
developing countries in graph 1; slow and fast in SSC in graph 2. This figure shows 
the levels of GCI are slightly higher in fast-growth than slow-growth in developed 
countries. Slow-growth countries have the higher useful contribution of GCI than fast-
growth countries. On the contrary, higher levels of GCI in slow-growth are more 
effective than lower levels in fast-growth in developing countries. Furthermore, in 






















Graph 1: Capital formation versus technology exports



























































































































yet, fast-growth countries have more effective GCI than slow-growth countries as 
shown in graph 2.  
It seems to suggest that GCI, though necessary, is not the critical factor in 
propelling economic development in SSC. Why? The possible explanation could be 
that the generated concept of GCI is not capturing the key factors that propel 
economic growth in SSC. The concept of GCI might be giving the same level of 
performance of factors involved while there might be some factors more important in 
this region than in developed countries. Nevertheless, some of the findings of GCI 
above are in line with literature (Lall, 2001). Table 5.5 above indicates that the impact 
of GCI on GDPPC is about four times less than the impact of SEC in the same table. 
That suggests that the microstructure of the countries is very crucial in determining 
the productivity and competitiveness of the countries. The microstructure of countries 
relies on cultural capital depicted in this chapter as CPR, SEC, and SOC. Therefore, 
cultural capital (ICC see details in chapter 2 section 2.3) is needed in finding solutions 
to problems engulfing countries mainly when markets fail, and interventions are 
needed to sort out the challenges. This ICC is related to firm capabilities needed to 
succeed in fierce competition as observed by (Lall, 1992). Capabilities and 
institutions46 work hand in hand as expressed by Elder (1994); Thomas and Znaniecki 
(1920) who contended that individuals through their reflections and competitive 
attitude help the formation of social organization and culture, even though social 
organization and culture could constrain and inform the individuals. That appears to 
suggest that the intellectual ability and moral qualities rely on the formal and informal 
institutions of the specific country47. See more information in chapter 2 section 2.4. It 
implies that the construction of the way of life by making decisions as to what 
strategies and choices to pursue concerning local and global environments 
determines social outcomes, such as economic growth or underdevelopment. The 
discussion of GCI in this section fulfills the intention of the study of meeting the goals 
of identifying the variables that enhance or hinder economic growth in developed and 






                                            
 





Figure 5.18: Higher levels of GCI contributes significantly to GDPPC  
        Notes. Graph 1 shows differences in GCI levels in slow growth and fast growth in developed   
              and developing countries. Graph 2 also indicates the levels of GCI in slow and fast SSC.  
 
5.3.4.6    AID increases dependency spirit  
AID in this study is defined as inflows of foreign aid to SSC from all donors. 
The finding in Tables 5.4 and 5.5 above shows that AID in SSC reduces GDPPC 
significantly. Graph 4 in Figure 5.16 above shows that the relationship between AID 
and GDPPC is negative in SSC over the period from 2001 to 2015. Why should this 
be possible? The finding seems contradictory to the assumption of the neoclassical 
theory that the accumulation of capital stock significantly increases economic growth 
in the countries. It is reported in the literature that in SSC AID averages about 44 % 
of governments' budgets. Some countries in this region receive much higher support 
than this from developed countries (Klugman, 2010). Regarding the negative 
relationship between AID and GDPPC as indicated in graph 4 in Figure 5.16 above, 
Landes (1998)  argued that economic growth of countries does not rely on AID but 










































































section 4.3.4.4 in chapter 4 argued that FDI48 significantly contributes to GDPPC in 
fast-growth developing countries demonstrating their capabilities to compete globally. 
It enables the fast-growing countries to enjoy the opportunities provided by 
globalization while slow growth countries are vulnerable to external competition 
(Slaughter, 1997; Thomas, 1997). Furthermore, Tables 5.6 and 5.7 above for 
SlowOLS1SSC and FastOLS1SSC models show that AID in SlowOLS1SSC 
significantly reduces GDPPCG. On the other hand, AID in FastOLS1SSC 
insignificantly reduces GDPPCG. Why differences in the impact of AID on GDPPCG 
in countries in the same region? The possible answer could be that slow-growth 
countries though receive much more AID from developed countries than fast-growth 
countries as demonstrated in Figure 5.8 above cultivate dependency attitude, hence, 
significant adverse impact on GDPPCG.  Alternatively, is it because the fast-growing 
countries have institutions that better COC than those in slow-growth countries? 
Concerning COC in Tables 5.6 and 5.7 above, COC significantly reduces GDPPCG 
in SlowOLS1SSC model while in the FastOLS1SSC model it insignificantly impacts 
GDPPCG. That seems to suggest that fast-growth countries have a better quality of 
institutions than slow growth countries.  This suggestion is contrasted in Figure 5.12 
above whereby slow-growth countries have slightly higher levels of COC than fast-
growth countries. Despite the better performance of institutions in the slow-growth 
countries than in fast-growth countries, the economic growth in fast-growth countries 
is higher than in slow-growth countries. That seems to suggest that AID is not the 
critical determinant of economic growth in SSC. Hence, the finding in section 4.4.4.4 
seems to suggest that developing countries need to cultivate the spirit of self-reliance 
to change the slow and erratic economic growth in the countries. However, the finding 
as illustrated in Figure 5.12 above that slow-growth countries seem to have better 
institutions, demands further examination in chapter 6 a multi-case study for Malawi 
(slow-growth) and Botswana (fast-growth). Generally, the finding in this section 
seems to suggest AID is not the critical element in stimulating economic growth in 
SSC. Also, the results in Tables 5.6 and 5.7 suggest that the lack of entrepreneurship 
skills in SSC fail to boost economic growth through the creation of employment as 
discussed in the next section. 
                                            
 
48 FDI as direct investment is a category of cross-border investment associated with a 
resident in one economy having control or a significant degree of influence on the 
management of an enterprise that is resident in another economy (see Table 3.2 for more 




5.3.4.7    ETR fails to boost economic growth due to poverty 
The finding in this chapter indicates that ETR significantly reduces GDPPC in 
SSC. The negative relationship of ETR and GDPPC is reported in the literature 
(Carree et al., 2007; Wennekers et al., 2010). Also, Freytag and Thurik (2007) 
together with Van Stel et al. (2005) attributed this negative relationship to low levels 
of business formation across countries. Figure 5.19 below illustrates the trends of 
business creation over a 15-year period in SSC. However, the average business 
creation in slow and fast growth SSC is 2 and 2.1 businesses per 1,000 people in this 
region as illustrated in graph 1 in Figure 5.20 below. On the other hand, graph 2 in 
the same figure indicates that developed countries have more ETR skill levels than in 
developing countries. Table 3.2 in chapter 3 shows that a standard deviation 
increases of 1.79 of ETR enhance GDPPC by a standard deviation of 78.09 over 15 
years' time. This seems to suggest that ETR skills are essential to promote economic 
growth in SSC and these skills are attributable to cultural aspects in the literature 
(Freytag and Thurik, 2007, p. 12; Boettke and Coyne, 2009, p. 137). For example, 
graphs 1 in Figure 5.20 below shows that there are differences in ETR skill levels in 
slow and fast growth. Even though fast growth countries have slightly higher levels of 
ETR compared to slow growth countries, ETR significantly reduces GDPPCG in the 
FastOLS1SSC model while in SlowOLS1SSC it insignificantly promotes GDPPC. The 
explanation why the impact of ETR is better in slow than fast SSC needs further 
research. However, the illustration in graph 2 in Figure 5.20 below shows that 
developing countries have harmful levels of ETR skills compared to developed 
countries. Therefore, promoting more entrepreneurship value preferences in the SSC 
could increase the ability to create economic activities that can raise the productivity 
of the countries to propel economic development. Nonetheless, the findings in this 
chapter are in line with literature (Okun, 1962). Henceforth, stimulating 
entrepreneurship values is one of the critical answers to underdevelopment and 
unemployment in SSC. Another possible solution to unsustainable economic growth 
in SSC is by increasing exports of goods and services. For instance, Table 5.4 above 
shows that EGS significantly contributes to GDPPC in SSC. Also, Table 3.3 in chapter 
3 shows a standard deviation of 80.35 of EGS in SSC increases GDPPC by 78.09 
standard deviations over the 15-year period. Hence, more exports essential for 




Figure 5.19: Trends in new business creation across SSC  
  
 
Notes. New registrations of firms per 1,000 people aged 15-64 depict the entrepreneurship skills in the SSC. Apart from Botswana and South Africa, the number of 
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Figure 5.20: ETR skill levels in developed and developing countries  
 
Notes. Graph 1 shows ETR skill levels in slow growth and fast growth SSC. Graph 2 indicates 
ETR skill levels in developed and developing countries. 
 
 
The findings discussed above briefly show that insecurity, lack of civic and social 
capital and low entrepreneurship skill levels, derail economic development in SSC. It is 
also observed that confident attitude, utility capacity, competitive orientation among 
individuals, better governance promotes economic development in the countries. 
Summary of the key findings in this chapter is presented in section 5.3.3 above. 
However, the findings in this chapter are compared to existing literature in the next 2 
sub-sections. Appendix 2 help to highlight the role of the findings of this chapter relative 
to existing literature.  
5.3.5.1    Similarities and differences of other studies to this study   
Nunn and Wantchekon (2011) in article 1 in Appendix 2 below researched the 
slave trade and the origins of mistrust in Africa. They concluded that low levels of social 
capital reflect the legacy of the slave trade across the ethics in the Sub-Saharan 
countries. Their finding seems to disagree with the results of this study. For instance, 
Tables 5.4 and 5.5 above indicate that social capital positively and significantly impact 
GDPPC in the 18 SSC. Even though Nunn and Wantchekon's study and this study used 
AS and OLS estimation methods in the same context, the studies had different 
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rationales. For example, their study focused on the impact of the slave trade in Africa 
on trust among individuals while this study emphases the explanation of income 
disparities between developed and developing countries. Also, this study employed 
more extended period of study than theirs in explaining the slow and erratic economic 
development in SSC. Also, Bjørnskov (2012) in row number 2 in Appendix 2 researched 
how social trust affects economic growth. His trust data was sourced from the five waves 
of the WVS data. See Appendix 2 for more details on sources of data. He used 1SLS, 
2SLS, and 3SLS regressions for analysis and concluded that social capital is a deeper 
determinant of economic development than any of the other variables used in his study. 
Bjørnskov's study differs from this study concerning context and estimations techniques. 
Nevertheless, his finding that cultural trait of social capital determines economic 
development seems to be similar to the finding discussed in sub-section 5.3.4.4 above. 
Furthermore, Granato et al. (1996a), as indicated in Appendix 2 article 5, embarked on 
research on whether cultural values have an effect on economic development among 
countries. They used WVS data of 1990 to generate their achievement motivation and 
post-materialists’ values. Their study aimed to find out if components culture has effects 
on economic development. Moreover, they concluded that both economic and cultural 
variables are necessary to enhance economic development. Their findings are like this 
study's findings that cultural values have an essential role in explaining economic 
development among countries. The components of culture used in this study are 
different and are generated from the different data source. The data sources they used 
are not consistently collected in SSC, while in developed countries WVS data sources 
are readily and consistently available. The studies in Appendix 2 have some similarities 
and differences not very different from the studies discussed in this sub-section. All in 
all, the findings in this chapter raise some theoretical issues briefly highlighted in the 
next sub-section. 
Further exploration in this chapter regarding human capital is undertaken in 
Table 5.8 below by comparing the performance of human capital in column (2) model 
with all the three categories of variables with a model in column (3) without cultural 
category. The results show that there are changes in human capital performance when 
cultural variables are controlled. For instance, human capital's unstandardized 
coefficient is higher in a model with all variables categories than in OLS2 model without 
cultural variables. Also, the significance of contribution is higher in a model with all 
categories (**) than in the model without a cultural category (*). The effect size in a 
model with cultural variables in column (2) is about two times more effective than column 
without cultural variables in column (3). Hence, cultural variables affect the productivity 
of human capital. These cultural variables not only affect the productivity of human 




capital but other variables as well. What do these results mean to definitions of human 
capital? Of course, quality education impacts the productivity of human capital, but also 
human capital productivity depends on the socio-political structures in the countries.  
See more explanation in chapter 2 section 2.6. These are formed from the values and 
beliefs that determine the behaviors of people in the countries. So, these are reflected 









































Table 5.8: Comparison of variables Performance in three models 
  
Standard errors in parentheses, significant levels *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Notes. OLS in column (1) is model for all the three variable categories. OLS in column (3) is a 
model without cultural variables while OLS in column (4) is for the model without the institutional 
category. This table highlights the fact that cultural variables affect the performance of other 
variables in the model.  
 
5.4 CONCLUSION 
 The performance of variables is illustrated in Tables 5.4, 5.5, 5.6, and 5.7 above. 
Also, the results are discussed in section 5.3 above. Section 5.3.4.1 above notes that 
insecurity concerns in SSC reduce economic growth. It seems to suggest that insecurity 
chases investors away due to high-security costs for businesses. This leads to high 
numbers of unemployed people, leading to high dependency ratios derailing economic 
development. Surprisingly, employment in developed countries insignificantly reduces 
GDPPC while in developing countries though it positively impacts GDPPC, it is 
insignificant. Why are the results contradictory? Taking into consideration the different 
Dependent Variable: GDPPC 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES OLS with all Categories  OLS No Cultural category OLS No Institutional category 
Traditional     
EMP -0.0164 0.0608 0.0485 
 (0.1331) (0.1340) (0.1238) 
HDI -0.0216** -0.0179* -0.0156 
 (0.0107) (0.0108) (0.0108) 
IGS 76.8200** 34.6941 65.0288* 
 (38.1403) (37.9965) (37.6915) 
RKN -0.0293** -0.0205 -0.0304** 
 (0.0149) (0.0149) (0.0150) 
HCT 33.9346** 24.9214* 33.4265** 
 (14.3161) (14.4284) (14.5768) 
EGS 0.1319* 0.1379* 0.2045*** 
 (0.0728) (0.0737) (0.0707) 
AID -0.1862*** -0.1798** -0.1883** 
 (0.0716) (0.0739) (0.0733) 
GCI 0.1076** 0.1270** 0.1007** 
 (0.0489) (0.0499) (0.0487) 
GRS 0.0403 0.0420 0.0129 
 (0.0533) (0.0546) (0.0533) 
ETR -5.5920* -6.1682* -6.0976* 
 (3.1097) (3.1865) (3.1068) 
Institutional     
ROL 0.0836* 0.0810*  
 (0.0441) (0.0444)  
GEF -6.3771*** -5.9665***  
 (2.1119) (2.1081)  
COC -130.4326*** -162.1023***  
 (49.1160) (43.9136)  
Cultural     
CPR -22.1926***  -20.2450*** 
 (5.2051)  (5.2581) 
SOC 11.9876*  5.7987 
 (7.1377)  (6.7656) 
REG 11.8196  14.5181* 
 (8.5169)  (8.4290) 
SEC 55.1315***  63.5821*** 
 (13.2460)  (13.1672) 
Constant 158.2456*** 174.7251*** 54.4952 
 (54.8223) (42.7589) (43.6411) 
Observations 270 270 270 
R-squared 0.3478 0.2809 0.3115 
r2_a 0.304 0.244 0.274 
Df-r 252 256 255 
Df-m 17 13 14 
F 7.904 7.693 8.239 
P-value 0 0 0 




outcomes of employment as indicated above, further examination is needed and will be 
done in a case study between Malawi and Botswana, the next chapter.  
Section 5.2.4.3 observes that political participation with public involvement spirit 
is desperately needed in SSC. The findings in Table 5.4 above show that CPR 
significantly reduces economic development in 18 SSC in line with the findings of (Guiso 
et al., 2010). Furthermore, Table 5.6 above indicates that CPR significantly and 
negatively impacts GDPPCG in SlowOLS1SSC model while in the FastOLS1SSC model 
it insignificantly reduces GDPPCG. The reduction impact on GDPPCG in 
SlowOLS1SSC model is 17 times more than in FastOLS1SSC model as illustrated in 
columns (4) in Table 5.7 above. It seems to suggest that CPR regarding levels are much 
better in the FastOLS1SSC model than in SlowOLS1SSC model. See Figure 5.15 
above. The finding seems to agree with the finding in chapter 4 section 4.4.4.3 whereby 
Figure 4.13 shows that CPR appears to be lacking in developing countries in 
comparison with developed countries. Hence, encouraging people to participate in 
politics determines the economic success of fast growth countries compared with slow 
growth countries.  
Furthermore, section 5.3.4.5 revealed that competitiveness in Table 5.4 above 
significantly contributes to GDPPC in the 18 SSC. Unexpectedly, competitiveness in 
both SlowOLS1SSC and FastOLS1SSC models in Table 5.6 above insignificantly 
contributing to GDPPCG. However, GCI impact on the FastOLS1SSC model is almost 
two times more effective than in SlowOLS1SSC as demonstrated in Table 5.7 above. In 
contrast, Figure 5.18 above indicates that slow growth countries have higher levels of 
GCI than fast-growth countries. Likewise, in chapter 4 in Tables 4.7 and 4.8 
competitiveness, although significantly contributes to GDPPC in both slow and fast-
growing developing countries, the impact is two times more effective in slow growth than 
fast-growth countries. That seems to be confirmed by graph 1 in Figure 5.18 whereby 
slow growth countries have higher GCI levels than fast-growth countries. The question 
is why in both scenarios the slow growth countries competitive spirit seems to perform 
better than in fast-growth countries? It will be explored further in chapter 6 the case 
study for Malawi and Botswana.  
Besides, AID seems to increase dependency syndrome in SSC. The discussion 
in section 5.3.4.6 above suggests that AID in SSC reduces GDPPC significantly. Graph 
4 in Figure 5.16 above shows that the relationship between AID and GDPPC is negative 
in SSC over the period from 2001 to 2015. Why? The finding seems contradictory to the 
assumption of the neoclassical theory that the accumulation of capital stock significantly 
increases economic growth in the countries. It is reported in the literature that in SSC 
AID averages about 44 % of governments' budgets (Klugman, 2010). Graph 4 in Figure 




seems to agree with Landes (1998) who argued that the economic development of 
countries does not rely on foreign aid but the imbued capacity the citizens have to deal 
with context challenges. Hence, the finding in section 5.3.4.6 seems to suggest that SSC 
need to cultivate the spirit of self-reliance to change the slow and erratic economic 
growth in the countries.  
Furthermore, section 5.3.4.7 above observes that entrepreneurship significantly 
reduces economic development in the SSC. The negative relationship between 
entrepreneurship and GDPPC is reported in the literature (Carree et al., 2007; 
Wennekers et al., 2010). Also, Freytag and Thurik (2007); Van Stel et al. 2005 attributed 
this negative relationship to low levels of business formation across countries in the 
region. Figure 5.20 above illustrates low levels of entrepreneurship in SSC. That seems 
to suggest that cultural aspects in the region are attributable to low entrepreneurship 
levels as suggested by (Freytag and Thurik, 2007, p. 12; Boettke and Coyne, 2009, p. 
137). Therefore, promoting more entrepreneurship value preferences in the SSC could 
increase the ability to create economic activities that can nurture the productivity of the 
countries to propel economic growth. Also, the results in Tables 5.3 above show that 
human capital contributes to GDPPC significantly in 18 SSC. However, after grouping 
the 18 SSC into slow and fast-growing countries, human capital significantly contributes 
to GDPPC in slow growth countries, while in the fast-growing countries it insignificantly 
contributes to GDPPCG. The impact of human capital on SlowOLS1SSC model is six 
times more effective than in the FastOLS1SSC model. It seems to suggest that HCT 
though prominent in the 18 SSC does not explain differences in economic growth 
between SlowOLS1SSC and FastOLS1SSC models. In the same vein, the results in 
Table 5.8 above show that there are changes in human capital performance when 
cultural variables are controlled. For instance, the significance of human capital 
contribution is higher in a model with cultural variables (**) than in the model without 
cultural variables (*). Hence, cultural variables affect the productivity of human capital 
as reported in the literature (Bangwayo-Skeete et al., 2011; Hanushek and Woessmann, 
2010, 2012). Therefore, education policies in SSC should be aimed to nurture 
productivity that is relevant to the challenges faced in this region. 
Even though some of these findings relate to the existing literature, these 
findings essentially engage some cultural variables that are overlooked in the literature. 
For example, most of the studies that engaged SSC used WVS that are rarely covered 
in some countries in this region. Hence, using AS captures cultural variables that are 
relevant to the context. In this regard, a new understanding of the importance of cultural 
factors in explaining economic differences among countries is highlighted. At the same 
time, economic theories that advise policymakers on how to stimulate economic 




education systems should explore how cultures in the region are structured and how 
people in this region can creatively interact with the environment to solve the current 
challenges of slow and erratic economic growths as suggested by (Berry et al.,1992). 
That suggests that treating countries as indistinguishable by enforcing policies that have 
worked in other regions, only worsens the outcome as is currently witnessed by the 
enlarging gap in economic development between SSC and other developed regions in 
the world. 
CHAPTER 6:  A MULTI-CASE STUDY OF 
BOTSWANA AND MALAWI VERSUS 
FINDINGS IN CHAPTERS 4 AND 5 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter intends to provide insight into how variables interact with each other 
within a given institutional, political and cultural setting and thereby seeking to drill down 
deeper than secondary data analysis allows. The previous two empirical chapters used 
secondary data, usually collected for other purposes and OLS hypothetical-deductive 
estimation technique for data analysis. Hence the findings are illustrated in Table 6.1 
below. Therefore, it is often difficult to drill down into detailed data about the individual 
and unique conditions existing in any specific country at any precise time. For example, 
La Porta et al. (2004) point out that the findings of their research entitled “Judicial checks 
and balances” showed Peru had a perfect score on judicial independence, yet in reality, 
Peru had the persistence of authoritarian executive and rampant corruption. Therefore, 
differences between objective measurements captured by variables used in models and 
the reality such as the case in Peru is analogous to the distinction between de jure and 
de facto institutions as claimed by (Woodruff, 2006).  
This chapter seeks to examine the findings intensely in Table 6.4 below. By 
taking into consideration that the intangible cultural capital (ICC) in different forms as 
explained in details in chapter 2 sub-section 2.3.1, is assumed that ICC is associated 
with the embodiment of individuals relying on broader socio-economic processes, 
political-economy interplay with power facilitation, and through the endurance of 
inequalities and the possibilities of social transformation. These ways of how ICC formed 
in individuals and created through the strategies such as semi-structured interviews and 
questionnaires (Butler and Robson, 2001; Smith and Phillips, 2001; Ley, 2003; Bridge, 
2001; Bridge, 2006; Waters, 2006). Some layers of ICC such as social capital has 
attracted some criticism in the literature that it may not correlate with the measure of 
trust by attitude surveys. For example, Glaeser et al. (2000, p. 813) question standard 
attitudinal question in surveys that generally do not predict individual choices of 




trustworthiness. There is to some extent that social capital can be either be measured 
through trust or trustworthiness and are widely used in literature (Holt, 2008, p. 227). 
For this reason, economic growth differences among countries can be explained 
by the views of people experiencing how political leaders interact with current changing 
environments. For instance, in societies where the agents of political representation 
objectively construct the social world, they also consider the current structures or 
institutions to novel their challenges. The chapter therefore strengthens and 
compliments the secondary data analysis executed in chapters 4 and 5. 
The secondary data analysis has already been executed in chapters 4 and 5 
respectively. The findings in these two chapters broadly highlight in a similar picture the 
factors that seem to explain economic growth differences between developed and 
developing countries, and sub-groups of slow and fast economic growth in chapters 4 
and 5 respectively. However, understanding can be improved by investigating specific 
examples to identify specific causes of specific findings. For instance, education seems 
essential for economic growth in both chapters, but the variable does not necessarily 
explain whether is due to inclusive educational policies in the countries or due to 
investment focus on primary, secondary, or tertiary education. Therefore, the case study 
approach can help to intensively and thoroughly examine into the causation of the 
factors considered essential to explain economic growth differences among countries 
identified in chapters 4 and 5.  
6.2 CASE STUDY: BOTSWANA AND MALAWI, WHY? 
The case study focuses on two countries, Malawi from the slow growth SSC 
model and Botswana from the fast growth SSC model. The question is how 
representative can these two countries be for each case represented by slow and fast 
growth models? Seawright and Gerring (2008, p. 299) explain that a case that 
demonstrates a steady cross-case relationship is known as a typical case. Also, 
according to Hersen and Barlow (1976), it is possible to regard a typical case such as a 
slow model or fast model as a representative case (s).  However, Hersen and Barlow 
(1976) suggest that the representativeness of a model relies on whether a model meets 
normality or misspecification conditions. Figure 6.1 below shows both slow and fast 
growth models meet the normality condition. 
Furthermore, the misspecification of a model is shown by the linktest command 
after running slow and fast growth models respectively. The results indicate _hatsq’s p-
value for slow model = 0.889 which is more than 0.05 indicating no misspecification. 
Also, in fast model _hatsq’s p-value is 0.982 more than 0.05 showing no misspecification 
See further explanation in sub-section 3.5.1.2 in chapter 3. The fast and slow models 
have passed normality and misspecification tests, hence, they can be typical cases, and 




according to Seawright and Gerring (2008), a Large N technique can be used to identify 
a typical case from a potential of large population cases by a low residual case in each 
model. For example, after running the regression, in both models, the distance between 
the observed and predicted values for all cases in respective modes is what is called 
residual (s). In this situation, it is often noted that there would be countless cases with 
identical low near-zero residual. Alternatively, in other instances, many cases might 
have high near-zero residuals. The differences in the residues might highlight some 
problems within cases which might need further probes.  
Figure 6.1: Normality graphs in slow and slow growth models 
 
                                                                                                                                                                    
 Notes. Both graphs 1 and 2 meet the normality conditions.  
 
Figure 6.2 below in graph 1 shows the frequencies of residuals very low are more 
than those slightly above zero. This shows that the difference between the observed 
and predicted values of residuals of GDPPC growth as explained by the independent 
variables is more negative than positive. Frequencies below zero are about 85 versus 
65 that are above zero. Hence, according to Seawright and Gerring (2008), many cases 
are below zero and becomes identified more as slow growth than fast growth. For this 
reason, any case within the model might represent others for further analysis as a typical 
case. Equally, graph 2 in Figure 6.2 indicates that there are 136 frequencies above zero 
while only 51 below zero. Hence, the model is identified as fast growth than slow growth. 
Therefore, any case in fast growth model might help to explain the discrepancies if any 
in the model as a typical case. However, using mean to categorize economic growth of 
countries may not be representative since not all countries possibly were close to that 
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possibly just crossed the mean demarcation. Hence, to ensure further 
representativeness exploration in countries in each group was conducted.     
Figure 6.2: Frequencies of residuals in slow and fast growth models 
             
Notes: Frequencies of residuals in each model.  
  
 Further examination of variables in the models indicated that Botswana had 
highest average scores of competitiveness index (GCI) and the exports of goods and 
services (EGS) over time while other variables were relatively not very different to other 
countries in the fast-growing group. On the other hand, in the slow-growing group, 
Malawi had the average scores of GCI and EGS comparing to other countries in the 
same group. Therefore, to maximize explanation of the variances of economic growth 
between slow-growing and fast-growing countries, Botswana and Malawi were chosen 
as representative. The comparison of the performances in economic growth of the two 
countries may provide explanations as to how slow growth countries can boost the 
growth of their economies. Hence, countries such as Botswana and Malawi are 
purposively sampled as recommended by Guarte (2006) after indications that the two 
countries have remarkable differences in the variables that explain economic growth 
differences as shown in Figure 6.2 above which each country represent. That seems to 
agree with the classification regarding GDPPC, GNI by UN. For instance, Botswana is 
classified in the upper-middle-income category while Malawi is the low-income category 
(United Nations, 2013). Therefore, the differences in development levels of these 
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chapters 4 and 5. The in-depth investigation relies on multiple sources of evidence as 
suggested by (Yin, 1994, p. 13).  Hence, this multi-case study compliments secondary 
data analysis by seeking to understand how individual variables, circumstances, 
institutions and environment interact with each other in specific national settings to 
produce measured effects (Darke et al., 1998, p. 277; Popper, 2014).  
Consequently, for this chapter to accomplish further investigation of the findings 
as indicated in Table 6.5 below. Sections 6.1 and 6.2 are covered above, the analysis 
and discussions of the findings will immediately follow section 6.3. The Section will give 
essential information about the economies of Botswana and Malawi, the location of the 
countries, historical information covering the periods before and after independence and 
the demographics in both countries. Section 6.4 introduces the findings in Table 6.4 































levels *** p<0.01, 
** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     
Notes. Performance of variables ranked by standardized coefficients in chapter 4 for developing countries model, chapter 5 model for 18 SSC, 10 Slow growth and 8 Fast 
growth models for SSC. 
 
 
 Dependent Variable: GDP per capita (GDPPC) Dependent Variable: GDP per capita growth rate (GDPPCG) 

























1 GCI*** 0.81 18.13 SEC *** 0.54 4.9
5 
SEC*** 0.97 15.34 REG*** 0.42 4.93 
2 FER *** 0.31 4.79 GCI ** 0.18 1.3
8 
HCT*** 0.38 3.59 ROL** 0.31 3.30 
3 GEF*** 0.27 4.94 HCT ** 0.18 1.6
1 
SOC** 0.24 2.00 GCI 0.19 1.35 
4 SOC** 0.24 2.42 IGS** 0.15 1.1
6 
EGS* 0.23 1.54 SOC 0.15 0.58 
5 CPR 0.21 0.77 EGS * 0.14 0.9
4 
GCI 0.16 0.92 SEC 0.15 0.29 
6 TED* 0.12 1.23 ROL* 0.14 1.0
3 
IGS 0.16 1.05 HCT 0.14 0.61 
7 FDI 0.12 1.17 SOC* 0.14 0.8
1 
GRS 0.10 0.70 IGS 0.07 0.17 
8 EMP 0.08 0.49 REG 0.09 0.5
5 
EMP 0.06 0.17 COC 0.04 0.05 
9 ROL 0.07 0.28 GRS 0.04 0.1
6 
REG  0.06 0.30 EMP 0.03 0.02 
10 EGS 0.01 0.01 EMP -0.01 0.0
0 
HDI 0.04 0.12 EGS 0.03 0.03 
11 GRS 0.01 0.01 HDI** -0.12 1.1
6 
ETR 0.03 0.03 RKN 0.02 0.02 
12 HDI -0.00 0.00 ETR* -0.13 0.9
2 
GEF 0.01 0.00 GRS -0.02 0.02 
13 IGS -0.05 0.10 AID*** -0.14 1.9
3 
ROL -0.05 0.07 AID -0.12 1.24 
14 ETR -0.07 0.25 RKN** -0.15 1.1
1 
AID** -0.16 2.38 HDI* -0.18 2.07 
15 HWK -0.14 0.84 COC*** -0.20 2.0
2 
COC*** -0.25 2.93 ETR* -0.23 1.99 
16 REG*** -0.53 3.62 GEF*** -0.22 2.6
1 
RKN *** -0.53 7.66 GEF** -0.28 4.15 
17 RKN*** -0.70 5.28 CPR *** -0.62 5.1
9 




6.3 BACKGROUND FACTS OF BOTSWANA & MALAWI 
 The summary of economic development information of Malawi and Botswana is 
presented in Table 6.2 below.  
Table 6. 2: Essential information about Malawi and Botswana  
*(at constant 2010 prices in US$) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
No. Type of 
information 
Malawi Botswana 
1 Area 118,484 km2 582,000 km2 
2 Population (2014 
est) 
17.3 million 2.1 million 
3 Geographical group Southern Africa Southern Africa 
4 Stage of 
Industrialization 
Least Developed Countries Other Developing countries 
5 Manufacturing 
Value Added (MVA) 
(2015) * 




1. Food and beverages (47%) 
2. Tobacco products (20%) 
3. Chemicals and chemical products (10%) 
1. Furniture; manufacturing n.e.c. (58%) 
2. Food and beverages (30%) 
3. Textiles (3%) 
7 (Value added in % 
to total MVA) 
22% 25% 
8 Share of 
manufactured 
exports (2013) 
135 (of 143 ranked) 79 (of 143 ranked) 





value added in % to 
output 
2005 2012 2005 2013 
25.97 22.89 23.30 25.07 
      
11 GDP composition 
by end use 
Household consumption 75.1% Household consumption 46.1% 
Government consumption 17.4% Government consumption 17.1% 
Investment in fixed capital 11.9% Investment in fixed capital 29.5% 
Investment in inventories  2.6% Investment in inventories  6.9% 
Exports of goods and 
services 
42.6% Exports of goods and services 52.4% 
Imports of goods and 
services 
-49.6% 2016 est Imports of goods and services -52% 2016 
est. 
      
12 GDP composition 
by sector of origin 
Agriculture: tobacco, 
sugarcane, cotton, tea, corn, 
potatoes, cassava (manioc, 
tapioca), sorghum, pulses, 
groundnuts, Macadamia nuts; 
cattle, goats 
32% Agriculture: livestock, sorghum, 
maize, millet, beans, sunflowers, 
groundnuts   
1.8% 
Industry: tobacco, tea, sugar, 
sawmill products, cement, 
consumer goods. Note: 
industrial production rate is 
4% compared to world 55%. 
17.5% Industry: diamonds, copper, 
nickel, salt, soda ash, potash, 
coal, iron ore, silver; livestock 
processing; textiles 
29.8% 
Services:  50.5% 2016 est. Services 68.4% 2016 
est. 
13 Labour force 5.747 million (2007 est.) 1.177 million (2016 est.) 
Labour force: agriculture 90% Labour force: 
agriculture 
NA% 
Labour force: services & 
industry 
10% (2003 est.) Labour force: 
services & industry   
NA% 
      
14 Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) 
average annual real 
growth rate (in %) in 
2 periods compared 
internationally 
2005-2010 2010-2015 2005-2010 2010-2015 






World BWA UMC World 






2.41 3.75 1.31 2.86 
    
15 MVA average 
annual real growth 
rate (in %) in 2 
periods compared 
internationally  
2005-2010 2010-2015 2005-2010 2010-2015 






World BWA UMC World 






2.27 4.82 2.30 2.49 
    
16 MVA per capita * 
compared 
internationally in 
2005 & 2015 
2005 2015 2005 2015 






World BWA UMC World 
46 72 1,493 47 92 1,630 415 1,1
89 




Notes. The number of rows from 1 to 10 and 14, 15 and 16 in green color in column (1) have 
information sourced (UNIDO, 2013). The rows from 11 to 13 in sky blue in the same column (1) 
for each country are from (CIA WORLD FACTBOOK: BOTSWANA, 2017) and (CIA WORLD 
FACTBOOK: MALAWI, 2017).   
  
  
 Table 6.2 above in row 1 shows each country area in columns (3) and (4) 
respectively. The area size for Malawi is 118,484 km2, and its population is about 17.3 
million people. Similarly, Botswana’s land area is 582,000 Km2, and its population is 
about 2.1 million people. The geographical locations for Malawi and Botswana are 
illustrated in Figure 6.3 below. Malawi is in South East Africa, a landlocked country 
bordering Tanzania in the northeast, Zambia in the northwest, Mozambique in east, 
south, and west. It was formally known as Nyasaland and got its independence from 
Britain in 1964. Malawi has a lake with its surface area of about 29, 000 Km2, about 
24.5% of the country’s area. Botswana is also a landlocked country in Southern Africa. 
Botswana was formally known as British protectorate of Bechuanaland and in 1966 
became independent, and borders Zimbabwe to the northeast, South Africa to the east 
and south, Namibia to the north and west, and touches Zambia at one spot on the 
Zambezi River in the north. According to Acemoglu et al. (2001, p. 9), about 84% the 
area of Botswana area is Kalahari sand, and 80% of the population live in a long strip of 
land in the east of the country beside the rail line which connects South Africa and 
Zimbabwe.   
 
According to Tough (2009), before independence Sub-Saharan countries (SSC) 
experienced colonization by mostly European countries. Moreover, some scholars claim 
that political systems established by colonial powers in colonized countries depended 
on whether or not they settled in these colonized countries (Robinson, 1965). However, 
it is also reported that in most of SSC, after attaining their independence from colonial 
masters, social differences between the ruled and the rulers arose (Tough, 2009). These 
social differences could not be addressed due to suppression by autocratic leaders as 
highlighted by (Pachai, 1973; Roberts, 1976).   
It is reported in the literature that there is historical continuity of impoverishment 
of the country in pre-colonial and post-colonial periods (Bertocchi and Canova, 2002; 
Lwanda, 2006). In both periods chiefs who are traditionally respected leaders in almost 
every tribe in Malawi were tamed and marginalized in political and socio-economic 
matters of the country (Beraho, 2007; Lwanda, 2002, 2006; Ribot, 2002). Hence, 
traditional chiefs are not useful as catalysts for the socio-economic and political 
transformations of their people, as suggested by (Chinsinga, 2006). Because of this, 
most of the population of Malawi are in subsistence economy category whereby the 
6.3.1  The location of Botswana and Malawi 




political elites have a more significant influence upon the socio-economic development 
of the nation (Pryor, 1990). For example, McCracken (1977) observed that the elites 
who took over from the British in 1961 repeated the misuse of scarce national resources 
to their advantage. Hence, these elites combined political power and economic power 
that increases inequalities among people (Phipps, 1972). 
Acemoglu et al. (2002) argue that Botswana has succeeded economically not 
because colonizers left favorable institutions but because of good policies advanced by 
post-independence leaders (Good, 1992; Harvey and Lewis, 1990; Leith, 2000). 
Parsons (1979) noted that post-independence leaders such as Presidents Khama and 
Masire made critical decisions in the direction of the country for the better, both 
economically and politically. Schapera (1940) claimed that Tswana chiefs developed 
institutions and political structures that limited the power of the post-independent elites, 
hence, these leaders were held accountable and effective. Robinson and Parsons 
(2006) also commented that Botswana is prosperous in developing its institutions and 
political structures because the Tswana chiefs were limited in number and they easily 
integrated other tribes, for example, Kalanga, eventually resulting in the formation of 
Botswana state. Moreover, these chiefs were highly respected because they treated 
their people well and protected them from foreign invasions (Beaulier, 2003). Parson 
(1984) observed that parliament in Botswana is empowered to make laws for peace and 
order. From the discussion above, one thing that remains consistent is the embedding 
of indigenous culture with political systems, which promote accountability and respect 








Figure 6.3: Southern African Development Community (SADC) 
 
 
Notes. Botswana and Malawi are both members of SADC economic region 
 
 
In this multi-case study, the age distribution of Malawi and Botswana is 
demonstrated in Table 6.3 below. The age distribution is in three categories in both 
countries namely:  0-14 years, 15-64 years, and 65+ years. The data for age distribution 
is only available in the years 2014 and 2015 in both countries (Malawi and Botswana), 
and data is obtained from (African economic outlook, 2017).   
Table 6.3: Age distribution (%), Mortality, and fertility rates in both countries 
 
Notes. Botswana has a higher distribution of age in group 15 to 64 than Malawi while Malawi has 
higher distribution in 0 to 14 age group. Malawi has higher birth and mortality rates than Botswana. 
 
6.3.3  Demographics in Malawi and Botswana 
 Botswana Malawi 
Distribution by age (%)  
Age group 2014 2015 2014 2015 
0 -14 33.26  32.00  45.02 45.16 
15 - 64 63.04 64.40 51.74 51.40 
65+ 3.69 3.60  3.24 3.44%.  
Mortality and fertility rates 
 2014 2015 2014 2015 
Total fertility rate (per woman) 3 3 5 5 
Mortality under age 5 (1,000) 38 42 114 62 
Infant mortality rate per (1,000) 30 44 84 43 
                                                                                                                                                             Botswana Malawi 
Distribution by age (%)  
Age group 2014 2015 2014 2015 
0 -14 33.26  32.00  45.02 45.16 
15 - 64 63.04 64.40 51.74 51.40 
65+ 3.69 3.60  3.24 3.44%.  
Mortality and fertility rates 
 2014 2015 2014 2015 
Total fertility rate (per 
woman) 
3 3 5 5 
Mortality under age 5 
(1,000) 
38 42 114 62 
Infant mortality rate per 
(1,000) 





Table 6.3 above shows that mortality rates for under age 5 per 1000 women in 
both countries in the year 2014 are 114 children for Malawi and 38 children for 
Botswana. The mortality rate in Malawi is about three times more than in Botswana. On 
the other hand, the infant mortality rates per 1000 women in Malawi and Botswana in 
2014 were as follows: 84 in Malawi, 30 in Botswana. Again, more infants died in Malawi 
than Botswana per 1000 women.  Unexpectedly, in the year 2015 the infants who died 
reduced to 43 per 1000 women from 84 in Malawi, while in Botswana infants deaths 
were increased by 4 per 1000 women from the previous year. The death of infants in 
Malawi in the year 2015, though reduced, is still much higher than the death of infants 
in Botswana. The higher death of infants in Malawi could be explained by higher fertility 
rates as shown in Table 6.3 above.  
 
The structures of tribes in Malawi and Botswana are very different. For instance, 
Figure 6.4 below shows the ethnic groups and their composition in Malawi. That shows 
that Malawi has many more ethnic groups than Botswana as shown in Figure 6.5 below. 
These differences in the racial composition may contribute to different historical settings 
and formation of the institutions in Botswana and Malawi as explained in sections 6.3.2 
above.  The data for both countries (Malawi and Botswana) for ethnic groups is sourced 
from (Mecometer, 2017).  
Figure 6.4: Ethnic groups in Malawi 
 
Notes. The figure shows that the largest ethnic group is Chewa with 32.6%; Lomwe ethnic group 
is second with 17.6%; Yao is third with 13.5%; Ngoni is fourth with 11.5%; Tumbuka is next with 




8.8%. The other smaller ethnic groups are as follows: Nyanja with 5.8%; Sena with 3.6%; Tonga 
with 2.0%; Ngonde with 1,9%; other ethnic groups combined comes to 3.5%. 
 
Figure 6.5: Ethnic groups in Botswana 
 
Notes. Tswana has the largest ethnic group with 79%; the next ethnic group is Kalanga with 11%; 
then Kgalagadi on 7%; and lastly Basarwa on 3%.   
  
6.4 EXPLORATION OF THE KEY FINDINGS 
 
The close examination of the variables follows the ordering of the findings as 
indicated in Table 6.4 below. However, in the process of close examinations of the 
variables, the categories of variables may not apply, and evidence could come from 
different sources of data other than surveys. The procedures followed in data 
preparation and analysis are highlighted in section 3.6 in methodology chapter 3.   
Table 6.4: The findings in chapters 4 and 5 calling for further exploration  
                                                                                                                                                                    
 
Notes. Column (1) shows the ranking of findings as presented in this chapter, while column (2) 




Finding ranking The main findings overarching chapters 4 and 5   
1 Governance (Utility capacity) as a crucial element of economic growth  
2 Social capital necessary for growth in developing countries 
 3 Foreign aid versus Self-reliance or dependency versus economic growth 
4 Competition good for economic growth in Africa 
5 Security and economic growth 





 Firstly, governance in slow and fast-growing countries is proxied by the rule of 
law ROL), government effectiveness GEF), and control of corruption (COC) the impact 
of these attributes on economic growth differs between the groups. For instance, ROL 
significantly impacts economic growth in fast-growth countries while in slow growth 
countries insignificantly reduces economic growth. On the contrary, GEF significantly 
reduces economic growth in fast-growth countries while in slow-growth countries 
insignificantly contributes to economic growth. On the other hand, COC reduces 
economic growth significantly in slow growth countries while in the fast-growth group 
insignificantly enhances economic growth. These findings suggest that governance 
attributes seem to influence economic growth differences between the two groups. 
Hence, this study is going to explore whether the differences in the performance of the 
governance attributes depends on other factors. If this can be the case, then what 
factors enhance more economic growth whereby the countries in the slow growth can 
adopt to enhance their economies.  
 Secondly, the findings also indicate that social capital (SOC) impacts economic 
growth significantly in slow-growth countries while in fast-growth countries enhance 
economic growth insignificantly. The effect size of SOC on economic growth is three 
times more in slow-growth than in fast-growth. However, the fact economic growth is 
higher in the fast-growth group; it seems to suggest that SOC may not be that important 
for economic growth. Hence, exploring the real context in Botswana and Malawi might 
suggest approaches that might help Malawi or slow-growing countries to enhance their 
economic growth. While on the same, civic capital (CPR) is also included in the category 
of social capital but specified differently in Table 6.1 above shows that CPR significantly 
reduces growth in slow-growth countries while in fast-growth countries insignificantly 
reduces economic growth. What is fascinating with CPR is that the effect size of 
reduction on economic growth is approximately seventeen times more harmful in a slow-
growth group than in a fast-growth group. What is it that the slow-growth countries do 
that erodes economic growth gained due to the combination of other factors? Is there 
anything the fast growth country (Botswana do to avoid such substantial negative impact 
on their economy? Stimulating economic growth in slow growth countries is important. 
 Thirdly, the finding in Table 6.1 above shows that foreign aid (AID) significantly 
reduces economic growth in the slow-growth group while in fast growth insignificantly 
reduces economic growth. The negative impact on economic growth in slow-growth 
countries is twice as much than in fast-growth countries. It is, therefore, essential to 
understanding what causes Aid to be more effective in fast-growing countries than in 
slow growth countries. Can the donors encourage the approaches implemented in fast 




factors that need changing to enhance economic growth in slow growing economies? 
The exploration of this finding in Malawi and Botswana can shade some light to enhance 
the economic performance of Malawi or other countries in the same group. 
 Fourthly, even though competitiveness index insignificantly and positively 
contributes to economic growth in both slow and fast-growth countries, the variable 
seems essential. For example, GCI significantly impacts economic growth in 
OLS2(developed), OLS3(developing), and OLS1SSC models as indicated in Tables 4.5 
and 5.5 in chapter 4 and 5 respectively. Also, Botswana has very high levels of 
competitiveness index than all the countries in the fast group. Therefore, examining GCI 
could help to identify whether is the critical determinant of the economic success story 
in Botswana.  Moreover, how does GCI help Botswana to achieve sustained economic 
growth in the country? Hence, examining the conditions between Malawi and Botswana 
could help to identify some causes of weak economic growth in the country.   
 Fifthly, it has been noted that security (SEC) significantly reduces economic 
growth in slow-growth countries than in fast-growth countries. It is, therefore, essential 
to explore whether security issues in Malawi and Botswana have any effect on economic 
growth differently. For example, does FDI depend on the security conditions prevailing 
in the country? What can Malawi learn from Botswana how to deal with security 
problems? Lastly, human capital (HCT) impacts economic growth positively and 
significantly in slow-growth countries while in fast-growth countries insignificantly. Why 
in slow-growth group HCT significantly contribute to economic growth? Other factors will 
be explored in Malawi and Botswana that causes productivity differences of HCT among 
countries.    
 
Generally, it is accepted that economic success of countries rests on good 
governance steered by effective leadership and sound institutions where best decisions 
for best outcomes for the society are made (North, 1990; Knack and Keefer; 1995, 1997; 
Acemoglu et al., 2001; Rodrik et al., 2004). However, the cause of effective leadership 
and institutions seems elusive. For instance, Rindermann et al. (2015) suggest that good 
governance relies on the thinking capacity of the entire society. They related cognitive 
capital to the competitiveness of the countries, innovation, and degree of economic 
freedom. Also, Givens (2013) notes that the proxy of good governance used in most of 
the studies in literature is unidimensional that fails to capture some categories of 
governance that are important for economic success in one society while in other society 
is not. Hence, he used the multidimensional approach of governance which he claims is 
more useful to explain economic success than a unidimensional approach. The concern 
of governance representation in literature is also shared by (Mimicopoulos et al., 2007; 
Ravallion, 2010).  




However, the upshot of the findings in Table 6.1 above governance is captured 
by three variables like GEF, ROL, and COC (see Table 3.2 for more details). The 
findings indicate that the proxy variables for governance perform differently in the 
models for chapter 4 for OLS3 (developing) model, chapter 5 for OLS1SSC, 
SlowOLS1SSC, and FastOLS1SSC (See Table 6.1 above). For instance, in OLS3 
(developing)  model in chapter 4, GEF significantly contribute to GDPPC; in OLS1SSC 
model for chapter 5, GEF significantly reduces GDPPC; GEF insignificantly enhances 
GDPPCG in SlowOLS1SSC while in FastOLS1SSC significantly reduces GDPPCG. 
 Furthermore, ROL as a proxy for governance in OLS3 (developing) model 
insignificantly contributes to GDPPC; in OLS1SSC model in chapter 5  significantly 
enhances GDPPC; however, in SlowOLS1SSC model insignificantly reduces GDPPCG 
while in FastOLS1SSC significantly and positively impacts GDPPCG. While on the 
same, governance proxied as COC in OLS1SSC model for chapter 5 and 
SlowOLS1SSC models significantly reduces GDPPCG while in FastOLS1SSC 
insignificantly enhances GDPPCG. Therefore, the findings highlighted above seem to 
suggest that different proxies of governance perform differently in countries even after 
being grouped according to their level of development and economic growth status. 
Why?  
 In order to examine the governance variables above, Afrobarometer surveys are 
used covering the years from 2002 to 2018. Table 6.5 below indicates participants’ 
evaluation of leaders in two indicators of governance collected by Afrobarometer 
Surveys from 2002 to 2018 period.  The average percentage per category and number 
of participants participated in each survey (round) in each country are shown in column 
(3). In Table 6.4 below. Generally, over 50% participants in Botswana evaluated their 
leaders fairly well compared to only 25.8% of participants in Malawi evaluated their 
leaders’ performance fairly well in managing the economies in respective countries over 
16 years time.  While on the same, 37.8% participants on average over time considered 
the leaders in Malawi performed very badly compared to only 9.4% in managing the 
economy.  In the same table, about 53% of Botswana participants rated their leaders 
fairly well in improving the living standards of the poor people over 16 years period. In 
contrast, only  27% of participants in Malawi regarded their leaders did fairly well in 
improving the living standards of people in Malawi over a period of 16 years.   
Furthermore, Figures 6.7, 6.8, 6.9, and 6.10 below play a supporting role of 
identifying if there patterns of interest in the participants’ responses to governance 
indicators in column (1) in Table 6.5 below. The observations highlighted above shows 
that leaders in Botswana are more effective than Malawi contrary to the findings in 
SlowOLS1SSC (Malawi) and FastOLS1SSC(Botswana) in Table 6.1 above. The proxy 




model (Botswana as a typical case) while in Slow1SSC (Malawi as a typical case) 
insignificantly reduced economic growth. However, Figures 6.7 and 6.9 below for Malawi 
in both governance indicators in column (1) in Table 6.5 below show that in round 4 to 
round 5 period, participants in Malawi rated their leaders in managing economy 38% 
fairly well, 29% very well and are the highest scores over a period of 16 years. Why?    
Further examination for other governance indicators probably can also shade some 
institutional change in the period of five to six years  (2008 to about 2012) as 




Table  6.5:  Evaluation of leaders in Botswana and Malawi by the participants in  Afrobarometer Surveys
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
























Very Badly 9.4%  11.0% 8.9% 6.9% 6.8% 10.2% 12.3% 
Fairly Badly 20.0%  20.0% 19.0% 13.4% 20.5% 24.7% 22.3% 
Fairly Well 54.7%  46.6% 57.1% 64.9% 58.0% 52.2% 49.3% 
Very Well 10.8%  13.3% 10.4% 10.7% 9.5% 10.8% 9.9% 
Don't know 5.2%  9.2% 4.6% 4.1% 5.2% 2.1% 6.2% 
(N) 7,178 (100%)  1,200 (100%) 1,200 (100%) 1,200 (100%) 1,199 (100%) 1,200 (100%) 1,179 (100%) 
Malawi 
Very Badly 37.8%  46.9% 40.8% 14.6% 17.5% 55.6% 54.4% 
Fairly Badly 15.1%  19.3% 8.8% 14.7% 9.7% 14.4% 29.4% 
Fairly Well 25.8%  22.1% 25.6% 37.8% 33.5% 20.6% 12.7% 
Very Well 12.6%  6.6% 13.4% 28.6% 18.4% 7.0% 1.6% 
Don't know 8.6%  5.1% 11.4% 4.3% 20.8% 2.3% 1.9% 












Very Badly 9.9%    12.6% 7.6% 9.9% 9.6% 
Fairly Badly 20.4%    25.8% 17.3% 23.5% 14.9% 
Fairly Well 53.4%    53.5% 57.0% 50.5% 52.7% 
Very Well 14.8%    7.4% 16.9% 15.4% 19.5% 
Missing 0.3%    - - - 1.2% 
Refused  0.0%    - - - 0.2% 
Don't know 1.1%    0.7% 1.3% 0.7% 1.9% 
(N) 4,798 (100%)    1,200 (100%) 1,200 (100%) 1,200 (100%) 1,198 (100%) 
Malawi 
Very Badly 33.3%    19.6% 22.3% 43.3% 48.8% 
Fairly Badly 19.3%    17.9% 18.5% 16.3% 28.1% 
Fairly Well 27.2%    40.2% 25.2% 26.2% 20.3% 
Very Well 12.3%    19.8% 13.5% 12.6% 1.8% 
Missing 0.0%    0.0% 0.1% - - 
Refused 0.0%    - - - 0.0% 
Don't know 7.9%    2.5% 20.4% 1.6% 0.9% 




Figure 6.6. How Botswana manage the economy 
 
 
Notes. R2=2002/2003, R3=2005/2006, R4=2008/2009, R5=2011/2013,  R6=2014/2015, and 
 R7=2016/2018. 
 
Figure 6.7. How Malawi manage the economy 
 
 
Notes.  R2=2002/2003, R3=2005/2006, R4=2008/2009,  R5=2011/2013, R6=2014/2015, 






Figure 6.8: Handling improving living standards of the poor in Botswana 
 
 
Notes. R4=2008/2009,  R5=2011/2013,  R6=2014/2015,  and  R7=2016/2018. 
 
Figure 6.9: Handling improving living standards of the poor in Malawi 
 
 




Table 6.6: Performance of leaders in Botswana and Malawi versus the participants in  Afrobarometer Surveys 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 

























Very Badly 13.1%  18.8% 12.3% 5.8% 8.8% 14.0% 19.1% 
Fairly Badly 21.7%  21.1% 19.8% 17.8% 20.4% 27.8% 23.1% 
Fairly Well 47.5%  40.3% 53.3% 53.9% 47.8% 46.1% 43.5% 
Very Well 10.7%  8.5% 10.3% 14.7% 14.0% 7.6% 8.9% 
Don't know 7.0%  11.3% 4.3% 7.8% 9.0% 4.4% 5.4% 
(N) 7,178 (100%)  1,200 (100%) 1,200 (100%) 1,200 (100%) 1,200 (100%) 1,200 (100%) 1,178 (100%) 
Malawi 
Very Badly 35.2%  46.0% 32.8% 11.5% 13.0% 56.2% 52.5% 
Fairly Badly 16.3%  22.3% 5.9% 21.1% 15.2% 12.7% 25.6% 
Fairly Well 24.2%  18.5% 26.4% 34.6% 29.5% 19.2% 16.7% 
Very Well 14.5%  6.8% 27.0% 27.7% 17.8% 8.4% 2.5% 
Don't know 9.8%  6.4% 7.8% 5.0% 24.5% 3.5% 2.7% 











Very Badly 6.4% 6.9% 6.7% 4.5% 3.0% 4.3% 7.4% 12.2% 
Fairly Badly 15.8% 19.3% 12.6% 12.9% 12.6% 11.6% 22.0% 19.6% 
Fairly Well 59.6% 52.1% 60.3% 69.9% 65.6% 60.7% 56.9% 51.4% 
Very Well 16.6% 19.5% 18.4% 11.7% 17.7% 21.4% 12.8% 14.9% 
Don't know 1.6% 2.2% 2.1% 1.0% 1.1% 2.0% 1.0% 2.0% 
(N) 8,366 (100%) 1,187 (100%) 1,200 (100%) 1,200 (100%) 1,200 (100%) 1,199 (100%) 1,200 (100%) 1,180 (100%) 
Malawi 
Very Badly 23.5% 21.3% 27.9% 38.5% 7.2% 7.3% 35.3% 31.3% 
Fairly Badly 15.3% 15.7% 20.5% 10.9% 16.1% 9.3% 15.2% 25.3% 
Fairly Well 35.0% 31.6% 34.5% 29.4% 43.9% 37.0% 32.5% 36.4% 
Very Well 20.2% 30.6% 16.0% 16.4% 29.7% 27.4% 14.4% 5.7% 
Don't know 6.0% 0.7% 1.1% 4.8% 3.2% 19.0% 2.6% 1.2% 




Figure 6.10: Performance of leaders in fighting corruption 
 
Notes. Fighting corruption seems satisfying in Botswana 
Figure.6.11: Performance of Malawi leaders in fighting corruption 
 
Notes. Fighting corruption in Malawi seems not effective 
Table 6.6 above specifies that 47% of Botswana participants regarded control of 
corruption (COC) in Botswana was working reasonably well and 10% considered the 




Malawi considered COC was done relatively well while about 15% regarded COC was 
going on very well. Also, in the same table, about 35% of participants in Malawi 
considered COC in Malawi very bad, and 16% regarded COC in the country reasonably 
bad. While in Botswana only 13% and 22% considered COC very bad and fairly wrong 
respectively. Table 6.6 also shows the evolution of leaders regarding addressing the 
educational needs in Botswana and Malawi respectively. In Botswana, about 59% rated 
leaders in Botswana were achieving the task at reasonably well comparing to 17% who 
rated the work of leaders very well. On the other hand, in Malawi, 35% regarded the 
leaders were addressing educational needs reasonably well while 20% thought the 
leaders did very well. Generally, the overall performance of the leaders in Botswana was 
favorably rated while the leaders in Malawi were categorized not doing enough 
regarding addressing the issues in the country.  
Moreover, Figures 6.10 and 11 above also indicate that Malawi participants rated 
their leaders favorably in the years from 2008 to 2012. For instance, 35% and 28% of 
participants in round 4 considered leaders handled fighting corruption reasonably well 
and very well respectively. The same pattern repeated in handling educational needs 
whereby 44% and 30% of Malawi participants regarded the leaders did their job 
reasonably well and very well respectively. Further exploration in Figure 6.12 below is 
done by running an Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) model in Botswana and Malawi. The 
model has the same variables applied in SlowOLS1SSC and FastOLS1SSC models in 
Table 6.1 above. Figure 6.12 below indicates that Malawi had the highest observed 
economic growth values in the years about 2008 to 2012. These are the years whereby 
participants in Malawi rated the leaders more favorably than other years in the surveys 
as demonstrated in Tables 6.5 and 6.6 above. Figures 6.6 to 6.11 above also help to 
identify the pattern of the participant's responses over the period of about 16 years. 
  The short period Malawi performed to the expectations of its citizens falls in the 
leadership rule of the late President Bingu wa Mutharika who assumed power in 2004. 
Bingu wa Mutharika was re-elected soundly after his full first term in 2009. According to 
Kondowe (2014), late Bingu wa Mutharika had a successful first term as president of the 
Republic of Malawi, but due to his dictatorship attributes, his second term was 
unsuccessful until his demise in 2012. Nonetheless, his leadership taking into the views 
of the participants in Afrobarometer Surveys created hope for many Malawians. It seems 
to suggest that Bingu wa Mutharika had a strong personal leadership that changed the 
course of political events in the country. For instance, during his time, all the indicators 
of governance according to the evaluation of the participants in the surveys Bingu wa 
Mutharika performed well compared to other leaders in the history of the country. He 
seemed to have used his strategic position in power, capacity, and skill of the leader to 




strong opposition from his competitors (Jervis, 1976 cited in Šćepanović, 2018). As a 
result, the ability of leaders in respective responsibilities regulates the social or civic 
capital that plays a crucial role in the implementation of the formulated policies (Gill et 
al., 2018). 
Figure 6.12. Malawi’s participant's evaluation of leaders versus model  
                    prediction 
 
Notes. Positive observed values are highest in a period participants rated the leaders positively in 
 Malawi. 
 
All in all, the discussions above appear to suggest that proxies of governance 
used in literature may not reflect what is taking place in reality. For example, the 
predictions of governance variables in SlowOLS1SSC and FastOLS1SSC models 
above seem to contradict the observed indicators of governance in Botswana and 
Malawi as illustrated in Tables 6.5, 6.6, and Figures 6.6 to 6.12 above. However, the 
next paragraphs will explore more on other proxies of governance about observed data 
in Malawi and Botswana. Figure 6.13 below introduces Voice Accountability (VOA) as a 




























Figure 6.13: scores of governance proxies in Botswana versus Malawi   
 
                                                                                                                                    
Notes. This figure captures the environmental attributes in Malawi and Botswana. These attributes 
explain governance differences between Botswana and Malawi. 
 
Figure 6.13 above shows voice accountability (VOA) scores in Malawi which are 
relatively low (under 30%) comparing to Botswana about 40%.  Even though Botswana’s 
VOA scores are higher than in Malawi, the scores are relatively low, under 50% in both 
countries. It seems to suggest that the executive’s policy after the electoral process 
could be no longer be in the voters’ interests to some extent in both countries. Hence, 
less accountability after the democratic electoral process is associated with 
unsuccessful governance (Kitrosser, 2009). According to Meier and O’Toole Jr. (2008), 
ineffective governance in most cases is connected to the conditions in countries 
whereby political branches regulate the bureaucracy function. In other words, in such 
conditions, civil servants in bureaucracies are more accountable to the political branches 
other than performing their duties for quality public services. The tendencies of 
unproductive governance as explained in the previous sentences seem to limit 
opportunities for productive investment in economic, political and social development in 
SSC. For instance, Fayissa and Nsiah (2013) researched the impact of good 
governance in African countries mainly SSC region covering the period from 1995 to 
2005, and they concluded that good governance has a significant impact on economic 
growth in the region. However, their research engaged six proxies of good governance 
which seem to correlate with each other, hence could be prone to spurious findings. 
Therefore, this thesis fills the gap by engaging fewer proxies of governance and carefully 
related to status quo regarding political and social capital effectiveness in the multi-case 
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Similarly, Rivera‐Batiz and Rivera‐Batiz (2002) associate democracy and 
economic growth in terms of good governance through elements like: checks and 
balances on executive powers, constitutional processes and guarantees, freedom of the 
press and the absence of restriction, transparent and effective judicial and legal 
structures, incumbent term limits, and transparency, openness and citizen input in 
policymaking. It seems to suggest that proper governance respects citizens’ 
participation in decision-making processes. In other words, a precondition for 
sustainable economic growth and social development is the peoples’ participation at all 
levels such as public and corporate settings, national, local, and regional levels (Stiglitz, 
2000 cited in Rivera‐Batiz and Rivera‐Batiz, 2002). There seems to be a strong 
correlation between democracy and good governance especially in countries where 
there are free, open and competitive elections whereby executive in authority does not 
subvert the will of the people. Having said that Figure 6.13 above shows, Botswana has 
higher scores for political stability than Malawi. However, the average scores of the 
participants in the Afrobarometer survey from 2008 to 2018 about the freedom to say 
what they think to show differently. Unexpectedly, 72.7% of participants in Malawi 
indicated were utterly free while in Botswana about 65% felt were free as demonstrated 
in Table 6.7 below. 
Table 6.7. Freedom of citizens Versus government accountability 
 
Notes. R4=2008/2009, R5=2011/2013, R6=2014/2015, and R7=2016/2018. 
Furthermore, Figures 6.14 and 6.15 below indicate that complete freedom in 
Botswana has declined dramatically from 83% in 2008 to 46% in 2018. Similarly, 





Round 2 Round 3 Round 4 Round 5 Round 6 Round 7 
  Botswana: Freedom to say what you think 
Not at all free 4.9%   1.7% 3.6% 5.9% 8.3% 
Not very free 9.9%   3.7% 8.6% 9.7% 17.5% 
Somewhat free 18.6%   10.0% 18.7% 18.7% 27.1% 
Completely free 65.3%   83.3% 67.6% 64.5% 45.6% 
Don't know 1.4%   1.3% 1.5% 1.1% 1.5% 







  Malawi: Freedom to say what you think 
Not at all free 3.1%   4.2% 1.8% 2.9% 4.8% 
Not very free 10.2%   6.8% 11.6% 7.4% 16.6% 
Somewhat free 12.9%   10.6% 6.9% 11.9% 29.0% 
Completely free 72.7%   76.7% 78.6% 76.9% 48.4% 
Don't know 1.2%   1.7% 1.2% 0.8% 1.2% 







  Botswana: Government gets things done but no citizen influence vs. Govt. 
accountable to citizens 
Agree very strongly with 
1 
12.4%    9.2% 14.8% 13.3% 
Agree with 1 14.0%    14.5% 18.6% 9.1% 
Agree with 2 29.3%    38.1% 33.5% 16.3% 
Agree very strongly with 
2 
41.2%    35.8% 31.0% 56.7% 
Agree with neither 1.9%    1.3% 1.0% "3.4% 
Don´t know 1.2%    1.2% 1.2% 1.2% 





  Malawi: Government gets things done but no citizen influence vs. Govt. 
accountable to citizens 
Agree very strongly with 
1 
27.8%    22.3% 36.3% 22.1% 
Agree with 1 7.5%    9.8% 4.9% 8.3% 
Agree with 2 10.1%    12.2% 5.0% 15.8% 
Agree very strongly with 
2 
53.1%    54.3% 52.4% 52.2% 
Agree with neither 0.6%    0.7% 0.3% 1.2% 
Don´t know 0.8%    0.7% 1.1% 0.3% 








complete freedom in Malawi has plummeted from 77% in 2014 to 48% in 2018.  
However, complete freedom in Malawi remained steady from 2008 to 2014 while in 
Botswana there was a sharp fall from 2008 to 2011 and remained steady until the sharp 
decrease from 2014 to 2018. 
Figure 6.14: Freedom to say what people think in Botswana  
 
 
Notes. Dramatic fall of complete freedom in Botswana 
 
Figure 6.15: Freedom to say what people think in Malawi 
 
 
Notes. A sharp decrease of complete freedom in Malawi from 2014 to 2018. 
 
Therefore, proxy uses of governance indicators such as those demonstrated in 
Figure 6.13 above may not capture all elements reflecting the reality of governance in 




Figure 6.13 above shows Botswana have higher scores than Malawi, yet one of the 
critical measurements of the governance elements Malawi scores higher than Botswana 
in Table 6.7 and Figures 6.14 and 6.15 above.  Moreover, in Table 6.7 above participants 
in Botswana and Malawi expressed their views regarding government being 
accountable to the citizens. Alternatively, the government should do whatever they want 
without considering the views of the participants. The table shows that 53% of 
participants in Malawi in all the three surveys consider government should be 
accountable to the citizens while in Botswana only 42% share the same view in the 
same period. However, the pattern of participants’ views in Botswana has fluctuated 
from 2011 until 2018 as observed in Figures 6.16 and 6.17 below. For example, 36% in 
2011 considered government be accountable to its citizens, in 2014 only 31% 
considered government is accountable to citizens. Surprisingly, there was a sharp rise 
in 2018 about 57% considered government is accountable to its citizens. On the other 
hand, in Malawi, the participants’ views remained stable in the 50’s (%) from 2011 until 
2018.   
Figure 6.16: Government accountability to the citizens in Botswana 
 
 












Figure 6.17: Government accountability to its people in Malawi   
 
 
 Notes, A steady decrease in participants’ views regarding government accountability 
 Therefore, the observations made in Figures 6.16 and 6.17 above appear to 
demonstrate that it is at times challenging to find proxies which capture the real situation 
in the countries. Can this explain why the same variables in four models in Table 6.1 
above performed differently? For example, GEF insignificantly and positively contributed 
to GDPPCG in SlowOLS1SSC model while in FastOLS1SSC model significantly 
reduces GDPPCG. Ironically, Botswana in the fast-growing countries has relatively 
higher scores than Malawi in the slow growth countries as illustrated in Figure 6.13 
above. Table 6.7 and Figures 6.14 to 6.17 above show that citizens in Malawi are freer 
than Botswana citizens. Also, more people in Malawi regard government should be more 
accountable than Botswana people. Accountability is one of the key elements in good 
governance, but accountability scores in Figure 6.13 above are more in Botswana than 
Malawi. Is the index of accountability measure what people experience in countries? 
Proxies of governance such as VOA are debatable as deliberated above.    
 According to the United Nations, (2014) classification of country economies, 
Botswana is in the upper-middle-income group while Malawi is in the low-income country 
group. What do participants feel about the overall direction and performance of their 
respective countries? Figure 6.18 below about 38% of Botswana citizens think the 
country is going in the wrong direction over time (from 2011 to 2018). In contrast, in 
Malawi 51% in 2011 considered the country is going in the wrong direction, the number 
increased to 78% in 2014 and then 88% in 2018. All in all, Malawians think leaders are 
not accountable to the citizens’ expectations. It, therefore, seems to suggest that 
differences of economic growth between Botswana and Malawi could be explained by 
the good governance of the leaders, contrary to the performance of GEF in Table 6.1 




Figure 6.18: Direction of the countries regarding economic performance 
 
 Notes. Participants’ views about the direction of Botswana and Malawi countries 
 While on the same, Table 6.7 and Figures 6.14 and 6.15 above show that people 
in Botswana seem to be not politically free comparing to Malawi, could this indicate that 
strong leaders are necessary for economic growth in Africa? If participants’ limitation to 
freedom as observed above could be related to strong leadership in Botswana, then 
strong leadership is good for economic growth. For example, Singapore’s current 
economic development status according to Tong, (1996) mainly depended on the quality 
of political leadership who formulated policies embedded in cooperation between the 
executive and its citizens that through their determination steered their country out of 
the mire of poverty to prosperity. This seems to suggest that democratic institutions 
remain fragile and incomplete if executive authority lacks the strong leadership to 
mobilize their citizens to be achievement oriented regarding delivery of their duties in 
respective positions. However, strong leadership from the head of state (President or 
Prime Minister) is without shortfalls. For example, Waltz (2001) states that in politics 
individuals are prone to changes due to human being nature. Hence, steadfast 
leadership of individuals fails to explain the lack of sustainable economic growth in 
developing countries. It appears to suggest that prevailing political conditions in 
countries determine the course of political events, not individuals Byman and Pollack, 
2001 cited in Šćepanović, 2018).  
 Can this be connected to the performance of the ROL in Table 6.1 above? ROL 
is another aspect of good governance whereby leaders obey the law as they lead the 
citizens. The findings in Table 6.1 in OLS3 (developing) model in chapter 4 insignificantly 
enhances GDPPC. While in OLS1SSC model for chapter 5 significantly contributes to 
GDPPC. However, in the SlowOLS1SSC growth model, ROL insignificantly reduces 
GDPPCG. Contrary, ROL significantly enhances GDPPCG in FastOLS1SSC model 




FastOLS1SSC models because Botswana as one of the fast-growing countries has a 
higher percentage score of ROL than Malawi representing slow growth countries. 
Therefore, it seems to suggest that the rule of law enhances economic growth combined 
with strong leadership. These observations seem to agree with observations noted in 
Tables 6.5 and 6.6 above. Furthermore, ROL appears to be connected to the integrity 
of the leaders and adhering to the rule of law and property rights as demonstrated in 
Figure 6.19 below. 
Figure 6.19: Government integrity and property rights in Malawi and Botswana 
  
 Notes. Botswana has the much higher integrity of government operations and property rights than 
 Malawi. 
 
Figure 6.17 above shows that Botswana leaders have more credibility in their 
leadership than Malawi. It seems to agree with Figure 6.18 above whereby participants 
in Botswana feel the performance of the country is going in the right direction. Contrary, 
in Malawi about 80% of the participants felt the country is going in the wrong direction. 
Why? Probably, due lack of the rule of law and integrity of the leaders. Therefore, despite 
the weaknesses noted in strong leadership, according to Greenstein (1967), the 
personality of a leader can change the course of political events in the country. The 
strategic position in power, capacity, and skill of the leader do not only affect policy 
implementation but also force changes despite to some extent reluctance of state 
bureaucracy according to (Jervis, 1976 cited in Šćepanović, 2018). Personality 









2000 2005 2010 2015 2000 2005 2010 2015
Botswana Malawi
Government integrity: Scale (5 to 22) scores range from (31.3 to 64.0) %
Property rights: Scale (5  to 7) scores range from (58.1 to 75.0) %
index year


























changes. However, a leader’s capacity just like other individuals involved in politics can 
be influenced by experiences of generational effects (Jervis, 2017). Therefore, the lack 
of strong political leadership could cause stagnant economic growth in developing 
countries (Norris and Zinnbauer, 2002). 
The integrity of the government is related to the variable of COC. Table 6.1 above 
shows that COC significantly reduces GDPPC in OLS1SSC and SlowOLS1SSC 
models. Contrary, in FastOLS1SSC model insignificantly contribute to GDPPCG. Figure 
6.13 above shows that Botswana has higher scores of COC than Malawi agreeing with 
the findings in the models for slow and fast-growing countries. That is reflected by the 
information available at The Directorate on Corruption and Economic Crime, (2006), 
whereby Botswana deals with corruption decisively in that anybody committing 
corruption crime faces the full force of the law regardless of status or political affiliation. 
In contrast, information from Economic Freedom, (2017) shows that Malawi fails to 
control rampant corruption prevailing in the country. It could be due to Anti-corruption 
Bureau (ACB) in charge of investigating and prosecuting of corrupt officials being 
underfunded and appointments in most cases made to office bearers being politically 
motivated. That compromises the responsibility and accountability of the bureau 
officials. The underfunding of the ACB could be due to lack of political will in the country 
to apply the full extent of the law to the corrupt officials. Why? Possibly, political leaders 
in government in Malawi fund their parties by diverting the resources meant for more 
critical issues in the country (Wild, 2014).  Also, the success of dealing with corruption 
in both countries is reflected in the ranking by Corruption Perceptions Index, (2017) 
whereby Botswana is ranked 35 while Malawi 120 out of 176 countries. Figure 6.13 
above also illustrates that Botswana has better regulatory control on the elected officials 
than Malawi.  
 Moreover, the presence of inefficient bureaucracy and political corruption in 
democratic institutions undermines representative bureaucracy theory. Adsera et al. 
(2003) argue that good governance also depends on the principal-agent theory whereby 
effective governance relies on the function of the extent to which citizens hold elected 
officials accountable. Adsera and others measured political accountability by the 
availability of the standard mechanism of control and information flow to the electorate 
through newspapers (2003). They used a broad cross-section of countries with data 
from (Kaufmann et al., 1999a cited in Adsera et al., 2003). They concluded that elected 
officials in most cases abuse power by holding information to the electorate why policies 
were formulated, hence, pursuing their agenda that jeopardizes the welfare of all 
citizens. The principal-agent theory in this chapter is tested through two variables 
namely: political capital and social capital generated from two sources World Values 




institutions in developing countries, the countries until now do not register sustainable 
economic growth. The underperformances of democratic institutions need further 
scrutiny specifically in the participation of citizens in the electoral process. For instance, 
Rivera‐Batiz and Rivera‐Batiz (2002)  state that exercising the right to vote, free and fair 
elections, and presence of many parties competing in the elections do not warrant 
effective democratic institutions. They, however, observed that the degree the citizens 
get involved in decision making in different structures of the society matters more to 
regulate the misuse of power by elected officials. Higher levels of participation of the 
citizens in policy formulation and implementation imply that elected officials are 
accountable in decision machinery of the government after being elected. The lack of 
this accountability derails welfare services to all citizens in the respective countries 
whereby selfish elected officials can reverse the will of the people. Figures 6.14 to 6.16 
above appear to confirm the findings of (Rivera‐Batiz and Rivera‐Batiz, 2002).   
  
  The prediction of Consequently, the ability of leaders in respective 
responsibilities determines the social (civic) capital that plays a crucial role in the 
implementation of the formulated policies (Gill et al., 2018). The formation of social 
capital also relates to the servanthood of the leaders. For instance, Wang et al. (2018) 
conducted a research in a banking company whereby employees were in three 
categories: highly skilled managers, supervisors, and low skilled employees. They 
observed that servanthood of the highly skilled managers influenced levels of 
commitment and performance of the low skilled employees through the medium of the 
supervisors. The leaders with transformational and service characteristics are desirable 
in most of the developing countries to enhance sustainable economic growth in the 
countries. These type of leaders could put the interests and needs of their citizens first 
that could, in turn, have effect in the public delivery systems for the benefit of all people 
in respective countries (Van Dierendonck et al., 2014). The infectious influence of 
servant ship leadership to the subordinates is in line with social learning theory whereby 
role modeling process has a considerable effect on performance behavior of the 
followers (Bandura, 1977; Liden et al., 2014b). The relationship between servant 
leadership and the followers discussed above are empirically researched in work-related 
environments. However, this study applies the same theory in a political environment 
whereby leaders play crucial roles in enhancing the economic, political, and social 
development of the citizens in mainly developing countries discussed in detail in the next 
paragraph.  
 The findings in Table 6.1 above shows that SOC in OLS3 (developing); 
OLS1SSC, and SlowOLS1SSC models significantly and positively contribute to 




GDPPC. Contrary, in FastOLS1SSC model insignificantly impact GDPPC. However, 
Figure 5.15 in chapter 5 indicates that SOC is twice as much higher in the FastOLS1SSC 
model than in SlowOLS1SSC model. Table 3.5 in chapter 3 indicates how variables of 
SOC (trust capital) and CPR (public capital) were generated. SOC was generated from 
four variables captured in Afrobarometer surveys as Q59A. Trust president; Q59B. Trust 
parliament/national Assembly; Q59C. Trust national Electoral Commission; and Q59E. 
Trust your elected local government council. CPR was generated from Q30A. Contact 
local government councilor; Q30B. Contact MP; Q30C. Contact official of a Government 
Agency; and Q30D. Contact political party official. See details in chapter 3 sub-section 
3.4.5 the techniques used for the formation of SOC and CPR variables. Having said that 
Table 6.8 below indicates details of the performance of the president against attributes 






































Table 6.8: Performance of the president versus social capital and civic capital 
  
 Notes. Social capital levels in Malawi fluctuates with the performance of the president in each 
 survey, unlike the levels of civic capital.  
 
 Table 6.8 above broadly illuminates the performance of the president in Malawi 
and Botswana. In Botswana, about 44% of participants approved the president, and 
28% strongly approved over the period of 19 years. The overall average approval of the 
surveys for the president in the two categories is 72% in Botswana. On the other hand, 
in Malawi, about 26% of the participants approved the president and 31% strongly 





Round 1 Round 2 Round 3 Round 4 Round 5 Round 6 Round 7 
  Botswana: Performance of President 
Strongly Disapprove 8.3% 5.3% 12.7% 9.9% 3.4% 7.3% 7.4% 12.2% 
Disapprove 12.5% 15.1% 17.0% 13.8% 5.4% 12.1% 11.4% 12.6% 
Approve 44.1% 45.7% 46.1% 56.0% 35.7% 44.6% 43.4% 37.2% 
Strongly Approve 28.2% 11.7% 17.6% 14.4% 51.9% 31.9% 36.2% 33.8% 
Don't know 6.9% 22.2% 6.7% 5.9% 3.6% 4.1% 1.5% 4.2% 














  Malawi: Performance of President 
Strongly Disapprove 24.3% 16.5% 19.6% 24.8% 7.6% 9.3% 45.5% 41.2% 
Disapprove 13.4% 18.3% 12.1% 6.4% 6.8% 11.5% 14.3% 25.3% 
Approve 25.5% 33.9% 32.4% 16.6% 23.2% 29.3% 21.7% 21.3% 
Strongly Approve 31.4% 29.1% 32.2% 38.9% 60.3% 38.9% 16.4% 11.3% 
Don't know 5.4% 2.2% 3.8% 13.3% 2.2% 11.0% 2.1% 1.0% 
(N) 10,798 (100%) 1,206 (100%) 1,200 (100%) 1,200 (100%) 1,200 (100%) 2,401 (100%) 2,400 (100%) 1,191 (100%) 
  Botswana: Trust the President 
Not at all 12.6% 10.6% 19.6% 14.2% 5.8% 9.8% 13.8% 14.5% 
Just a little 20.0% 25.3% 31.1% 15.3% 13.4% 17.2% 18.0% 19.5% 
Somewhat 22.7% 31.4% 30.0% 21.3% 20.4% 24.9% 18.7% 12.3% 
A lot 38.4% 12.4% 14.4% 44.9% 56.2% 44.6% 48.4% 48.1% 
Don't know 6.2% 20.3% 4.9% 4.3% 4.2% 3.4% 1.0% 5.6% 
(N) 8,384 (100%) 1,196 (100%) 1,200 (100%) 1,200 (100%) 1,200 (100%) 1,200 (100%) 1,200 (100%) 1,188 (100%) 
  Malawi: Trust the President 
Not at all 23.9% 19.2% 18.0% 16.8% 7.7% 14.6% 45.6% 32.9% 
Just a little 21.9% 29.1% 30.4% 16.6% 11.5% 16.9% 22.7% 30.1% 
Somewhat 14.2% 24.0% 22.3% 9.1% 15.0% 14.5% 8.8% 11.0% 
A lot 35.2% 26.0% 25.8% 51.2% 63.8% 42.5% 20.1% 24.7% 
Don't know 4.8% 1.7% 3.5% 6.3% 2.1% 11.5% 2.8% 1.3% 
(N) 10,809 (100%) 1,208 (100%) 1,200 (100%) 1,200 (100%) 1,199 (100%) 2,406 (100%) 2,399 (100%) 1,196 (100%) 
  Botswana: Trust courts of law 
Not at all 9.2% 6.3% 13.3% 9.8% 7.0% 8.1% 10.3% 9.2% 
Just a little 17.9% 17.5% 25.8% 16.3% 14.6% 16.1% 17.0% 17.8% 
Somewhat 28.9% 39.0% 40.5% 27.0% 26.1% 24.7% 27.5% 17.9% 
A lot 37.6% 26.0% 16.8% 41.6% 46.5% 42.0% 41.2% 48.9% 
Don't know 6.5% 11.2% 3.7% 5.3% 5.8% 9.1% 4.0% 6.2% 
(N) 8,379 (100%) 1,186 (100%) 1,200 (100%) 1,200 (100%) 1,200 (100%) 1,200 (100%) 1,200 (100%) 1,193 (100%) 
  Malawi: Trust courts of law 
Not at all 9.8% 18.7% 7.9% 7.9% 6.4% 4.9% 10.1% 16.8% 
Just a little 17.0% 27.7% 26.3% 10.3% 14.4% 11.4% 16.1% 19.2% 
Somewhat 19.4% 19.5% 28.7% 6.8% 22.5% 18.4% 19.5% 21.0% 
A lot 49.8% 27.6% 32.6% 71.4% 51.8% 62.5% 51.0% 38.0% 
Don't know 4.0% 6.5% 4.5% 3.6% 4.8% 2.7% 3.3% 5.0% 
(N) 10,804 (100%) 1,208 (100%) 1,200 (100%) 1,200 (100%) 1,199 (100%) 2,399 (100%) 2,400 (100%) 1,199 (100%) 
  Botswana: Contact official of a government agency 
Never 78.9%  82.2% 86.6% 77.5% 79.4% 75.2% 72.4% 
Only once 7.4%  6.9% 6.6% 8.5% 6.8% 7.0% 8.5% 
A few times 9.4%  8.4% 5.6% 9.9% 8.8% 12.1% 11.7% 
Often 4.2%  2.5% 1.2% 3.8% 4.9% 5.7% 7.1% 
Don't know 0.1%  - 0.1% 0.3% 0.2% - 0.3% 
(N) 7,196 (100%)  1,200 (100%) 1,200 (100%) 1,200 (100%) 1,199 (100%) 1,200 (100%) 1,197 (100%) 
  Malawi: Contact official of a government agency 
Never 89.6%  86.3% 91.1% 90.9% 88.7% 89.6% 91.7% 
Only once 3.7%  4.1% 2.4% 3.5% 4.3% 4.0% 3.4% 
A few times 4.3%  6.6% 3.2% 3.1% 4.8% 4.5% 3.4% 
Often 1.9%  2.8% 3.3% 1.6% 1.4% 1.7% 1.5% 
Don't know 0.4%  0.3% - 1.0% 0.8% 0.1% 0.0% 
(N) 9,604 (100%)  1,200 (100%) 1,200 (100%) 1,200 (100%) 2,405 (100%) 2,400 (100%) 1,199 (100%) 
  Botswana: Interest in public affairs 
Not at all interested 12.20%   10.8% 14.7% 19.3% 16.3%  
Not very interested 15.3%  14.1% 14.8% 15.5% 15.3% 16.8%  
Somewhat interested 33.7%  38.3% 29.2% 29.3% 36.1% 35.6%  
Very interested 38.1%  46.4% 44.1% 40.0% 28.9% 31.0%  
Don't know 0.7%  1.3% 1.2% 0.5% 0.4% 0.2%  
(N) 5,998 (100%)  1,200 (100%) 1,200 (100%) 1,200 (100%) 1,198 (100%) 1,200 (100%)  
  Malawi: Interest in public affairs 
Not at all interested 17.5%   16.2% 21.4% 23.5% 18.8%  
Not very interested 12.1%  12.7% 7.9% 16.5% 14.0% 9.7%  
Somewhat interested 19.2%  22.9% 15.0% 22.7% 18.2% 18.8%  
Very interested 50.2%  62.3% 58.8% 38.8% 43.9% 52.0%  
Don't know 1.0%  2.1% 2.2% 0.5% 0.4% 0.7%  




approved, the average total approval of the president for the two categories in Malawi is 
57%.  Figures 6.20 and 6.21 below establish that the approval of the president in 
Botswana does not change much as it does in Malawi. For instance, in Malawi, the 
approval of the president was highest in round 4 (2011/2013) with total approval of 84%. 
The least total approval of the president was 33% in round 7 (2017/2018) in Malawi. 
Generally, the approval of the president seems to influence how people trust the 
president. For example, Table 6.8 above and Figure 6.23 show that the trust of the 
president in Malawi was highest in round 4 (2011/2013) at 79% while in round 7 
(2016/2018) at 36%. The link between the performance of the president and trust in the 
president in Malawi associate to how leadership succeeds in executing implementation 
of policies concerning improving the lives of their citizens in the country as illustrated in 
Tables 6.5 and 6.6 above.  
Figure 6.20: Performance of the president in Botswana  
 
  















Figure 6.21: Performance of the president in Malawi 
 
 
 Notes. Performance of was at a peak in round 4 and plummeted to low in round 7 
 
Figure 6.22: Trust of the president in Botswana 
  






Figure 6.23: Trust of the president in Malawi 
 
  
 Notes. Rounds 3, 4 and 5 the president got the highest levels of trust comparing to other rounds 
 The percentages of trust in the president in Figures 6.22 and 6.23 above in 
Botswana and Malawi respectively, appear to reflect the performances of the president 
in each country. Tables 6.5 and 6.6 above generally indicate that the leaders in 
Botswana perform very well in indicators of government services than leaders in Malawi. 
It might explain why citizens in Botswana have much trust in their leaders than Malawian 
citizens.  These observations seem to contract with the finding in Table 6.1 above 
whereby SOC significantly contributed to GDPPCG in SlowOLS1SSC model 
represented by Malawi while in FastOLS1SSC model insignificantly enhances 
GDPPCG. The differences between Malawi and Botswana citizens’ feelings about 
leaders may determine the level of commitment to development programmes or political 
participation in Malawi and Botswana as noted by (Bros and Borooah, 2013, p. 257). 
What does this suggest about utilizing human capability? It seems to suggest that the 
level of leadership accountability determines the potential for commitment and capability 
of the citizens. 
 However, Table 6.8 above shows that the performance of the president has no 
direct effect on the levels of civic capital (CPR) probed in Figures 6.24 and 6.25 below. 
CPR in Table 6.8 above is depicted as interest in public affairs and Contact with an 
official of a government agencyy. In Malawi, about 69% of participants were interested 
in public affairs compared to about 72% in Botswana. However, in both countries, the 
percentage of participants who contacted agency official of the government is less than 
15% correspondingly. Moreover, Figures 6.24 and 6.25 below do not indicate any 
influence from the president’s performance in both countries. However, regarding the 




reduces GDPPCG in SlowOLS1SSC while in FastOLS1SSC insignificantly reduces 
economic growth. The negative impact of CPR on economic growth in SlowOLS1SSC 
is 17 times more than in the FastOLS1SSC model. The causes of more public capital in 
developing countries seem elusive.  However, Graph 1 in Figure 6.26 below shows that 
Botswana as a typical case for fast growth SSC has higher CPR levels than Malawi a 
typical case for slow growth countries. Graph 2 in the same figure shows that the levels 
of both SOC and CPR fluctuate over time, but SOC increases with time in Botswana 
while in Malawi slightly recovers from a dip fall. However, there seems to be a negative 
relationship between the levels of SOC and CPR in graph 1 in Figure 6.26 below. For 
instance, low levels of SOC in Botswana lead to high levels of CPR. Contrary, in Malawi 
high levels of SOC, lead to low levels of CPR. Why? 
Figure 6.24: Interest in public affairs in Botswana 
 




Figure 6.25: Interest in public affairs in Malawi 
 
 Notes. Interest in public affairs seems to increase when the performance of leaders worsens in 
 Malawi. 
Figure 6.26: Relationship between SOC and CPR in Botswana and Malawi 
  
 
Notes. Higher levels of SOC in Malawi decreases CPR while in Botswana lower SOC levels 
 increases CPR. There seems to be a negative relationship between SOC and CPR variables in 
 Botswana and Malawi. 
 
 The observations in Figures 6.24, 6.25, and 6.26 above seem to suggest that 






















Graph 1: Trust capital Versus Civic capital
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Graph 2: Trust capital and Civic capital




such as Malawi, the public still seems to be in a dilemma regarding their importance in 
shaping the political landscape in the countries. It also seems to suggest that in peoples’ 
minds the state has still ultimate power and it dictates what people should do or not do. 
These concerns of outcomes of liberal democracy in Africa is also noted in the literature. 
For example, Pabst (2016) raises concern about the concentration of power in 
unrepresentative and unaccountable in the hands of small social groups (p. 91). 
Nonetheless, transformed institutions in democratic countries empower people to 
exercise their right and play a part in the state’s operations (Rose and Miller, 1992). The 
populace in developing countries like Malawi needs to understand that the role of the 
government is primarily to think and act for its people in areas of wealth, security, health, 
education, and happiness. According to Rose and Miller (1992) government articulates 
dreams, strategies, schemes, and maneuvers by the elected officials that shapes the 
beliefs and behaviors of its citizens by acting in the direction of the wills and dreams of 
its citizens. 
On the other hand, citizens are also held accountable by their aggregate 
participation in electing the officials who determine their level of receiving expected 
outcomes through the making and implementation of the policies (Devarajan et al., 
2011, p. 6). People in most of developing countries lack accountability in many ways. 
However, political accountability is crucially important in making the political parties not 
to depend on peoples’ attachment to parties due to ethnic, social groups but regarding 
policies good for all people. The definition of political accountability in this thesis 
captures both people in leadership and in the context of social relations in line with 
Bovens's, (2010) definition49.  For instance, Keefer and Khemani (2009) researched the 
constituency development fund (CDF) in India and observed that legislators apply less 
effort in constituencies where people are attached to the political party. The implication 
is that CDF programs have less impact when people have more affiliation or attachment 
to the party, hence, lack of accountability regarding the social relations (mechanisms). 
Lewis (1992) in his article titled ‘Political transition and the dilemma of civil society in 
Africa’ rightly describes that civil society is substantially for consolidating free 
participation in politics to achieve common outcomes in the construction of democratic 
political space in mainly African countries. In other words, the public should have a say 
in the state’s public policy exercise and valued resources’ allocation. Hence, according 
to Lewis, civil society engages in a wide range of relations between state and society 
(1992, p.35).  
                                            
 
49 Both the broader concept, in which accountability is seen as a personal or organisational 
virtue, and the      narrower concept, in which accountability is defined as a social relation or 




In other words, people should be able to embrace both definitions of political 
accountability and should apply in choosing their leaders. After the introduction of 
democratic institutions in most of the SSC in the late 20th century, both states and civil 
societies in each country to be blamed for the lack of political accountability in leaders 
and the public. Firstly, many governments in the continent of Africa stifled sound civic 
engagements introduced by different civil societies’ organizations in the countries by 
playing clientelism politics as highlighted above. They also constrained the 
independence of civil society organizations by limiting their resources and using tactics 
of divide and rule between the civil society organizations. Consequently, the 
organizations that were supposed to have a consistent message of collectively 
mobilizing people to have a say in the role of the states regard public policies, allowed 
to fall in the trap of championing interests of their social group representation. Secondly, 
despite civil the societies’ successes in the introduction of human rights of people in the 
countries and fighting the injustices of governments, their political mediation between 
the state and the public fell short of common purposes to achieve empowering people 
economically and politically. How? Possibly, civil society organizations’ representatives 
focussed more on implementing global moral views than focussing first on context 
values relevance to political accountability (Bhandari, 2006, p. 7). It is rather explained 
rightly by Lewis (1992, p. 39) who says that the breadth of democratic public life in 
different countries hinges on the creation of political society by different levels of political 
professionals, and representatives’ capabilities in managing the transition process after 
the exit of autocratic governments. It seems to suggest that the current manifestations 
of democratic public life in developing countries lack values of stable and accountable 
political societies in the countries.  
Furthermore, Baumgarten and Amelung (2017) observe that even though the 
formation of political participation of citizens in developing countries rely on the level of 
engagement between the state and civil societies, global public play a crucial role in the 
political formation. However, they observed that differences in global institutional 
settings, formalized and non-formalized political participation in countries could lead to 
various outcomes of pollical participation of the citizens. Hence, the main actors in each 
country are the state and civil society that should be responsible and accountable to the 
formation of political participation in the light of diverse and ever-growing ideals of civil 
society in the global context. The increased presence of clientelism and patron-client 
relationships between the political leaders and the public in Sub-Saharan democratic 
institutions show forms of inadequate engagements between the states and civil 
societies. How? There seems to have been incongruence between some African 




elitist leaders in the countries took advantage and emboldened indigenous people to 
reject some of the universal ideals (Randall, 1988 cited in Bradley, 2005, p. 545). 
Moreover, these leaders attach themselves to the histories connected to pre-
colonial orientations, colonialism, and the slave trade aversions that blurs the genuine 
transition of the African democracies. This seems to be in line with Bhandari (2006, p. 
6) who notes that civic societies shaped by Western liberal thought implemented in post-
colonial contexts though useful, not adequate in the formation of the right political 
societies in the developing countries. For instance, Ede (2016) bemoans the lack of 
dialectical interactions between African context cultures and politics championed by civil 
societies create the condition of Afropolitanism50 that provides a little platform for 
ideological tolerance and progressive autonomous associational realms. Therefore, the 
championship of sustained socio-economic improvement in developing countries 
critically needs political populism whereby citizens shade off cultural misconceptions 
that have permeated developing countries societies for a very long time. The citizens 
should have a collective responsibility by being co-creators of a democratic public 
world51 imbued with skills, power, and determination needful in addressing the 
challenges in the societies (Boyte, 2003).  
Boyte further elaborated that in the new democracies citizens and civic 
organizations have a huge responsibility of working hard, being active and bold, 
independent partners in solving countries’ problems, contrary to being apolitical and 
unfruitful protesters (2003, p. 740). Nonetheless, the elites in the new democracies 
attempt to monopolize the political platform and economic power of the societies to 
dishearten any efforts to shape political populism. For example, Akinrinade (1999, p. 
238) notes that in countries where there is the presence of clientelism, patron-client 
relationships, democracy can be a disruptive process whereby existing infighting groups 
are given a platform to manifest freely. Hence, the very things such as the power of 
elites, democracy presuppose to gets rid of, the elites can polarise the political arena so 
that they can hold on the grip on the part they share ideologies (1999, p. 238). The 
enduring presence of clientelism and patron-client relationships in some SSC like 
Malawi seem to agree with Cheibub et al. (1996) who observed that countries with less 
than $1,000 GDP per capita struggle to enforce democratic principles than those with 
GDPPC over $6,000. In other words, citizens with less income are prone more to 
                                            
 
50 Viewed as a mere capitalist stunt against cosmopolitan values, hence, elitists’ orientations 
(Eze, 2014, p. 239). 
51 The public work as the "expenditure of visible efforts by ordinary citizens whose collective 
labour produces things or create processes of lasting civic value” (Boyte and Farr, 1997 cited in 




accepting the monetary benefits from clientelist in an exchange with votes than those 
with more able income. It seems to suggest that economic behavior of citizens might be 
embedded in social structure relations prevailing in the countries other than only in 
practical conventional wisdom advocated by classical and neoclassical theories 
(Granovetter, 1985). Social structure relations are manifested in the presidential address 
by Sklar (1983) cited in Fatton Jr. (1990, p.455) who lamented the failure of the political 
and economic agendas pioneered by dictators in many African countries by dismantling 
the tenets of democracy such as unity, cooperation, political and economic freedom; 
instead they steered ethnic divisions and favouritisms through corruption and injustice. 
Hence, the political participation of citizens impaired by structural relations fails to 
influence representative public interests in policy formulation and implementation by the 
leaders (Duru, 2017, p. 145). For example, Figure 6.27 below appears to indicate that 
in Botswana about 68% of the citizens think all ethnic groups are treated fairly in the 
country versus 32% who feel there is to some extent of unfair treatment due to ethnic 
identity. In contrast, in Malawi, about 54% of the citizens are of the view that ethnic 
identity plays an essential role for fair treatment comparing to only 46% who consider  
all ethnic groups are treated fairly in the country. That is an issue in Malawi due to many 
ethnic compositions as discussed in 6.3.3 above. 
Figure 6.27: Ethnic group treatment in Botswana and Malawi 
 
Notes. 54% of citizens in Malawi think sometimes, or often ethnic groups are mistreated comparing 
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Therefore, Figure 6.27 above seems to indicate the presence of ethnic 
fractionalization in Malawi. According to Van Staveren and Pervaiz (2017) observe that 
ethnic fractionization in most cases negatively and significantly impacts on economic 
growth (see for example the studies of Easterly and Levine, 1997; Alesina et al., 2003). 
However, the negative association of ethnic fractionalization and economic growth 
according to the van (Staveren and Pervaiz, 2017) are relegated to short or medium-
term periods than long term. Furthermore, Fine (2001); Harriss (2001); Dolfsma and 
Dannreuther (2003); Casey and Owen (2014) suggest that ethnic fractionalization might 
not be the cause behind the negative connection with economic growth, but, income 
inequality between ethnic groups. However, van Staveren and Pervaiz (2017) point out 
that the relationship between ethnic fractionalization and economic growth remained 
significant and harmful in many empirical studies in the literature. In other words, ethnic 
fractionalization (diversity) impacts economic growth negatively through features such 
as suspicion, fear, corruption, riots, conflict or violence between social groups by 
impairing social cohesion between ethnic groups as observed by (Kanbur et al., 2011). 
This seems contrary to diversity theory in literature whereby diversity in societies 
enhances economic growth through markets and cooperation between ethnic groups. 
Consensus agreements among different groups of people promote equality and 
tolerance in decision making according to the law of variety (Bear and Woolley, 2011; 
Zenger and Folkman, 2012; Desvaux et al., 2007). 
Nevertheless, the benefits of diversity are eroded when social exclusion between 
ethnic groups become evident.  For instance, Figure 6.28 below 59% of Malawi citizens 
think leaders should help own community more than treat all equally. In Botswana, about 






















Figure 6.28: Leaders help own community versus treat all equally 
 
         
Notes to Figure 6.16. Most of the citizens in Botswana and Malawi feel leaders should help more 
own community than treat all equally.  
 
It is alarming that in Malawi about 49% felt leaders actively should help own 
communities than treat all ethnic groups equally. Even though in Botswana significantly 
percentage felt leaders should help own community more than others, the accountable 
leadership help to bond people together that spurs economic growth in the country. 
Contrary, in Malawi inequality between ethnic groups through social exclusion 
(horizontal relationship), has a direct negative impact on economic growth as observed 
by (Stewart, 2016). Also, Perotti (1996); Alesina and Perotti (1996) observed that social 
exclusion manifested as socio-political instability impacts negatively economic growth 
through the distributional mechanism. Moreover, Easterly and Levine (1997) claim that 
in Africa there is a significant negative association between economic growth and ethnic 
fractionalization particularly in the period between 1960 and 1990. They attributed 
negative association to a monopoly for public services, and commercial distribution by 
dominant groups that further lead to lent seeking behaviors, and none cooperation 
among the ethnic groups. It seems to relate to the finding in the study by Borooah 
(2005:399) that unequal treatment between groups of people leads to inequality of 
household incomes between the groups. 
On the other hand, in societies where people have bonded together socially 





















































































































growth. For instance, Singh (2011) researched an Indian state of Kerala which has many 
ethnic groups, yet, his findings show that residents worked with each other very well. 
This being the case, the residents were politically tied, and all felt belongingness and 
supportive to the public goods provision leading to higher levels of socio-economic 
development. There are other studies conducted in different contexts on the same topic 
namely: Algan et al., (2016) in France; Tolsma et al., (2009) for the Netherlands; Silver 
and Messeri, (2014) for New York City, and  Letki, (2008) British neighbourhoods in the 
UK. They all concluded that socio-economic deprivation among the ethnic groups 
erodes community social cohesion that in turn lead to a weak economic performance in 
the respective communities. This seems to suggest that how the ethnic groups are 
positioned socially in the countries and how the individuals relate to each other 
determine the levels of social cohesion which play a crucial role in the economic 
performance of the countries. Failure to address low levels of cohesion between ethnic 
groups in most cases lead to conflicts such as those taking place in Rwanda, Sudan, 
South Africa, Uganda, and Zaire experiences of weak economic growth are manifested 
(Bush and Saltarelli, 2000).  
Hence, the views of participants that leaders should actively help own community 
than others particularly in Malawi erodes SOC and CPR which are essential for 
economic growth. Duru notes that lack of trust in democratic transitions push the citizens 
to private realms away from public to avoid frustrations, leading to low political 
participation in developing countries (2017, p. 148). Even though political participation 
is vital in the democratic transition in developing countries, there is yet more admired 
aspect expounded by Boyte and Kari (1996) as directed citizen action to public work 
which earns their ultimate goal of satisfaction than personal achievement. Moreover, it 
seems Botswana sets an excellent example of the relationship between leaders and 
their citizens. If in the democratic transition period in countries such as Malawi, both the 
government representatives and civil society organizations could emphasize public 
participation as one of the critical components of democratic institutions, then this 
orientation can embody citizens to be co-creators of the public world.  It seems to 
suggest that SOC and CPR are essential aspects in matters concerning good 
governance because out of them the accountability and responsibility of civil servants 
who exercise considerable discretions in charging their duties in public bureaucracies 
originate. While acknowledging the fact that decisive leaders are vital to enforcing policy 
implementation, bureaucratic personnel are equally crucial in molding public policies. 
Kranz (1976); Krislov (1974) state that each bureaucratic individual has attitudes and 
values that influence their behaviors originated by socialization since their childhood. 
Hence, representative bureaucracy is desirable in democratic institutions so that all 




board. The bureaucratic representation may vary from country to country, but, generally 
in developing countries to have sound representation in the bureaucracies is when the 
most vulnerable are considered in the processes of policy formulation and 
implementation. According to Selden (2015) presence of minority in bureaucratic 
personnel shares values and attitudes with those in minorities, hence, helping to 
formulate policies that are effective in providing their needs. However, Meier and Nigro 
(1976) claimed that representative bureaucracy might not produce the desired results 
due to the conditions practiced in the organizational hierarchy. The organizational values 
and norms may be inculcated into employees whereby representative bureaucracy 
theory can be weakened.  
Alberts (2009) in her article titled ‘how Constitutions Constrain’ explains that the 
fundamental purpose of democratic constitutions is to control the power of the political 
leaders as they charge their duties. The public expects that the political leaders will 
exercise their authority within the democratic norms as per the constitution. However, 
Alberts observed that the expected democratic norms could vary from country to country 
due to historical trajectories’ differences reflected in their norms and values (2009, p. 
127). Therefore, the differences in democratic institutions among countries, also, hinges 
on how the elites adhere to the established norms in line with democratic procedures 
and rules in the constitution. Failure of political elites to strictly follow the democratic 
rules and laws, citizens’ constitutional right to participate in public spheres concerning 
their interests such as socio-economic development is undermined. 
Similarly, Zakaria (1997, p. 22) argues that illiberal democracies are being 
watched taking hold of transitional democratic countries whereby the elected officials 
undermine the constitutional rules and laws to pursue their interests at the expense of 
peoples’ freedom rights. Therefore, participation in elections does not necessarily mean 
the country is following democratic rules or laws. Hence, Zakaria concluded that 
advanced countries give contradicting information by emphasizing multiparty elections 
while at the same time failing to enforce the canons of liberal governance in democratic 
transition countries (1997).   
Nonetheless, Clark (2000) claimed that despite democracy implementation 
shortfalls, democratic elections remain a vital feature in changing the regimes that do 
not adhere to the tenets of democracy through the pressure by international community 
together with civil societies organizations in the transition countries (Ekiert et al., 2007, 
p. 13). Kapstein and Converse (2008) explain that failure of regulating the power of the 
executive branch, stifles other arms of government, hence, investors, and agents of civil 
society doubt if the policies for the general welfare of the public could be formulated and 
implemented. This being the case, the ultimate goals of democratic institutions of 




the process of consolidating democratic institutions in developing countries. Even more, 
worrying for democratic institutions in developing countries is the recent nationalist 
waves in established democracies in USA, Canada, and Western Europe. For instance, 
Mounk (2018) notes that for decades democratic institutions have excelled in the 
advanced countries and there was consistent and broad political consensus among the 
people that provided a sense of future in the world. However, in recent years the most 
developed democracies are experiencing polarised politics, and people seem to shun 
away from the tenets of democratic institutions (Galston, 2017, p. 23; Mounk, 2018, p. 
99). For example, the rise of Donald Trump in the USA, Marine Le Pen in France, Brexit 
in the UK, and Viktor Orbán in Hungary to mention a few. The rising of populist 
movements in the advanced democracies could embolden the tendencies of clientelism 
and patron-client relationships in transition democracies. Why? In some way, the civil 
society organizations championing the tenets of democracies in transition countries 
could be in a dilemma due to the divide taking place politically in the Western countries. 
Hence, the elites in developing countries could rejuvenate their ambitions of swaying 
citizens away from democracy by shaping the developing countries institutions. 
Equivocally, according to Galston (2017), the rise of populism in advanced countries 
might be due to the failure of the elected most liberal governments to meet the expected 
political and economic policies by the public. Hence, recently, the public seems to have 
lost confidence in the liberal governments, and the support waned away. However, 
Huntington (1991) argues that democratization in the developing countries remains the 
most significant political development internationally in the twentieth century. Therefore, 
Malawi leaders need to embrace good governance and social mobility policies that could 
help to bridge differences due to tribes of the citizens in the country to reasonably reduce 
inequality among people in Malawi as suggested by (Arun et al., 2016, P 535). 
 
GCI defined as the productivity and efficiency of countries can help to explain 
economic growth differences in Malawi and Botswana. The findings summarized in 
Table 6.1 above indicate that the competitive environment is crucial for consistent and 
robust economic growth in the countries. Therefore, this sub-section is going to 
scrutinize some factors that create competitiveness differences between Malawi and 
Botswana. The factors used for comparison of competitiveness between Botswana and 
Malawi may not address all the conditions for providing a competitive environment in the 
countries. However, may highlight the potential weaknesses in the present application 
of competitive environment mainly in the slow-growing economy countries. For instance, 
the competitiveness of countries could be due to the differences in gross capital 
formation (GCF). GCF could illustrate capability differences in production between 




Botswana and Malawi as observed by (Cohen and Uphoff, 1980, p. 216). Figure 6.29 
below illustrates the utility capability differences between Botswana and Malawi whereby 
GCF showed as a percentage of GDP is higher in Botswana than Malawi. In the same 
vein, the figure also indicates that Gross Fixed Capital Formation (GFCF) is higher in 
Botswana than Malawi. GFCF is the net saved after subtracting consumption from GCF. 
The net saving increases capital stock levels (RKN) when invested in the economy, 
hence increasing the capacity to produce. Also, Figure 6.29 below reveals that the Gross 
Fixed Capital Formation in Private Sector (GFCFPS) is higher in Malawi than Botswana. 
Why? It seems to suggest that private sector in Malawi have a responsibility to utilize 
the resources they have to survive in the respective competitive businesses.  
For example, Figure 6.30 below shows differences in the ownership of firms in 
Botswana and Malawi. The figure reveals that the ownership of firms by the government 
in Botswana declines with time while in Malawi the ownership by government increases 
with time. Also, the ownership of the firms by foreigners in Botswana increases with time 
while in Malawi declines over time. It seems government ownership policies are not 
productive of capital formation in Malawi and instead increase consumption possibly due 
to inappropriate use of resources. Therefore, for Malawi to enhance capital formation 
need to diversify government’s acquisitions or ownership and increase competition by 
allowing more foreign investors into the country as observed by (Arun and Turner, 2004). 
This seems to explain why Botswana manufactured goods in Figure 6.32 below add 
more value to the economy than in Malawi. Malawi consumes more per capita as a 
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Figure 6.30: Ownership of firms in Botswana and Malawi 
  
Notes. Government’s firm ownership decreases over time in Botswana while in Malawi increases 
 rapidly.  
 
The household consumption in Malawi in Figure 6.31 below is much higher over 
the period than Botswana. The differences in household consumption between 
Botswana and Malawi also illustrate differences in utilization capability. It appears to 
suggest that Botswana effectively formulates policies relevant to the needs of its 
citizens and mobilizes its resources to meet the targets desired in a competitive 
environment. In contrast, Malawi ineffectively directs the policies and resources they 
have to unproductive ends such as diverting resources for personal gains of the people 
in authorities. Therefore, the differences in utilization capability between Botswana and 
Malawi could be due to corruption malpractice as suggested by (Collier et al., 2008a). 
For example, graph 4 in Figure 6.34 below shows the household consumption in Malawi 
was lower in the years 2014 and 2015 while the gross capital formation and capital 
stock levels were higher in these two years than other years over the period. Why? 
 According to SOAS University of London, (2013) under the leadership of Dr. 
Joyce Banda (Her Excellency former President of the Republic of Malawi), financial 
maladministration was uncovered and was dubbed cash gate of public money. As a 
result, Malawi did not receive budgetary support from the international bodies such as 
IMF, the World Bank, and developed countries. After a change of government in May 
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flaws in the Malawi financial systems. Hence, the new the leaders were forced to utilize 
the available resources for their survival which might have led to better performance of 
Malawi in the years 2014 and 2015. Therefore, graph 4 in Figure 6.34 seems to illustrate 
the point that Botswana utilizes its resources better than Malawi. 
Moreover, Malawi could catch up with Botswana regarding economic growth 
even though there could be differences in richness of natural resources in the two 
countries. The differences in utilization capacity between Malawi and Botswana could 
be as previously demonstrated in sub-section 6.4.1 whereby governance is a crucial 
element in enhancing competitive settings in the countries. Therefore, the analysis 
presented in this sub-section seems to explain why RKN presented in Table 6.1 above 
fails to enhance economic growth in OLS3 (developing), OLS1SSC, and 
SlowOLS1SSC models. Table 6.1 also indicates that RKN in FastOLS1SSC model 
insignificantly reduces economic growth due to possibly the formulation and 
implementation of policies that enhance gross capital formation as discussed above.   
Of course, the competitiveness of countries also depends on the accountability 
of the institutions. For instance, according to information at BBC: Botswana (2017), 
Botswana is one of the most stable countries politically in the African continent with the 
long-term uninterrupted democratic system. Botswana is also known as a peaceful and 
an open society encouraging live debates of ideas. These seem very important in 
political participation and engagement of the citizens so that they have best ideas for 
dealing with the challenges the country faces. That may also increase the 
competitiveness of the country. On the other hand, Malawi politics show signs of 
instability in that after independence there was an authoritarian government until early 
1990 were when the country changed into the multiparty democratic system as 
discussed in sub-section 6.3.2 above. Since, then democratic institutions have taken 
shape in the country (BBC: Malawi, 2017). The undemocratic tendencies of the 
government towards opposition parties, media, and academic institutions discourages 
live debates among its citizens. Hence, differences in political environments between 
Malawi and Botswana seem also to give Botswana competitive advantage in foreign 
business investments over Malawi.  
Other attributes such as Rule of Law (ROL), Regulatory Quality (REQ), Voice 
and Accountability (VOA), and GEF are all critical for the success of the aggressive 
policy implemented in both Malawi and Botswana. For instance, the competition policy 
in Malawi was sanctioned in 1997, and its three objectives were reducing business entry 
barriers; decreasing restrictive business practices; and protecting consumers. The 
lower scores of attributes in Malawi in Figure 6.13 above suggest that the 




Commission (MCFTC) met difficult challenges, hence, failing to enhance 
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The differences in the implementation of aggressive policies are evidenced by 
the competitive attribute scores in both countries whereby Botswana has higher scores 
than Malawi see Figure 6.13 above. For example, the competition policy in Botswana 
was adopted in the year 2005. However, due to political will, by 2007 it was drafted into 
law. Moreover, Botswana’s better implementation of aggressive policies demonstrates 
that it adheres to the ROL, REQ, VOA, and GEF better than Malawi. Figure 6.13 above 
also illustrates the better business environment in Botswana than in Malawi. Hence, the 
differences in competitiveness between Malawi and Botswana depends on 
environmental attributes highlighted in the figure.  Consequently, better conditions for 
competition as indicated in Figure 6.13 above in Botswana, Botswana seems to have a 
higher share of manufactured exports than Malawi. For example, Malawi is ranked 135 
out of 143 countries regarding manufactured exports while Botswana is ranked 79 as 
illustrated in Table 6.2 above. Furthermore, Figure 6.32 below demonstrates the value 
of goods Botswana and Malawi profit from the exports of manufactured goods. The 
value of manufactured goods in Botswana is very high comparing to Malawi 
manufactured goods.  
Figure 6.32: Value of goods exported from Botswana and Malawi 
 
 Notes. The value of other goods apart from manufactured goods are relatively low in both 
              countries. 
 
 That being the case, Figures 6.29, 6.30, 6.31, and 6.32 above demonstrate that 
GCI explains economic growth differences between Botswana and Malawi. Therefore, 
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is vital to the enhancement of economic growth in the SSC region. That is in line with 
Galvan (2016, p. 2-4) who noted that African countries lag in GCI compared to other 
regions. Therefore, improvement in environmental attributes and utility capacity in 
countries would enhance economic growth considerably in the SSC region. Of course, 
economic growth depends on many different explanations, but the models demonstrated 
in Table 6.1 above provide some of the critical aspects of economic growth in the 
samples of countries addressed. The next factor to be explained is how foreign aid (AID) 
explains economic growth in Botswana and Malawi. 
 
Dijkstra (2018) claims that AID initiative to developing countries was mainly 
directed to hooking these countries from adopting communism system during the time 
of cold war. He, however, pointed out that after the end of the cold war the objective of 
aid to developing countries was shifted to the reinforcement of democratic accountability 
and human rights. Similarly, Dunning (2004) suggests that in the cold war period AID 
had significantly and negatively impacted introduction of democracy mainly in African 
states because the conditionality of AID relied on a geographical position between the 
Soviet Union and the western countries. Nevertheless, during the post-cold war period, 
African leaders lost leverage for conditions of AID and were forced to implement 
democratic institutions as conditional for AID by the Western donors. Hence, AID seems 
to have had a negative relationship to democracy in cold war period and a positive 
relationship in the post-war period. Nonetheless, Hoebink (2006) observes that in the 
1980’s donors noted little progress in democratic and human rights implementation in 
developing countries. Hence, they focussed their goal on the creation of effective 
governance in the AID recipient countries.  
The nature of the disagreements of the effectiveness of AID particularly in 
developing countries possibly lead to Paris Declaration on aid effectiveness whereby 
the extent of ownership of AID projects between donors and developing countries were 
discussed regarding the alignment of AID to local systems and local priorities (Paris 
High-Level Forum, 2005). They believed that this could enhance harmonization and 
cooperation between donors and developing countries. However, this approach is 
without setbacks, for example, Bigsten and Tengstam (2015) agree that aid cooperation 
between donor and recipient countries reduce donor transaction costs and provide a 
pleasant atmosphere of donors achieving their objectives. However, it would at times 
compromise poverty reduction usefulness due to loss of political control to recipient 
countries. Hereafter, the donor countries might compromise some of the intended 
objectives against the importance of the political control. 




Nonetheless, according to Bigstein et al. (2011) donor countries in the presence 
of political incongruities, they might develop other mechanisms of monitoring the 
recipient country by collecting governance information. If the inappropriate behavior of 
the recipient country is identified, donor countries would circulate amongst themselves 
and enforce conditions to deter such behavior. However, coordination among the donor 
countries may face challenges. Hence, enforcement of the Paris Declaration on aid 
effectiveness could not yield desired outcomes. For instance, Wood et al. (2011) 
observed that some countries not part of Paris Declaration such as Brazil, China, and 
Venezuela do not enforce conditions declared by other donor countries. While on the 
same, Moyo (2009) states that lack of responsibilities of African leaders incites other 
people mainly from developed countries to fill in the leadership vacuum of providing 
quality services to a sizeable African populace. Moyo, further questioned the 
conditionalities provided by the donors to curb ineffectiveness of aid to developing 
countries whereby the institutions such as World Bank and International Monetary Fund 
exist by lending money out to countries (2009). Similarly, Easterly (2002) argues that 
despite the good intentions of the international institutions such as the World Bank (WB) 
and International Monetary Fund (IMF), their bureaucracies appear to hinder output-
oriented services targeting the poor.  Easterly, claimed that the intended recipients have 
no direct link to give the real feedback, instead are represented by their governments 
who might have used the intended aid for other targets other than the one's aid was 
intended to achieve.   
Besides, Moss et al. (2008) claimed that after their review of evidence of the 
relationship between inflows of AID versus local revenues in Sub-Saharan countries, 
they concluded that countries that consistently receive more AID inflows are less 
accountable to their citizens than the countries that rely on revenues collected locally. 
Similarly, Asongu (2015) argues that taxation, political accountability and foreign aid on 
53 African countries concluded that countries heavily rely on AID are weak in 
governance indicators than those who depend on local tax avenues. Nevertheless, 
some studies such as Jones and Finn (2016) claim positive relationship particularly 
inflow of AID to developing countries on good governance. However, they acknowledge 
that the aggregate inflow of aid to developing countries has a minimal positive effect on 
economic development. Furthermore, Dijkstra (2018) researched on aid and good 
governance and examined its unintended effects in developing countries. He concluded 
that AID improves governance in the countries and improves the task of controlling 
corruption.  
The findings in this thesis summarized in Table 6.1 above indicate that AID 
significantly reduces GDPPC (GDPPCG) in OLS1SSC and SlowOLS1SSC models. In 




reason why Botswana and Malawi were chosen to be typical cases representing fast 
and slow growth countries see details in section 6.2 above.  
Generally, the findings seem to agree with other findings in the literature, but, 
the finding that FastOLS1SSC model has the less negative impact of foreign aid than 
SlowOLS1SSC model necessitates further exploration. Figure 6.33 below shows that 
the average dependency ratio in Malawi is almost six times higher than Botswana over 
15 years period. Also, the dependency ratio is declining with time in Botswana while in 
Malawi is increasing with time. What does this imply in managing their economies? 
Figure 6.34 below shows four graphs numbered one to four depicting capital stock 
(RKN), RKN formation, total factor productivity (TFP), and house consumption (HSECO) 
respectively. Graph 1 in the same figure shows Botswana has higher levels each year 
from 2001 until 2013. Malawi has surprising higher levels of RKN in 2013 and 2014. 
Why?  Capital stock levels cannot explain Malawi's better performance in 2014 and 2015 
from the previous years because Botswana had much higher capital stock levels than 
Malawi. On the other hand, graph 2 indicates that there are notable differences in gross 
capital formation between Botswana and Malawi.  
Figure 6.33: Dependency ratio differences between Malawi and Botswana  
                                                                                                                                                                
                                                                                                                                                                




















































































Furthermore, Graph 3 below in Figure 6.34 below shows that Botswana has 
higher TFP than Malawi. The productivity in both countries has been declining over the 
period from 2001 to 2015. It may suggest that both countries might have improved on 
input production factors that each year chips away the TFP of the countries. For 
instance, gross capital formation in graph 2 shows a steady increase of RKN formation 
in Botswana but not the same in Malawi. The differences in RKN formation between 
Malawi and Botswana illustrate capability differences in production between the two 
countries (Cohen and Uphoff, 1980, p. 216). The differences in RKN formation could be 
due to the point illustrated in graph 4 in Figure 6.34 below. This graph shows that Malawi 
household consumption (HSECO) is much higher in each year over the period than 
Botswana. The differences in HSECO might illustrate differences in utilization capability. 
It is further developed in the next sub-section. 
6.4.4.1     Impact of AID in Botswana and Malawi economies  
Graph 4 in Figure 6.34 below shows that the households in Malawi have higher 
consumptions than Botswana suggests that Malawi attains lower investments and 
savings than Botswana. The implication of this is that RKN formation in Malawi is limited 
compared to Botswana, as noted in graph 2 in Figure 6.34 below. All this seems to 
suggest that Malawi could lead to lower capital levels and hence lower economic growth 
than Botswana. It is contrary to the assumption of the neoclassical theory that countries 
with lower capitals grow faster than those with higher capitals. The analysis in this 
section confirms the findings in chapters 4 and 5 whereby countries with lower capitals 
fail to catch up with those with higher capitals. Higher dependency ratio and higher 






















    
                                   Notes. This figure demonstrates the managing capacity of Botswana and Malawi regarding their economies.   











































































































































































































































































































































































Graph 4: Household consumption at current PPPs




However, what about AID money coming into the country? Figure 6.35 below 
shows three indicators of AID received from developed countries over the period from 
2008 to 2014. AID indicated by green color is the net total of official development 
assistance (ODA) from all donors to Botswana. In the year 2008 Botswana received 
about 20% of the AID, and this aid kept declining to about 5% in 2014. In contrast, 
Malawi received about 30% of ODA from all donors in 2008 and kept on increasing to 
about 40% in 2014. 
Furthermore, both Botswana and Malawi received ODA as countries in the DAC 
list. Botswana received about 20% in 2008 and declined to about 4% in 2014 while 
Malawi received about 15% in 2008 then this AID increased to about 25% in 2014. 
Lastly, Botswana received about 2% ODA (multilateral) in 2008 which remained 
constant until 2014 while Malawi received about 17% of ODA (multilateral) in 2008 which 
increased steadily to 20% in 2014. The observations described above seem to indicate 
that Botswana utilized assistance to deal with the needs of the country while Malawi 
failed to utilize this assistance as demonstrated in Figure 6.35 below. Malawi seems to 
be a consuming and a dependant syndrome society while Botswana seems to be a 
responsible and self-reliant society, this is further discussed in the next sub-section. 
Figure 6.35: AID to Malawi in different forms from ODA ever increasing  





6.4.4.2    Self-reliance, dependency, and economic growth   
Self-reliance concept is mainly associated with economic growth using available 
resources and ability of the citizens in the country (Galtung et al., 1980; Preiswerk, 
1980). This concept is also linked with self-help and mutual-help, cooperation and 
commitment of people who are capable of meeting the needs faced by the community 
(Ghai et al., 1977; Fonchingong and Fonjong, 2003, pp.199-200). Therefore, self-
reliance concept seems to relate to utilization capacity demonstrated in Figure 6.34 
above. In contrast, dependency syndrome takes place when people capable of doing 
things for themselves rely on other people to do for them. Consequently, dependency 
mode of thinking creates economic dependency which seems to be the norm in some 
countries in the SSC region. Why?  
According to Mudimbe (1988, p. 3), the psychological dependency syndrome in 
developing countries, particularly SSC region, was inculcated by colonizers whereby it 
was the norm for subservient attitude to be embraced by the colonized. He associated 
socio-economic challenges presently in SSC to the submissive orientation of people in 
the region. That seems to resonate well with the words of former President Barack 
Obama of the United States of America who observed that “Africa’s future is up to 
Africans,” in other words, Africans have to own solutions to the challenges they face to 
give their citizens better conditions of life (Quartapelle, 2010). The concepts of self-
reliance and dependency conditions are the opposite ends of the ownership spectrum 
of economic growth, particularly in SSC. The rationale of ownership determines policy 
choices, commitment to chosen policy-direction, participatory governance, 
administrative and technocratic managerial capacities as observed by (Castel-Branco, 
2008, p. 5). However, the ownership of these concepts reflects the socio-cultural and 
political attitudes or perceptions prevailing in the societies. Moreover, these perceptions 
and leanings could affect economic growth in countries differently.  
 Englebert (2000) states that most countries in the SSC region have poorly 
performed regarding economic development compared to other regions of the world. 
He, however, observes that within this region there is the substantial inconsistency of 
economic performances of the countries due to differences in intra-cultural experiences.  
In other words, within the region, few countries such as Botswana, Mauritius, and Cape 
Verde have generally performed better than most of the countries. Why? To explain 
considerable variation among Sub-Saharan countries, Englebert (2000) used the neo-
patrimonial theory by observing the degree of incompatibleness between pre- and post-
colonial institutions. He also argued that the extent of the collision in a country between 
pre-colonial and post-colonial institutions determine the capability of the country versus 




performance of economic growth in most of the African countries to the survival of the 
African leaders who grabbed their leadership from colonial masters by advocating neo-
patrimonial strategies (Jackson and Rosberg, 1982; Sandbrook, 1986; Lewis, 1996 cited 
in Englebert, 2000). 
Moreover, most of the African leaders had little interest in the artificial polities 
instituted by colonial masters but instead cherished pre-colonial peasant type of 
societies. This type of affiliation between the leaders and citizens according to Scott, 
(1972) is called a patron-client relationship. Scott explained that bureaucracies and 
political parties infiltrated by such relationship undercut established formal institutions in 
the countries (1972). It seems to suggest that the bureaucrats in respective positions 
might charge their duties by following intimate connections other than the duties vested 
them constitutionally. Also, political parties and their leaders champion the interests of 
the affiliated groups at the expense of all citizens in countries. In societies where most 
people are poverty-stricken, unfair distribution of the resources can be a stimulus for 
conflict. Also, people can be vulnerable to the elites in exchange for their security in a 
very unfriendly environment. For instance, Kaufman (1974) argued that the theory of 
patron-client relationship is generally applied to a hostile environment whereby the 
people with the low status submit to those with social, political, and economic power in 
the environments described above. In other words, the clients in the low-status type of 
life are characterized by the extreme scarcity of necessary things to their lives. Powell 
(1970) ascribe to such environment as peasant society whereby people rely on 
cultivation with limited resources, hence, hindering their productivity. 
Consequently, people are prone to a lack of essential things.  According to 
Powell, the verity of lack of necessary things leads to patterns of social relations that 
help to navigate the challenges and for security reasons (1970). Some social 
relationship patterns in peasant societies may fall within the patron-client relationship 
whereby there is reciprocity of goods and services. However, principally the low-status 
clients obtain in the form of provisions or security from threats while the high status 
(patron) may get personal services or administrative services such as being elected into 
the respective office of influence. The behavior of the low-status clients according to 
Smith (1776) cited in Jancsics (2014, p. 359) seem to practice utility maximization since 
they will benefit socially (Ansell, 2018; Fox, 1997). The discussions about neo-patrimony 
and patron-client theories to some extent recount realities in developing countries. Does 
this reflect the situation in Malawi? Possibly, Figure 6.35 above shows Malawi receives 
more aid than Botswana, yet economic conditions are better in Botswana than Malawi 
see Table 6.2 above. In contrast, Ryan (1998) states that people in the West (developed 
countries) perceive that democratic governments (whereby officials are elected in 




public. Hence, politicians are elected in offices basing on issues other than the money 
they have raised or spent on campaigns. Ryan warns that in societies where politics do 
not reflect hardship realities of people could experience apathy when people withdraw 
from participating in politics.  That seems to be the case in Malawi because Table 6.7 
and Figure 6.21 above indicate Malawi citizens are not happy with the performance of 
their leaders. However, it might also suggest that the elites in Malawi (slow-growing 
developing countries) are so sophisticated in mobilizing people of low status mainly in 
rural areas of the countries by introducing cheap and short-term policies to prolong their 
grip on power in the countries. In other words, the relationships between leaders and 
people in developing countries might wholly depend on individual accountability other 
than the public accountability. Sandbrook (1972), also, acknowledges that instead of 
people of the same social classes from all the ethnic, social groups uniting for collective 
welfare, they pursue their material interests associative with the patron-client network. 
Hence, he noted that people who lack material things easily sell out their votes to social, 
economic and influential people in the form of Clientelism.  
 Why is it that some of the leaders in the SSC region seem to engage theories 
such as neo-patrimonial, patron-client, clientelism, and principal-agent? Probably, most 
of them are afraid to champion political institutions reforms because they think can 
create electorate uncertainty, hence, fear of not being elected to the office of power and 
control. Alternatively, they create AID dependency syndrome to retain power so that 
they can misuse countries’ resources by misleading desperate to help populace to 
depend on their help through neo-patrimonial, patron-client, clientelism, and principal-
agent theories. These reasons may not apply to all countries, but help to understand 
why AID is working in countries such as Botswana but not others like Malawi. The High 
household consumption tendencies in Malawi as illustrated in Figure 6.31 above might 
explain misappropriation or misuse of the resources by leaders. Furthermore, such 
behavior of leaders appears to fuel most of the conflicts in the region. Hence, good 
governance from the executive branch could enhance cooperation among the ethnic, 
social groups and promote policies that will deliver outcomes for all people. That is 
demonstrated in Figure 6.20 above whereby Botswana citizens overwhelmingly support 
policy implementations of their leaders. Therefore, to some extent, Englebert (2000) is 
right that the capacity of Sub-Saharan countries to develop economically, socially, and 
politically is a function of the degree of legitimacy and similarity with pre-colonial 
institutions. What is needed to maximize foreign aid? The next sub-section will explore 
more on the responsibilities of leaders and individuals.  
6.4.4.3    Leaders and citizens’ responsibilities (FER), and economic growth 
Figure 6.33 above highlights the vulnerability of Malawi citizens to people in 




could be due to ethnic group differences that affect some forms of behavior regarding 
solutions to poor economic conditions in Malawi (Cox et al., 1991, p. 839) see also sub-
section 6.3.3 above. The failure of the leaders in Malawi to reduce poverty despite 
support from donor community confirms the views of people as shown in Tables 6.5, 6.6 
and 6.7 above. By way of contrast, Figure 6.36 below shows FER in countries such as 
Ghana, Rwanda, South Africa, and Zimbabwe collected from World Values Surveys 
from 2010 to 2014. It appears that 72% of the participants in Rwanda mentioned that 
FER is vital in let the children learn at home. It also shows that Rwanda has the highest 
GDP average growth rates compared to the other African countries as indicated in 
Figure 6.37 below. Figures 6.36 below indicates that Rwanda has the most responsible 
citizens.  
Figure 6.36: Responsibility attitude essential for economic growth  
     
 
Notes. FER attitude is captured from WVS from 2011 to 2014.  
While Figure 6.37 below shows Rwanda has the highest annual GDP per capita 
growth. The annual average growth in Africa is about 5%, Rwanda 8%, Ghana 7%, 
South Africa 3%, and Zimbabwe 3%. The responsibility of people in Rwanda is also 
indicated in the responsibilities of the leadership in steering the country to economic 
development. That is very different from what is happening to most of the other countries 
such as South Africa and Zimbabwe. Therefore, social cultural and political conditions 
contribute to countries’ self-reliant attitude or dependent syndrome as illustrated by 




in the production functions does not explain the real income disparities in the countries. 
These characteristics, say for example of dependency orientation in Malawi, lead to high 
household consumptions confirming the significant reduction of GDPPC by AID in 
chapter 5. 
Figure 6.37:  GDPPCG annual growths in four countries  
      
  Notes. Rwanda is another shining example for economic growth in SSC.  
 The observations in the model for six developing countries in Table 6.1 above 
indicates that FER significantly enhances economic growth in the countries. Hence, it 
is desired to admonish people in various developing countries to embrace the 
responsible attitude for stimulating economic growth in the countries. Having explained 
possible reasons why different outcomes of Aid in Botswana and Malawi, next sub-
section will discuss security (SEC) and economic growth. 
 
Generally, the unsustainable economic development in most of the SSC has 
been attributed to the prevalence of civil wars in the region. For instance, Guillaumont 
et al. (1999) state that political instability in SSC between 1970 and 1990 explained the 
limited economic growth in the countries. According to Klosek (2018), civil wars are likely 
to take place when there are high levels of valuable deposits of natural resources. 
Income gained through illegitimate sales of the natural resources say for example by the 
rebels is inappropriately directed for buying more firearms to gain superiority over others 
for more control of natural rich territories at the expense of the loss of innocent lives in 
the controlled territories by the rebels (see for example (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004). 




Unquestionably, the loss of lives and prolonged civil conflicts in some of the developing 
countries constrain the effectiveness of institutions or the capacity building of the 
countries in providing excellent public services to their citizens (Reno, 1999). Ironically, 
the cause of conflicts either by internal or external sources rest on the wisdom and 
intelligence of elected officials mirrored in legislation to effectively counter the conflicts 
(Aristotle, 2009/330 BC). Wisdom and intelligence relate to higher or lower thinking 
ability whereby higher ability according to Rindermann, (2013) improves current 
environments such as societies, institutions, and quality of peoples’ lives regarding 
health and real income per capita.  
Even though, conflicts or civil wars negatively affect economic growth in SSC 
region as discussed above; most of the countries adopted in this study, have not had 
conflicts or civil wars for some time. Nevertheless, the definition of security in Table 3.2 
in chapter 3 does include the possibility of conflicts or wars in the region. Table 6.1 
summarizes the findings in chapter 5. The findings show that security (SEC) significantly 
enhances GDPPC in OLS1SSC model and SlowOLS1SSC model, while in 
FastOLS1SSC model insignificantly enhances GDPPCG. However, further investigation 
of data shows that SEC was inversely coded 0 to 4, where 0 denoted no security fear, 
conflicts, or robberies while anything above 0 denoted presence of fear and other things. 
Hence, the results instead suggest that SEC significantly reduces economic growth in 
OLS1SSC and SlowOLS1SSC models, while in FastOLS1SSC model insignificantly 
reduces economic growth. Therefore, further analysis in this chapter is performed in 
Botswana and Malawi as typical cases for analysis to explain why differences in SEC 
impact on GDPPCG in SlowOLS1SSC and FastOLS1SSC models. 
Figure 6.38 below compares participants’ views from three different questions 
concerning security (SEC) in both countries. Graph 1 shows 46% of people in Malawi 
feared crime at home comparing to 45% in Botswana. Similarly, about 13% people in 
graph 2 feared something stolen home while in Botswana only 10% feared such crime. 
Also, graph 3 indicates 6% feared being physically attacked at home in Malawi and 
Botswana only 4%. Generally, graphs from 1 to 3 seem to indicate that most people did 
not fear something stolen home or being physically attacked. Nonetheless, Figure 38 
seems to suggest that Malawi participants feared crime at home more than Botswana 
participants. Chiefly, there is a significant fear of participants in both countries. Hence, 
the SEC of their lives and property need improvement. However, exploring further the 
fear of crime at home, it shows that in both countries the degree of fear seems to 
increase with time as indicated in Figure 6.39 below.  
On the other hand, Figure 6.40 below reveals that most of the participants who 
never feared crimes were not employed. It seems to suggest that people who were 




that property. The observations in Figure 6.38 seems to agree with the findings in Table 
6.1 above whereby SEC SlowOLS1SSC (Malawi) reduces GDPPCG significantly, while 
in FastOLS1SSC (Botswana) insignificantly reduces GDPPC. Furthermore, Figure 6.39 
below indicates that participants in Malawi who never feared crime increased with time 
while in Botswana decreased with time. On the other hand, participants who twice or 
often feared crime in both Malawi and Botswana increased over time. Moreover, 
participants who always feared crime at home increased with time in both countries, but, 
there was a much higher percentage in Botswana than Malawi.  
Figure 6.38: SEC concerns in Malawi and Botswana 
 
 
Notes. Graphs 1 to 3 show the fear of crimes in homes, something is stolen home, and people 




















































































Graph 3: How often people physically attacked




Figure 6.39: Fear of crime at home over time  
                                                                                                
 
Notes. Fear of crime over time in Malawi and Botswana 
 
Figure 6.40: SEC concerns versus employment status  
 
Notes. The participants not employed felt more SEC than the employed.  
 
This observation seems to verify earlier findings in Figure 5.9 in chapter 5 
whereby SEC concerns were increasing with increasing level of economic development 
in OLS1SSC model. The observations made in Figures 6.38, 6.39, and 6.40 above raise 




































































































































more questions about how SEC impacts economic growth in Malawi and Botswana. 
There could be different ways of explaining this, but in this study, the focus is on how 
the two countries perform in investment index. Investment can be either foreign or local, 
and high SEC costs can subdue this investment. According to Ndulu et al. (2007) respect 
of property rights happens when there is judicial effectiveness and the rule of law, and 
it invites FDI into the country. Hence, the comparison is made between Malawi and 
Botswana in SEC costs out of firms’ annual sales and percentage of firms who claim 
lack of SEC limits investment as illustrated in Figure 6.41 below. SEC costs in Malawi 
as a percentage of annual sales are higher than in Botswana. Malawi SEC costs range 
from 3.2% to 6.6%. While in Botswana SEC costs are much lower than Malawi from 
1.2% to 2.2% of annual sales. Contrary, firms who claim that lack of SEC hinders 
investment are higher in Botswana than Malawi.                                                               
Figure 6.41: Security costs in Botswana and Malawi 
 
 
Notes. Security costs in Botswana and Malawi range from 1.2% to 6.6%. The claim by  firms 
 that lack of limits investment ranges from 20.7% to 24% 
 
 For example, about 24% of firms in 2005 claimed lack of SEC reduces 
investment in Botswana, while in 2010 about 22.6% made the same claim. On the other 
hand, in Malawi, in 2010 about 22.8% of firms observed investment was hindered by 
high costs of SEC, while in 2015 only 20.7 made the same claims. Generally, these 
findings suggest that SEC is very needful in SSC to enhance GDPPC. For instance, in 
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than other 16 variables. SEC is four times more effective than GCI in the countries. Also, 
in the same table, a model for slow grow countries SEC is four times more than HCT 
which is ranked 2nd to SEC in Table 6.1 above. Therefore, countries in the region need 
to take note of the SEC and improve to attract investments from outside the countries 
and inside the countries. 
  
Human capital (TED: tertiary education) and capital stock (RKN) in Table 4.9 in 
chapter 4 lose their significant impact on GDPPC when cultural variables are excluded 
in OLS2 (developed) model. In contrast, TED and RKN in OLS3 (developing) model 
maintain significance impact though they both lose effect size when cultural variables 
are not included in the model. Further exploration in Table 5.8 in chapter 5 shows that 
the performance of human capital (HCT: index years of schooling) changes when 
cultural variables are controlled. For instance, the effect size in a model with cultural 
variables in column (2) is about two times more effective than column without cultural 
variables in column (3). Of course, quality education impacts the productivity of human 
capital, but also human capital productivity depends on the socio-political structures in 
the countries.  Therefore, this sub-section is going to explore why human capital (HCT, 
TER) seem to impact economic growth differently in the models presented in Table 6.1 
above, mainly focussing on Botswana and Malawi. These two countries represent 
FastOLS1SSC and SlowOLS1SSC models in Table 6.1 above whereby HCT 
significantly contributes to GDPPCG in SlowOLS1SSC and insignificantly in the 
FastOLS1SSC model. The prediction in the models may fail to capture some attributes 
for HCT productivity between countries, hence, the main aim for this sub-section to 
explore HCT/TED variable.  
Human capital (HCT/TED) is associated with the absorptive and productive 
capacity of the countries that propels the flow of goods and services in countries 
(Mankiw et al., 1992; Nelson and Phelps, 1966).  Figure 6.42 below shows 50% to 60% 
of Botswana population over 15 years old completed primary education compared to 
40% Malawi population.  The figure also shows 20% to 30% population in Botswana 
completed secondary education while in Malawi about 10% of the population have 
secondary education. The percentage of the female population with secondary 
education is higher than the percentage for both sexes in Botswana. On the other hand, 
the percentage for both sexes in Malawi is slightly higher than the percentage of the 
female population. Furthermore, the figure shows that in both countries population with 
tertiary education is less than 10% of both female and total categories. All in all, 
Botswana seems to have higher levels of human capital than Malawi.   
 




Figure 6.42: Human capital levels in Botswana and Malawi   
                                           
   
 Notes. Botswana has higher levels of human capital than Malawi 
However, HCT in SlowOLS1SSC represented by Malawi significantly contributes 
to economic growth while insignificantly enhances economic growth in FastOLS1SSC 
model represented by Botswana. Why? Should it be said that quality of education in 
Botswana is inferior to Malawi?  Figure 6.43 below illustrates differences in the quantity 
of human capital and quality by education expenditures in Malawi and Botswana. Graph 
1 in Figure 6.43 below illustrates that Botswana has higher levels of education than 
Malawi, while graph 2 in the same figure shows Malawi has more expenditure in 
secondary and primary education than Botswana, while Botswana has more 
expenditure in tertiary education. The higher expenditure on education in Malawi could 
be because Malawi has a very high population of about 17.3 million people of which 
about 45% are under 14 years as presented in Table 6.2 above. Nonetheless, the public 
expenditure on education in Botswana is 9.49% of GDP while in Malawi 7.70% of GDP 
is spent on education. Hence, the higher population in Malawi strains the limited 
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Figure 6.43: Human capital vs. education expenditure in Malawi and Botswana   
     
                                                                                                                                                              
 Note. Graph 1 highlights human capital levels in Malawi and Botswana. Graph 2 shows  
 expenditure on each level of education in Malawi and Botswana.  
 
For instance, Figure 6.44 below shows that Malawi has a higher number of pupils 
per teacher in both primary and secondary education than Botswana. In the year 2014, 
68 pupils per teacher in Malawi versus 25 pupils per teacher in Botswana. In the same 
year in secondary education, Malawi had 42 students per teacher while Botswana about 
14 students per teacher. In 2015, in primary Malawi had 62 pupils per teacher while 
Botswana 23 pupils per teacher. Also, in secondary education, Malawi’s secondary ratio 
increased to 70 students per teacher while Botswana reduced the number to 11 students 
per teacher. It appears to suggest that Botswana’s education has more quality value 
than Malawi because pupils have more attention from teachers in their education than 
the pupils in Malawi. Even though Figure 6.43 above suggests Malawi spends more in 
primary and secondary education, the pupil and teacher ratio numbers in Malawi seem 
to suggest education funding is not enough. These observations cast doubt on the 
prediction of SlowOLS1SSC model (Malawi) that HCT significantly enhances economic 




































Source: Penn World Tables 9 from 2001 to 2015

















































Source: World Development Indicators from 2001 to 2015
Graph 2: Expenditures on education in Malawi and Botswana





Figure 6.44: Pupil and teacher ratios in Botswana and Malawi  
 
 
Therefore, education quality to explain productivity seems debatable in the 
models presented in Table 6.1 above. Could inequality in education due to gender 
explain this dilemma? Figure 6.45 below indicates that the disparity in Malawi between 
men and women is enormous, regardless of efforts made to reduce the disparities in the 
country. While Botswana seems to have managed to reduce education disparity 
between women and men, however, other forms of disparity due to gender such as 












Figure 6.45: Education disparity in Botswana and Malawi 
 
                                                                                                                                                           
Notes. Education disparity in Malawi between women and men is worrisome.   
   
 Further exploration indicates that both countries have introduced some 
programmes to fight discrimination against women. For example, in 2015 Malawi 
government criminalized child marriage under the Marriage, Divorce and Family 
Relations Act (DFRA) (Marriage Act) of 2015, so that marriage with someone under the 
age of 18 is illegal (The Government of Malawi, 2015). The Malawi government initiated 
this because it became aware that early marriage negatively affected girls’ education. 
However, poverty is still the key contributor to early marriages in Malawi, noted by (World 
Bank, 2011) which claimed that about 53% of poor women gave birth under the age of 
18 years. The education parity between males and females in Malawi as illustrated in 
Figure 6.45 above which confirms that the girls’ education is hampered by early 
pregnancies and marriages of girls as demonstrated in graphs 1 and 2 in Figure 6.46 
below. Figure 6.46 shows the Malawi household surveys conducted in the year 2010 
and 2015 demonstrate that early pregnancies and marriages of girls reduce their 
educational attainment. That is despite Sections 20 and 41 of the Constitution of Malawi 
which uphold the principle of equal rights for men and women and prohibit any 
discrimination based on gender or marital status (OECD-MW, 2016). Graphs 2 and 3 in 
Figure 6.43 indicate that children get married at age 10. It happens in mainly rural areas 
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exchange with their daughters. According to the present laws of Malawi, it is illegal to 
marry a child under the age of 18. Nonetheless, children are given into marriage with a 
blessing from the parents who are the primary beneficiaries. These practices have to 
change to stop discriminating against the girls in Malawi. Botswana too has got its issues 
though both countries are controlled to some extent by their traditions. For example, 
Section 15 of the Constitution of Botswana provides the right to non-discrimination on 
the grounds of sex (Section, 15). The Marriage Act, in Botswana, was amended in 2001, 
and the legal age of marriage is 18 for both sexes, conditional on parental consent. 
However, the legal age without the consent of the parents is 21 (OECD-BW, 2016). 
 Additionally, United Nations reported that about 5.3% of the girls of ages 15 to 
19 in Botswana are either married, divorced, or widowed (DESA, 2013). The right of girls 
not to be discrimination against, as stated in the constitution of Botswana section 15 
seems not to be observed due to customary laws. Graph 1 in Figure 6.47 below indicates 
that most girls become pregnant only after obtaining at least secondary education. 
However, girls are prone to sexual activity possibly due to cultural aspects prevailing in 
the society of Botswana. Even though Botswana regards its constitution as the supreme 
law, many feel it is merely theoretical because in practice custom law or religious law is 






Figure 6.46: Discrimination against women causes low education attainments     
 
 
Notes. Graphs 1, 2 and 3 show that most of the women get married at very young ages with no education. Graph 4 illustrates the vulnerability of women for 














































































































































Source: Malawi Households 2015-2016
Graph 3






























Figure 6.47: Good education levels for the girls in Botswana 
           
    Notes. Graph 2 shows very young girls involved in sexual activity.                                                                                                               
 All in all, the presentations in Figures 6.42 to 6.47 above demonstrate that 
education productivity differs among countries. Some concerns such as education 
levels, expenditures, and pupil-teacher ratios have been explored above, but the finding 
in SlowOLS1SSC is contrary to expectations in literature whereby higher levels of 
education are associated with high productivity through absorption of internal and 
external technology (Mankiw et al., 1992; Nelson and Phelps, 1966). However, 
inequality among people reduces human capability in the countries. Hence countries, 
notably SSC, need to focus on the reduction of discrimination due to gender or economic 
status so that people would thereby be able to contribute to the countries equally. Hence, 
the productivity of human capital could also be due to prevailing cultural conditions in 
the countries as noted in Tables 4.9 and 5.9 whereby the control of cultural variables 
reduces the effect size of other variables.  
 
 













































































Graph 1: Level of education at pregnancy

























































Graph 2: Age when had firts sex






6.5 DISCUSSION OF THE FINDINGS    
 
Figure 6.13 above shows that Botswana performs well in all the proxies of 
governance included in this figure. Generally, it is accepted in the literature that effective 
leadership and sound institutions are connected to good governance that is considered 
the engine of economic growth in the countries. However, there are inconsistencies in 
the literature on the right proxies for governance. Hence, this study utilized 
Afrobarometer surveys who devised questionnaires for people to evaluate their leaders 
regarding how they have performed in implementing policies based on governance. The 
attributes in Figure 6.13 were objectively collected whereby Botswana outperform 
Malawi in all proxies. Hence, the further probe is done by comparing objectively collected 
measures and subjectively collected from surveys whereby the distinction between de 
jure and de facto institutions can be identified (Woodruff, 2006).  
The views of people are reported in Table 6.6 and Figures from 6.6 to 6.9 
regarding how leaders managed the economy (GEF) in Botswana and Malawi. The 
findings show that people in Botswana approve their leaders for managing the economy 
well in all the six surveys covering the period from 2002 to 2018. On the other hand, in 
Malawi people in four surveys evaluated their leaders performed very badly in managing 
the economy. Unexpectedly, in two surveys leaders in Malawi were favorably appraised. 
Another governance indicator of (GEF) rated was about how the leaders performed in 
improving the living standards of the poor. In this indicator, only four surveys conducted 
and the findings in Botswana show that people rated their leaders favorably. In Malawi, 
two surveys rated well the leaders while the other two surveys overwhelmingly 
disapproved the performance of the leaders.  
Furthermore, Table 6.6 and Figures 6.10 to 6.12 present the governance 
indicator of corruption control (COC). People in Botswana considered their leaders were 
doing remarkably well in all the seven surveys covering the period from 1999 to 2018. 
In contrast, most people in Malawi thought leaders were not doing enough to control 
corruption in the country. However, as noted in the previous finding, two surveys 
favorably commended the leaders. Also, in Table 6.7 and Figures 14 to 15 people in 
both Malawi and Botswana considered free to say whatever they want which implies 
that both countries appear to have democratic institutions. However, most people in 
Malawi are of the view that government should be more accountable to its citizens than 
the counterparts in Botswana.  






The findings above suggest that governance in Botswana is in line with the 
expectations of people as shown in Figure 6.17. In contrast, in Malawi, people think 
leaders are not accountable. Hence, their overall performance of the direction of the 
country is rated in the wrong direction as illustrated in Figure 6.18. Despite Botswana in 
the fast growth suffering negative impact of GEF, the government effectiveness is 
generally very impressive. On the other hand, in Malawi though has significant GEF 
impact on economic growth, management of the economy and control of corruption 
seems to be poor. Hence, ethical leadership in Malawi could enhance economic growth 
in the country. For example, the two surveys Malawi leaders were rated well was during 
the period that Bingu wa Mutharika was the president of Malawi from 2004 to 2012. He 
was considered a strong leader regarding control of corruption and implementation of 
policies which improved the lives of people.  
  
The prediction in Table 6.1 indicates that social capital (SOC) significantly 
enhance economic growth in OLS1SSC, OLS3 (developing), and SlowOLS1SSC 
models. While in FastOLS1SSC model insignificantly contributes to economic growth. 
The observations in Table 6.8 and Figures from 6.20 to 6.23 indicate that most of the 
people in Botswana trust the president almost in all the surveys and the trust in the 
president increases with time see Figure 6.22. On the other hand, the trust of the 
president in Malawi depends on the performance of the president as indicated in Figures 
6.21 and 6.23. However, Figure 6.26 shows that social capital generated from several 
variables as indicated in Table 3.5 are higher in Malawi than Botswana. In this case, the 
prediction of the models above might be right. However, it seems to suggest that in 
Malawi trust can be in high levels as networks among people of different social groups 
other than the leaders and citizens. 
Furthermore, Figure 6.26 seems to suggest that higher levels of SOC in Malawi 
is associated with low levels of public capital (CPR) while in Botswana low levels of SOC 
is associated with high levels of civic capital. It seems to suggest that there is a form of 
social capital which enhances economic growth which seems to be the case in 
Botswana. For example, CPR significantly reduces economic growth in SlowOLS1SSC 
model while in FastOLS1SSC model insignificantly reduces growth. All in all, trust in the 
leaders in Malawi relies on their ability to manage the economy and improving the living 
standards of people. In contrast Figure 6.25 CPR was lowest in Malawi when leaders 
perform well and tend to increase when leaders fail to perform.  






The leaders with transformational and service characteristics are desirable in 
most of the developing countries to enhance sustainable economic growth in the 
countries. These type of leaders could put the interests and needs of their citizens first 
that could, in turn, have effect in the public delivery systems for the benefit of all people 
in respective countries (Van Dierendonck et al., 2014). Further examination of cultural 
variables in sub-section 6.4.2 illustrates the point of understanding how individual 
variables, circumstances, institutions, and environment interact with each other in 
specific national settings to produce measured effects on economic growth.  This 
seems to also point to how weak institutions in Malawi impact economic development 
negatively due to low scores in Figure 6.13above. As a result, corruption seems to grip 
the nation due to high inequalities among the Malawi citizens. This seems to agree with  
Borooah (2016) who connected corruption to inequality among people in India. 
Therefore, the performance differences between Malawi and Botswana can also be 
explained by these differences in the quality of institutions in the countries. Botswana 
sets an excellent example from which other countries in the same region can learn and 
purposefully formulate institutions that deliver quality services to people in all sectors. 
The upshot is that SOC is captured within the institution citizens live, and in this vein 
lower levels of SOC in Malawi negatively impacts economic growth (see more details in 
chapter 2). 
   
The findings in Table 6.1 above show that GCI significantly contribute to GDPPC 
in OLS3(developing) and OLS1SSC models. The same table shows GCI insignificantly 
enhances GDPPCG in both SlowOLS1SSC and FastOLS1SSC models. However, 
comparison regarding effect size of GCI on GDPPC, fast growth SSC have a higher 
impact than slow growth countries. Further analysis appears to suggest that fast growth 
countries have more competitive environment than slow growth countries as illustrated 
in Figure 6.13 above. However, the factors used for comparison of competitiveness 
between Botswana and Malawi may not address all the conditions for providing a 
competitive environment in the countries. However, may highlight the potential 
weaknesses in the present application of competitive environment mainly in the slow-
growing economy countries. For instance, the competitiveness of countries could be due 
to the differences in gross capital formation (GCF). GCF could illustrate capability 
differences in production between Botswana and Malawi as observed by (Cohen and 
Uphoff, 1980, p. 216). Figure 6.29 above illustrates the utility capability differences 
between Botswana and Malawi whereby GCF showed as a percentage of GDP is higher 






in Botswana than Malawi. In the same vein, the figure also indicates that Gross Fixed 
Capital Formation (GFCF) is higher in Botswana than Malawi. GFCF is the net saved 
after subtracting consumption from GCF. The net saving increases capital stock levels 
(RKN) when invested in the economy, hence increasing the capacity to produce. Also, 
Figure 6.29 above reveals that the Gross Fixed Capital Formation in Private Sector 
(GFCFPS) is higher in Malawi than Botswana. Why? It seems to suggest that private 
sector in Malawi have a responsibility to utilize the resources they have to survive in the 
respective competitive businesses. Hence, developing the ability to manage resources 
responsibly seems desirable in Malawi. That is possible as indicated above that in the 
time responsible leaders are leading the country things change positively reducing 
income inequalities among people. Therefore, low developing countries such as Malawi 
need to learn from the successes of the countries like Botswana in the same region.  
  
Table 6.1 above indicates that AID significantly reduces in OLS1SSC and 
SlowOLS1SSC models. On the other hand, in FastOLS1SSC model AID insignificantly 
reduces economic growth. The findings suggest that countries such as Botswana have 
self-reliance and responsibility to utilize available resources to spur economic growth. 
In contrast, some countries like Malawi develop dependency syndrome whereby rely on 
others to bail them from challenges they can manage. Hence, AID has been increasing 
over time in Malawi, and yet economic growth is generally low comparing to Botswana. 
The observations in Figure 6.35 seems to indicate that Botswana utilized assistance to 
deal with their needs, while Malawi failed to utilize this assistance. Even though 
Botswana received less AID; it managed to reduce harsh poverty conditions more 
effectively than Malawi. Figure 6.34 illustrates some of the ways Malawi can capitalize 
to increase the capacity to produce and provide for its people. Hence, self-reliance, 
rather than AID, is the key to the economic development as observed in Botswana, but 
this is not the case in Malawi.  
 
Even though, conflicts or civil wars negatively affect economic growth in SSC 
region as discussed above; most of the countries adopted in this study, have not had 
conflicts or civil wars for some time. Nevertheless, the definition of security in Table 3.2 
in chapter 3 does include the possibility of conflicts or wars in the region. Table 6.1 
summarizes the findings in chapter 5. The findings show that security (SEC) significantly 
reduced GDPPC in OLS1SSC and SloOLS1SSC models, while in FastOLS1SSC model 
insignificantly enhances GDPPC. Figures 6.38 to 6.41 shows that citizens in Malawi are 
6.5.3   AID, Self-reliance, dependency and economic growth  






more concerned with their properties for fear of being robbed than counterparts in 
Botswana. For example, about 24% of firms in 2005 claimed lack of SEC reduces 
investment in Botswana, while in 2010 about 22.6% made the same claim. On the other 
hand, in Malawi, in 2010 about 22.8% of firms observed investment was hindered by 
high costs of SEC, while in 2015 only 20.7% made the same claims. Generally, these 
findings suggest that SEC is very needful in SSC to enhance GDPPC. For instance, in 
Table 6.1 above, the model for 18 SSC shows that the SEC is the most effective and 
relevant than other 16 variables. SEC is four times more effective than GCI in the 
countries. Also, in the same table, a model for slow grow countries SEC is four times 
more than HCT which is ranked 2nd to SEC in Table 6.1 above. Therefore, countries in 
the region need to take note of the SEC and improve to attract investments from outside 
the countries and inside the countries. 
6.4.6   Human capital versus economic growth in Botswana and Malawi 
Human capital (HCT) in SlowOLS1SSC represented by Malawi significantly 
contributes to economic growth while insignificantly enhances economic growth in 
FastOLS1SSC model represented by Botswana. Figure 6.43 illustrates differences in 
the quantity of human capital and quality by education expenditures in Malawi and 
Botswana. Graph 1 in Figure 6.43 illustrates that Botswana has higher levels of 
education than Malawi, while graph 2 in the same figure shows Malawi has more 
expenditure in secondary and primary education than Botswana, while Botswana has 
more expenditure in tertiary education. The higher expenditure on education in Malawi 
could be because Malawi has a very high population of about 17.3 million people of 
which about 45% are under 14 years as presented in Table 6.2 above. Nonetheless, the 
public expenditure on education in Botswana is 9.49% of GDP while in Malawi 7.70% of 
GDP is spent on education. Hence, the higher population in Malawi strains the limited 
resources more than Botswana with a population of under three million.  
Figure 6.44 also indicates that education in Botswana has more quality regarding 
the number of students in primary and secondary per teacher. However, Figure 6.46 
seems to indicate the productivity of human capital can be lost due to inequality due to 
gender in both countries. Having said that the chapter also notes productivity of human 
capital can be contextual due to prevailing conditions that hinder or promote abilities of 
the individual. Therefore, developing countries need to formulate curricula in their 
education systems that promote independence and competitive attitudes that are noted 
as being vital for economic development in the developing countries. How can this 






thinking in developing countries communities. The three pillars of scientific thinking are 
logic, empirical facts and systematic reasoning whereby people should base their 
decisions coupled with respect for others embroiled in scientific endeavors (Ceci and 
Wendy, 2009; Flynn, 2007). However, for scientific thinking to prevail in societies 
dominated by ideological orientations as precursors to civil conflicts, academic freedom 
should be protected to promote logic, empirical facts, and systematic reasons in the 
developing societies. For instance, Vrielink et al. (2011) incorporate three requirements 
for academic freedom namely: individual expressive rights where they can be able to 
study, teach, or research; institutional autonomy; and an obligation by government 
agencies to protect and respect academic freedom.   
The SOC and CPR contribute to the formation of peoples’ behaviors, attitudes, 
and values that reside in people with education or not. Therefore, the differences on 
how participants perceived and answered the questions in the surveys in Malawi and 
Botswana could explain their differences in economic performance. This assumption is 
based on the claim that social interaction impacts on social phenomena suggesting that 
knowledge is also created through experiences (Locke, 1961). It is similar to Saunders 
et al. (2012) who observed that social phenomena are an outcome from the perceptions 
and subsequent actions of social actors. Hence, the participants’ answers to the 
questions relevant to the variable concepts given above give evidence to highlight 
differences in economic performance between Malawi and Botswana. Moreover, if 
participants’ limitation to freedom as observed in Figure 6.9 above could be related to 
strong leadership in Botswana, then strong leadership is good for economic growth. For 
example, Singapore’s current economic development status according to Tong, (1996) 
mainly depended on the quality of political leadership who formulated policies 
embedded in cooperation between the executive and its citizens that through their 
determination steered their country out of the mire of poverty to prosperity. This seems 
to suggest that democratic institutions remain fragile and incomplete if executive 
authority lacks the strong leadership to mobilize their citizens to be achievement 













The thesis has investigated if cultural factors influence economic growth 
differences among countries. The intriguing question motivated it as to whether the gap 
between developed and developing countries is widening. Technically speaking, some 
countries which were regarded as underdeveloped three or four decades ago are now 
regarded as developed as articulated in the introduction of chapter 1. On the other hand, 
the Sub-Saharan region has failed to register convincing economic development 
(Seguino and Were, 2014:1). See chapter 1 for more information. Unconvincing 
performance in this region seems to persist despite the introduction of new international 
economic orders by international organizations such as IMF and World Bank (Brandt, 
1980; South Commission, 1990). In this regard, the reality of poverty and inequality of 
billions of people in developing countries provides a challenge to the methods, theories, 
and policies used in dealing with the escalation of the gap of economic development 
between developed and developing countries. One of the ways indicated in literature of 
dealing with the situation is that after the devastating World War II, countries co-operated 
in instituting international bodies like World Bank, United Nations, International Monetary 
Fund and General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade primarily to reduce the gap between 
developed and underdeveloped countries (Dube, 1988; Morawetz, 1977; Thirlwall, 
2011). It is more than a half a century since the end of Second World War, but the 
income disparities between developed and developing countries (notably SSC) seems 
to be widening as explained in chapter 1. Countries seem to grow at different rates and, 
whilst much is known about the various factors which influence this growth potential, 
there are indications that a broader range of factors may be at play and therefore 
developing nations, seeking to raise the future prospects for their citizens, may wish to 
consider the implications of this broader range of factors when designing their social and 
economic strategies. In particular, this thesis examined the impact that cultural variables 
may have on economic growth. The objectives of the thesis were met by employing four 
hypotheses on all variables in each category in chapters 4 and 5, as summarized below. 
 
7.1.1   How the objectives of the thesis were addressed  
  
The first objective was to identify the causes of economic growth 






was to identify cultural values that hinder economic growth in developing 
countries particularly countries in the Sub-Saharan region.  The third was to 
explore the cultural values that promote economic growth in the region. These 
objectives were addressed by engaging variables in all the three categories 
namely: traditional, institutional, and cultural and were operationalized in 
chapters 4, 5, and 6. Each category had four hypotheses as follows: (see Table 
2.2 for full names of the variables) 
H1a: EMP HDI IGS RKN TED HCT EGS FDI GCI GRS ETR AID (traditional); ROL FER   
         COC (institutional); HWK CPR SOC FER REG SEC (cultural) significantly 
         contribute to economic growth 
 
H1b:  EMP HDI IGS RKN TED HCT EGS FDI GCI GRS ETR AID (traditional); ROL         
          FER COC (institutional); HWK CPR SOC FER REG SEC (cultural) do not      
          significantly Contribute to economic growth 
 
H1c:  EMP HDI IGS RKN TED HCT EGS FDI GCI GRS ETR AID (traditional); ROL FER  
         COC (institutional); HWK CPR SOC FER REG SEC (cultural) has an effect on  
         economic growth 
 
H1d:  EMP HDI IGS RKN TED HCT EGS FDI GCI GRS ETR AID (traditional); ROL FER   
         COC (institutional); HWK CPR SOC FER REG SEC (cultural) has no effect on    
         economic growth   
 
 These hypotheses were tested in chapters 4 and 5. The summary of the findings 
is demonstrated in Table 7.1 below. The outline of the findings is demonstrated in the 
next section. 
7.2 OVERVIEW OF THE FINDINGS AND IMPLICATIONS 
7.2.1   The findings 
 The environment that includes both economic and social systems determines 
the development of the capacities of individuals. In other words, the development of an 
individual’s capacities depends on the interaction in the whole environment in which the 
individual is located. Thus, to explain economic disparities among countries, this thesis 
has taken into consideration theoretical and empirical approaches that embrace the 
socio-cultural and political relations, intersubjective meanings and value in economic 
development, and stochastic environments to explain economic disparities among 
countries. The context becomes a foundation where people become experts in 
developing their strategies and using that knowledge in their application (Gauvain and 
Perez, 2007). This is very important because the knowledge they acquire includes 
norms, values, skills, and standards and are equally regulated by them regarding any 






undertaken generally explains why countries such as those in Sub-Saharan region 
appear not to catch up with other regions regarding economic development as explained 
in chapter 2. 
For this reason, this thesis embraced mixed research design that enabled the 
investigation of how traditional, cultural, and institutional variables interact with each 
other in different contexts such as in developed and developing countries to produce 
measured effects as explained in chapter 3. Hence, the mixed design was chosen to 
attempt to explain why there is different economic growth among countries. This design 
has a dynamic element that considers and interrelates multiple components of research 
strategy rather than emphasizing one particular way in the investigation as observed by 
(Creswell and Plano Clark, 2010).   
The findings in chapter 4 show that the performances of all the three categories 
of variables depend on the development level of the country. For instance, capital stock 
(RKN) levels in developing countries impede the flow of goods and services while RKN 
levels in developed countries propel the flow of goods and services as noted by (Aghion 
and Howitt, 1998). This is happening despite the investment in capital stock through 
foreign aid (AID) from developed countries to developing countries. It seems to suggest 
that the wisdom of capital accumulation is not the critical determinant of economic 
growth in developing countries. Moreover, the catch-up assumption seems to work in 
developed countries better than in developing countries. Therefore, combining both 
developed and developing countries in the investigation could lead to a bias of the 
results. For instance, the performances of variables in OLS1 (combined) model in Table 
4.6 are different from OLS2 (developed), and OLS3 (developing) models in the same 
table. This suggests that the emphasis on a universal approach to enhancing economic 
growth among countries overlooks the effect of development levels of countries. Chapter 
4 also identified that developing countries need to develop the attribute of being 
responsible and accountable regarding public services at both individuals and 
leadership levels because this attribute significantly enhances economic growth in the 
countries. In other words, individuals’ responsibility, rather than perceiving that it is the 
government’s responsibility, for the welfare of individuals and their societies, enhances 
economic growth. In so doing people become self-reliant and pursue things that will 
make their societies poverty free. In contrast, it was noted that individuals in developed 
countries are more responsible and engage in activities that promote economic growth 
leading to the economic development of the countries. 
 Also, chapter 4 observed that religion derails development in developing 






obedience as demonstrated in Figure 4.16. Religion seems to provide a context where 
habits, customs, and education direct the behaviors of people (Guiso et al., 2009; Smith, 
1776). Moreover, according to Mathers and Williamson (2011) obedience or religion 
captured in the concept of culture limits freedom which is a necessary component for 
enhancing economic development. Likewise, some social scientists have negatively 
connected Catholicism to economic development (Harrison, 1985; Morsc, 1964). This 
seems to agree with Branco (2007) who pointed out that the profound influence of 
secularism in countries where religious life is a status quo fails to boost economic 
growth. The findings in chapter 4 also show tertiary education (TED) contribute 
significantly to economic growth in both developed and developing countries. However, 
the impact of social capital (SOC) a layer of intangible cultural capital (ICC) has more 
effect size on economic growth than TED in developing countries. 
Moreover, Responsibility attribute (FER) is about four times more effective 
regarding economic growth in developing countries than TED. The layers of ICC such 
as SOC and FER, in general, capture social conditions that affect individuals in 
performance outcomes in different societies (Malik, 2013). Different societies embrace 
social norms that influence people’s behaviors and choices, hence influencing outcomes 
of the whole society.  
The findings in chapter 5 indicate that security (SEC) concerns in Sub-Saharan 
countries (SSC) significantly reduce economic growth. SEC is captured in Table 3.2 
generated from views of participants in SSC, and it indicates that it is one of the essential 
factors in explaining why SSC experience slow and erratic economic growth. The 
question is what the possible cause of insecurity in SSC is? Some possible suggestions 
are the ineffective rule of law, little confidence in police or justice systems, political 
instability, reduced use of public resources, and inadequate regulatory control. These 
elements are shown in Figure 5.9 capturing security differences between developed and 
SSC. Developed countries scores are higher than SSC in all security elements in Figure 
5.9. Lower scores in SSC in all the elements of security illustrate that security concerns 
in these countries derail economic growth. For instance, security concerns in slow 
growth countries reduce GDP per capita growth (GDPPCG) 53 times more than in the 
fast-growing countries as shown in Table 7.1 below. SEC has further explored in chapter 
6, and the observations confirm the findings in chapter 5 whereby firms in Malawi pay 
very high costs for security than in Botswana as demonstrated in Figure 6.41 in chapter 
6 Therefore, failure to address insecurity concerns in most of the slow growth countries 
is a human factor. Moreover, in most cases demonstrated in self-seeking individuals and 






(Ostrom, 2010, p. 642; Krueger, 1974, p. 291; Ehrlich and Lui, 1999, p. 272). This being 
the case, lack of security in most of Sub-Saharan countries chases investors away due 
to high security costs for businesses (Ndulu et al., 2007, p. xv; Enamorado et al., 2014, 
p. 2; Hall and Jones, 1999, p. 94; Beraho, 2007, p. 265; Duch and Taylor, 1993, p. 752).  
Similarly, it seems to suggest that lack of entrepreneurship qualities in SSC 
contributes to the unproductive contribution of RKN as discussed above. This leads to 
high numbers of unemployed people, leading to high dependency ratios derailing 
economic development as observed in Table 7.1, hence the persistence of slow and 
erratic economic growth in the SSC. The findings in Table 7.1 show that civic capital 
(CPR) significantly reduces economic development in SSC in line with the findings of 
(Guiso et al., 2010). The negative impact on economic growth in slow growth countries 
is 17 times more than in fast-growing countries in the SSC region. It seems to suggest 
that CPR regarding levels are much better in fast-growing countries than in slow growth 
countries as illustrated in Figure 5.15 in chapter 5. That seems to agree with the finding 
in chapter 4 section 4.4.4.3 whereby Figure 4.13 shows that civic capital appears to be 
lacking in developing countries in comparison with developed countries. Hence, 
encouraging people to participate in politics determines the economic success of fast 
growth countries compared with slow growth countries.  
Furthermore, competitiveness in Table 7.1 significantly contributes to GDPPC 
per capita (GDPPC) in the 18 SSC. Similarly, in chapter 4 competitiveness significantly 
contributes to GDPPC in OLS1 (combined), OLS2 (developed), and OLS3 (developing) 
models, but the impact is much higher in OLS3 (developing) model than other models 
in Table 4.6.  Also, the findings in chapter 5 indicate that AID seems to increase 
dependency syndrome in SSC. For instance, in chapter 6, it has been noted that AID 
increases to Malawi every year while in Botswana AID is being reduced. Ironically, 
Botswana manages to reduce the levels of income inequalities than Malawi. Despite the 
claim that the accumulation of capital increases economic growth, AID in SSC reduces 
GDPPC significantly. For example, sub-section 5.3.4.6 discusses the impact of AID in 
the SSC region. The finding seems contradictory to the assumption of the neoclassical 
theory that the accumulation of RKN significantly increases economic growth in the 
countries. It is reported in the literature that in SSC AID averages about 44 % of 
governments’ budgets (Klugman, 2010). This seems to agree with Landes, (1998) who 
argued that the economic development of countries does not rely on AID but the imbued 






Chapter 6 a multi-case study of Botswana and Malawi drilled down below the 
macro data to try to put some of the findings from the other two analytical chapters into 
context and to explain apparent inconsistencies. Sub-section 6.4.1 generally explored 
governance issues in Malawi and Botswana. The findings indicate that people in Malawi 
feel leaders are not doing enough to manage economy issues and that often the country 
heads in the wrong direction. In contrast, people in Botswana approve the leadership 
direction of the country and management of the economic issues in the country. 
Strikingly, the period between 2004 and 2012 Malawians recommended the leaders and 
was satisfied leaders were heading in the right direction, very contrary to other years 
before or after. It, therefore, seems to suggest that strong leadership is required in 
countries which seem to have weak institutions. The study also uncovers that the 
performance of leaders has a different effect on citizens depending on the vibrant of the 
institutions in place in the countries. For example, in Botswana, the approval of the 
president or leaders remained generally constant while in Malawi fluctuated depending 
on the leader’s performance on issues affecting Malawians.  
Consequently, sub-section 6.4.2 shows that social capital (SOC) levels in Malawi 
depend on the performance of the leaders. While in Botswana leaders did not have 
much effect on the levels of SOC. Further examination of SOC reveals that regarding 
the effect on economic growth, SOC based on social groups networks other than as 
diversity of cooperation among people reduces civic capital (CPR) in Malawi. In contrast, 
in Botswana people believe more in institutions and hence leaders have a marginal 
effect on the SOC levels. Moreover, the trust among social groups seems low because 
they have all have trust in the institutions all share in the country. Hence, Botswana has 
more CPR than Malawi. The finding seems to confirm the results in chapter 5 as 
illustrated in Table 7.1 below whereby CPR is positively effective more in fast-growing 
countries than in slow-growing countries.  
Chapter 6 also discovers that Botswana has a competitive edge over Malawi. 
For example, sub-section 6.4.3 shows that Botswana has much ability capacity to 
produce as indicated in Figure 6.32. It seems to indicate that Botswana is capable of 
producing goods that maintain or increase the flow of goods and services while Malawi 
seems not to achieve the level required. This is in line with Neuayer (2001) who claimed 
that depreciation of both manufactured and natural capital that is greater than 
investment leads to the unsustainability of economic development. Therefore, the 
findings in chapters 4 and 5 that capital stock reduces economic growth in developing 
countries seem to indicate that these countries fail to reach the threshold to maintain or 






Botswana in Figure 6.32 increases capital levels that enhance economic growth as the 
case in Botswana. At the same time failure to achieve threshold to maintain or increase 
capital stock slows economic growth as the case in Malawi. Further examination of 
capital stock in chapter 6 observed that the differences in gross capital formation 
between Malawi and Botswana illustrate capability differences in production between 
the two countries as observed by (Cohen & Uphoff, 1980:216). Figure 6.34 in chapter 6 
illustrates the utility capability differences between Botswana and Malawi. For example, 
gross capital formation (GCF) as a percentage of GDP is higher in Botswana than 
Malawi. In the same vein, the figure also indicates that gross fixed capital formation 
(GFCF) is higher in Botswana than Malawi. GFCF is the net saved after subtracting 
consumption from GCF. The net saved increases capital levels when invested in the 
economy, hence increasing the capacity to produce. Figure 6.34 also reveals that the 
gross fixed capital formation in the private sector (GFCFPS) is higher in Malawi than 
Botswana. Why? This seems to suggest that the private sector in Malawi is better able 
to use the resources they have to compete with other businesses. Generally, Malawi is 
a higher consuming society than Botswana, although Botswana has a higher standard 
of living than Malawi. It is demonstrated in Figure 6.31 in chapter 6. 
The finding in Table 5.5 in chapter 5 shows human capital significantly 
contributes to economic growth in SSC. However, Table 7.1 indicates that human capital 
significantly impacts GDPPC in slow growth countries while in fast-growth countries 
insignificantly impacts economic growth. Further exploration in Figure 6.42 in chapter 6 
reveals that Botswana (fast growth economy) has higher levels of educational 
attainment in each category of primary, secondary and tertiary education than Malawi in 
the slow growth economy group. Graph 1 in Figure 6.43 in the same chapter confirms 
that Botswana has higher education levels than Malawi, yet human capital insignificantly 
contributes to economic growth in the countries with fast economic growth while in 
Malawi, the slow growth economy, human capital significantly contributes to GDPPC. 
Further exploration shows in graph 2 in Figure 6.43 that educational expenditure in 
primary and secondary schools in Malawi is higher than Botswana. While in the same 
vein, tertiary education expenditure in Botswana is higher than Malawi. Surprisingly, 
regarding the teacher/pupil ratio, Botswana has a better quality of education than Malawi 
as demonstrated in Figure 6.12. This seems to suggest that human capital contribution 
to economic growth depends on the development level of the countries as shown in 
Table 5.5 in chapter 5. Therefore, grouping countries of different economic development 
levels do not reflect the real productivity of human capital in the countries. Also, Table 






depends on the cultural context because the significance of the contribution of these 
variables is significantly reduced when cultural variables are controlled.  
7.3 THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS 
  
 The findings in chapters 4 and 5 revealed that capital stock is negatively 
correlated with economic growth in 6 developing countries while significantly increases 
economic growth in 6 developed countries. However, the summary of the findings in 
Table 7.1 below for chapters 4 and 5 indicates that the negative impact of GDPPC 
changes when 6 developing countries are grouped into 3 slow growth and 3 fast-growing 
economies. For instance, the negative effect size of capital stock on GDP per capita in 
6 developing countries is about 5%, while in slow growth economies are 7% and there 
is no indication that capital stock has a significant negative impact in 3 fast-growth 
economies. Similarly, capital stock in 18 Sub-Saharan countries negatively impacts 
GDP per capita by 1% regarding effect size. Furthermore, capital stock reduces GDP 
per capita by 8% in slow growth countries, while in fast growth capital stock does not 
significantly reduce GDP per capita. The impact of capital stock is different in different 
countries representing different environments. This finding was further explored in 
chapter 6 whereby Malawi represented slow growth economies while Botswana fast-
growing economies. It was observed that the negative impact of capital stock in slow 
economies (Malawi) is associated with the insufficient production of goods and services. 
In contrast, Botswana seems to have the capacity to produce to maintain the flow of 
goods hence no significant adverse effect on their economic growth. This seems against 
expectations whereby everyone is expected to catch up, even in developing countries 
with lower capitals. Hence, the catch-up the assumption of neo-classical theory seems 
not to work for all countries in the same way and at the same time.  
Table 7.1 below also shows that AID has the adverse effect of 2% on GDP per 
capita in 18 Sub-Saharan countries. On the other hand, AID has the negative effect of 
about 2% in slow growth countries in the Sub-Saharan region. In contrast, in fast growth 
Sub-Saharan countries, foreign aid has a positive effect on GDP per capita but not as 
significant as indicated in Table 7.1. This seems to suggest that some countries benefit 
from foreign aid while others do not. Further exploration in chapter 6 indicates that 
Malawi from slow growth economies received more aid from the donors than Botswana 
from fast-growth economies. Botswana utilized the foreign aid they received and 
became more self-reliant as time went on. In contrast, Malawi received more foreign aid 






in the case of Malawi and as also indicated in the literature (Greenwald and Stiglitz, 
1988, p. 122; Harcourt, 2008, pp. 185-197). Therefore, the accumulation effect as 
advocated by neo-classical theory seems not to address the challenge of 
underdevelopment mainly in Sub-Saharan region. The problem of underdevelopment in 
some Sub-Saharan countries persist despite the foreign help. Why? Partly, this could 
be due to neo-classical theory missing out by excluding cultural and institutional 
categories of variables in their estimation models.  
Also, there is the inconsistent performance of human capital as indicated in 
Table 7.1 below. Human capital impacts GDP per capita significantly in the 18 Sub-
Saharan countries and 10 slow growth economies. The impact in 18 Sub-Saharan 
countries is 2% compared to only 0.3% in slow growth economies. Despite, significance 
impact of human capital in slow growth economies, the countries fail to boost economic 
growth such as the fast-growing economies where human capital is not significant in 
contribution to GDP per capita. Further examination in Tables 4.9 and 5.8 in chapters 4 
and 5 respectively whereby the performance of human capital changes significantly from 
the model with all three categories of variables to model when cultural variables are 
controlled. The results show that the model without cultural variables loses some 
significance and magnitude of the coefficients. Hence, cultural variables affect the 
productivity of human capital. These cultural variables not only affect the productivity of 
human capital but other variables as well. What do these results mean to definitions of 
human capital? Of course, quality education impacts the productivity of human capital, 
but also human capital productivity depends on the socio-political structures in the 
countries to be discussed in the next paragraph.   
Table 7.1 below also shows that cultural variable of feeling responsibility 
significantly reduces GDPPC in developed countries, while in developing countries 
significantly enhances GDPPC. This seems to suggest that feeling responsibility is an 
essential attribute in developing countries to enhance economic growth as 
demonstrated in fast-growing developing countries. Furthermore, Figure 6.36 in chapter 
6 shows feeling responsibility in countries such as Ghana, Rwanda, South Africa, and 
Zimbabwe collected from World Values Surveys from 2010 to 2014. It appears that 72% 
of the participants in Rwanda mentioned that feeling responsibility is vital to let the 
children learn at home. It also shows that Rwanda has the highest GDP average growth 
rates compared to the other African countries as indicated in Figure 6.37 in chapter 6. 
Figures 6.36  and 6.37 indicate that Rwanda has the most responsible citizens and the 






Africa is about 5%, Rwanda 8%, Ghana 7%, South Africa 3%, and Zimbabwe 3%. The 
responsibility of people in Rwanda is also indicated in the responsibilities of the 
leadership in steering the country to economic development. It is very different from 
what is happening to most of the other countries such as South Africa, Zimbabwe, and 
Malawi. Therefore, feeling responsibility seems to be an essential attribute whereby 
further research needs to be done in future because this thesis could not get more data 
for Sub-Saharan countries which is a limitation to this study.  
Table 7.1 below also shows that trust capital is more important in developing 
countries or Sub-Saharan countries than in developed countries. This seems to suggest 
that the performance of the variables depend on environments prevailing in the 
countries. For instance, chapter 6 analysis showed that Botswana is more competitive 
than Malawi regarding the scores of the global competitive index. The competitive 
advantage of Botswana was observed in the environment surrounding Botswana and 
Malawi in Figure 6.13 in chapter 6. The environments in this figure are illustrated as the 
rule of law, regulatory quality, political stability, voice, accountability, government 
effectiveness, and control of corruption. The higher scores of these elements by 
Botswana than Malawi seems to suggest that institutions are more effective in Botswana 
than in Malawi. That in turn citizens in Botswana trust more their leaders and 
government than the counterparts in Malawi as demonstrated in Figure 6.40 in chapter 
6 where more Malawians do not trust their leaders. Likewise, in Table 7.1 below trust 
capital in fast growth Sub-Saharan economies significantly impacts GDP per capita than 
the slow growth economies in the same region. As demonstrated by Botswana, trust is 
an essential element in developing countries to stimulate economic growth which is not 
the case in developed countries which have well-established institutions. Therefore, the 
failure to include non-economic factors in neo-classical models misses out crucial 
variables important for growth in developing countries. That suggests that policymakers 
have to address underperformance of some developing countries by explicitly looking 
at what variables are essential for economic growth in that country, other than 








Table 7.1: Variables’ performance differences between countries with different institutions, environments, and development levels 
Significance levels *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Notes. Variables in rows showed green have a positive and significant effect on economic growth in respective countries with similar institutions or environments. Variables 
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Positive effect on economic growth 
GCI *** 14.5
5 
GCI*** 11.50 EGS 2.87 GCI*** 18.13 GCI*** 2.10 GCI*** 18.0
0 
GCI ** 1.38 HCT*** 0.38 REG*** 4.93 
REG** 3.43 REG*** 6.74 ROL 2.53 FER *** 4.79   GEF*** 13.1
8 
HCT ** 1.61 SOC** 0.24 ROL** 3.30 
GEF*** 6.39 EGS*** 5.34 GRS 3.36 GEF*** 4.94   REG 0.41 IGS** 1.16 EGS* 0.23 GCI 1.35 
HDI*** 5.03 TED*** 3.14 HDI 1.59 SOC** 2.42   FER 3.08 EGS * 0.94   SOC 0.58 
ETR *** 6.16 ETR* 1.12   CPR 0.77   FDI*** 5.13 ROL* 1.03   SEC 0.29 
RKN* 1.57 ROL** 1.81   TED* 1.23   EGS* 1.96 SOC* 0.81   HCT 0.61 
CPR*** 5.53 HDI* 0.97         GCI ** 1.38     
TED* 1.88                 
Negative effect on economic growth 
IGS* 1.96 EMP* 1.05 IGS* 3.87 REG*** 3.62 RKN*** 6.78 IGS** 2.98 HDI** 1.16 AID** 2.38 HDI* 2.07 
  IGS** 1.88   RKN*** 5.28     ETR* 0.92 COC*** 2.93 ETR* 1.99 
  FER*** 4.78         AID*** 1.93 RKN *** 7.66 GEF** 4.15 
            RKN** 1.11 SEC*** 15.34 CPR 0.99 
            COC*** 2.02 CPR *** 16.40   
            GEF*** 2.61     
            SEC *** 4.95     






Table 7.1 furthermore reveals that CPR seems vital in developing countries while 
in developed countries seems not may be due to healthy institutions. For instance, 
chapter 6 reveals that CPR in Botswana is more effective than in Malawi as discussed 
above. However, an increase in people considering politics “very important” in 
developing countries increases economic development significantly.  Hence the current 
situation in which many people in developing countries do not consider politics important 
as indicated in Figure 4.13 in chapter 4, and this view negatively impacts economic 
development. In contrast, in developed countries, more people consider politics very 
important rather than not significant which reflects public capital performance in Table 
4.6 in chapter 4. Hence, variables’ performance in the models depicts the peoples’ skills, 
behaviors and views prevailing in the different countries in different settings.  
Table 7.1 further shows religion to be negatively associated with economic 
growth in developing countries, while in developed countries insignificantly impacts 
economic growth. Figure 4.5 in chapter 4 shows that developed nations tend to place 
greater emphasis upon more individualistic values of determination to succeed and thrift 
than do developing nations, whose emphasis is more traditional in orientation, 
emphasizing obedience and religious faith (Harrison, 1985; Morsc, 1964; Branco, 2007). 
This may interact with other evidence from the world values studies, which indicate that 
citizens of developed nations place greater emphasis upon personal responsibility and 
independence than do citizens of developing nations. Consequently, it might be the case 
that it is more traditional values, which place greater emphasis upon universal social 
norms, which may include religious faith and obedience, rather than more individualistic 
values which may foster a different approach to work and business activity, and hence 
economic growth. These different approaches seem to suggest that the values 
inculcated into people’s lives through social networks or culture determine the level of 
performance of the individuals. Therefore, it is necessary for the leaders in developing 
countries to understand what the current values in the countries that need change are? 
Moreover, formulate policies to stimulate people in values that enhance economic 
growth. This needs responsible and accountable leadership to mobilize people to 
responsibility and determination values which are essential for economic growth. For 
example, the fast-growing economies in Sub-Saharan countries seem to grasp the 
importance of the individualistic values of determination, hence, doing better 
economically than the slow growth economies in the same region. 
All in all, the performance of variables demonstrated in Table 7.1 above indicate 
that the performance of variables depends on some factors. For instance, the same 






differently in developed and developing countries. Furthermore, after grouping each 
sub-sample of developed and developing countries, variables also performed differently. 
Also, variables performed differently in slow and fast-growing economies in the Sub-
Saharan region. This seems to suggest that the importance of the factors of economic 
growth varies their importance with the development level of countries, economic growth 
rates, and also the environments the countries have. This seems to be contrary to 
traditional economic models whereby what has worked in developed countries has to 
work in developing countries as earlier on discussed in chapter 1. However, the 
persistence of slow and erratic growth in developing countries and the evidence 
produced in this study seem to suggest that broader range of factors seem to play a role 
in stimulating economic growth among countries mainly in developing countries in 
Africa. However, due to data inconsistency, further research in the future can further 
explore the factors found to be crucially important for economic growth in developing 
countries. 
7.4 CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE FIELD OF STUDY 
 
A new approach to understanding economic disparities among countries 
 This thesis focussed on the interaction between culture and economic growth. 
The literature review in chapter 2 indicated that the impact of culture on growth is not 
particularly well articulated at present, and therefore this thesis seeks to contribute to 
this aspect of theory and practice. Also, to the extent that culture has a significant impact 
on growth potential and its realization, culture is not homogenous in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
This will have a potentially significant impact upon different countries and should be 
taken into consideration by governments and development agencies seeking to promote 
economic growth and sustainable development across the continent.  
Methodology contribution 
The thesis used secondary data to uniquely engage mixed methods of quantitative and 
qualitative approaches to address theoretical and empirical inconsistencies in the 
literature, as explained in chapter 2. 
Theoretical contribution and empirical contribution 
 The findings in this thesis show that the performance of variables is subject to 
the economic development level of countries and economic growth status of the 
countries. Hence, grouping countries with different levels of development seem not to 






provided insight into how variables interact with each other within a given institutional, 
political and cultural setting. Also, the definitions of traditional variables such as human 
capital and capital stock seem to omit the contribution of culture to the productivity of 
these variables. Hence, consideration by governments and development agencies 
seeking to promote economic growth and sustainable development across the African 
continent needs to consider the cultural contexts and develop appropriate strategies to 
address underdevelopment in the continent. 
7.5 LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY AND FURTHER RESEARCH 
  
The empirical investigations are implemented in chapters 4 and 5. The data used in this 
study is limited to secondary sources as highlighted in Table 3.2 in chapter 3. Even 
though the data sources used are reliable and used extensively in the literature, 
sometimes the type of data source influences the outcome of results possibly due to the 
different techniques employed in data collection and generation. Hence, the data 
sources used in this study might not produce the same results in a different context of 
the study. Chapter 4 has two sub-samples of 6 developed and six developing countries 
and further divided each of these samples into slow and fast economies. The number of 
countries in each sub-sample was limited to 6 due to the inconsistency of WVS in mainly 
developing countries. Due to this limitation, choice of countries in developing countries 
was difficult for the study. Hence, future research could be desirable by engaging more 
countries with WVS cultural variables consistently collected in developing countries.  
 On the other hand, the cultural variables used in chapter 5 are collected from 
Afrobarometer Surveys covering a period from 2001 to 2015. One of the limitations of 
using a different source of cultural data in chapter 5 to chapter 4 is that questionnaires 
used to collect data in surveys may not capture precisely the same topics. For example, 
feeling responsibility variable is covered by WVS surveys while AS does not. This study 
finds that this variable is crucially important in African countries. Hence, future research 
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Cultural impact on 
national economic 
growth 
Context of study: 92 low & medium 
developed countries. Dependent 
variable: Economic growth,                                          
Independent variables:                   
Entrepreneurial values, Thrift, 
Capitalism,  Honesty, Trust in 
people, Trust in institutions, 
Unselfishness,  Initial income, 
Education, Legal Structure &  
Property Rights, Free trade, Size 
of government, Totalitarian, 
communism, Geography, OLS 
Results suggested that 
achievement orientation 
plays a very significant role 
in the economic 
performance. When values 
and beliefs support an 
achievement orientation in 
the population, productivity 
and investment increases 













Context of study: 74 developed & 
developing countries. Dependent 
variable: growth rate GDP pc; 
Independents variables: trust, 
respect, self-determination, 
obedience, Investment, log area, 
population growth, Urban 
Population, primary enrolment,  
geography, legal origin, GDP pc 
(log),. WVS  
Overwhelmingly, they found 
that their measure of culture 
does, in fact, enhance the 
effectiveness of economic 
institutions.  
















Context of study: 110 developed & 
developing countries Dependant 
variable: Income pc. Independent 
variables:   Years of education, 
Population, Temperature, Inverse 
distance to coast, Oil production, 
institutional quality, expropriation 
risk, Trust in others, ethnic groups, 
% Directors & officers in workforce, 
% Employers in workforce, Dummy 
variable:  Country. OLS  
At country level, 
temperature, inverse 
distance to coast, and oil 
endowment are all highly 
statistically significant in 
explaining cross-country 
variation in incomes, and 
together explain an 












Context of study: 41 developed 
and developing countries. 
Dependent variable:  GDP growth 
rate. Independent variables: 
Cultural background: efficiency 
orientation; performance 
orientation; future orientation; 
assertiveness; Power distance, 
Uncertainty avoidance; social 
Orientation: gender; egalitarianism; 
collectivism; human orientation; 
capital; investments; Human 
capital; Labour. OLS, PCA 
Found that the “Social 
Orientation” cultural back- 
ground in societies may be a 
reinforcing element for long-
run economic growth, and 
these “Social Orientation” 
factors certainly can be 
promoted by policy 
interventions. 









Context of study: 80 developed 
and developing countries.  The 
cultural values from WVS, 2006. 
Factor analysis  
Results show clearly that 
cultural dimension  is a 
reliable predictor of GDP-
per-person change, both for  





An exploration of 
the impact of 
culture on the 
economy: an 
empirical study of 
unemployment 
Context of study: 18 developed 
countries.   
Multiple regressions  
Dependent variable: 
unemployment rate. Independent 
variables: employment protection; 
replacement rate; benefit duration; 
active labour market policies; 
Union density; union coverage 
index; union employer 
coordination; total tax rate; 




substantively the list of 
powerful explanatory 









development in the 
regions of Europe 
Context of study: The sample 
consists of 69 regions in 8 
European countries 
Dependent variable: yp9500 
Independents variable: school , 
urban rate1850,  pc culture; pc 
They claimed that culture is 
a long-run determinant of 







Notes to Appendix 1. From the left, columns are titled in this order: article number, author and year of 
study, period covered, study theme, methodology engaged, and results 
culture pos;  pc children, literacy;  
pc institutions; tertiary education; 
agriculture share capital in 1979,  
marital status, gender,  the age 
group, a self-reported social class, 
health condition, human capital; 
trial duration. OLS 









Context of study: Regions in China 
Dependent variable: per capita 
GDP Independent variables:  
culture: Protestant churches 
density; Dialects, trust, agricultural 
development. Control variables: 
capital stock, population, human 
capital; trade, infrastructure,   
regional institutional quality; 
population proportion, distance to 
sea. 2SLS.  
The empirical results at 
province level and state level 
both indicate that culture has 
a significant effect on 
regional economic 
development  










Context of study: 141 developed & 
developing countries. Fixed effects 
regressions from WVS data. Factor 
analysis reduced cultural data. 
Dependent variables: i) (CO2); ii) 
log GDP per capita. Independent 
variables: Capitalist values: Hard 
work + thrift and savings, 
consumption, fertility, innovation, 
education, religion. 
Found that societies that 
place high value on hard 
work, thrift, and savings are 
more innovative, more 
educated, have higher 
savings rates, have lower 
consumption rates and 






The influence of 






Context of study: USA, longitudinal 
dataset from Big Brothers/ Big 
Sisters of America program 
(BBBSA) during the 1990s. 
AZ).Dependant variable: GPA ; 
Independent variables:  Cultural 
capital, Museum visits; Play 
attendance; Cultural lessons; Time 
spent reading; Habitus: a) Harter 
scholastic competence score 
(HSC); b) B&M school value score 
(SC).  OLS      
Overall, their results 
indicated strong positive 
effects for habitus on GPA 
even when controlling for 
cultural capital and prior 







The effect of 







Context of study: 25 developed 
and developing countries. 
Dependant variable:  GDP growth 
rate. Independent variable: GDP 
pc in 1960; Prim education in 
1960; Sec education 1960; 
Investment;  Post-materialist; 
Achievement Motivation index: 
thrift  + determination - (obedience 
+ religious faith). OLS & EBA                                                                        
Found that investment in 
human capital increases 
economic growth; capital 
accumulation increases 
economic growth.  Both 
achievement motivation and 
post materialism are 
significant predictors of 
economic  








growth: Panel data 
evidence 
Context of study: 42 developed 




opp). Independent variables: 
Informal institutions,  Control of 
corruption,  one's skills, Formal 
institutions; procedures for new 
business, Private coverage to 
getting credit, Control variable: 
growth rate; OLS & 3SLS  
All the models are highly 
significant and have high 
explanatory power, 
explaining 69.5% of the 
variance in opportunity 
entrepreneurship and 79.5% 






Social capital in the 






Context of study: 63 Developed 
and developing countries 
Dependent variables: Trust; GDP 
Growth rate 
Independent variables: Years in 
education 
Found that social capital has 
positive and significant 
impact on economic growth 
14 
 
Temple &     







Context of study: 74 developed 
and developing countries 
Dependent variable: log 
difference GDP per capita   
Independent variables:  Constant 
SOCDEV, In (I/GDP), In (n + g + 
8); In (SCHOOL); In (GDP60); 
AFRICA; LATINCA; EASTASI; 
NDUST. OLS  
SOCDEV and initial 
variables explain nearly 40 
percent of the growth rate 
variation, and SOCDEV is 







     
Appendix 2: Results from other studies with similar or different approaches  
Articl
e No. 
Author(s)     
&  
Year 
Period Theme under study Methodology Results 
1 Nunn & 
Wantchekon, 
(2011) 
2009 The Slave Trade and 
the Origins of 
Mistrust in Africa 
Context of study: 17 Sub-Saharan 
countries. OLS. Dependent variable: 
level of trust Independent variables: 
slave exports, ethnic groups, districts, 
countries, age, age squared,  gender 
indicator, location indicator, education, 
religion  
They claimed that findings 
provide evidence for the 
importance of internal 
norms and beliefs in 
transmitting the impacts of a 
historical shock of slavery.  




How Does Social 
Trust Affect 
Economic Growth? 
Context of study: 85 developed & 
developing countries. OLS; using 1SLS, 
2SLS, & 3SLS. Dependent: Schooling; 
rule of law; price distortion, investment on 
GDP 
Independents: Log of GDP / capita, 
openness, fertility, social trust, post-
communist, government share, price 
distortion, government expenditure. 
He claimed that trust 
appears to be a deeper 
determinant of economic 
development than any of 
other variables involved in 
the study. Social trust 
affects growth rates 





basic human needs, 
and their effect on 
economic growth 
Context of study: In top 10 and bottom 10 
countries ranking in all variables out of 
118 countries. Dependent: GDP growth 
Independents: LogGDP1970, IQ, 
HEALTH, PEACE, SWL, IQ*HEALTH, 
IQ*PEACE, IQ*SWL 
Their study demonstrated 
that IQ was the strongest 
predictor of economic 
growth compared to other 
socioeconomic predictors.  
4 Beraho, 
(2007) 
 Colonial history and 
its effects on Sub-
Saharan economic 
development 
Context of study: Sub-Saharan  
Data were compiled from statistical data 
from various countries. Also library 
sources  
This paper finds that the 
Sub-Saharan countries 
misruled themselves and 
ruined their economies 
soon after they gained 
independence.  






The effect of cultural 
values on economic 
development: 
Theory, hypotheses, 
and some empirical 
tests 
Context of study: 25 developed and 
developing countries. OLS; bootstrap; 
EBA. Dependent variables:  Per Capita 
Economic Growth (1960-89) 
Independents variables:  Per Capita 
GDP in 1960,  Primary Education in 
1960, Secondary Education in 1960,   
Achievement Motivation,  Korea/United 
States Dummy, investment,  Post-
materialists 
Their findings suggested 
that one specific dimension-
achievement motivation-is 
highly relevant to economic 









and poverty traps in 
Sub-Saharan Africa: 
The role of 
Education and TFP 
Shocks. 
Context of study: 32 sub‐Saharan 
(unlucky) and G7 (lucky) economies (7).  
They used VAR; descriptive analysis to. 
Examined the dynamics of education, 
capital, income, and TFP.  
They confirmed that the 
TFP seems to explain a 
larger portion of the income 
gap between Sub‐Saharan 










The Effect of 
Cognitive Ability on 




Context of study: 90 countries OLS 
Dependent: TFP growth; Independent: 
IQ. Est.IQ, Pre-1970 IQ, h 1960, Log TFP 
1960 
Social environment with 
higher IQs allows 
intelligence to flourish 
(Rindermann & Heller, 
2005). And creates 
collective cognitive ability 
that further stimulates the 






Cognitive skill and 
technology diffusion: 
An empirical test 
Context of study: 113 countries 
(interpolations created by Lynn and 
Vanhanen based on demographic 
comparisons with neighboring countries), 
and a smaller database of countries that 
uses only pre-1970 scores.  
High-IQ citizens are better 
at discerning good 
economic policies; and 
high-IQ citizens are better 
at building good Political 
institutions. 








Context of study: Many countries in Africa 
and the OECD. System GMM; OLS 
Variables: EDU, TIMSS, SKILLS, H 
Overall, the evidence 
confirms the view that 
cognitive skills are strong 
predictors of domestic 








Notes to Appendix 2. The table shows authors and title of the study, year or period of study, context and 








Cultural impact on 
national economic 
growth 
Context of study: 92 low & medium 
developed countries. Dependent 
variable: Economic growth, 
Independent variables:                   
Entrepreneurial values, Thrift, Weber’s 
Spirit of Capitalism, honesty, Trust in 
people, Trust in institutions, 
Unselfishness,  Initial income,    
Education, Legal Structure &  Property 
Rights, Free trade, Size of government, 
Totalitarian, Communism, Geography. 
OLS 
Results suggest that 
achievement orientation 
plays a very significant role 
in the economic 
performance of a country 
and more important than 
the combined influence of 
the quality of formal 
institutions and the quantity 













economic growth of 
African countries 
Context of study: Sub-Saharan Africa 47 
countries  OLS; 2SLSDependent: GDP 
per capita growth Independents: human 
capital, physical capital, Faster 
population growth, labour force, Oil 
exporter, lagged per capita growth  
Concluded that investment 
in human capital and 
physical capital are 
important determinants of 
economic growth and 







Up In Africa And In 
The Middle East: A 
Panel Data Analysis 
Context of study: 32 African & Middle 
East countries GMM panel estimator was 
used 
Dependent: GDP (Y) Independents: 
physical capital (K), human capital (H), 
and labour (L), TFP (A), he urban 
population, the skilled emigration rate 
 
Human capital stock and 
degree of openness of a 
country are the only 
variables that have a 
positive and robust effect 
on the TFP growth. 
Convergence is not an 
automatic phenomenon for 






2005 Does education 
engender cultural 
values that matter for 
economic growth? 
Context of study: 43 developed and 
developing countries. PROBIT; 
OPROBIT  
Dependent: Cultural values index 
Independents: education, media, sports, 
arts, church, labour union, political party, 
environment, charity, consumer, gender, 
age, married, children, income, 
employed, religious, Christianity, Muslim 
The results show that 
formal education matters 
significantly for perceptions 
of cultural values. As 
people become more 
educated there is increased 
likelihood of placing more 
emphasis on achievement 
motivation, as opposed to 
conforming to traditional 
social norms. 
 









Context of study: 80 developed and 
developing countries. Done at a nation 
level in all variables and all correlations. 
The cultural values are from the WVS by 
Factor analysis  
Results show clearly that 
the cultural dimension is a 






The influence of habitus 
in the relationship 
between cultural capital 
and academic 
achievement 
Context of study: USA, data from Big Brothers/ 
Big Sisters of America program (BBBSA) 
Dependant variable: GPA; Independent 
variables:  Cultural capital, Museum visits (last 
12 months) Play attendance (last 12 months) 
Cultural lessons (hours per week) Time spent 
reading (hours per week); Habitus: a) Harter 
scholastic competence score (HSC); b) B&M 
school value score (SC).        
Overall, these results indicate 
strong positive effects for 
habitus on GPA even when 
controlling for cultural capital 
and prior ability via first 
differences. 
